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 ABSTRACT 
Bret C. Devereaux: “The Material and Social Costs of Roman Warfare in the Third and Second 
Centuries B.C.E.” 
(Under the direction of Richard Talbert) 
 
 This dissertation examines the causes of Roman military success and expansion beyond 
Italy, focusing on the initial period of expansion from the First Punic War (264 B.C.E.) to the 
defeat of the Cimbri (101 B.C.E.).  I argue that, while the current demographic explanation of 
Roman success in this period, which focuses on seemingly inexhaustible Roman manpower, has 
validity, it represents only part of a solution which must also include the Roman ability to 
efficiently mobilize and organize the resources of Italy for warfare.  Through the examination 
and comparison of battlefield equipment recovered archaeologically and described in literary 
sources, this project investigates the cost of Roman military matériel.  This project also seeks to 
situate that matériel cost in the context of Rome’s major rivals in this period in order to show that 
Rome was able to mobilize comparatively more resources for warfare, both generally and on a 
per-soldier basis, beyond the established advantage of its manpower.  This approach is further 
extended to include naval warfare, particularly during the First Punic War, by combining the 
recorded figures for the year-to-year fleet strengths of the Roman and Carthaginian fleets with 
comparative evidence from the classical Athenian navy to produce rough estimates of the total 
cost of naval operations.  The result of these investigations is to show that Rome’s advantage in 
this period extended beyond manpower to include a superior ability to mobilize a broad range of 
economic resources.  Finally, this project seeks to investigate the sources for this Roman 
iv 
advantage in resource mobilization.  It suggests that the ability of the Roman Republic to 
marshal such vast reserves was due to the translation of the social institution of clientela into a 
blueprint for the inter-communal system of alliances in Italy, which in turn enabled Rome to 
efficiently and extensively harness the economic and demographic power of Italy.  Rome’s rivals 
were not able to extract revenue and manpower from their own holdings as efficiently, leading to 
a decisive Roman military advantage.
v 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 As with the many pieces of equipment discussed in this work, a dissertation is the work 
of many hands, even if it is only the swordsmith, the armorer or the author whose maker’s mark 
adorns the final product.  I want to start by thanking my advisor, Richard Talbert, whose counsel 
aided in nearly all aspects of the project, but most especially in his continuing encouragement 
and tireless care in editing.  I would also thank my committee, Wayne Lee, Jonathan Coulston, 
Thomas Parker and Fred Naiden, for their valuable expertise and feedback. 
 Assembling the archaeological catalog required the cooperation of multiple museums and 
the expertise of their staff, without which this project would not have been possible.  I would 
thank, in no particular order, Claire Burton and the Ashmolean Museum of Art and Archaeology, 
Ludivine Marquis and the Nouveau Musée Bienne, Vanessa Haussener and the Bernisches 
Historisches Museum, Gianna Servais and the Laténium de Neuchâtel, Alexis Belis and the J. 
Paul Getty Museum, Frances Brumley and the Museum of Fine Arts, Boston, Martin 
Maischberger and the Antikensammlung, Berlin, Alicia Rodero and the Museo Arqueológico 
Nacional, Madrid, Catherine Bastien and the Louvre, and perhaps most of all Alex Truscott and 
Ben Harridge at the British Museum. 
This project would not have been possible without the endless love, support and editing 
of my wife Diana.  I also want to thank my sister and my extended family for their 
encouragement.  Finally, to my parents, whose support for my education has been unstinting and 
bottomless, I owe a debt of gratitude I can never fully repay.  This work is dedicated to them. 
vi 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
LIST OF TABLES ............................................................................................................. ix 
 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ........................................................................................... xii 
 
MAP 1. PRINCIPLE BATTLES AND THEIR DATES (B.C.E.) .................................. xiv 
 
MAP 2.  PRINCIPLE ARCHAEOLOGICAL SITES .......................................................xv 
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CHAPTER 1: MATÉRIEL MATTERS
 By the end of the year 216 B.C.E., the Roman Republic appeared to be on the verge of 
collapse.  The long conquest of Italy, which had taken nearly three centuries to complete, was 
unravelling before the stunned eyes of the Roman people.  For three years the armies of Rome 
had been soundly, if not decisively, beaten with Roman losses in excess of 70,000, around one 
tenth of all of the men, Romans and allies, liable for service in Italy.1  Lost along with the men 
were thousands of horses and tens of thousands of sets of armor and weapons.  The horses had 
been slain or run off, but the best of the armor and weapons, now looted, adorned Hannibal’s 
army.2  Hannibal, like Pyrrhus before him, had shown that Rome’s armies were far from 
invincible on the battlefield. 
                                                          
1 The main sources for casualty figures are Polybius and Livy, though their accounting is incomplete and not always 
in agreement.  For the small engagement at Ticinus (218) and the subsequent loss of the Roman sentries to 
defecting Gauls, neither Livy (21.45-48) nor Polybius (3.65-68) give figures, except for 600 prisoners taken by 
Hannibal, reported by Livy (21.47).  For the Battle of the Trebia (218), Livy gives the Roman army as 38,000 of 
which only 10,000 arrived at Placentia (21.55-6), a point on which Polybius agrees, but also notes a small number 
of other survivors (3.74.6-8), suggesting a figure probably quite less than 28,000 losses for the battle, given that 
routed allies and auxiliaries, mentioned in the battle narrative, are not accounted for.  For the Battle of Lake 
Trasimene (217), Livy gives 15,000 losses (22.7) while Polybius gives 15,000 prisoners taken and an unknown 
number killed (3.84-65).   Livy then also reports the loss of 4,000 cavalry under C. Centenius (22.8), which Polybius 
also reports but gives no numbers (3.86.4).  At the Ager Falernus, Livy reports a skirmish in which the Roman force 
lost ‘a few’ (aliquot, 22.18); Polybius reports the action and gives 1,000 as the figure for Roman losses (3.93-94).  
Minucius’ army was then roughly handled at Geronium (Livy 22.28-30, Polybius 3.103-105) before rejoining Fabius, 
but no casualty figures are given.  Finally, Cannae, where Livy gives Roman and allied losses at 48,200 (Livy 22.49) 
while Polybius gives 70,000 casualties as a figure (Polybius 3.117), but his figures here are inconsistent, see J. F. 
Lazenby, Hannibal’s War : A military history of the Second Punic War (Warminster: Aris & Philips, 1974), 84.  Total 
manpower following Plb.. 2.23-24. On these figures, see P.A. Brunt, Italian Manpower: 225 B.C. – A.D. 14 (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1971), 44-60, 422. 
2 Plb. 3.114.1 
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 And yet the Roman Republic recovered, despite the lost men, the lost allies, the lost 
prestige, and the tremendous lost wealth in the form of equipment and animals.  It recovered not 
over decades, but almost immediately, fielding 14 legions by the end of 216.  Peter Brunt 
estimates that between 214 and 212 the Romans called up between 225,000 and 240,000 men.3  
It was as if the Romans had never lost the armies at all.  Over the following century, Rome 
would have little rest, careening from one major war to the next while simultaneously dealing 
with continuous low-intensity warfare in the territories it had won, especially in Spain.  For 
nearly any other state, ancient or modern, such events would be the hubristic prelude to imperial 
overreach and collapse, but for the Roman Republic this was the road to dominance over the 
Mediterranean, the path by which Rome would, in Vergil’s memorable phrasing, “spare the 
humbled and war down the proud.”4  But how was it that the Romans were able to defy the odds, 
despite tremendous setbacks and despite the presence of formidable enemies?  How was this 
tremendous expenditure of men, money and resources possible and why were none of Rome’s 
rivals unable to achieve the same? 
 This study aims to examine that question by looking at the costs of waging Rome’s 
expansionary warfare during the first phase of Rome’s expansion beyond Italy, from the 
beginnings of the First Punic War (264 B.C.) to the defeat of the last major foreign incursion into 
Italy under the Republic at the Battle of Vercellae (101 B.C.).  This initial phase of overseas 
expansion marks a crucial turning point in Rome’s history; at the beginning of the period, Rome 
was only one of several powerful states and was by no means the first of that group, but at the 
end, the Roman Republic suffered no equal in the world that it knew.  With the benefit of 
                                                          
3 Brunt (1971), 418-422. 
4 Vergil, Aeneid 6.853, parcere subiectis et debellare superbos 
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hindsight, Rome’s expansion seems grandly preordained.5  But Rome was only one city and the 
Romans only one people on the Mediterranean with ambition.  Thus, the question: why was 
Rome able to achieve such exceptional success during the third and second centuries B.C.E.? 
 
 
Militarism and Foreign Policy – the Diplomatic Argument 
 The diplomatic situation in the Mediterranean, while a promising explanation for Roman 
expansion at first glance, does not offer an answer to the question of exceptional Roman 
expansion.  This is not to say the Romans were a peaceful people.  Rome was, by modern 
standards, very bellicose and very aggressive, as argued by William Harris in War and 
Imperialism in Republican Rome.  Harris posits that Roman society was adapted to warfare, 
noting that “for a war against some enemy or other, with some ‘justification’ or other, the 
Romans expected and intended almost every year.”6  Roman religion and rituals, which might 
have been checks on Roman bellicosity, became instead legitimization tools for endemic Roman 
warfare.7  Accepting this state of affairs as deeply unusual a priori, Harris suggests that Roman 
aggression was fueled by a political structure that strongly incentivized the Roman elite to seek 
military glory through conquest, reinforced by a citizenry that was at least tacitly supportive of 
war when not actively motivated “in the hope of gaining land and booty” and by the high value 
placed on martial excellence in Roman society.8  Ernst Badian had already made a similar point 
                                                          
5 Vergil, of course, suggests as much, Aeneid 6.792-807. 
6 W. V. Harris, War and Imperialism in Republican Rome, 327-70 B.C. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979), 254. 
7 Harris (1979), 166-175. 
8 Harris (1979), 47. 
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concerning the imperialism of Late Republic, seeing Roman imperialism as driven by the 
interests of the ruling class and, in a more limited sense, those of the rising equestrian class as 
well.9  As an examination of Roman militarism in isolation, these studies are revealing. 
 Harris’ argument is not comparative, however, and his evidence retains a narrow focus on 
internal Roman politics.  Nevertheless, many of Harris’ conclusions carry a comparative flair.  
Harris notes, for instance, that “the regular harshness of Roman war-methods sprang from an 
unusually pronounced willingness to use violence against alien peoples.”10  However compared 
to the picture of brutally realist Athenian imperialism provided by Thucydides or the bloody 
swath cut by Alexander across the Achaemenid Empire, it is not readily apparent that Roman 
willingness to use violence against alien peoples really was in fact “unusually pronounced.” 
Likewise, in a clarifying statement in a preface to the 1985 paperback edition, Harris, while 
admitting that the Romans might not have always been the aggressor, does note that he “finds 
nothing absurd in the notion that in this period Rome was an exceptionally aggressive state.”11 
Kurt Raaflaub, accepting Badian and Harris’ vision of an unusually aggressive and rapacious 
Roman people, attempts to trace this exceptional aggression back to its origins.  What he finds is 
that, “the Romans were not born to be wolves.  Rather they turned into imperialists at a certain 
stage of their communal development,”  specifically that the Romans were forged into 
imperialists in a crucible of conflict stretching from the foundation of the Republic until the 
middle of the fourth century B.C.E., as the fragility of Roman power and even survival in this 
                                                          
9 E. Badian, Roman Imperialism in the Late Republic (Ithaca: Cornell University Press; 1968). 
10 Harris, (1979), 51. 
11 Harris, (1979), preface. 
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period necessitated increasing militarism.12  Thus traumatized, the Roman people then 
subsequently acted out their trauma on the Mediterranean world as “tough and stubborn warriors 
to whom warfare had become a normal, if not indispensable, part of their lives…they took on the 
Samnites–and never looked back.”13  This vision of the Romans as an exceptionally aggressive 
people, typically presented without substantial use of comparative evidence, exerts a significant 
influence on the discussion of Roman foreign policy.14  However, Roman aggression only has 
explanatory power in as much as the Romans were exceptionally aggressive, such that their 
unusual behavior conferred an advantage over their neighbors.  Despite this need to establish 
Roman bellicosity as exceptional, most studies of Roman aggression have lacked an explicitly 
comparative angle. 
 Some comparative benchmarking is clearly in order, and here arise problems in the thesis 
that the Romans were an unusually aggressive or bellicose people, because tremendous levels of 
warfare and violence seem to be common features of pre-modern societies.  Far from the 
peaceful ideal of Rousseau, early humans appear, in as much as evidence survives, to have 
engaged in remarkably high levels of violence.  In War in Human Civilization, Azar Gat argues 
                                                          
12 K. Raaflaub, “Born to be Wolves? Origins of Roman Imperialism” in Transitions to Empire: Essays in Greco-Roman 
History, 360-146 B.C., in honor of E. Badian, ed. Robert W. Wallace and Edward M. Harris (Norman, OK: University 
of Oklahoma Press, 1996a), 300. 
13 Raaflaub, (1996a), 300. 
14 See for instance, J. A. North, “The Development of Roman Imperialism,” JRS 71 (1981): 1-9.  R. Rowland, “Rome’s 
Earliest Imperialism,” Latomus 42 (1983): 749-762.  S. Mandall, “The Isthmian Proclamation and the Early Stages of 
Roman Imperialism in the Near East,” Classical Bulletin 65 (1989): 89-94.   S. Mandell, “Roman Dominion: Desire 
and Reality” Ancient World 22 (1991): 37-42. Harris’ view has also been challenged, see for instance: A. N. Sherwin-
White, “Rome the Aggressor?” JRS 70 (1980): 177-181;  A. N. Sherwin-White, Roman Foreign Policy in the East: 168 
B.C. – A.D. 1 (London: Duckworth, 1984); R. M. Kallet-Marx, Hegemony to Empire: The Development of Roman 
Imperium in the East from 148 to 62 B.C.  (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996); J. S. Richardson, 
Hispaniae: Spain and the Development of Roman Imperialism: 218 – 82 B.C. (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2004). 
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that this endemic warfare was motivated by resource scarcity, combined with the much higher 
‘returns’ to successful warfare than to other activities.15  Because specialization and productivity 
in pre-agricultural economies are so low, the greatest gains come from the acquisition through 
warfare of larger territory and more resources.16  The level of violence in these early pre-state 
societies could be truly staggering.  Assembling a broad range of studies made of pre-state 
societies, Gat estimates that the average violent mortality rate of these earliest societies “may 
have been in the order of 15 per cent (25 per cent for the men),” exceeding even estimated 
military mortality rates for Rome during the Second Punic War and the century of imperial 
expansion that followed.17 Thus Azar Gat suggests that even in the earliest societies, “a 
fundamental condition of competition and plurality made fighting a norm that very few 
communities could escape or fail to be prepared for.”18   
Increased production via agriculture, the dominant form of production in the Roman 
world, paradoxically intensifies rather than ameliorates this violent competition. Production 
remains closely tied to the amount of land available to a society, but new levels of sophistication 
                                                          
15 Azar Gat, War in Human Civilization (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 61-67, 87-113.  Likewise, on this 
topic, but focused more narrowly on pre-state societies, Lawrence H. Keeley, War Before Civilization: The Myth of 
the Peaceful Savage (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996).   
16 Gat, (2006), 61-76. 
17 Gat, (2006), 131.  Gat notes in comparison Brunt (1971), that Italy may have lost around 20% of its adult male 
population, but that this burst of mortality was exceptional, even for the Romans.  It is worth noting that the 
estimates for the mortality of this singular exceptional war, typically used to demonstrate the high tolerance of the 
Romans for violence, only comes close to, but does not exceed, what appears to be the normal state of affairs for 
pre-state peoples.  On military mortality in the Middle Republic, see N. Rosenstein, Rome at War: Farms, Families 
and Death in the Middle Republic (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2004), 107-146.  Rosenstein 
estimates that from 200-168 B.C., Rome’s wars produced an excess annual mortality of 3.25% to 3.95% of all 
soldiers, high in comparison to other pre-modern states, but significantly lower than the estimates Gat presents 
for pre-state societies. 
18 Gat, (2006), 140. 
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in organization allow for the labor of conquered populations to be harnessed to the purposes of 
the conqueror, whether through tribute, slavery or forms of serfdom, which in turn increases 
potential long-term returns for successful warfare.19  Greater degrees of social sophistication 
allowed for more effectively channeled violence and thus more successful warfare, culminating 
in the emergence of early states.20  Strategies for successfully coping in a system of militarized 
anarchy often intensify the violence of the system, a condition which Gat terms the ‘security 
dilemma.’21  Because power derives from economic and demographic strength, which is in turn 
dependent on expansion, and because states are forced to seek supremacy in order to render 
themselves secure (being able to rely only on their own strength), states are forced to expand in 
order to merely secure their own status quo.22  Moreover, in order to provide effective security, 
especially for agriculture which tends to be geographically dispersed, states must not only win 
battles but also actively keep enemies from raiding their territory.  States are thus forced to 
engage in strategies we might term ‘preclusive aggression’ by removing threats and often 
expanding into frontier zones in order to protect their existing holdings, a strategy with ample 
parallels in Roman foreign policy.23  The intense pressure of warfare seems to have been a near 
                                                          
19 See Gat, (2006), 210-230 on high returns from warfare producing social stratification and hierarchy organized 
around warfare, and Gat, 401-414 more broadly on increasing costs and gains to warfare with the advent of 
agriculture.  This point on the returns to warfare is noted by Harris, see Harris (1979), 56. 
20 Gat, (2006), 231-322. 
21 Gat, (2006), 92-100.  Note also A. M. Eckstein, Mediterranean Anarchy, Interstate War and the Rise of Rome 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2006), 13-16, on much the same in the Mediterranean world. 
22 Gat refers to this sort of endless escalation as the ‘Red Queen effect.’ 
23 This is an aspect of security Harris fails to consider in discussing Rome’s wars in Italy, considering it a “reason to 
doubt that defensive thinking was the dominant reason for Rome’s Italian wars” that most of those wars were 
fought outside of Roman territory, Harris (1979) 175-182.  But even a state defending itself may well prefer to have 
the devastation of a defensive war occur on enemy land, especially in an environment where raiding is common. 
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constant in pre-modern societies.  In a perverse irony, societies that failed to victimize their 
neighbors set themselves up to be victimized in turn, a point which Thucydides places in the 
mouths of the Corinthian envoys to Sparta.24 
Thus, we may return to the Mediterranean in order to take a more detailed look at how 
Rome figures within the diplomatic system it inhabited.  Analyzing this problem in two works, 
Arthur Eckstein concludes that the Mediterranean existed in a system of interstate anarchy in 
which “the Romans were highly militaristic, bellicose and assertive internationally, but so was 
every other state.”25  Far from being unique to Rome, Eckstein notes that the bellicose features 
that Harris identifies, from the prestige accorded to successful commanders to the militarism 
contained in state religious rituals were a common part of civic life in the ancient Mediterranean 
state system. 26  Building on the work of Kenneth Waltz, Eckstein explains this state of affairs by 
arguing that the fearsome pressure of an anarchic interstate environment, one in which “war is 
normal,” produces convergences among competitors such that states rapidly begin to resemble 
one another in their militarism and bellicosity.27  Though evidence is limited and obscured by the 
cultural convergence prompted by Roman expansion, this process appears to be well underway 
in Italy prior to the unification of the peninsula under Rome.28 
                                                          
24 Thuc. 1.69.5. Thucydides of course has the Athenians argue that such practices are essentially normal in their 
own defense, Thuc. 1.76.2. Such sentiments are relatively common, see for instance Xen., Hell. 7.5.26; App. 8.53; 
Thuc. 5.105.2-3; Dem. 3 Phil 19-22; on this theme in Thucydides more broadly, see, Eckstein (2006), 48-57. 
25 A. M. Eckstein, Rome Enters the East: from Anarchy to Hierarchy in the Hellenistic Mediterranean (Malden: 
Blackwell Publishing, 2008), 19.  On this topic, note also Eckstein (2006). 
26 Eckstein (2006), 181-241. 
27 Eckstein (2008), 16-17.  K. N. Waltz, “The Origins of War in Neorealist Theory,” Journal of Interdisciplinary History 
18, no. 4 (1988), 620. 
28 See particularly, P. Kent, “The Roman Army’s Emergence from Its Italian Origins” (PhD diss., University of North 
Carolina, 2012).  On the relative similarity of government forms in pre-Roman Italy, note E. T. Salmon, The Making 
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Thus the brutal anarchy in which the Romans were so successful stretches far back before 
Rome itself, from the calculating and feuding poleis of Thucydides through the pages of the Iliad 
to the walls of Mycenae and back before the development of agriculture.  This perspective leads 
to a more nuanced model of the Mediterranean state system, embroiled in opportunistic warfare 
since the dawn of Mediterranean states, a model which in turn robs Roman bellicosity of its 
explanatory power and, as Walter Scheidel noted in his review of Rome Enters the East, redirects 
“focus on the problem of unequal outcomes.” 29  Thus the riddle of Roman expansion returns: if 
many of the states and pre-state peoples of the Mediterranean were engaged in the opportunistic 
pursuit of empire and profit through warfare, why were the Romans so much more successful? 
 
Population and Manpower – the Demographic Argument 
 That now brings us to what I will term the demographic argument, namely that Rome 
succeeded because, due to an unusually large or durable manpower base, the Romans were able 
to field more forces and sustain greater losses than their opponents.  This issue was by no means 
foreign to the ancient sources who seem keenly aware of the need to maintain the population of 
small, freeholding farmers who made up the bulk of the assidui, the citizens liable for military 
service.30  Much of the modern scholarship echoes this emphasis on the role of manpower, with 
Nathan Rosenstein perhaps putting it mostly succinctly, that it was “the massive Italian 
                                                          
of Roman Italy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1982), 1-39, especially the degree to which military leagues 
become common. 
29 W. Schiedel, review of Mediterranean Anarchy, Interstate War and the Rise of Rome by Arthur Eckstein, Journal 
of Interdisciplinary History, 39 no. 1 (2008), 101. 
30 See for instance Polybius 2.24.2-17, 3.89.9, 6.52.11, 18.28-32.  Also Plut. Tiberius Gracchus 9.4, App.. Bel Civ. 1.8-
11. 
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manpower that formed the basis of Rome’s military might and imperial success.”31 In his 
emphasis on manpower, he is hardly alone.32  The focus on manpower in a relatively narrow 
demographic sense, that is, manpower as a product primarily of population size rather than 
administrative or economic factors, is often implicit in the methods and rationale with which the 
study is approached.  Brunt, for instance, justifies writing Italian Manpower in part by noting 
that, “success in war…depended largely on the balance between the forces that Rome and her 
enemies could mobilize” and proceeds to argue that as a result “an assessment of population is 
indispensable” for this purpose.33  Some studies, such as Rosenstein’s Rome at War, seek to take 
broader economic and cultural factors into account, but typically focus on those factors as they 
impact the supply of bodies to the army.34  Generally missing in these approaches are any 
treatments of the broader costs of warfare beyond manpower or a strong effort to place Rome in 
the context of other Mediterranean states.  Once again, some comparative benchmarking may be 
in order. 
                                                          
31 Rosenstein, (2004), 107.   
32 For this theme elsewhere in the scholarship, see N. Rosenstein, “Republican Rome” in K.S. Raaflaub and N. S. 
Rosenstein, eds. War and Society in the Ancient and Medieval Worlds: Asia, the Mediterranean, Europe and 
Mesoamerica (Cambridge, 1999), 193-216; J. E. Lendon, Soldiers and Ghosts: A History of Battle in Classical 
Antiquity (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005), 166-169; J. P. Roth, Roman Warfare (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2009), 43-4, 57, 84-85, P. Erdkamp, “Manpower and Food Supply in the First and Second Punic 
Wars” in A Companion to the Punic Wars, eds. D. Hoyos, (Malden: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011), 58-76, and in general 
histories, such as C. S. Mackay, Ancient Rome: A Military and Political History (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2004), 65.  This theme also shows up in broader works of military history, such as Gat (2006), 316-317, citing 
Brunt (1971).  On some of the limits of this theme, see especially J. H. Clark, Triumph in Defeat: Military Loss and 
the Roman Republic (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 71-75. 
33 Brunt (1971), 3.  Brunt also notes, quite correctly, the importance the demographic picture of Italy has on the 
understanding of Rome’s social, economic and political history.  My objection to a purely demographic answer to 
Roman expansion should not be taken as a rejection of demography itself. 
34 Rosenstein (2004).  Also in this vein, see K. Hopkins, Conquerors and Slaves (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1978), whose thesis is in no small part the target of Rosenstein’s revisions. 
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The Population of Italy in 225 B.C.E. 
 In order to determine if Roman manpower was truly exceptional, it seems reasonable to 
begin by asking if the demographic base of Roman manpower was itself exceptionally large.  Put 
more simply, did the Roman state control an unusually large population?  Estimating the 
populations of ancient states is necessarily difficult due to the poor quality to the surviving 
evidence, and the resulting estimates are by the same necessity only rough approximations.  
Moreover, in the particular case of Italy, there is significant argument concerning the size and 
shape of the Italian population.  Because establishing a baseline for comparison will be important 
both here and later in this work, it is worthwhile to discuss, albeit briefly, the debate.35 
Brunt’s Italian Manpower, building off of the work of Karl Beloch, remains the starting 
point for the discussion of the population of Roman Italy.  Brunt’s conclusion, after an extensive 
examination of population figures for the second century B.C., provided primarily by Livy, is 
that the problem facing Tiberius Gracchus was not an absolute population decline, but rather a 
decline in the number of free-holding farmers who provided the bulk of Rome’s armies.36  This 
conclusion is bound up with Brunt’s estimate of the population of Italy, which provides the basis 
for what is known as the ‘low count.’  Brunt concludes that the free population of Italy in 225 
                                                          
35 For a more detailed discussion of the debate than what is presented here and the broader implications beyond 
this study, see L. De Ligt, Peasants, Citizens and Soldiers: studies in the demographic history of Roman Italy 225 BC 
– AD 100 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 1-39 and also W. Scheidel, “Roman Population Size: The 
Logic of the Debate” in People, Land and Politics: Demographic Developments and the Transformation of Roman 
Italy, 300BC – AD 14, eds. L. De Ligt and S. J. Northwood (Leiden: Brill, 2008), 17-70..  Also note the older, but still 
quite useful summary of debates on the issue by W. Scheidel, “Progress and problems in Roman demography” in 
Debating Roman Demography, ed. W. Scheidel (Leiden: Brill, 2001a). 
36 Brunt, (1971), 74-81. 
 12 
B.C., including Cisalpina, was perhaps 4.4 million, with 3 million of those living in Roman 
controlled peninsular Italy, with perhaps half a million slaves in addition, and that the free 
population grew very little over the subsequent two centuries.37  Keith Hopkins, accepting the 
broad outlines of Brunt’s figures, buttressed Brunt’s argument by providing a model for both the 
ruin of the smallholding farming class and the expansion of the slave population implied by 
Brunt’s numbers and his interpretation of the causes of the Gracchan land reform.  Hopkins 
suggested a model of mutually reinforcing developments in which Roman conquest results in 
long-term deployments that economically ruin the small farmer, while victory at the same time 
results in an abundant supply of slaves that allows wealthy landholders to purchase the land of 
ruined smallholders and combine them into large, profitable slave-run estates.38  If Brunt’s 
analysis was in part to explain the engine that powered the success of the Roman Republic, 
Hopkins turned that same demographic model, with some expansion, towards the decline of the 
Republic.  Rome’s reliance upon rural manpower for its success, in this view, not only gave birth 
to Roman hegemony in the Mediterranean, it also destroyed the Republic. 
 Although the ‘low count’ remains, for now at least, the orthodox position, it has come 
under attack from multiple angles in recent years.  The most direct of these attacks have been the 
effort of several scholars, most notably Elio Lo Cascio, to revive the ‘high count’ estimates 
originally suggested by Tenney Frank, which would posit an Italian population at or above 15 
                                                          
37 Brunt, (1971), 121. 
38 Hopkins, (1978).  Note that Hopkins also moderately revises Brunt’s population estimates, suggesting only 4 
million free and 2 million slaves for a total population of around 6 million in Italy in 28 B.C. 
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million in 28 B.C.39  While the ‘high count’ argument tends to remain focused on the Augustan 
census figures, Lo Cascio has also revised population estimates for Italy in 225 B.C. up to 
between 6 and 8 million, in an effort to show that the ‘high count’ model does not require an 
unrealistic level of population growth between 225 B.C. and A.D. 14.40  Because the ‘high count’ 
assumes both a higher population in 225 B.C. and a higher rate of growth in the citizen and allied 
populations of Italy, it renders the “apprehension of depopulation” surrounding Tiberius 
Gracchus’ reforms very difficult to interpret, with Lo Cascio suggesting that the problem 
Gracchus was confronting was not demographic at all.41  Despite Lo Cascio’s efforts, however, 
the low-count remains the orthodox view and is not without its defenders, most notably Walter 
Scheidel and Luuk De Ligt.42 
                                                          
39 T. Frank, “Roman census statistics from 225 to 28 BC’, Classical Philology 19, (1924), 329-41.  E. Lo Cascio, ‘The 
size of the Roman population: Beloch and the meaning of the Augustan census figures’, JRS 84 (1994):23-40.  Note 
also in support of this E. Lo Cascio, “Recruitment and the size of the Roman population from the third to the first 
century BCE’ in Debating Roman Demography, ed. W. Scheidel (Leiden: Brill, 2001), 111-37.  The key difference 
between these two counts is how the census figures recorded in the Res Gestae are interpreted.  The ‘low count’ 
relies on the assumption, made by Beloch and Brunt, that the Augustan census figures include not only men but 
also women and children of citizen status, while the ‘high count’ estimates assume that Augustus’ census followed 
Republican practice, registering only men. 
40 Elio Lo Cascio and P. Malanima, “Cycles and Stability: Italian population before the demographic transition (225 
BC-AD 1900), Rivista di Storia 21 (2005): 5-40. 
41 Elio Lo Cascio, “Roman Census Figures in the Second Century BC and the Property Qualifications of the Fifth 
Class” in People, Land and Politics: Demographic Developments and the Transformation of Roman Italy, 300 BC-AD 
14, eds. L. De Ligt and S. J. Northwood (Leiden: Brill, 2008), 239-256. 
42 Note for example de Ligt, (2012), and de Ligt, “The population of Cisalpine Gaul in the time of Augustus,” in 
People, Land and Politics: Demographic Developments and the Transformation of Roman Italy 300 BC – AD 14, ed. 
L. De Ligt & S. J. Northwood (Leiden: Brill, 2008), 139-186.  For Scheidel, see for instance, W. Scheidel, “Quantifying 
the Sources of Slaves in the Early Roman Empire” in JRS 87 (1997): 156-169; Scheidel, (2001a), 1-82; W. Scheidel, 
“Human Mobility in Roman Italy I: The Free Population” JRS 94 (2004): 1-26; W. Scheidel, “Human Mobility in 
Roman Italy II: The Slave Population” in JRS 95 (2005): 64-79; W. Scheidel, “A Model of Real Income Growth in 
Roman Italy” in Historia 56.3 (2007a): 322-346; W. Scheidel, “Italian Manpower” in JRA 26 (2013): 677-688.  
Scheidel strikes a somewhat more even-handed tone in Scheidel, (2008), 17-70. 
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 While a renewal of the high count’ has not caught on generally, Saskia Hin has provided 
one more option, by arguing for a ‘middle count,’ where the civium capita of the Res Gestae 
refers to individuals sui iuris. 43  Hin argues that Polybius’ figures for Italy in 225 BC, unlike 
normal census figures such as those recorded for 234 BC, recorded all men who would be 
classed as iuniores for the purpose of military service, while the records of census figures for 
Roman citizens record individuals sui iuris but, following two passages of Livy, orphans and 
widows, were excluded.44  Hin suggests that the reason Livy notes the exclusion of orphans and 
widows from earlier census records is that in the census of his own day, the ones recorded in the 
Res Gestae, those individuals were counted.  Hin does not give a set of final figures for the 
population of Italy in 225 B.C.  However, Alessandro Launaro, applying Hin’s method, comes to 
a count of 4.6 million in all of Italy, including Cisalpine Gaul, with 3.4 million of those living in 
Roman controlled peninsular Italy.45 
 Perhaps the most meaningful recent development in the argument has been the effort to 
use archaeological data in an attempt to test the assumptions of each population model.  
Launaro’s Peasants and Slaves marshals field survey data to show an overall growth in site 
numbers which in turn suggests a rising population inconsistent with the stagnant population 
growth of Brunt’s original ‘low count’ model.46  Meanwhile, De Ligt in his Peasants, Citizens 
                                                          
43 S. Hin, “Counting Romans” in People, Land and Politics: Demographic Developments and the Transformation of 
Roman Italy, 300 BC-AD 14, eds. L. De Ligt and S. J. Northwood (Leiden: Brill, 2008), 187-238. 
44 Hin (2008) 202-3.   
45 A. Launaro, Peasants and Slaves: The Rural Population of Roman Italy (200 BC to AD 100), (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2011), 43-4.  Launaro subsequently enlarges these figures to account for a 15% 
undercount, suggesting 4.1 million for peninsular Italy and another 1.2 million for Cisalpina. 
46 Launaro (2011). 
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and Soldiers proposes a revised ‘low count’ model, suggesting only 2.9 million free persons in 
peninsular Italy and 4.2 million inhabitants in Italy including Cisalpina and allowing for 
subsequent population growth to 5.7 million by 28 B.C.47  De Ligt then tests this new low count 
model with archaeological data for town numbers and sizes in Italy concluding that the 
urbanization rates the data reveal cannot be made to support a ‘high count’ estimate.48  While 
these works have not settled the debate, Scheidel seems to be correct in suggesting that the area 
of contention has narrowed to a debate between the revised ‘low’ and ‘middle’ count positions.49  
For the purposes of this study, these two sets of estimates constitute an acceptably small range, 
implying a population for the Roman Republic in 225 B.C. between 2.9 million (De Ligt’s 
revised low count) and 3.4 million (Launaro’s interpretation of Hin’s middle count). 
 
 
 
The Populations of the Great States of the Mediterranean 
 Information on the populations of the three major Hellenistic powers, the Seleucid, 
Ptolemaic and Antigonid kingdoms is far more difficult to come by, as the advantage presented 
by preserved Roman census figures is not available.  Estimating a population for Carthage and its 
empire is more difficult still.  Nevertheless, it is possible to get some sense of where Rome 
ranked, demographically, compared to the other great powers.  Moreover, this exercise is crucial 
                                                          
47 De Ligt (2012), 71-2, 242-6. 
48 De Ligt (2012), 193-246. 
49 Scheidel, (2013): 677-688. 
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as a starting point from which to examine the economic basis of these states and their militaries 
in subsequent chapters. 
Without a doubt, the Seleucid Empire held the largest population of any Mediterranean 
state, as well as the largest total land area by far.  Makis Aperghis suggests a population between 
14 and 18 million people for the Seleucid Empire at its points of greatest expansion, and his brief 
regional breakdown suggests a population at the core (Mesopotamia, Syria and the Levant) of the 
state of between 5.75 and 7.25 million.50  Walter Scheidel offers a similar estimate, with an 
upper bound of roughly 15 million.51  At the low end, Colin McEvedy and Richard Jones’ Atlas 
of World Population History suggests a peak population of the Seleucid Empire of around 12.5 
million in 200 BC based on regional estimates, although it should be noted that McEvedy and 
Jones’ regional estimates are often substantially lower than estimates of the same regions by 
specialists.52  In any case, the population of the Seleucid Empire will have substantially exceeded 
that of the Roman Republic prior to the end of the Roman-Syrian War.  Indeed, for much of the 
                                                          
50 M. Aperghis, The Seleukid Royal Economy: The Finances and Financial Administration of the Seleukid Empire 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 247-8.  Aperghis gives regional estimates of 4-5m for 
Mesopotamia, 1.5-2m for Northern Syria, 0.25m for Judaea.  These estimates represent substantial reductions 
from Aperghis’ earlier attempt, M. Aperghis, “Population – Production – Taxation – Coinage” in Hellenistic 
Economies, eds. Zophia H. Archibald, John Davies, Vincent Gabrielsen and G. J. Oliver (London: Routledge, 2001), 
77.  There, Aperghis suggested a peak around 20-25 million for the Seleucid Empire around c. 280 BCE, and 
another peak around c. 190 BC, approaching 20 million. 
51 W. Scheidel, “Demography” in The Cambridge Economic History of the Greco-Roman World, eds. Walter 
Scheidel, Ian Morris, Richard P. Saller (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007b), 45. 
52 C. McEvedy and R. Jones, Atlas of World Population History (New York: Puffin, 1978).  Breakdown by region in 
200 BC: Syria and Lebanon 2m, Palestine and Jordan 0.6m, Iraq 1.25m, Iran 4m, Anatolia 5m.  As noted, McEvedy 
and Jones’ population estimates for the ancient world are often surprisingly low.  McEvedy and Jones aim to 
emphasize the impact of modernization on population and thus tend to assume lower populations in ancient and 
medieval periods compared to the pre-modern.  However, note M. H. Hansen, The Shotgun Method: The 
Demography of the Ancient Greek City State Culture (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2006), 14 and Walter 
Scheidel, Death on the Nile, Disease and the Demography of Roman Egypt (Leiden: Brill, 2001b), 185-250, on the 
perils of using 19th century populations as an upper-limit for ancient populations. 
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third century, the Seleucid Empire’s population must have been more than double that of the 
Roman Republic, even during periods of Seleucid contraction. 
 More information and thus more estimates are available for the ancient population of 
Egypt, but most are focused on the population of Egypt as a Roman province, rather than as a 
Ptolemaic Kingdom.  Two ancient figures survive, but neither is trustworthy: 7 million according 
to Diodorus, amended by Dominic Rathbone to read 3 million, and 7.5 million, excluding 
Alexandria, according to Josephus.53  Several estimates converge on a population for Roman 
Egypt of between 4 and 5 million, including Rathbone and Bruce Frier.54  At the high end, Peter 
van Minnen suggests a population of roughly 7.5 million, while Elio Lo Cascio goes further with 
a population between 8 and 9 million.55  More recently, Scheidel estimates for Roman Egypt “a 
deliberately wide range from five to seven million.”56  Estimates for the population in the 
Hellenistic period tend necessarily to be lower and more speculative.  Writing in the Cambridge 
Economic History, Scheidel suggests that the population of Egypt, “fluctuated between perhaps 4 
                                                          
53 Diodorus 1.31.6-8.  Josephus Bell. Jud. 2.385. Note that Rathbone wishes to amend the text of Diodorus to read 
3 million.  D. W. Rathbone, “Villages, Land and population in Greco-Roman Egypt” Proceedings of the Cambridge 
Philological Society 36 (1990): 103-7.  On the weaknesses of these sources, see, Scheidel (2001b), 184-5. 
54 D. W. Rathbone, “Villages, Land and population in Greco-Roman Egypt” PCPS 36 (1990): 103-42, gives 5 million 
for the population of Roman Egypt.  Frier and Bagnall largely concur, suggesting a population for Egypt at 4 million 
under Augustus, rising to 5 million by the high empire.  R. Bagnall and B. Frier, The Demography of Roman Egypt 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994) and B. Frier, “Demography” in CAH2, vol 11 eds. A. Bowman, P. 
Garsney and D. Rathbone, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 787-816.  McEvedy and Jones also give 
roughly the same estimate, with 4 million in AD1 rising to 5 million in AD 200, McEvedy and Jones (1978), 226-7. 
55 P. van Minnen, Roman Hermopolis: a study of the social and economic history of an Egyptian town in the first 
four centuries AD (Amsterdam: Geiben, 1999).  E. Lo Cascio, “La popolazione dell-‘Egitto Romano,” in La 
démographie Historique Antique, eds. M. Bellancourt-Valdher and J.N. Corvisier (Arras: Artois Presses Université, 
1999a). 
56 Scheidel (2001b), 246-7. 
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and 7 million during the Greco-Roman period,” suggesting a lower bound of perhaps 4 million.57  
McEvedy and Jones suggest a peak population in the Hellenistic period of 4 million around 200 
BCE.58  Aperghis gives a lower estimate, suggesting between 3 and 3.5 million for Egypt in the 
Hellenistic period.59   
Breaking with the consensus more recently, Willy Clarysse and Dorothy Thompson have 
estimated, based on a study of the Arsinoite nome, a population of 1.5 million for Egypt in the 
third century BCE.60  However Clarysse and Thompson reach this figure by extrapolating from 
the estimated population density of the Arsinoite nome, which was far from typical, as the 
authors themselves note, but fail to otherwise account for.61  As Clarysse and Thompson note, 
extensive irrigation works under the Ptolemaic dynasty had recently significantly extended and 
intensified agriculture in the area of the Arsinoite nome, in stark contrast to the Nile proper, 
which had been settled for millennia and that in the period under examination the process of 
settlement for the newly arable parts of the Arsinoite nome was not yet complete.62  Moreover, 
                                                          
57 Scheidel, (2007), 45.   
58 McEvedy and Jones (1978), 226-7.  McEvedy and Jones’ graph suggests a population slightly below 3 million in 
300 BCE, rising to 4 million in 200 BCE, before falling again to perhaps 3.5 million in 100 BCE, but the apparent 
specificity here is false.  While the population of Egypt probably was quite volatile, see Scheidel 2001, the evidence 
does not permit us to speculate on the troughs and ridges of that volatility. 
59 Aperghis (2004), 247. 
60 W. Clarysse and D. J. Thompson, Counting the People in Hellenistic Egypt (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2006), 100-102. 
61 Clarysse and Thompson (2006), 101, “The application of the same (low) population density to 20,000 km2 of 
cultivable land in Egypt as a whole would result in a total population of 1,200,000 at this early stage of Ptolemaic 
development.  Such a straightforward multiplication is, however, probably unjustified, since the Arsinoite was on 
most accounts an atypical area.”  Nevertheless, in order to complete their estimate, Clarysse and Thompson 
merely add in 300,000 persons to represent the population of Alexandria. 
62 Clarysse and Thompson (2006), 90-1.  The authors also note that the region is remarkably atypical for the large 
number of foundations with Greek names, indicating that Greek settlers made up a large proportion of the 
population. 
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Clarysse and Thompson’s low population figure requires us to accept an implausibly high rate of 
growth in order to conform to the estimates for the Roman period population.63 Given the 
evidence, Scheidel’s higher range for the period seems the most probable, but it will suffice here 
to note that Ptolemaic Egypt likely had a population somewhere between perhaps 3 million and 4 
million, probably on the upper end of that range. 
 Estimating the population under the control of the Antigonid dynasty is more difficult, in 
part because of the nature of the estimates available and in part because of the complicated 
nature of Antigonid control over Greece.  No detailed estimate of the population of the Antigonid 
state has been attempted; however there are estimates for the geographic components of the 
Antigonid state, particularly during the Classical and Roman periods.64  The most detailed of 
these remains Julius Beloch’s 1886 study in Die Bevölkerung Der Griechisch-Roemischen Welt.  
Beloch suggests estimates for each of Greece’s constituent regions for the Classical period, 
giving a total population of around 3 million for Greece, including Macedonia and Epirus.65  
While Beloch does not give an estimate for the Antigonid state, it is fairly simple to arrange his 
                                                          
63 In order to reach even the lower estimate of 4 million in the early Roman period (see n. 46), the population of 
Egypt would have to grow more than 160% in two centuries, which seems unreasonably high, see Scheidel 
(2001b), 245 and n. 279.  Cf.  Estimated growth rates for Italy in the same period ranging from 28% to 71%, 
Launaro (2011), 165. 
64 Michael Grant, The Hellenistic Greeks: From Alexander to Cleopatra (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1982), 48 
suggests estimates for all three successor states, but the figures he gives are implausibly high (30 million for the 
Seleucids, 7 million for the Lagids, 4 million for the Antigonids) and Grant gives no hints as to where those numbers 
are derived from. 
65 J. Beloch, Die Bevölkerung Der Griechisch-Roemischen Welt (Leipzig: Dunker & Humblot, 1886).  While a 
masterpiece for its time, Beloch’s method has flaws.  Totals for each region are calculated by taking figures for 
ancient armies preserved in the sources and, assuming those figures represent all of a region’s military-age 
manpower, multiplying by four (for women and children) and then adding additional numbers of slaves and 
metics.  Such a method is likely to undercount, since it assumes 100% participation by all eligible males in the 
army, as a result, Beloch’s estimates should probably represent a floor on population for the Classical period.  On 
the limitations, see M. H. Hansen (2006), 4-7. 
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estimates for the purpose, with the result suggesting a little over a million people living in 
directly controlled territory, and roughly another 1.3 million people in the states of the 
Symmachy at the beginning of the reign of Philip V.66   
McEvedy and Jones, using modern borders, suggest a population for Greece of 2.5 
million in 400 BC, falling to 2 million by AD 1, a low count that seems implausible given other 
estimates.67  Working from population density estimates, Jean-Nicolas Corvisier and Wieslaw 
Suder suggest 3 million inhabitants for Greece including Macedonia, Epicurs and Thessaly, with 
2 million of those south of Thessaly.68  Corvisier suggests 660,000 in Macedonia and 425,000 in 
Epirus, both significant increases over Beloch’s estimates, but accepts sub-regional estimates 
which would result in a reduced population for Thessaly.69 Prior to Chaeronea, Corvisier and 
Suder suppose Philip II to have ruled approximately 1.6 million subjects.70  However, Mogens 
Herman Hansen objects to Corvisier’s method of using estimated population density, noting that 
where our information is more detailed, we find densities significantly in excess of Corvisier and 
Suder’s estimations.71  Hansen instead tackles the problem through counting poleis and 
estimating their size.  He estimates the total population of the Greek world, including Greek 
                                                          
66 For the core Antigonid state, Beloch’s estimates are: Macedonia 400,000; Thessaly 400,000; Euboea 60,000; and 
Thrace 600,000, although the interior of Thrace was not controlled by the Antigonids, so only perhaps half this 
number were under Antigonid rule.  For the regions under the Symmachy, Beloch gives Boeotia 150,000; Megara 
40,000; Locris and Phocis 60,000; Arcadia 150,000; Argolis 335,000; Achaia 75,000; Epirus: 300,000; Crete: 
200,000; Adding together suggests 1,610,000 million in the kingdom proper, with 1,310,000 in the Symmachy. 
67 McEvedy and Jones, (1978), 112-3. 
68 J.-N. Corvisier and W. Suder, La population de l’Antitiquite ́classique (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 
2000), 32-35.  The convergence of Corvisier and Suder’s total estimate with that of Beloch’s seems intentional. 
69 Corvisier and Suder (2000), 34. 
70 Corvisier and Suder (2000), 44. 
71 Hansen, (2006), 11, n. 39. 
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colonies throughout the Mediterranean, Macedon and Epirus, to be no less than 7.5 million, a 
formidable number to be sure.72  For the Greek mainland, including Akarnania, Thessaly and the 
Ionian and Aegean Islands, but without Epirus and Macedonia, Hansen suggest 3 to 3.5 
million.73  Richard Billows estimates 1 to 1.5 million Macedonians in the fourth century, a rather 
high figure, but notes that while Alexander’s expedition need not have overly taxed Macedonian 
manpower, subsequent political chaos and Gallic incursions will have reduced this number 
somewhat.74  On the other chronological end, Frier estimates 2.8 million for Greece in the first 
century AD, with another 2.7 million in the ‘Danube Region,’ but does not separate Macedonia 
from the provinces of Moesia and Dalmatia.75   
The broad range of these estimates, combined with the volatility of Antigonid power in 
the third century makes any estimate necessarily very tentative.  However, it seems reasonable to 
suggest the population of the Antigonid state proper consisted of perhaps 1 to 1.5 million, 
including Thessaly and Macedonian possessions in Thrace.76  To this may be added between 1.3 
                                                          
72 Hansen (2006), 27. 
73 Hansen (2006), 32-33.  The implication, made explicit on Hansen (2006), 117-118, is that Macedonia and Epirus 
have a combined population around 400,000 for Epirus and 660,000 for Macedonia in the Classical period. 
74 R. Billows, Kings and Colonists: Aspects of Macedonian Imperialism (Leiden: Brill, 1995), 198-203.  Billows 
favorably compares the size of Macedonia in the fourth century (30,000km2) to that of the ager Romanus in 230 
BC (25,000km2) to support his estimate, noting that the ager Romanus supported roughly 1 million citizens at that 
time.  Billows bases his much higher estimate for the region on 19th century population figures, the weaknesses of 
which are noted above.  Note that Billows’ estimate does not appear to include the Greeks living in Thessaly, since 
his concern is ethnically Macedonian manpower. 
75 Frier, (2000), 811-812.  The contrast between Frier’s figures for Roman Greece and McEvedy and Jones’ is 
instructive. 
76 The lower bound of this estimate is defined by Beloch (1886), see n. 65.  The upper bound assumes a more 
robust population in Macedonia and Thessaly (see M. H. Hansen (2006), 119-20), but still comes in below the 
numbers suggested by Hansen (2006) or Billows (1995). 
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and 2 million for the Greek poleis of the Symmachy, suggesting a total population under 
Antigonid control ranging from 2.3 to 3.5 million.77 
Finally, Carthage.  Strabo reports a population of “seventy myriads” (700,000), as the 
population of the city prior to the Third Punic War, although like all such ancient figures, this 
one deserves significant skepticism.78   Beloch suggests a population for the city of Carthage 
itself between 200,000 and 300,000, but does not estimate a population for all of Carthage’s 
holdings.79  Ulrich Kahrstedt suggests between 125,000 and 130,000 for the city itself and 
roughly 2.1 million for the entire empire.80  Brian Warmington supposes as many as 400,000 
people might have lived in the city of Carthage itself, while Gilbert Picard suggests a population 
of around 100,000 for the city proper, with another 100,000 living in Megara.81  Walter Ameling 
has suggested a population within a broad range between 90,000 and 225,000 for the city of 
Carthage.82  Dexter Hoyos, assuming roughly 200,000 citizen men, estimates a population of 
between 700,000 and 800,000 (including around 100,000 resident aliens and slaves) dwelling in 
                                                          
77 It seems likely that the Greek states of the Symmachy had a greater population than the core of the Antigonid 
state, much like the situation in Roman Italy at the time.  The lower bound for this estimate is again Beloch (1886).  
Beloch’s figures suggest that we might expect the Antigonids to have controlled through the Symmachy around 
60% of the population of Greece excluding Macedonia and Thessaly.  Assuming this ratio holds, Hansen (2006) 
would suggest the states of the Symmachy to have had a combined population between 1.8 and 2.1 million, 
setting the upper bound on the figure. 
78 Strabo 17.3.15.  Note that this figure, while dismissed by D. Hoyos, Hannibal’s Dynasty: Power and Politics in the 
Western Mediterranean, 247-183 BC (London: Routledge, 2003), 225, is actually accepted by Werner Huss, 
Geschichte der Karthager, (München: C.H. Beck, 1985).   
79 Beloch, (1886), 467. 
80 U. Kahrstedt, Geschichte der Karthager von 218-146, 3 vols. (Berlin, 1913), 133. 
81 G. C. Picard, Daily Life in Carthage at the Time of Hannibal, trans. A.E. Foster, (New York: Macmillan, 1961).  B. H. 
Warmington, Carthage (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1964). 
82 W. Ameling, Karthago: Studien zu Militär, Staat und Gesellschaft (München: Beck, 1993). 
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both the city and its territory.83  Further afield, Hoyos suggests 1.5 to 2 million subject Libyans 
and Punic allies in North Africa and another 1.5 million in Hasdrubal’s Spain, for a total 
population under Carthaginian control in 221 of 3.7 to 4.3 million.84  Accepting these estimates 
as a range, we may tentatively assume Carthage and its empire had a population in the range 
between 2 and 4 million on the eve of the Second Punic War. 
Such an analysis, it must be stressed, is extraordinarily tentative, but serves to establish 
the point.  The Roman Republic, with no more than 4 million people, in terms of population (and 
thus in terms of raw manpower in the demographic sense) does not appear to have been 
exceptional in comparison to the great powers of the Mediterranean.  Ptolemaic Egypt appears to 
have had a population of roughly the same size, somewhere between 3 and 4 million, while 
Antigonid Macedon was probably slightly smaller between 2 and 3.5 million.  The Carthaginian 
Empire is also on the same general order of size and, if Hoyos is correct, could even have a 
slightly larger population.  The clear standout is not Rome but the Seleucid Empire, with a 
population and land area several times larger than any of its competitors.  The third century 
Mediterranean was thus dominated by five large states of roughly similar size (although the 
possessions of the Seleucids were the standout) and of a roughly similarly bellicose disposition.  
From this perspective, Rome’s apparent manpower advantage appears at best minimally related 
to the actual demographics of Roman Italy.  Instead, the ability of any ancient state to utilize its 
own population for war was constrained by social and economic factors far more so than 
demographic ones, as so we must look elsewhere for the sources of Rome’s strength. 
 
                                                          
83 Hoyos (2003), 225.   
84 Hoyos (2003), 225-6. 
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Agriculture and the Organic Economy 
 Manpower in the ancient world was always constrained by social and economic factors 
that prevented ancient states from utilizing most of their available manpower reserves.  
Eligibility for military service was often determined by individual wealth,85 particularly owing to 
the need for individual citizens to supply their own equipment in many ancient states.  However, 
this wealth requirement often took on important social significance outside of its immediate 
economic function.  Moreover, certain types of military service might be restricted, either de 
facto or de jure, to specific ethnic groups86 or to individuals of a certain citizenship status.87  No 
doubt these limitations will have vexed the rulers of ancient states, who tried, with varying 
degrees of success, to expand their recruitment bases.88  However these were often legacy 
systems deeply entrenched within the social structure that undergirded the state, and were thus 
often resistant to change.    
                                                          
85 Brunt supposes around half of all Romans to have fallen below the property requirement for service at the time 
of the Second Punic War, Brunt, (1971), 64-66, 417-20, however Rosenstein argues for a much lower figure, 
perhaps as low as 10%, Rosenstein, (2004), 185-8.  In either case, both figures must stand in addition to the 
number of slaves in Italy (see above) who would also have been ineligible for military service except in absolute 
emergencies.  
86 Note for instance on the important of ethnic Greeks and Macedonians in the Seleucid army, B. Bar Kochva, The 
Seleucid Army: Organization and Tactics in the Great Campaigns (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976), 
20-48, 56-58.  Bar Kochva notes especially that the Seleucids seem to have consciously avoided arming or 
conscripting Syrians or Mesopotamians, due, Bar Kochva suggests, to internal security concerns, Bar Kochva, 
(1976), 52.  Likewise, though Ptolemy’s descendants did make use of native troops, the bulk of the Ptolemaic 
phalanx remained Macedonian, Christelle Fischer-Bovet, Army and society in Ptolemaic Egypt (Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press: 2014), 166-191.  Ethnically Macedonian manpower also seems to have been a limiting 
factor for the Antigonids, although they had fewer other ethnic groups to draw upon, Billows (1995), 183-212. 
87 J. Landers, The Field and the Forge: Population, Production, and Power in the Pre-Industrial West (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2003), 285. 
88 On the willingness of certain states to expand political rights in order to gain more access to military strength, 
see below and in subsequent chapters.  Note also reaching for manpower without expansion of political rights, as 
with the Seleucid ‘national contingents,’ Bar Kochva, (1976) 48-53, and also with Ptolemaic Egypt, Fischer-Bovet, 
(2014), 161-166.  See also A. Chaniotis, War in the Hellenistic World (Malden: Blackwell, 2005), 24-39 on the efforts 
of Hellenistic states to reach for manpower. 
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We might expect the relentless pressure of an anarchic interstate system to force states to 
reach more broadly for manpower, and to a degree they did, but broader economic limits 
restricted the ability of ancient states to field most of their manpower.  As put by John Landers, 
the problem was “just one more manifestation of the basic question dogging organic economies: 
how to promote specialization and the division of labour against a background of low 
productivity.”89  In short, the problem of mobilizing resources for war was primarily an 
economic problem, but one complicated by added layers of social and institutional constraints.  
As such, it is useful to discuss in general the economics of the problem of mobilization which 
will have faced all powers in the Mediterranean world, before moving on to discussing the 
specific challenges faced and solutions arrived at by Rome and her adversaries. 
The roots of all of the economies of the ancient Mediterranean were in agriculture, where 
the majority of the population labored to produce enough food to feed itself.  It is crucial to 
remember that all of the non-agricultural activities, including not only warfare and the 
management of the state, but also the production of specialized military equipment, would have 
to be supported within the relatively small agricultural surplus generated by the countryside.  At 
the same time, economic specialization will necessarily be lower in a society where something 
on the order of 80% of the population is agricultural.  Productivity, rather than the total scale of 
production, is crucial in this case because military activity requires a surplus, not only to feed the 
soldiers themselves, but also the workers required to produce and supply essential military 
supplies: the wood-cutters, shipwrights, blacksmiths, and so on.  While it remains a truism that 
                                                          
89 Landers, (2003), 282. 
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agricultural productivity in the ancient world was low, it is important to distinguish between 
different kinds of productivity.   
Roman Italy provides a relatively convenient case study for agricultural productivity, as 
agricultural conditions there are better attested, in no small part due to the focus of ancient 
agronomists on Italy.  Previous scholarship has tended to follow ancient agricultural writers in 
assessing productivity based on seed yields, but has generally relied on the lowest reported seed 
yields to generate models of seed productivity at or below 4:1.90  More recently, Paul Erdkamp 
has demonstrated that excessively low seed yield figures are the result of an over-selective 
reading of the sources and an under-appreciation of the range of farming techniques reported by 
Roman agricultural writers.91  Instead, Erdkamp argues that ancient seed yields could be as high 
as 8:1 or even 10:1, with more typical yields as high as 6:1 or 7:1, noting that yields reported in 
ancient sources are often this high and that ancient methods of agriculture were sophisticated 
enough to support such yields.92  
Moreover, even at very low yields, land scarcity hardly seems to explain low agricultural 
productivity.  Put another way, the Malthusian case, that the problem is too many people and not 
enough land, seems to be untenable, at least in its simplest formation.  Pessimistic assessments of 
the carrying capacity of Italy based on the assumption that about 40 per cent of the land surface 
                                                          
90 References for low productivity: D. P. Kehoe, The Economics of Agriculture on Roman Imperial Estates in North 
Africa (Gottingen: Vanderhoeck & Ruprecht, 1988), G. Rickman, The Corn Supply of Ancient Rome (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1980), Rathbone (2000).  The very low figures are from Columella, as noted. 
91 P. Erdkamp, The Grain Market in the Roman Empire: a Social, Political and Economic Study (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005).  Erdkamp notes in particular a general over-reliance on Columella’s overly 
pessimistic seed yield figures for grain, seed yield figures which are likely selected to serve Columella’s argument 
that there is no profit to be made in cereal farming.  On the evidence for relatively high productivity in ancient 
agriculture, see also G. Kron, “Agriculture” in A Companion to Food in the Ancient World, ed. John Wilkins and 
Robin Nadeau (Malden: Wiley Blackwell, 2015), 160-172. 
92 Erdkamp (2005), 34-38. 
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was cultivated and using Columella’s low seed yield figure of 4:1 suggest that even in this case 
Roman Italy could have potentially supported a population of 8 million, with more optimistic 
projections pushing the figures as high as 12.5 million.93  Such figures would naturally have to 
be adjusted substantially upwards in the face of Erdkamp’s work on seed yields, but they suggest 
that the population of Italy in the third and second centuries was capable of substantial 
expansion, a fact increasingly recognized by demographers as noted previously.  Yet even if 
sufficient land to expand production was available and seed yields were not necessarily ruinously 
low, agricultural productivity remained low.  Why? 
The problem is not seed productivity or even land productivity, but labor productivity.  
Large, tightly run estates could potentially be quite productive and allow for substantial surplus. 
Erdkamp estimates that 50 iugera of wheat on an estate cultivated by slaves might produce an 
annual surplus between 330 and 610 modii and that the ‘gross agricultural surplus,’ defined as 
production minus seed and labor, might be as high as 70 to 85 per cent on the estates of wealthy 
landowners.94  However, large market-oriented estates were not the only form of ancient 
agriculture, or even the predominant one; rather the countryside was populated in no small part 
by smallholding households whose production capacity and goals were quite different from the 
large estates of the wealthy.  While bemoaning the fading of the smallholding farmer is a favorite 
                                                          
93 Willem Jongman, The Economy and Society of Pompeii (Amsterdam: J.C. Gieben, 1988), 80-82; Neville Morley, 
Metropolis and Hinterland: The city of Rome and the Italian economy 200 B.C. – A.D. 200 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1996), 46-50; Elio Lo Cascio, “Popolazione e Risorse Agricole Nell ‘Italia Del II Secolo A.C.” in 
Demografia, Sistemi Agrari, Regimi Alimentari Nel Mondo Antico, Atti del Convegno Internazionale di Studi (parma 
17-19 ottobre 1997), ed. Domenico Vera (Bari: Edipuglia, 1999b), 217-245.  Morley’s calculations run along the 
same lines as those of Jongman, but with a smaller assumed fraction of the land in Italy being arable, whereas Lo 
Cascio arrives at his much higher figure by accounting for yields higher than 1:4 and the use of a short-fallow 
system.  For the limitations of this sort of approach, see de Ligt (2012), 20-39. 
94 Erdkamp, (2005), 46-54.  
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topos of ancient writers,95 recent work with survey archaeology has tended to call into question 
the decline of the Italian smallholder, at least in the period of the Republic.96  To understand the 
mobilization of ancient armies it is to these small farmers we must turn. 
 
A ‘Typical’ Smallholder 
Information on smallholders in the ancient world is substantially more limited, so it is 
necessary to rely on modeling a ‘typical’ smallholding household in order to approach the 
problem of agricultural productivity.97  We may then posit a six member household consisting of 
a prime-age married couple, an elderly woman (a still living parent), an adult son and two 
children.98  Such a family might require something on the order of 4,500,000 calories annually, 
                                                          
95 See for instance Plut. Tiberius 8.1-3, App. Bel. Civ. 1.8-9.    
96 See particularly, Launaro (2011) for survey evidence.  Likewise, Rosenstein (2004) questions the degree to which 
the smallholding class will have been depleted in this period.  There is more evidence for significance 
encroachment by large estates during the early empire, see J. R. Patterson, “What Crisis? Rural Change and Urban 
Development in Imperial Appennine Italy,” PBSR 55 (1987): 115-146. 
97 Similar, but more extensive and substantial efforts have been made in modeling Roman smallholders by 
Rosenstein (2004) and Erdkamp (2005).  Both models are valuable but have substantial limitations.  Erdkamp’s 
model works entirely from ancient units, allowing for a high degree of fidelity to ancient sources, but making some 
of the calculations (such as the estimated wheat consumption of the household, expressed in modii) more 
speculative.  Erdkamp notes the potential importance of wage labor or share-cropping as a strategy for poor 
Roman smallholders, but does not investigate further.  Rosenstein, by contrast, proceeds from modern nutritional 
estimates, but does probe the potential of adding sharecropped land. 
98 This household is meant to represent merely one plausible arrangement for the purpose of demonstrating the 
economics constraints on smallholders.  The households of Mediterranean small farmers appear in general to have 
frequently been extended or multi-generational, with a great deal of variation in family size and structure, see 
Bagnall and Frier, (1994).  For the general applicability of the same patterns of family structure in Italy, see, R. P. 
Saller, Patriarchy, Property and Death in the Roman Family (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 43-70.  
The epigraphic evidence from Italy shows some regional variation, but far more substantial variation in 
commemoration patterns restrict its use to estimates of minimum family size, see Paul Gallivan and Peter Wilkins, 
“Familial Structures in Roman Italy: A Regional Approach” in The Roman Family in Italy: Status, Sentiment, Space 
eds. Beryl Rawson and Paul Weaver (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), 239-255. 
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roughly the equivalent of 200 modii of wheat.99  In practice, our typical farm will likely have 
produced a range of crops, in part to hedge against the uncertainty of failure in any one type of 
crop.  This strategy will have increased the amount of land the family will have had to keep 
under cultivation, as other crops, such as barley or legumes have a lower calorie yield per 
iugerum.100 The average size of a Roman smallholding seems to have been quite small, between 
5 and 10 iugera and sometimes even smaller.101    In this case, we may assume a fairly typical 
farm of perhaps 9 iugera, growing a mix of wheat, barley and legumes, in this case beans.102 As 
we will see, some quantity of wage labor or sharecropping will have been necessary in most 
                                                          
99 Efforts to gauge the nutritional requirements of ancient families have proceeded from two methods.  The first 
method, used by L. Foxhall and H. A. Forbes, “Σιτομετρεία: The Role of Grain as a Staple Food in Classical Antiquity” 
in Chiron 12 (1982):40-90 and also used by Rosenstein (2004) has been to proceed from modern calculations of 
nutritional requirements such as those in the FAO, WHO and UNU, Energy and Protein Requirements: Report of a 
Joint FAO/WHO/UNU Expert Consultation, WHO Technical Report Series, no. 724 (Geneva: WHO, 1985).  As Foxhall 
and Forbes note, however, these figures tend to be extremely high; the report’s figures suggest that our typical 
family would require some 5,692,175 yearly calories (roughly 254 modii of wheat).  Figures in this report for the 
needs of adult males substantially exceed the 4 modii per month figure ancient sources provide for Roman soldiers 
and slaves (Plb. 6.39; Cato, De Agriccultra, 56) by more than 10%.  On the other end, Erdkamp (2005), 49 has 
attempted to generate subsistence figures using the aforementioned ancient sources; his calculations would 
suggest our typical family required between 150 and 180 modii of wheat, however Erdkamp’s figures (which are 
reduced from the 48 modii per year implied by Polybius and Cato) seem excessively low.  Here I have opted to split 
the difference.  200 modii of wheat (roughly 1,344kg, using Foxhall and Forbes (1982) for figures for the density of 
wheat) will contain approximately 4,489,000 calories, or roughly 80% of the 5,692,175 calories required yearly 
following the FAO report.  Following the higher modern figures will increase the family’s food requirements (and 
thus labor requirements) but not enough to push the family into deficit, assuming sufficient opportunities for wage 
labor or sharecropping are available. 
100 Erdkamp (2005), 48-9, strangely treats a modius of wheat, barley or legumes as interchangeable for the purpose 
of subsistence after harvest.  However, a single modius of wheat (approximately 6.72kg) will have contained 
22,445 calories (3340 calories per kg), while a modius of unprocessed barley (approximately 6.465kg) will have 
contained only 13,951 calories.  As noted by Foxhall and Forbes (1982), processing into course barley flour, alphita, 
will have reduced this figure further, to only 12,878 calories per modius of barley (measured before sifting and 
winnowing).   
101 Rosenstein (2004), 75, n.68.  Erdkamp, (2005), 47-8. 
102 On legumes available to ancient farmers, see, K. B. Flint-Hamilton, “Legumes in Ancient Greece and Rome: 
Food, Medicine or Poison” Hesperia 68.3 (1999): 371-385. 
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cases to supplement the output of the farm, so it is important to make an estimate of how much 
total labor is available to the household for those purposes. 
The women of the household will not have been idle, but their labor should probably not 
be assigned to the pool of available agricultural labor under normal circumstances.103  Instead the 
quintessential labor of Roman women was generally textile production, particularly the time 
intensive spinning of wool.104  Indeed attentive wool-working was a staple of descriptions of the 
virtue of Roman women both elite and common, from the commendation of a “tireless attention 
to wool-working” in the so-called Laudatio Turiae and Lucretia’s legendary display of virtue 
spinning by lamplight to Columella’s advice that a slave forewoman ought to be attentive to her 
wool-working and to the famous second century epitaph of a Claudia which declares at the end 
simply lanem fecit: “she spun wool.”105  
Producing enough textiles to provide even a basic level for a Roman household would 
have been a formidable task, though estimating the scale of that task is necessarily an exercise in 
                                                          
103 Note that Rosenstein (2004), 68-69 calculates the labor availability for the Roman family assuming that the 
women of the household worked full time in the fields. 
104 For a general discussion of the evidence for women involved in textile production, both domestically and 
commercially, see L. L. Lovén, “Female Work and Identity in Roman Textile Production and Trade: A 
Methodological Discussion” in Making Textiles in pre-Roman and Roman Times: People, Places, Identities, eds. M. 
Gleba and J. Paśztoḱai-Szeőke (Oxford: Oxbow Books: 2013), 109-125 and S. Gällnö, “(In)visible Spinners in the 
Documentary Papyri from Roman Egypt” in Making Textiles in pre-Roman and Roman Times: People, Places, 
Identities, eds. M. Gleba and J. Paśztoḱai-Szeőke (Oxford: Oxbow Books: 2013), 161-170.  Note also M. Gleba, 
Textile Production in pre-Roman Italy (Oxford: Oxbow Books, 2008), 171-8 for evidence for domestic textile 
production by women in pre-Roman Italy.  For similar labor divisions in the Eastern Mediterranean, see E. W. 
Barber, Prehistoric Textiles; The Development of Cloth in the Neolithic and Bronze Ages, with Special Reference to 
the Aegean (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991) and E. W. Barber, Women’s Work: The First 20,000 Years, 
Women, Cloth and Society in Early Times (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1994). 
105 CIL 6.1527, 31670 (ILS 8393), Liv. 1.57.9.  Cf. also Suetonius’ claim that Livia still wove most of Augustus’ clothes, 
Seut. Aug. 73, Col. 12.3.6, CIL 1.2.1211.  For an overview of the evidence for textile manufacture in funerary 
contexts, see L. L. Lovén, The Imagery of Textile Making: Gender and Status in the Funerary Iconography of Textile 
Manufacture in Roman Italy and Gaul (Göteborg, University of Göteburg, 2002), also note Lovén, (2013), 109- 125. 
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informed guesswork.  Cato advises that agricultural slaves be issued a tunic and a cloak (sagum) 
every other year, with the old clothing being made into patchwork.106  Cato’s figures suggest that 
clothing an agricultural slave required, at minimum, some 43,300cm2 of cloth every other 
year.107  Such an estimate, however, must surely be too low for a free family of the Roman 
assidui, but it is impossible to say how low.108  If we assume that the family might replace a 
single complete set of everyday clothing per member per year, then we might estimate our family 
to need 214,200cm2 of fabric, at a minimum.109  In order to produce that much fabric 
domestically, the women of the family would have to spin approximately 41,500m of thread.  If 
produced in linen fabric, we might assume the entire process would take roughly 2,220 hours 
merely to spin and weave the fabric, following estimates by Aldrete et al.110  Wool production 
was more common in Italy, but no detailed estimates of the time intensity of carding, spinning 
and weaving wool have been published, although given the greater need to process wool prior to 
                                                          
106 Cato, de agricultura 59, Vestimenta familiae. Tunicam P. III S, saga alternis annis. Quotiens cuique tunicam aut 
sagum dabis, prius veterem accipito, unde centones fiant. 
107 This estimate assumes the tunics are made of two panels roughly 1m wide and 1.04m (=3.5 Roman feet, as per 
Cato) long and that the sagum a single panel roughly 1.5m square. 
108 Jinyu Liu supposes perhaps two complete sets of garments per year for Roman soldiers during the Empire,  J. 
Liu, “Clothing Supply for the Military.  A look at the Inscriptional Evidence” in Wearing the Cloak: Dressing the 
Soldier in Roman Times, ed. Marie-Louise Nosch, (Oxford: Oxbow Books, 2012), 19-28. 
109 This estimate assumes that for the adult males, everyday wear consists of a tunic and sagum as per the previous 
estimate.  Including a toga would dramatically increase the cloth demands, but as a piece of formal wear, it seems 
unlikely that the toga would be replaced so frequently.  For the adult females, this reconstruction assumes the 
replacement of a somewhat longer tunic of two panels, 0.9m by 1.5m each and a stola of roughly the same size.  
As with the toga, I have left out the palla, although as apiece of everyday public wear, it was probably replaced 
more often.  For each of the two children, I have assumed a smaller tunic, perhaps 0.7m by 0.7m.  The estimate 
does not include any of the other myriad uses to which textiles were put to in an ancient household, so it seems 
likely that any actual number must necessarily be substantially higher. 
110 Time and material estimates for production in linen follow G. S. Aldrete, S. Bartel and A. Aldrete, Reconstructing 
Ancient Linen Body Armor: Unraveling the Linothorax Mystery (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 2013), 
149-153. 
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spinning, it seems likely that woolen textile production would have been even more time 
intensive than linen.111  And it should be stressed, such an estimate is necessarily a minimum; it 
is easy to imagine that a household with the capacity to produce more textiles might either invest 
that additional time into producing higher quality textiles for the household itself, or in 
producing materials for sale.  Likewise, though wool-working seems to have been one of the 
primary jobs of free Roman women in the household, this does not preclude specialization 
between household producers, facilitated by small scale trade or markets.112 
As a result, female agricultural labor seems only to have been significant at times of peak 
labor demand, specifically at the harvest.113  This should come as no surprise; in addition to the 
demands of wool-working, women performed a range of work in the Roman household which 
included child-rearing, cleaning and food preparation, all of which was essential to the survival 
of the smallholding Roman family and could be remarkably time intensive.114  The same basic 
                                                          
111 On the technology of textile production, see Gleba, (2008), 37-159; M. Hoffman, The Warp-Weighted Loom: 
Studies in the History and Technology of an Ancient Implement (Oslo: Robin and Russ Handweavers, 1964); M. 
Gleba and U Mannering, eds. Textiles and Textile Production in Europe: From Prehistory to AD 400 (Oxford: Oxbow 
Books, 2012);  
112 Apuleius mentions a poor woman spinning wool for sale in the market, Metam. 9.5.  For a more recent 
comparative example from the developing world of how specialization might exist in an environment where 
household textile production is common, see K. A. Bowie, “Unraveling the Myth of the Subsistence Economy: 
Textile Production in Nineteenth-Century Northern Thailand” in Journal of Asian Studies 51:4 (1992): 797-823.  
Bowie notes that while most textile production was small-scale and local, not all village women who could spin 
also wove, or who wove would also spin, with small-scale market interactions being used to exchange production. 
113 For the evidence of women’s involvement in agriculture specifically at times of peak labor demand, see 
Erdkamp (2005), 88-9.   
114 As late as 1900, food preparation and clean-up consumed 44 hours per week of the average American woman’s 
time, with another 14 hours dedicated to laundry and household cleaning, S. Lebergott, Pursuing Happiness: 
American Consumers in the Twentieth Century (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), 50-1.  While such 
modern figures cannot be taken as representative of ancient home life, such tasks were unlikely to be less time 
intensive in the ancient world. 
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division of labor appears to have also held for Greek households, albeit with a stronger 
prohibition against free, citizen women working outside of the home.115 
This leaves us with the labor of the two adult males, along with potentially some 
additional labor from the household’s children. Columella estimates roughly 290 working days 
in a year, setting aside 45 days for rain and holidays and another 30 days after the sowing for 
rest, giving the two adult males in our household a combined total labor of 580 days’ worth of 
labor over the year.  Columella gives labor requirements for a variety of crops, suggesting the 
labor required to cultivate wheat as 10.5 working days for four or five modii sown (conveniently 
the same amount he recommends sowing per iugerum).116  Columella presents barley as less 
labor intensive than wheat, requiring 6.5 days for 5 modii and for beans a total of seven or eight 
days labor for four to six modii sown.117 Both Michael Spurr and Rosenstein have suggested that 
Columella has undercounted the labor requirements however, and instead they suggest figures of 
14.25 and 19.5 days per iugerum respectively for the cultivation of wheat.118  Assuming that 
Columella has likewise undercounted the labor requirements of the other crops, we may assume 
a range between 14.25 and 19.5 working days per iugerum of wheat, between 9 and 12 days per 
iugerum of barley and between 10 and 14 days per iugerum of beans.  Assuming the farm is 
evenly split between these three crops, the total labor requirement for the farm would be between 
                                                          
115 S. Blundell Women in Ancient Greece (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995), 140-145. 
116 Columella 2.12.1 
117 Columella 2.12.2 
118 Rosenstein (2004), 68.  M. S. Spurr, “Agriculture and the Georgics” in Virgil, ed. Ian McAuslan and Peter Walcot 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), 69-93. 
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99.75 and 136.5 working days per year, well within the 580 days of labor available to our 
family’s adult males. 
The production of such a small farm will, however, not have been generally sufficient to 
provide for all of the needs of the household, except at exceptionally high yields.  At a 4:1 yield 
ratio, regarded by Erdkamp as the lower end of typical, the total productivity of the farm (with 
seed for the next crop removed) would amount to 45 modii of wheat, 54 modii of barley and 36 
modii of beans.119  Under these conditions the farm would provide the family with 2,441,708 
calories, or 54% of their total requirements.120  Even a quite robust yield of 6:1 still leaves our 
typical family short of their total requirements, although only by about 10% of their total 
needs.121  A more reasonable moderate yield of 5:1 leaves the family at 72% of their total 
needs.122  As Erdkamp notes, the weight of the ancient evidence suggests that most yields will 
have been between 4:1 and 6:1, with higher yields being possible but fairly rare and probably 
confined to regions with exceptional productivity.   
                                                          
119 Sowing for wheat (sowing 5 modii per iugerum), barley (6 modii per iugerum) and beans (4 modii per iugerum) 
follows Varro 1.44.1.  Columella 2.9 likewise advises sowing 5 modii of wheat per iugerum on land of medium 
quality, and 4 modii per iugerum for beans, but suggests only five modii of barley per iugerum.  It is worth noting 
that Varro advises sowing less seed on poor group, whereas Columella advises the opposite, suggesting that on 
rich ground one may sow only 4 modii of wheat.  Assuming moderate quality land, our family will have sown 15 
modii of wheat (5 modii * 3 iugera), 18 modii of barley (6 modii * 3 iugera) and 12 modii of beans (4 modii * 3 
iugera). 
120 Following Foxhall and Forbes (1982) for wheat and barley and utilizing FAO, Food Composition Tables for the 
Near East (Rome: Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations, 1982) for beans (Table II), 45 modii of 
wheat (approximately 302.4kg) would yield 1,010,016 calories, 54 modii of barley (approximately 394.11kg) would 
yield 753,379 calories, and 36 modii of beans (vicia faba – approximately 195.48kg) would yield 678,316 calories.  
121 At a 6:1 yield, our family’s farm would have produced 75 modii of wheat, 90 modii of barley and 60 modii of 
beans in excess of seed requirements for the next year, yielding 1,683,360 calories in wheat, 1,255,627 calories in 
barley and 1,130,526 calories in beans for a total of 4,069,513 annual calories. 
122 At a 5:1 yield, the family farm produces 60 modii of wheat, 72 modii of barley and 48 modii of beans in excess of 
seed requirements, yielding 3,255,610 total calories. 
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As a result, the family will have needed, in most years, to supplement the production of 
their farm with either wage labor or sharecropping.  The amount of additional sharecropping the 
family would require to achieve subsistence varies based on yield.  Assuming the sharecropped 
land produces at the same yield as the family farm and that the sharecropper receives half of the 
production after seed is removed, it would take an additional 13 iugera of wheat to meet 
subsistence needs at a yield ratio of 4:1, an additional 6 iugera of wheat for a yield ratio of 5:1 
and only 1.5 iugera of wheat at a yield ratio of 6:1.123  The labor demands of this additional 
labor, while significant, do not appear likely to have exceeded the labor available to our 
household; even in the worst case with a 4:1 yield, the additional 13 iugera of wheat would 
require between 185.25 and 253.5 total working days per year, for a total labor demand on the 
family between 285 and 390 working days out of 580 total days of labor available, leaving the 
family’s available agricultural labor tremendously underutilized.124 
Wage labor could also have been used in place of sharecropping to make up for the gap 
between the farm’s production and the family’s needs.  In a fluid labor market, there would have 
been little difference in returns between labor employed for wages and labor paid in-kind 
through a portion of the crop.  However there is ample reason to doubt that the rural labor market 
in the ancient world was ever so fluid or well-functioning.125  Because sharecropping or 
                                                          
123 On tenancy in the Roman world, see L. Foxhall, “The Dependent Tenant: Land Leasing and Labour in Italy and 
Greece,” JRS 80 (1990): 97-114.   
124 This labor demand will have increased greatly during the harvest (see Rosenstein (2004), 69), and at those times 
employing the labor of the women and children in the family may have been necessary.  Most of our evidence for 
women participating in agricultural labor is in the context of this peak labor demand, see Erdkamp (2005), 88-90. 
125 On the labor market in the Roman world, see P. Temin, The Roman Market Economy (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2013), 114 – 138 and P. Erdkamp (2005), 79-95. Temin is relatively sanguine about how well the 
Roman labor market functioned, arguing in particular that the slave labor system competed in a single unified 
market with free labor, but does admit that “the labor market worked better in cities than in the countryside.” 
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agricultural wage labor entailed giving up a significant portion of the harvest to the owner of the 
land, the marginal cost in labor for additional production beyond the family farm will have been 
relatively high, that is, it will have taken substantially more labor in sharecropping or wage labor 
to produce the same amount of food for the family.126  Such a high marginal cost will have 
discouraged production beyond the immediate needs of the family, reinforcing a relatively 
conservative aim for the smallholder’s household to produce, as Erdkamp puts it, “subsistence – 
and a little more” rather than to maximize production.127  The small surplus produced in this 
strategy would go to the purchase of the few goods the household did not produce itself, as well 
as to maintaining the social status of the household and providing for a small reserve against bad 
times.128  In either case, even without women laboring in the field through most of the year, a 
typical Roman smallholding family will have been able to meet this more modest goal of a small 
surplus over subsistence without using nearly its entire supply of labor. 
 
A Surplus Economy 
 What our model leaves us with, then, is an economic foundation to any ancient 
Mediterranean war effort that is long on manpower, but short on the agricultural surplus required 
                                                          
126 Foxhall presents a chart of tenancy arrangements in Mexico with tenant’s production shares ranging from as 
low as 9.37% to as high as 81.25%, with the most common arrangement for a tenant that supplied both labor and 
traction being 50%, Foxhall (1990), 106.   
127 Erdkamp (2005), 96.  A similar point is made by Horden and Purcell, who note that the Mediterranean 
peasantry will have generally aimed to produce more than mere subsistence, partly as security against disaster, P. 
Horden and N. Purcell, The Corrupting Sea: A Study of Mediterranean History (Malden: Blackwell Publishing, 2000), 
270-5. 
128 This model of relatively self-sufficient peasants should not be taken to mean that smallholders were entirely 
disconnected from markets, as smallholders would find themselves sellers of grain in the market in good years and 
consumers of it in bad years, many smallholders would in fact, be somewhat active in the market economy, 
Erdkamp (2005), 134-141. 
 37 
to support activities beyond agriculture.  Even under the most difficult circumstances, our model 
family never used more than 67% of its available agricultural labor, without even needing to 
employ the women of the household as full-time agricultural workers.  Instead the great mass of 
smallholding families were stingy with their agricultural surplus; what surplus was produced 
from the land was consumed by families that, as units of labor, were far too large for their farms.  
Elite estates and larger market oriented farms were more efficient and thus provided a larger 
surplus, but these were necessarily fewer and in most cases had to rely on the surplus labor of 
smallholders to thrive.  In order to mobilize an army for war, an ancient society would need to 
extract more surplus from the countryside.  This surplus would be required not merely to feed the 
soldiers, but also to maintain the specialists needed to build and maintain ships, the skilled 
craftsmen who produced arms and armor, the masses of animals and porters required to keep the 
army mobile, and also to maintain the elite stratum of society that made war their business and 
often provided the political and military leadership of the army. 
 So far, this discussion has avoided discussing these relationships in terms of money.  The 
most obvious reason for this is that not all of the societies on the Mediterranean were fully 
monetized, so to talk about war economics in these societies in monetary terms is to engage in 
anachronism.  But reducing the discussion of war economics entirely to money also serves to 
obfuscate key relationships between the nature of the ancient economy and warfare.  It was, after 
all, not precious metals that Rome required for war, but men, equipment, supplies and the will to 
fight; coinage was merely a means to these ends, not the end in and of itself.129  While ancient 
states could briefly surpass their normal limits through debasing their coinage or borrowing 
                                                          
129 The experience of the Spanish Hapsburgs after the discovery of the New World speaks to the perils of merely 
expanding the monetary base of a war effort without a concomitant expansion of the overall resource base. 
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money, both strategies had natural and potentially ruinous limits and neither was sustainable in 
the long-term with the limited fiscal and monetary tools available to ancient states.  Likewise, 
exploiting precious metal deposits and minting fresh currency could increase the purchasing 
power of the state, increasing the share of available agricultural surplus at the state’s disposal, 
but only if additional surplus exists to be gathered.  All of which returns us to the basic problem, 
that war required agricultural surplus not only to maintain the soldiers but also the additional 
economic activities, like the smelting of metal and making of equipment that war required. 
The subsequent chapters of this work will go into more detail concerning what is known 
of the methods for harnessing this basic economic resource, but it is worth briefly covering 
principles that applied to all ancient societies generally.  Ancient societies had four major means 
for extracting the needed surplus from the countryside: pillaging from the enemy, direct taxes on 
agriculture, indirect harnessing of the rents of elite landowners, or shifting the costs of warfare 
onto the larger numbers of small farmers directly.  While indirect taxes were certainly available 
to ancient states as a fifth method, they remained small as a portion of total revenue in most 
cases.130  The relatively small agricultural surplus also meant that the amount of economic 
activity outside of agriculture remained relatively small, leaving significantly less value to be 
captured with indirect taxes on non-agricultural activity than with taxing agriculture directly.  In 
                                                          
130 Tenney Frank concludes that indirect taxes in Italy were a very small part of Roman revenue even before the 
establishment of overseas tribute, T. Frank An Economic Survey of Ancient Rome, vol. 1 (Baltimore: John Hopkins 
University Press, 1933), 79.  Instead, it was the tributum, an direct tax on wealth, that was the primary tax to pay 
for state military activity in Rome prior to 167 B.C., Claude Nicolet, Tributum, recherches sur la fiscalité directe sous 
la républicque romaine (Bonn, Rudolf Habelt Verlag: 1976), 16-19; Lutz Neesen, Untersuchungen zu den direkten 
Staatsabgaben der römischen Kaiserzeit (27 v. Chr. – 284 n. Chr.) (Bonn: Rudolf Habelt Verlag: 1980), 4-5.  On 
Roman indirect taxes generally, see Sven Gunther, “Vectigalia nervos esse rei publicae” in Die indirekten Steuern in 
der Römischen Kaiserzeit von Augustus bis Diokletian (Wiesbaden: Harrasowitz Verlag, 2008).  On indirect taxes in 
the Seleucid Empire, see Aperghis (2004), 152-163, who likewise suggests that the taxes on land were likely more 
significant than indirect taxes and other sources of revenue, 169.    
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all cases, it is important to recognize that these methods were often the result of social evolution 
rather than intentional design, and of course that these methods of resource mobilization were 
not mutually exclusive.  Indeed, most ancient states and pre-state peoples relied on an often ad 
hoc combination of all of these methods, with substantial variation between states and societies. 
Pillaging from the enemy is perhaps the most obvious means of sustaining a war effort, 
but also the least reliable as no ancient army could ensure that it would always operate in the 
territory of the enemy or that it would always be victorious.  Cato’s famous declaration that “the 
war will feed itself” seems to have been rarely fully realized in practice, though looting 
equipment and subsisting an army off of the countryside of an enemy were frequent strategies to 
deflect costs.131  Post-war indemnities or the seizure of state treasuries also fit under the rubric of 
forcing the enemy to pay for one’s own warfare.  However such indemnities rarely covered all or 
even most of the full economic costs of warfare.132  While the extraction of regular tribute could 
emerge as the formalization of pillage or indemnity, such relationships lead to the formation of 
‘military patronage states,’ where the conquering state provides security in order to facilitate the 
production of a surplus to maintain military operations.  Such ancient states were, as Fergus 
Millar noted of the Seleucids, “primarily a system for extracting taxes and forming armies,” and 
their activities in exchanging security for taxes fit better under the rubric of direct taxation than 
                                                          
131 Livy 34.9.12.  On the limits of strategies of fiscal deflection in general, see Landers (2003), 300-308.  On the 
specific limits of obtaining supply locally through compulsion and ‘living off the land,’ see P. Erdkamp, Hunger and 
the Sword: Warfare and Food Supply in Roman Republican Wars (264 – 30 B.C.) (Amsterdam: J. C. Gieben, 1998), 
122-140. 
132 Ironically, the limited administrative power of ancient states made it difficult to do lasting damage to the 
underlying economy through such indemnities, a feature aptly demonstrated by Carthage’s rapid recovery from 
the heavy indemnities imposed by Rome after the First Punic War, despite continued warfare in Africa: Plb. 1.62.-
8-1.63.3.  Note a second Roman imposition, Plb. 1.88.12, and subsequent Carthaginian overseas expansion, Plb. 
2.1.5-9 and 2.13.1-7.  See Dexter Hoyos, Truceless War: Carthage’s fight for survival 241 to 237 B.C.  (Leiden: Brill, 
2007).  Perhaps an exception to this rule, the wealth gained by the seizure of the Macedonian treasury after Pydna 
was much greater, some 6000 talents, Plb. 18.35.5. 
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cost deflection.133  So strategies of cost deflection, either during war or after, could only take an 
ancient state so far in covering the costs of endemic warfare and generally not very far at that. 
More promising are direct taxes on agriculture.  Direct taxes on smallholders forced these 
farmers to produce more in order to maintain subsistence while still paying the taxes.  Such taxes 
in the ancient world were uncommon in smaller states and generally irregularly collected in 
either Greek poleis or in Italy, although Rome appears here to be an exception.134  The Roman 
direct wealth tax in Italy, the tributum, was an extraordinary tax tied to the raising of armies and 
the amount collected seems to have varied year-on-year.135  Regular direct taxation was more 
common in larger states which could not rely on either elite civic-mindedness or devolution into 
a patriotic class of freeholders to subsidize a large portion of the costs of warfare. Aperghis notes 
that direct taxation, combined with the direct holding of royal lands, seems to have made up the 
bulk of Seleucid royal revenue, and direct taxes on tributary land may have been as high as 
30%.136  Outside of Italy, in Sicily, the Romans also collected such a tax regularly, the decuma, a 
10% tax on grain, and such direct taxes formed the bulk of income from the provinces the 
Romans subsequently acquired.137  Such direct taxes, of course, could be collected in kind as 
well as in coin, but direct taxation in either coin or kind also tended to prove onerous for the 
                                                          
133 Fergus Millar, “The Problem of Hellenistic Syria” in Hellenism in the East: The interaction of Greek and non-
Greek civilizations from Syria to Central Asia after Alexander, eds. Amélie Kuhrt and Susan Sherwin-White (London: 
Duckworth, 1987), 129-30.  Rolf Strootman, “Kings and Cities in the Hellenistic Age” in Political Culture in the Greek 
City after the Classical Age eds. Onno M. van Nijf and Richard Alston, (Leuven, Peeters, 2011), 144-5.  N. di Cosmo, 
“State Formation and Periodization in Inner Asian History” Journal of World History 10.1 (1999): 1-40. 
134 Neesen, (1980), 4. 
135 Nicolet, (1976), 19-26. 
136 Aperghis (2004), 146-7.   
137 Cic. Ad. Ver. 2.3.12-15. 
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farmers and difficult to administer for the state.138  The cost of maintaining either the 
bureaucracy to directly administer such taxes would naturally lessen the efficiency of such a tax, 
as would merely delegating that administration to tax farmers who would, after all, need to 
extract a profit for their time. 
Another way to force the countryside to give up its surplus would be through the 
extraction of rents.  The most direct method would be for the state to claim ownership of the land 
and lease it out directly, collecting rents for the use of the land, as in the case of some of Rome’s 
ager publicus, particularly the ager censorius, which was leased out by the censors.139  Because 
the labor would be fed out of their portion of the proceeds, any rents so extracted would be 
purely surplus.  Alternately the state could attempt to extract this surplus through elite 
landowners whose land was worked by slaves, tenants or sharecroppers. In all cases, the 
agricultural product extracted as rents by the landowner, above what needed to be paid to tenants 
(or maintain slaves) or to upkeep or improve the land itself, will have been surplus.  While much 
has been said by writers both ancient and modern on the ideal self-sufficiency of elite estates, in 
practice, the wealthy landowner needed the surplus from his estates to sustain his own status and 
lifestyle.140 
                                                          
138 On taxes in kind, see R. Duncan-Jones, Structure and Scale in the Roman Economy (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2002).  Polybius notes the onerous nature of tributum in Italy during the first Punic War, Plb. 
1.58.9.  On the administration of direct taxes, Aperghis notes that Seleucid direct taxes required extensive and 
precise assessment, Aperghis (2004), 137-152.  Both the Romans and the Seleucids utilized intermediate tax 
farmers in order to reduce administrative burdens on the state, E. Badian, Publicans and Sinners: Private Enterprise 
in the Service of the Roman Republic (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1972).   
139 S. T. Roselaar, Public Land in the Roman Republic, A Social and Economic History of Ager Publicus in Italy, 396-89 
B.C. (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2010), 119-133. 
140 Erdkamp (2005), 106-120.  Morley, (1996), 86-90. 
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Such concentrated wealth was easier for smaller states to tap into, either with compulsion 
or through more or less voluntary expressions of civic-mindedness.  In classical Athens, these 
elite contributions tended to find expression through expensive liturgies, most notably the 
trierarchy, and emergency taxes such as the Athenian eisphora of 428/7.  Poleis in the 
Hellenistic period increasingly relied on voluntary euergetism, often connected to the holding of 
public office.141  Perhaps the most significant advantage of this method, especially for smaller 
states in the ancient world, was the relatively low administrative overhead required for an 
arrangement that often merely mandated that the wealthy themselves pay for certain state 
functions.142 Because such a mechanism relies heavily on the civic-mindedness of a city’s elite, 
euergetism as a means of state finance scales poorly to larger states.  While involved in systems 
of euergetism, Hellenistic states more often acted as benefactors, through the personal 
benefactions of their kings, rather than as recipients.143 
 The final option was to shift some of the costs of warfare directly onto the small farmers 
themselves, effectively privatizing parts of the war effort, although it is worth noting that for 
many ancient societies which had never had entirely state-run warfare there would be no sense 
                                                          
141 The eisphora, a direct tax against the property of the wealthy was levied in 428/7, raising 200 talents (Thuc. 
3.19.1) but probably abandoned by 425/4.  On the scale of elite spending, both voluntary and not, see David M. 
Pritchard, Public Spending and Democracy in Classical Athens (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2015), 42-48, 93-6.  
On the tension between democratic politics and euergetism in state finance, see Edward Ch. L. van der Vliet, “Pride 
and Participation.  Political Practice, Euergetism, and Oligarchisation in the Hellenistic Polis” in Political Culture in 
the Greek City after the Classical Age, eds. Onno M. van Nijf and Richard Alston (Leuven, Peeters, 2011), 155-184. 
142 Elite gifts, especially when in the form of trusts or donations towards specific practices, could entail some 
administrative overhead in the management of the money once in state hands, see Kaja Harter-Uibopuu, “Money 
for the Polis, Public Administration of Private Donations in Hellenistic Greece” in Political Culture in the Greek City 
after the Classical Age, eds. Onno M. van Nijf and Richard Alston (Leuven: Peeters, 2011), 119-139. 
143 Klaus Bringmann, “The King as Benefactor: Some Remarks on Ideal Kingship in the Age of Hellenism,” in Images 
and Ideologies, Self Definition in the Hellenistic World, eds, A. W. Bulloch et al. (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1993), 7-24. 
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that these activities somehow inherently ‘belonged’ to the public sphere.  Such privatization, 
though a conspicuous feature of the Roman Republic, was not unique to it or to the ancient 
world.144  As a method of mobilization, the privatization of some or most of the costs of warfare 
had the advantage of limiting the necessary administrative overhead, which was a significant 
benefit for ancient states that often had relatively few administrative officials.  In practice, 
privatizing the costs of warfare worked, much like direct taxes, by forcing smallholders to 
increase production, either by working more land or by working land more intensively, in order 
to meet the new costs while maintaining subsistence. This cost shifting could take the form of 
requiring soldiers to bring their own equipment or pay for their own supplies, or in the form of 
recruitment by conscription with below-market-value pay for soldiers, all mechanisms used not 
only by the Roman Republic but also other ancient states.145  This practice could prove very 
potent, especially in a context where state resources were often small compared to the total size 
of the economy.  Moreover, for pre-state peoples, where there was even less in the way of 
administrative structure, some practice of devolution, either onto individuals or onto wealthy 
grandees was effectively unavoidable.   
Mobilization through private expenditure was not without its limitations, however.  Most 
systems of this sort were forced to exchange at least some degree of political involvement, or at 
least group membership in order to motivate private buy-in in the war effort.  It is possible, of 
course, to conscript unwilling recruits by force, but it is much more difficult to convince them to 
                                                          
144 Landers, (2003), 285-287, 304-6. 
145 The stipendium for Roman soldiers in the period very small and decidedly below market value, Plb. 6.39.12.  The 
rations for Romans (but not allies) was then deducted from that value reducing it further, Plb. 6.39.14. 
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spend their own money in the process.146  As a result, this form of mobilization came with 
political costs.  Indeed, military participation was one of the major sources of leverage used 
during the struggle of the orders in Rome to obtain political concessions from the then-dominant 
patricians.  Livy draws attention to the connection between military service and political voice in 
his account of Lucius Verginius and the fall of the decemviri.  Livy has Lucius Icilius predict, 
correctly, that Verginius, on account of his military service and position as a centurion, could 
count on the aid of the soldiers.147  Verginius, for his part uses his military service as his chief 
argument to obtain legal help and when initially thwarted by a corrupt judge declares “I cannot 
believe a people will endure this who have arms.”148 As Kurt Raaflaub notes, eligibility for 
military service was what changed well-off Plebians “from nobodies to somebodies” who could 
then effect political change.149   
Such a phenomenon was not unique to the Romans.  Political involvement and military 
service were deeply interconnected in most Greek poleis, a point recognized by Aristotle in the 
Politics, who notes that “When, however, states began to increase in size, and infantry forces 
acquired a greater degree of strength, more persons were admitted to the enjoyment of political 
rights.”150 Even though serving under a king, Macedonian soldiers in the age of Philip and 
                                                          
146 Landers, (2003), 284-5. 
147 Livy 3.45.9.  Verginius’ successful appeal to the soldiers is what provokes a full crisis and brings down the 
decemviri, Livy 3.50. 
148 Livy 3.47.2-7.  passurine haec isti sint, nescio: non spero esse passuros illos, qui arma habent. 
149 K. Raaflaub, “From Protection and Defense to Offense and Participation: Stages in the Conflict of the Orders” in 
Social Struggles in Archaic Rome: new Perspectives on the Conflict of the Orders, 2nd Edition, ed. Kurt A. Raaflaub 
(Malden: Blackwell, 2005), 197. 
150 Aristotle, Politics 1296b16-28.  αὐξανομένων δὲ τῶν πόλεων καὶ τῶν ἐν τοῖς ὅπλοις ἰσχυσάντων μᾶλλον πλείους 
μετεῖχον τῆς πολιτείας.  On the connection between military service and political involvement in early Greek poleis 
generally, see Kurt A. Raaflaub, “Homer to Solon: the Rise of the Polis, The Written Sources” in The Ancient Greek 
City-State: Symposium on the occasion of the 250th Anniversary of the Royal Danish Academy of Sciences and 
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Alexander expected to be able to petition their king, and even that their king might have to 
justify himself to them.151  Because group membership in these systems was often exclusive, 
these relationships were difficult to scale up, a problem demonstrated perhaps most notably by 
the sharp negative reaction to Alexander’s effort to include ethnic Persians in roles typically 
reserved for Macedonians in his army.152  Thus while effective, devolving costs onto either elite 
landholders or the smallholding class was generally restricted to an often small group of 
stakeholders in the community which was difficult to expand effectively. 
 
Prices, Costs and Warfare 
Whatever the method of used to acquire and spend the surplus, certain costs will remain 
regardless.  Here it is important to clarify the distinction between costs and price.  Price refers to 
the amount paid for a good or service in a transaction, typically measured in money.  An object 
given away freely may thus rightly be called priceless, as there was no price in the transaction, 
but such an object is not costless, as the object’s production still incurred costs in time, labor and 
                                                          
letters, July 1-4 1992, ed. M. H. Hansen (Copenhagen, Det Kongelige Danske Videnskabernes Selskab, 1993), 41-
105, Kurt A. Raaflaub, “Soldiers, Citizens and the Evolution of the Early Greek Polis” in The Development of the Polis 
in Archaic Greece, eds. L. G. Mitchell and P. J. Rhodes (London: Routledge, 1997), 49-59, and Walter Donlan, “The 
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Power and Imperialism in Fifth-Century Athens” in Athenian Political Thought and the Reconstruction of American 
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and Kurt A. Raaflaub, “Equalities and Inequalities in Athenian Democracy” in Demokratia: A Conversation on 
Democracies, Ancient and Modern, eds. Josiah Ober and Charles Hedrick (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 
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151 Arr. Anabasis 5.25.-29, 7.8.1-7.11.9.  Cf. also the rebuke of Hermolaus in Curtius Rufus, 8.7.1. 
152 Arr. Anabasis 7.6.2-5, 7.8.1-3.  The subsequent banquet, Arr. Anabsis 7.11.8, served to confirm the central place 
of the Macedonians in literal fashion, by seating Alexander at the center, with the Macedonians around him, the 
Persians next, and all others pushed to the fringe. 
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resources.  Discussions of prices in the ancient world are necessarily difficult.  Price data in 
general for the ancient world are scarce and often unreliable.  Moreover, a great many economic 
interactions in all ancient societies were not conducted through market exchange, and thus have 
no price, monetary or otherwise, to assess.  While this study will occasionally refer to some of 
the few figures we have for prices in the ancient world, or to price comparanda from other pre-
modern societies, these should be understood not as meaningful on their own, but only as a way 
to reach the more important piece of information: cost.   
In this study, the term cost is taken to mean, more precisely, opportunity cost, that is the 
cost of forgoing other opportunities in order to perform an activity or produce an object.  In 
technical terms, the opportunity cost of something is the value of the ‘next best’ option for the 
use of the same inputs of time, resources and money.  For example, the money used to purchase 
a bronze helmet for a soldier could have gone towards any number of other activities, with the 
opportunity cost of the bronze helmet being the value of the ‘next best’ forgone option.  At a 
more basic level, the smith who forged the helmet could have produced a different object with 
that metal, or if no helmets were required at all, taken up another tradecraft entirely.  In this 
sense, cost encompasses all of the outputs forgone in order to produce or acquire a good, that 
being in essence the ‘true cost’ of something, accounting for the resources consumed, the time 
and expertise spent, and the other options forgone.   
These costs can then be divided into two conceptual units, production costs and 
transaction costs.  Production costs are all of the costs directly related to the production of the 
equipment and supplies required for warfare.  These production costs will include not only, for 
instance, the metal required to forge a sword, but also the cost of setting up production facilities 
(capital costs) and even the costs of food and necessities needed to maintain not only the 
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craftsman who forges the sword itself, but also the many miners, smelters and strikers required to 
produce and process the ore to produce the final product.153  On top of these costs, we must also 
consider transaction costs; that is the cost required to acquire and move the supplies and 
equipment.  For instance, the grain used to feed an army might have a relatively low production 
cost, but a high transaction cost if it must be shipped a long distance to reach the army, or if the 
official in charge of its purchase is corrupt and pockets a portion of the sale.  For the purposes of 
this study, transaction costs include not only the costs associated with the immediate acquisition 
of equipment and supplies, but also the costs and inefficiency losses associated with acquiring 
the revenue in the first place.  As a result, each step in the chain from levying taxes to the final 
deployment of the army on the battlefield entails transaction costs and thus reduced efficiency.  
The total cost of either a fleet or an army would thus be the sum of all relevant production and 
transaction costs.154 
At a basic level, production costs are not meaningfully impacted by the method of 
exchange.  A soldier may, for instance, be issued a grain ration at state expense, or the value of 
that ration may be deducted from his pay (the same thing in all but an accounting sense), or he 
may be given a small stipend with which to buy the grain, or he may even plunder the grain from 
the enemy, but the amount of grain he consumes and the amount of labor and resources that went 
into producing that grain (and that thus cannot be used for other purposes) remains the same.  
Likewise, a weapon may be purchased individually or at state expense, or be given as a gift or 
plundered, but it must still be forged nonetheless.  This is particularly relevant for non-monetized 
                                                          
153 Even this understates the full costs of any worked metal object, which would also have to account for the 
acquisition of large quantities of fuel for both the smelting and forging (or casting) processes. 
154 The cost of warfare in its entirety would be higher still, as it must include the cost of the destruction warfare 
entails, see Landers (2003), 300-308, 334-354. 
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or minimally monetized societies (such as those in Spain and Gaul), where few of the costs of 
warfare would have been expressed in monetary terms.  Even without monetary transaction, 
production costs remain the same.  Given that the economic growth rate in the ancient world was 
very low, at least by modern standards, it follows that differences in overall productivity, at least 
between the more densely settled and urbanized regions, were also fairly low, meaning that these 
basic costs of production are likely to have been reasonably similar from one ancient state to the 
next, although we lack the evidence to be sure on this point.155  While some areas will have 
enjoyed some productive advantage over others, these advantages are likely to have been slight. 
However, differences in the transaction costs associated with raising armies and navies 
for warfare could have been significant, and transaction costs, including transportation costs, in 
some cases will have dwarfed production costs.  Over long distance, the cost of transporting 
supplies, particularly food and water, could often exceed the cost of the supplies themselves.156  
                                                          
155 In order to sustain the prevailing model of significant but relatively low growth, especially in the presence of 
increasing economic connectivity through trade, differences in productivity between regions would also need to be 
relatively small (though not necessarily insignificant).  If regions had significant differences in productivity as a 
result of production methods, the diffusion of those methods, which was taking place in this period and especially 
subsequently, would result in substantial economic growth.  Alternately, if large differences in productivity were 
the result of local factors, the result would be substantial local comparative advantage, which would cause the 
observed increase in trade over the period to result in more pronounced growth.  While there is evidence for both 
of these processes occurring at some level, the limited scope of those changes, combined with relatively muted 
evidence for change in overall productivity would suggest, in conformity with the prevailing model of relatively 
low, if significant, growth, that differences in productivity in the Mediterranean world were relatively small and 
more dependent on local factors like soil fertility.  On the significant but relatively low rate of growth in this period 
and subsequently under the Roman Empire, see Richard Saller, “Framing the Debate over Growth in the Ancient 
Economy” in The Ancient Economy, eds. Walter Scheidel and Sitta von Reden (New York, 2002), 251-269. On 
technological diffusion generally, note K. Greene, “Technological innovation and economic progress in the ancient 
world: M. I. Finley reconsidered,” Economic History Review 53.1 (2000): 29-59.  On technological diffusion in 
agriculture and the agronomists, see Morley, (1996), 71-82, 115-129.  That the scale of trade rose generally over 
the period has been demonstrated convincingly by archaeology, see A. J. Parker, Ancient Shipwrecks of the 
Mediterranean & the Roman Provinces (Oxford: Tempus Repartum, 1992). 
156 On transportation losses for food supplies, see Roth (199), 156-219, Erdkamp (1998), 15-26, Donald W. Engels, 
Alexander the Great and the Logistics of the Macedonian Army (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1978), 14-
22.  On water, G. Moss, “Watering the Roman Legion,” (master’s thesis, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 
2015). 
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In addition to transportation losses, transaction costs also include inefficiency losses at each 
stage of mobilization.  Polybius famously cites a resistance to corruption as a Roman strength, 
but these inefficiency losses extend beyond simple corruption to include tax and conscription 
resistance and the cost of the administrative overhead necessary for tax extraction and 
mobilization.157  A state that requires large numbers of tax officials in order to gather the revenue 
necessary to engage in warfare is incurring a transaction cost maintaining those officials as those 
officials are a large part of the cost of moving resources from the countryside where they 
originate to the point where they can be used for warfare.  These inefficiency losses occur 
independently of the effectiveness of the actual revenue extraction measure, which is to say that 
a state may be able to extract a very large portion of the available agricultural surplus of its 
territory, but find it can only do so at the cost of very high inefficiency losses, such as those 
through administrative overhead, with the result that the added revenue does not outweigh the 
increased inefficiency losses.158  Because transaction costs are heavily dependent on the methods 
and institutions used to gather resources and mobilize them for warfare, the difference in 
transaction costs between different societies and states can potentially be quite large. 
The fundamental scarcity of resources also forced ancient states and societies into trade-
offs between quality and quantity.  Significant quality costs, either through training and 
experience or better equipment meant that fielding better soldiers usually meant fielding less of 
them.159  While relatively cheap light infantry still remained important in battle, by the third 
                                                          
157 Plb. 6.56.12-15. 
158 Perhaps the most obvious example of this phenomenon in action would be cases in which high tax rates 
triggered revolts. 
159 Landers, (2003), 291-296. 
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century B.C. the battlefields of Mediterranean were dominated by the more expensive heavy 
infantry and cavalry, with most armies adopting a combined arms framework (with lighter 
missile infantry, heavy infantry and cavalry) where the heavy infantry was the primary arm.160  
Where equipment was state issued and training was formalized, the trade-offs between quality 
and quantity are relatively obvious as more expensive equipment and more extensive training 
times will have consumed scarce state revenues.  Nevertheless these ‘quality costs’ will have 
remained in force even when the cost of recruiting soldiers was non-monetary; as noted above, 
high quality soldiers had a tendency to successfully demand political concessions from their 
leaders. 
In other cases, as with other parts of the mobilization system, the informal systems and 
formal institutions which controlled the tradeoff between quality and quantity were often legacy 
systems resistant to change.  Even in systems where the acquisition of military equipment was 
substantially privatized, the quality of equipment would depend significantly on the underlying 
economic makeup of individual households and on patterns of landholding, since most of the 
soldier-supplying households would have been smallholders.  While a countryside with fewer 
but better landed and thus wealthier households would produce more expensively equipped 
soldiers, it would produce fewer of them, given the scarcity of land.  Substantially altering those 
tradeoffs would have been difficult for any ruler as landholding patterns were typically resistant 
to change, although the creation of Hellenistic military settlements in the east and of Roman 
                                                          
160 On the size of the cavalry in Antigonid armies, see M. B. Hatzopoulos, L’organisation de L’armée Macédonienne 
sous les Antigonides: Problèmes Anciens et Documents Nouveaux (Athens: Boccard, 2001), 34.  On the size of the 
cavalry in Roman armies, see Plb. 6.20.9 and L. Keppie, The Making of the Roman Army: From Republic to Empire 
(London: BT Batsford, 1984), 33-35.  Comparative evidence suggests that an individual cavalryman might have 
been perhaps a bit more than twice the cost of a heavy infantryman, see Landers (2003), 295-6 and H. Elton, 
Warfare in Roman Europe AD 350-425 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), 122. 
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colonies in Italy both represent unusual opportunities for shaping these factors.161  Moreover, 
where there were opportunities to shape patterns of landholding and settlement, rulers often 
faced a range of competing political, military and economic objectives.162  Finally, ethnic and 
auxiliary contingents often fought in their own cultural styles and with their own equipment that 
would have been difficult and often counter-productive to change.163  Whether the compromise 
between quality soldiers and the quantity of soldiers was struck by the state or imposed on it by 
socially embedded legacy systems, the result remained that the two values were opposed, given a 
set amount of available agricultural surplus to be ‘spent,’ either directly or indirectly, on warfare. 
The result of all of these factors is that the question of military power in the ancient world 
was fundamentally a question of extracting resources from the very limited agricultural surplus 
and then efficiently deploying those resources for war.  However, it was mobilized, it was this 
extracted surplus that not only fed the army but also fueled the necessary secondary economic 
activity of building ships and making equipment.  Ancient sources still compared military power 
by the metrics they themselves could observe, such as available manpower,164 counts of ships,165 
and available funds,166 but these indicators were merely the visible manifestation of the deeper 
                                                          
161 Bar Kochva (1976) 20-47; Fischer-Bovet (2014), 18-37l; E. T. Salmon, Roman Colonization under the Republic 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press: 1970), 1-94. 
162 Aperghis notes that Seleucid land grants appear to aim to maximize silver revenue, rather than primarily serving 
political or military purposes, Aperghis (2004), 112-3.  Note that Roman colonies in Italy are the exception to this 
rule, being, as E.T. Salmon notes, principally military in function, Salmon (1970), 15. 
163 Bar Kochva (1976), 48-53.  Fischer-Bovet (2014), 138-42, Keppie (1984), 78-9.   
164 Plb. 2.24.  Thuc. 2.13.6-8. 
165 Plb. 1.63.  Thuc. 2.13.8. 
166 Thuc. 2.13.3-5.  Cf. also on the importance of money Thuc. 6.34.2, Cic. Phil 5.5. 
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economic factors that produced them.167  After all, a large population meant relatively little if 
sufficient resources could not be mobilized to supply and equip the generally abundant excess 
laborers in the countryside, while an abundance of money in the absence of a system to convert 
that money into the resources necessary for warfare was equally unprofitable.  Existing in a 
system of militarized interstate anarchy, ancient states and pre-state peoples were forced to seek 
to increase this sort of military power in order to remain secure, leading to intense competition 
over territory, which is to say competition over the regions that could produce the revenue and 
agricultural surplus that could feed further military activity.  In that context, victory belonged to 
the state that could produce the most efficient system for converting their agricultural surplus 
into war supplies and matériel, turning their agricultural economy into a war machine.  That state 
was Rome. 
 
 The rest of this study then aims to examine the evidence for Roman dominance in this 
war of resource extraction through an examination of the war matériel of the period, and also to 
suggest the mechanisms through which the Romans achieved this dominance.  Issues of food 
supply for armies, although important, will receive less focus because they have been discussed 
amply in other works.168  Likewise, this study will not focus on the careers of individual generals 
or the progress of individual campaigns.  It took the Roman Republic more than a century to 
defeat all of its rivals and to secure a durable Roman dominance over the Mediterranean; such 
                                                          
167 Using a few of the end products, usually highly visible or high prestige end products, of a war economy to gauge 
the overall economic might of a belligerent is not a method contained to the ancient sources, cf. for instance 
Richard Overy, Why the Allies Won (New York: W. W. Norton & Company: 1995), 180-244, 331-2.  
168 See especially Roth (1999), Erdkamp (1998) and Engels (1978). 
 53 
conquests cannot be attributed to a single brilliant campaign or military figure.  Instead, each of 
the following chapters will look at a system or set of systems for mobilization. 
 Chapter two will examine naval warfare, particularly in the context of the First Punic 
War, in which Rome achieved a level of dominance on the Mediterranean that it would maintain 
throughout the period.  This chapter approaches the problem of the high cost of naval warfare by 
comparing the naval efforts of Rome and Carthage in what Polybius correctly notes was the 
largest naval war in the ancient Mediterranean world.169  This chapter draws into question the 
narrative presented by Polybius and largely accepted by modern historians of the Romans, 
inexperienced at sea, overcoming a passive Carthage through sheer willpower and endurance at 
sea.  Instead, a detailed analysis of the naval costs borne by both sides suggests that Carthaginian 
and Roman expenditures in the naval war were roughly equal in scale.  Carthage, far from being 
passive or feckless, attempted to implement a consistent defensive strategy which had worked in 
the past against opponents like Pyrrhus, and very nearly worked against the Romans as well.  Far 
from lacking will, Carthage was willing to dedicate tremendous resources to this strategy.  
Nevertheless, this chapter also establishes the stunning scale of Roman expenditure required to 
exhaust Carthaginian resources in order to produce a Roman victory against an entrenched 
opponent. 
 Chapter three lays the groundwork for the remainder of this study by examining the 
supply and matériel costs for military activity.  While our evidence is often limited, I suggest that 
the balance of the evidence suggests that Roman expenditures in each element of these costs was 
likely to be higher, and certainly not likely to be much lower, than Rome’s rivals in the 
                                                          
169 Plb. 1.63. 
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Mediterranean world.  In addition, this chapter presents a more detailed discussion of the costs 
involved in the production of military equipment, especially arms and armor, and suggests that 
metal content may serve as an effective proxy for cost in the absence of price data. 
 Chapter four then looks at the equipment of the armies of Rome.  Contrary to the 
impression presented by modern scholarship of the infinitely expendable Roman soldier, an 
analysis of the cost of Roman field equipment, especially the quantity of metal used, strongly 
suggests that Roman soldiers were unusually expensive, despite their vast quantity.  Moreover, 
the equipment that Romans purchased for themselves at such cost created a real qualitative 
advantage, especially in defensive armaments.  Finally, the massive deployments of these 
uncommonly expensive Roman soldiers suggest that the Roman Republic was able to mobilize 
the resources of Italy on a very large scale, and furthermore that Roman success was as much a 
product of economic and institutional factors as demographic ones. 
 Chapter five then examines Rome’s chief land-power rivals, the three largest successor 
states, Antigonid Macedon, Ptolemaic Egypt and the Seleucid kingdom.  While each of these 
states used the same sort of heavy infantry with comparable equipment to provide the core of 
their armies, they all functioned under different constraints.  The analysis of the equipment of the 
Macedonian phalanx shows that, despite the large size of these kingdoms and their access to 
wealthy regions of the Mediterranean, the Macedonian equipment was substantially less metal-
intensive and thus less expensive than that of its Roman counterparts. Even with expansive 
empires, Hellenistic kings found themselves needing to continue using more cost-effective 
equipment in order to field a strong army.  Hellenistic rulers could, to a degree, counteract the 
disparity in resources by concentrating their own forces to obtain local superiority, but the scale 
of Roman deployments in the period and the concomitant cost of those deployments suggest that 
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such a strategy was unlikely to be successful in the long-term.  Moreover, Roman victories 
against large royal armies accomplished with only a fraction of Rome’s total active legions 
suggests that concentration of force was insufficient to fully counteract the Roman qualitative 
advantage. 
 Chapter six assesses the pre-state peoples or ‘barbarians’ that Rome fought through the 
third and second century B.C.E.170  Pre-state peoples, whether the Numantines in Spain, the 
Gallic mercenaries in Hannibal’s army, or the Cimbri and the Teutones who invaded Italy at the 
end of the second century, should not be dismissed.  Indeed, apart from Hannibal, some of 
Rome’s worst defeats in this period came at the hands of so-called ‘barbarians.’  An examination 
of the equipment of these various peoples reveals that they were not simply unsophisticated 
‘barbarians.’  Gallic equipment of the highest quality could be every bit as good as or even better 
than its Roman counterparts, and the Romans adopted more weapons and armor for use in this 
period from these groups than from any other.  However, literary, archaeological and 
representation evidence suggests that class distinctions in equipment quality, while also present 
in Hellenistic, Greek and Roman equipment, were far more strongly felt in the armies of pre-
state peoples.  Moreover, the limited and relatively less expensive equipment used by the non-
elite pre-state warriors speaks to the overall economic weakness of these societies when 
confronted with the Roman war machine, despite the evidently masterful skill of some Spanish 
and Gallic artisans. 
                                                          
170 The term pre-state, used here and following, is admittedly a somewhat imperfect and teleological term.  
However, by this period many of these peoples were already showing signs of early state formation, especially in 
Gaul.  As such, it seems more fitting to refer to them as pre-state rather than non-state, given that some of the 
early elements of state organization, particularly the beginnings of the emergence of larger political groupings 
under kings, were beginning to occur. 
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 Finally, the seventh chapter considers the results of each of these studies together.  This 
apparent paradox of Rome fielding large armies without sacrificing quality to do so is explained 
by the unique and culturally embedded system of recruitment and resource mobilization used by 
the Romans, which relied heavily on personal civic engagement to motivate private spending on 
warfare, both by elites and smallholders.  The great strength of the Roman system came from its 
unique ability, culturally embedded in Italic notions of hierarchical relationships, to scale up this 
system of civic engagement to include much of Italy, allowing the Roman Republic access to a 
very large pool of resources at very low administrative overhead.  In contrast, the three large 
successor states were never able to extract the full potential military resources from their 
territories and had to contend with substantial administrative and military overhead for what 
resources they were able to gain.  Rome’s pre-state enemies, on the other hand, ‘punched above 
their weight,’ becoming outsized threats to Rome despite their comparatively small resource 
bases; but they were not able to scale up sufficiently to match Rome’s massive and extensively 
exploited resource base. 
 Rome’s war machine both bequeathed to the Roman Republic an empire and also 
eventually consumed the Republic it was supposed to safeguard.  While history does not follow 
any pre-determined course, such a feat was not so much the result of luck or chance, but rather 
an outgrowth of an exceptionally powerful, if improvised, system of mobilization.  Rome’s 
ability to marshal tremendous resources for war did not make Roman victory inevitable, and it 
most certainly did not make Roman armies unbeatable.  But it did make Rome’s eventual 
dominance the most likely resolution to the militarized system of interstate anarchy that 
dominated the Mediterranean after the death of Alexander the Great, because it provided to 
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Rome the resilience to come back fighting, with fresh troops and fresh equipment, even after 
disasters like the battles of Drepana, Cannae or Arausio.   
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CHAPTER 2: NAVAL WARFARE: THE CARTHAGINIANS
 
 Of all of the military operations available to ancient states, naval warfare probably placed 
the greatest demands on finances and resources.  Naval warfare was staggeringly expensive, such 
that only relatively large states, or confederations of many smaller states, seem to have been able 
to engage in it on a significant scale.  Naval warfare apparently could not be handled through a 
non-monetary economy in the same way that the costs of a land army could often be devolved 
directly onto soldier-farmers themselves.  Rowers, drawn from the poor, had to be paid, or at 
least fed, in massive numbers.  Shipwrights and the members of the hyperesia, the officers of a 
warship, were skilled and thus could be expensive, needing to be either bought or trained.1  The 
resource requirements in timber, cloth and bronze to construct these warships were staggering 
and would have to be met somehow. 
 The First Punic War was, as Polybius notes, “the longest, most unintermittent and 
greatest” naval war fought in the ancient Mediterranean.2  The consensus view on the war is 
perhaps best summed up by John Lazenby, “in a slogging match, Rome could simply outslog 
Carthage.”3  Modern treatments of the war tend to echo Polybius’ own emphasis on the virtue of 
                                                 
1 On the cost of naval expertise, note F. S. Naiden, “Spartan Naval Performance in the Decelean War,” JMH 73.3 
(2009): 729-44.  There has been some debate concerning the meaning of the term hyperesia.  In using hyperesia in 
the sense of the specialists and officers of a warship, I follow J. S. Morrison, “Hyperesia in Naval Contexts in the 
Fifth and Fourth Centuries BC” JHS 104 (1984), 48-59. 
2 Plb. 1.63.4.  πόλεμος ὧν ἡμεῖς ἴσμεν ἀκοῇ μαθόντες πολυχρονιώτατος καὶ συνεχέστατος καὶ μέγιστος. 
3 J. F. Lazenby, “Rome and Carthage” in The Cambridge Companion to the Roman Republic, ed. H. I. Flower 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 270. 
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Roman willpower, often with the implication that this was the quality that Carthage lacked.4  
Lazenby berates the Carthaginians for their lack of initiate or aggressive strategy, concluding 
“there can be no doubt that, militarily speaking, Rome deserved to win.”5  John Grainger instead 
declares it a problem of unequal resources, noting “it was not that Rome and Carthage were 
generally equal in manpower and resources, still less in military ability.  Rome had greater 
supplies of all of these than Carthage.”6  This, of course, is the story Polybius has chosen to tell: 
a story about landlubber Romans who, by grit, sheer determination, endless resources and an 
apparently limitless tolerance for casualties, master a type of warfare with which they were both 
unfamiliar and temperamentally unsuited.  Polybius’ work is a cautionary tale, and the place of 
the First Punic War in that tale is as an omen.  Polybius declares at the end of his account “this 
confirms the assertion I ventured to make at the outset that the progress of the Romans was not 
due to chance.”7 
 Parts of this cautionary tale have already come under some scrutiny.  Christa Steinby 
persuasively argues in The Roman Republican Navy that the Romans were hardly as 
inexperienced as Polybius suggests, and that moreover the Carthaginians had likely only recently 
adopted the quinquereme or ‘five.’8  The skill gap, then, was not an illusion, but was by no 
means as wide as Polybius implies.  This might have been apparent to a close reader of Polybius, 
                                                 
4 Plb. 1.59.1. 
5 J. F. Lazenby, The First Punic War: A military history, (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1996), 170. 
6 J. D. Grainger, Hellenistic and Roman Naval Wars, 336-31 BC (Barnsley: Pen and Sword, 2011), 98.  Grainger 
here strikes a similar theme to J. H. Thiel, A History of Roman Sea-Power Before the Second Punic War 
(Amsterdam: North Holland Publishing Company, 1954), 332-337. 
7 Plb. 1.63.9. 
8 Christa Steinby, The Roman Republican Navy: From the sixth century to 167 B.C. (Helsinki: Societas Scientiarum 
Fennica, 2007). 
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who might note that, for a bunch of landlubbers, the Romans surprisingly win nearly all of the 
naval battles in the war. 
 Moreover, this conviction that the Romans won the war in part by a willingness to 
expend a far greater quantity of resources does not rest on a secure foundation.  Many scholars 
over the years have attempted to work through Polybius’ narrative to tease out what we might 
call an operational history of the naval war, including the naval strength of both sides, but this 
approach has not translated into an effort to gauge cost in any systematic way; instead it often 
falls back on Polybius’ own report of warships lost to each side.  Doubtless this approach is 
partly due to the evidence, for while Polybius notes that both the Romans and Carthaginians 
were exhausted by the end of the war, he provides no firm figures for the cost of ships, crews or 
fleets.  This gap in information stands in stark contrast to the narrative of the other great historian 
of naval wars, Thucydides, who lays great stress on the financial resources of Athens.9  On the 
subject of Roman manpower, Polybius is more than helpful, but on Roman finance he is almost 
totally silent. 
 This chapter aims to illuminate this gap and, in the process, shed some light on the 
astounding quantity of resources that Rome expended to become the master of the waters around 
Sicily, and the equally astounding quantity of resources that Carthage expended in failing to stop 
the Romans.  The chapter will proceed in three main parts, after a brief introduction on the nature 
of the sources themselves.  The first of the main parts aims to lay the groundwork by discussing 
the basic types of warships available to the Romans and Carthaginians, and the nature of the 
costs and limitations associated with these oar-powered warships.  These limitations are 
particularly important because ancient oar-powered warships are, in several important ways, 
                                                 
9 For instance, note Thuc. 1.80.3-4, 1.142.1-9, 2.13.3-6. 
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quite different from modern warships, or even warships of the age of sail, a fact often 
significantly underappreciated.  Having established the nature of these ships, the chapter then 
moves to its second main part, a detailed case-study of the evidence for the naval operations of 
the war, with the aim of constructing a plausible, if speculative, year-by-year reconstruction of 
fleet strengths and ship construction.  Finally, in the third part, this reconstruction provides the 
basis for a rough estimate of the relative total expenditure of both sides of the war, from which, 
finally, conclusions may be drawn. 
 
Sources 
 The principal source for the naval aspects of the First Punic War is Polybius’ account in 
the first book of his histories.  Polybius’ account is far closer to the original tradition than any 
other surviving account, such as those of Diodorus or Dio Cassius (via Zonaras), and provides a 
less confused and more coherent narrative of the war besides.  Further evidence does exist 
outside of Polybius’ account in sometimes fragmented and confused chunks in the works of 
Florus and Orosius, as well as the anonymous De Viris Illustribus; all of these sources pale in 
comparison to the reliability and enduring influence of Polybius.  However, his account poses 
some significant problems for assessing the cost of the naval aspects of the First Punic War that 
must be addressed.  Perhaps the most pressing problem is that he provides no detailed breakdown 
of materials or costs for the ships in question, preferring instead to use ship-counts as a proxy for 
his claim that “no forces of such magnitude ever met at sea.”10  Polybius’ purpose too, must put 
us on our guard, for even if we assume that his overall numbers are more or less accurate, an 
assumption not without risk, we must also be aware that he is likely to suppress details that might 
                                                 
10 Plb. 1.63.8. 
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weaken his argument that this war was the “longest, most unintermittent and greatest war we 
know of.”11  Fortunately, the discussion of Polybius’ narrative of the First Punic War has not 
stood entirely still, with important recent contributions on the topic, most notably by Christa 
Steinby.12 
 As a result, in revisiting the question of the cost of naval warfare in the First Punic War, 
it is necessary to reach beyond Polybius, even though he cannot be disregarded.  This chapter, 
then, seeks to combine recent archaeology and scholarship on the costs of warfare to enable a 
new and more probing look at the tremendous cost of the war at sea that Polybius presents.  
Perhaps the most valuable comparanda for the cost of the First Punic War are the costs 
associated with the financing of the Athenian navy, a topic with an increasingly useful body of 
scholarship owing to the larger body of literary and epigraphic evidence surrounding the 
Athenian navy and Athenian state finance compared to the Roman Republic.13  While the 
mechanisms of Roman naval finance were likely quite different, the structure of costs in the 
Athenian navy can offer us some hints as to what the major expenses were and their rough 
magnitudes, costs which will have to have been paid by the Romans one way or another.  In 
addition, efforts to reconstruct the Athenian trireme, culminating in the Olympias, have also 
significantly informed our understanding of the heavier ships of the third century, bolstered by 
the recovery and study of a growing body of waterline warship rams, most notably the Athlit ram 
and, more recently, the Egadi rams.14  As a result of this enlarged body of comparative and 
                                                 
11 Plb. 1.63.4. 
12 Christa Steinby, (2007).   
13 Note especially V. Gabrielsen, Financing the Athenian Fleet: Public Taxation and Social Relations (Baltimore: 
John Hopkins University Press, 1990), and Pritchard, (2015). 
14 Note especially L. Casson and J. R. Steffy, The Athlit Ram (College Station, Texas: Texas A&M University Press, 
1991), W. M. Murray, The Age of the Titans: The Rise and Fall of the Great Hellenistic Navies (Oxford: Oxford 
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archaeological evidence, we have ample cause and resources to revisit the question of the costs 
of naval warfare in this period. 
 
Ships, Costs and Limitations 
 Starting in the late fifth century, warship design underwent a period of rapid innovation.  
According to Diodorus, the first ‘five’ was built by the tyrant Dionysius I of Syracuse and was 
launched by the spring of 397.15  The origins of the ‘four’ are more obscure.  The earliest 
reference, found in Quintus Curtius Rufus, is to the siege of Tyre in 332, but Pliny the Elder 
quotes Aristotle as claiming the ‘four’ as a Carthaginian invention.16  Diodorus has Dionysius I 
building ‘fours’ alongside his newly invented ‘fives,’ suggesting that the build was common by 
that point.17  After the death of Alexander and particularly during the career of Demetrius 
Poliorcetes, the building of larger and larger ships took off, culminating in Ptolemy IV’s (r. 221-
204) construction of a ‘forty.’18  While the introduction of these larger ship types did serve to 
diversify the combat roles of warships between different designs, many of the fundamental 
limitations that had applied to the earlier triremes, being in turn a product of galley warfare, 
remained unchanged. 
                                                 
University Press, 2012), and most recently S. Tusa and J. Royal, “The landscape of the naval battle at the Egadi 
Islands (241 B.C.)” JRA 25 (2012), 7-48. 
15 Diodorus 14.41.3 - 44.7. 
16 Curtius 4.3.13, Pliny Nat. Hist. 7.208.   
17 Diodorus 14.41.3. 
18 Murray, (2012), 171-91.  J.S. Morrison and J. F. Coates, Greek and Roman Oared Warships (Oxford: Oxbow, 
1996), 269-277. 
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 General accounts of naval warfare in this period have tended to argue that the emphasis 
on building progressively larger ships reflected a shift from a focus on ramming to a focus on 
boarding.  Larger ships, the reasoning went, were valuable as veritable floating fortresses packed 
with catapults and marines for boarding operations, while classical ramming techniques faded 
into the background.19   This view fits well with an assumption that Roman fleets, increasingly 
dominant in the Mediterranean, prioritized grapple-and-board tactics on account of Roman 
inexperience with the sea. More recently, Christa Steinby has challenged Polybius’ 
representation of the Romans as novices who were forced to rely on the corvus boarding-bridge 
to make up for slow ships and a lack of skill at ramming.20  Her argument is reinforced by recent 
archaeology which has suggested that lighter ships, particularly the trireme, were more common 
in Roman fleets than Polybius’ emphasis on big ships would lead us to believe.21  As a result, the 
assumption of ancient navies shifting to more and more boarding-oriented tactics has been called 
increasingly into question. 
 Recently, William Murray in The Age of Titans has provided a more convincing model 
for the tactical and strategic uses of the increasingly diverse ship-types in Hellenistic fleets.22   
Drawing on the earlier work of Herman Wallinga, Murray rejects the overly simplistic view that 
boarding was a viable alternative to ramming strategies rather than a supplement to them.  
                                                 
19 Note for instance, W. W. Tarn, Hellenistic Military & Naval Developments (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1930), 144-152; Morrison and Coates. (1996), 309-310; Jean Rouge ́, Ships and Fleets of the Ancient 
Mediterranean, (Middletown: Wesleyan University Press, 1981), 96-104; L. Casson Ships and Seamanship in the 
Ancient World (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971), 119-123. 
20 Steinby (2007), 87-104. 
21 Tusa and Royal, (2012), 7-49.  Note that Polybius’ entire point in his section is reinforced by emphasizing the big 
ships. 
22 Murray, (2012). 
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Wallinga noted, in particular, that naval battles would have varied depending on the time of 
engagement, and he proposed three distinct phases based on the level of exhaustion of the 
rowers, with boarding largely confined to the final phase.23  Murray further argues that the 
emphasis in the sources, particularly Livy and Polybius, on the naval battle as land battle, and the 
importance of the skill of the marines, often contradicts the stated outcome of the battle, with 
more ships having been sunk by ramming than captured by boarding.  Rather, this focus, Murray 
argues, had to do with focusing on “a class who mattered to the historians” which is to say, the 
class of free farmers who comprised Rome’s infantry and likely its marines, rather than the 
poorer rowers of the fleet.24 
 Thus, rejecting the assumption of an increased focus on boarding, Murray’s 
reconstruction of naval tactics attempts to make sense of the continuance of ramming and the 
survival of the trireme alongside far larger ships in part by stressing the distinction made in 
ancient authors between larger, heavier ships and smaller, lighter ships.25  Murray’s 
reconstruction may be summed up by breaking ancient ships into three classes defined by 
primary function.  At the smaller end of Murray’s reconstruction are the lighter ships, 
particularly the trireme, along with lemboi and triemioliai, which relied on their speed and 
maneuverability to ram the unprotected sides of enemy ships.  These lighter vessels seemed to 
have featured a somewhat smaller design of ram, were not generally large enough or stout 
enough to ram frontally as a first resort, but instead functioned in larger fleets as escorts 
protecting the larger ships.  The larger workhorses of navies in this period were the heavier ships, 
                                                 
23 H.T. Wallinga, The Boarding Bridge of the Romans: its Construction and its Function in the Naval Tactics of the 
First Punic War (Groningen: J. B. Wolters,1956), 29-50. 
24 Murray (2012), 168-9. 
25 Murray (2012), 3-9, 47-8. 
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particularly the fours, fives and sixes.  The increased size of these vessels, Murray argues, along 
with prow reinforcement and heavier rams, permitted them to engage in prow-on-prow ramming 
against smaller ships, a feature of particular value first in harbor battles connected to sieges, but 
also of use in a crowded naval battle.  Finally, the ‘titans’ of Murray’s title, the ships often far 
larger than a six, appear to have been designed as siege support units.  While these ships could 
function in naval battles, they were designed to specialize in supporting the siege of coastal 
cities.  Neither the Romans nor the Carthaginians appear to have made much use of these super-
heavy ships.  The Carthaginians did not because, for a power on the strategic defensive, such 
mega-ships were of limited use, whereas the Romans clearly expected to conduct their sieges 
primarily by land.  Instead the Romans and Carthaginians focused on fleets that consisted 
primarily of ‘fives’ and ‘threes,’ which were classes of ships, in Murray’s view, well suited for a 
focus on ship-to-ship confrontations.  Overall, Murray’s interpretation of the Hellenistic naval 
system provides a more effective lens through which to analyze Roman and Carthaginian naval 
activities than older scholarship. 
  
Limitations 
Unlike modern navies which are usually independent service arms and often function 
thus on the operational level, the navies of the Classical and Hellenistic period were primarily 
and almost exclusively adjuncts to land forces.  Ancient fleets of galleys could not independently 
achieve complete command of the sea in the Mahanian sense.26  Mahan’s conception of 
command of the sea consisted of the ability to significantly deny access to the sea in general, 
                                                 
26 This does not prevent Mahan from indulging in a lengthy digression on the Punic Wars in his introduction, based 
mostly on a reading of Mommsen; Alfred Thayar Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1600-1783 
(Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1890), 13-22. 
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restricting an enemy force almost entirely to land warfare.  Such control required not only the 
crucial destruction of the enemy fleet but also the control of the strategic positions which 
dominate lines of trade and communication.  Such lines of trade and communication are, for 
Mahan, as a “great highway” or “a wide common” the “first and most obvious light in which the 
sea presents itself;” however, apart from engaging other battle fleets, ancient navies had little 
impact on these lines except at their end points.27  Apart from direct blockades of individual 
cities in support of a land-based siege, ancient fleets mostly lacked the capacity to deny access to 
the sea to an enemy.  Fleets instead served as secondary arms to land forces, delivering them to 
the theatre of operations, supplying them overseas, completing the sieges of coastal cities and 
attempting to prevent enemy fleets from doing the same.  This dependency is born out in the 
language used to describe the overall commander of a fleet, which typically reused terminology 
from land armies.  Roman fleets were most often led by one of the consuls; the leader of a Greek 
fleet was typically a strategos, while the Carthaginians entrusted leadership in war, on land or at 
sea, to a general, rab mahanet (literally an “army chief”).28 
There are some notable exceptions, but the indecisive nature of independent naval action 
serves to prove the rule.  Piracy and coastal raiding are both well attested as early as Homer and 
were occasionally used by Classical and Hellenistic navies, although rarely to decisive effects.29  
During the Peloponnesian War, Thucydides notes several attempts at commerce-raiding, guerre 
                                                 
27 Mahan (1890), 25. 
28 D. Hoyos, Mastering the West: Rome and Carthage at War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 17.  Several 
rab mahanets could be active at once.  Occasionally, Greek admirals are called ναύαρχος, especially in the case of 
Sparta, for instance Thuc. 4.11.2, Xen. Anabasis 1.4.2. 
29 On piracy in Homer and during the Archaic, see De Souza, Piracy in the Graeco-Roman World (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1999), 17-26. 
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de course against Athens.30  Despite Athens’ vulnerability to such tactics, Peloponnesian 
commerce-raiding seems to have had little effect.  Rather, it was the Peloponnesian fleet acting 
in support of a siege of Athens that ended the conflict on favorable terms.31  Philip de Souza 
notes “how unclear the distinction between warfare and piracy could be” in subsequent 
centuries.32  Although Hellenistic rulers often worked to suppress piracy, they also used pirates 
as tools against their enemies; but the most notable uses of such ‘pirates’ were as auxiliaries in 
conventional fleets operating in support of land-based operations.33  Despite the frequent use of 
such auxiliaries, particularly by the Antigonids, there is little sign that these efforts at guerre de 
course were a decisive or even effective use of naval power. 
Coastal raiding, also included in the ancient understanding of piracy, came closer to 
being decisive during the Peloponnesian War after the fortification of Pylos.  The subsequent 
Spartan failure to remove the fort resulted not only in the capture of 220 Spartiates but also 
opened Messenia to raiding.34  Subsequent efforts to control Athenian raiding in the following 
year resulted in a small defeat near Cotyrta; but despite the apparent free-rein of Athenian naval 
raiding, the war continued for another two years before the brief armistice of 423/2 without 
producing Spartan capitulation.  The Athenians would not employ this strategy successfully in 
the subsequent phases of the war.35  Likewise, the Romans were able to defeat a raiding fleet, 
                                                 
30 Thuc. 2.69, 5.115, 8.35.2. 
31 Xen. Hellenica, 2.3-5. 
32 De Souza (1999), 34. 
33 De Souza (1999), 43-48. 
34 Thuc. 4.41. 
35 Thuc. 4.56, 4.116-119. 
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probably Syracusan in origin, in 348 with no fleet of their own, merely by denying the fleet the 
ability to land and thus denying it the ability to operate on the coast of Latium.36   
The most significant impact of Carthaginian coastal raiding in the First Punic War may 
have been providing motivation for the Romans to take to the seas themselves, although 
subsequent operations show the need to complete the sieges of fortified coastal settlements as a 
more decisive use for these fleets.37  Polybius briefly mentions Carthaginian raiding at several 
other points, such as Carthaginian ravaging of the territory of Mylae prior to the battle there and 
again against the Italian coast by Hamilcar in 247, but he gives little impression that these raids 
had any lasting impact.38  Further reports of Carthaginian raiding occur in the accounts of 
Zonaras and Orosius.39  As a result, independent naval action was rarely able to be decisive in 
the ancient world; for that outcome, it had to function as the completion of a land action.40 
 
Costs 
 The structure of the costs of galley fleets also served to weaken the decisiveness of naval 
action, because the cost of replacing a lost fleet was often not so very much higher than the cost 
of maintaining a victorious one.  Nevertheless, initial construction and mobilization costs could 
be formidable.  Livy gives perhaps the best sense of the vast array of resources demanded for 
                                                 
36 Livy 7.25-26.  Steinby (2007), 51-2. 
37 Plb. 1.20.7. 
38 Plb. 1.23.1, 1.56.1-2. 
39 Raiding by Hannibal: Zonaras 8.10, Orosius 4.7.7.  Lazenby (1996), 62, tentatively dates these raids to 261or 260.  
Raiding by Carthalo: Zonaras 9.16, Orosius 4.10.4.  Lazenby (1996), 145, dates these raids between 251 and 248. 
40 These limitations to galley-based naval warfare remain true beyond the chronological limits of the ancient world, 
see Landers (2003), 190-193. 
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such a venture when in 205 Scipio Africanus constructs a relatively small fleet using resources 
from the socii.  Livy reports that, 
The men of Caere promised grain and supplies of all kinds for the naval allies 
(socii navales), the men of Populonium the iron (ferrum), the Tarquinii linen for 
sails, the Volaterrae the internal woodwork and grain, the Arretini three thousand 
shields, as many helmets, fifty thousand pila, javelins and long spears, with an 
equal number of each type and also of axes, shovels, sickles, baskets and 
handmills as many as were needed for forty war-ships, and a hundred and twenty 
thousand modii of wheat also and allowances for the decurions and oarsmen.  The 
Perusini, Clusini and Ruselani promised fir for shipbuilding and a large amount of 
grain; he also used wood from public forests…41 
Livy’s long list of resources, meant to stress Scipio’s resourcefulness, is nevertheless not entirely 
complete; no mention is made, for instance, of bronze for the ship rams, unless Livy includes this 
under the rubric of the ferrum from Populonium.  The reconstruction of the trireme Olympias 
gives a similar impression of the wide range and substantial quantities of resources required to 
build even a single galley warship, including major items like timber, sailcloth, ropes, oars, 
caulking and of course the bronze ram.42 
 The largest bulk item for the construction of ships was timber.  A number of different 
kinds of timber could be used for ship construction, with different sorts of wood being used for 
different functions when available.  Theophrastus notes that, “Fir (elate), pine (peuke) and cedar 
(kedros)” were the most common timbers used for ship construction.43  Theophrastus further 
notes that while fir was the preferred timber for warships because of its lightness, pine was 
                                                 
41 Livy 28.45.13-18.  Caerites frumentum sociis navalibus commeatumque omnis generis, Populonienses ferrum, 
Tarquinienses lintea in vela, Volaterrani interamenta navium et frumentum, Arretini tria milia scutorum, galeas 
totidem, pila gaesa hastas longas, milium quinquaginta summam pari cuiusque generis numero expleturos, secures 
rutra falces alveolos molas, quantum in quadraginta longas naves opus esset, tritici centum et viginti milia modium, 
et in viaticum decurionibus remigibusque conlaturos; Perusini Clusini Rusellani abietem in fabricandas naves et 
frumenti magnum numerum; abiete ex publicis silvis est usus. 
42 J. S. Morrison and J. F. Coates, The Athenian Trireme: The History and Reconstruction of an Ancient Greek 
Warship (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 180-191. 
43 Theophrastus, Enquiry into Plants, 5.7.1-3.  Morrison and Coates (1986), 180-1.  Russell Meiggs, Trees and 
Timber in the Ancient Mediterranean World (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982), 117-8. 
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generally used for merchantmen because it resisted decay, and could be used for warships, as 
could coastal pine (pitys) which was used on Cyprus.  Specialized timbers were also used for 
certain parts of warship construction.  Theophrastus notes the use of oak for the reinforced keel 
of a trireme; oars required a more flexible wood, for which Theophrastus recommends a young 
fir or pine.44  For the interior-work, Theophrastus suggests “mulberry, ash, elm or plane,” but 
also notes that sometimes coastal pine (pitys) is used too, because it is light.45  Meiggs notes that 
other timbers could be used, particularly cypress, as by Alexander in his preparations for the 
planned expedition against Arabia; it is listed later by Vegetius and Pliny as a ship timber.46   
The variety and quantity of timber required for fleet construction were staggering, but 
supplies for both Rome and Carthage were likely to have been local.  Morrison and Coates note 
that the basic wooden shell of the reconstructed trireme Olympias weighed roughly 15 tonnes, 
with another 10 tonnes of woodwork for outriggers, seats, decks and so on, some 25 total tonnes 
of timber, not including the mast, a little more than half the mass of the total ship.47  The timber 
requirements of larger ships, particularly the ‘fives’ that formed the mainstay of Roman and 
Carthaginian fleets in the First Punic War, will have been significantly higher still.  Coates 
estimates the loaded displacement of a relatively light ‘early five’ at 90 tonnes fully loaded, and 
a reconstructed ‘five’ based on the Isola Tiberina monument at 110 tonnes (compared to roughly 
45 tonnes for the Olympias).48  Timber availability would not have been a major problem for the 
                                                 
44 Theophrastus, op cit, 5.7.3-4. 
45 Theophrastus, op cit., 5.7.4.  Here I follow Morrison and Coates in reading τορνεία as ἐντερόνεια, Morrison and 
Coates (1986), 182. 
46 Meiggs (1982), 120.  Vegetius 43.4.  Pliny Nat. Hist. 16.76. 
47 Morrison and Coates (1986), 211. 
48 Morrison and Coates (1996), 285- 303.   
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Roman Republic.  The abundance of good ship timber in Italy was well known and even figures 
into Alcibiades’ recommendation for the Sicilian expedition.49  Livy’s account of the 
construction of a smaller Roman fleet in 205, quoted above, also attests to the Roman reliance on 
local timber supplies.50  Meiggs suggests that the timber required could have come down from 
Etruria and Umbria via the Tiber and its tributaries for final construction in Rome itself.51  
Carthage too, had significant local timber supplies, and Meiggs notes that Carthaginian failure 
should not be attributed to “the difficulty of finding adequate supplies of ship-timber.”52  The 
most plentiful local ship timber for Carthaginian ships would have been Aleppo pine, which 
seems to be confirmed by the study of what was apparently a Punic warship sunk off the north-
western shore of Sicily.53  It is possible, but by no means certain, that this gave the Romans a 
small advantage in the qualities of their ships as fir was amply available in Italy and, according 
to Theophrastus, made for faster warships than pine.54  
 The bronze ram probably represented the single most difficult and expensive part of any 
ancient oared warship and the largest line item in construction after timber.  The manufacture of 
rams was itself a complicated and difficult procedure, because the final ram needed to be free 
from flaws and uniform in composition in order to withstand the tremendous forces at play when 
ramming.  The impact of a 50-metric ton trireme traveling at 10 knots would release some 660kJ 
                                                 
49 Thucydides 6.90.3.  Meiggs, (1982), 124. 
50 Livy 28.45.13-18. 
51 Meiggs, (1982), 141. 
52 Meiggs, (1982), 142. 
53 Meiggs, (1982), 142-3. 
54 Meiggs, (1982), 48, 141.  Morrison and Coates (1986), 180-182.  Theophrastus Enquiry into Plants, 5.7.3-4. 
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of energy, or the equivalent of 157.7g of TNT, roughly the same energy as a car striking a solid 
object at highway speeds.55  Some of this energy would naturally be dispersed as the impact of 
the ramming pushed the struck ship laterally, but additional forces from the forward momentum 
of the struck ship would add to the overall stresses on the ram.  The forces exerted on the ram of 
a ‘five,’ designed to potentially ram another ship head on, would be much higher.  Two 110 
metric ton ‘fives,’ each moving at roughly 10 knots would release some 5,800kJ of energy, or the 
equivalent of 1.38kg of TNT in a head-on impact, representing probably the upper-most bound 
of the force a ram might be expected to withstand in combat.56  In order to withstand these 
forces, a ram would have to be cast as a single piece of bronze at a high level of quality.  
According to work by Asaf Oron, the recovered Athlit Ram appears to have been cast using a 
now lost but well-attested wax process technique for the production of hollow bronzes, although 
producing a bronze of this size and quality would have posed significant technical challenges, as 
noted by both Oron and Murray.57  This method of casting also allowed for a ram that would 
precisely fit the bow of the ship to which it was affixed, which was crucial for effectively 
transferring the force of impact to the ship without damage. 
 The material requirements for such a ram, especially for heavier ships, are themselves 
quite daunting.  Because of the demands of durability, size and shape, bronze seems to have been 
the only available suitable material for the production of waterline ship rams.  In addition to the 
                                                 
55 Mass and speed after Morrison and Coates (1986), 221.  Morrison and Coates present a rather confused 
computation of the force of impact in ‘tonnes of force’ instead of a unit of energy. 
56 Mass for the ‘fives’ after Morrison and Coates (1996), 285-303. 
57 Asaf Oron, “The Athlit ram bronze casting reconsidered: scientific and technical re-examination,” Journal of 
Archaeological Science 33 (2006), 63-76.  Murray (2012), 35-38. 
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bronze ram and cowling itself, the rams would also be affixed to the bow with a number of 
bronze spikes.58  Not all rams were made to the same size.  The available archaeological 
evidence suggests that the rams of heavier ships were substantially larger and more massive than 
the rams affixed to triremes.59  The largest recovered ram, the Athlit ram, which Murray 
identifies as the ram for a ‘four,’ is relatively complete and was approximately 465kg when 
cast.60  Murray’s examination of a marble model ram in Ostia and of the Actian Victory 
monument further suggests that the ram for a ‘five’ would be substantially larger than even the 
Athlit ram, with a substantially higher wale height to accommodate the larger timbers and 
possibly a greater length.61 
The rams for triremes, better attested in the archaeological evidence due to the finds off 
the Egadi islands, seem to have been smaller.  Murray supposes that the normal mass of a trireme 
ram might have been around 100kg, but recent data for the Egadi rams suggest a heavier average 
mass around 150kg.62  It seems reasonable to suppose that an increased emphasis on frontal 
ramming led to the use of heavier rams by the time of the First Punic War, thus explaining the 
different in mass between the Egadi rams and previous finds such as the Bremerhaven and 
Piraeus rams.  A sense of the tremendous value of the metal being used is fairly easy to gain by 
through comparison to Roman bronze and brass currency: the Athlit ram would have contained 
the equivalent bronze of around 2,480 asses (on the semi-libral standard in use c. 217) or about 
                                                 
58 Tusa and Royal, (2012), 14. 
59 Murray, (2012), 50 – 66. 
60 Murray, (2012), 51.  Casson and Steffy, (1991), 3. 
61 Murray, (2012), 59-65. 
62 Murray, (2012), 51.  See Table 2.1 for the masses of recovered rams. 
 75 
16,607 sestertii under Augustus.63  The same amount of bronze could produce a complete set of 
armor (lorica hamata, montefortino-type helmet and pair of greaves) for 58 Roman soldiers.  It 
is thus no surprise that the expenditure in casting a ram was sufficient to require the approval 
mark of a quaestor or other official.64  For large fleets, especially those with significant numbers 
of heavy ships, the amount of bronze required for the rams alone would have thus represented a 
tremendous expense.  
 
Maintenance Costs 
 The cost of maintaining a fleet of oar-powered warships could be just as formidable as 
the costs of building such a fleet.  Whereas merchant ships seem to have been built with an eye 
towards reliability and lower running costs, most oar-powered warships were built for speed over 
all other considerations, with the already tremendously expensive ‘titans’ forming a possible 
exception.  But for the ramming ships, from ‘threes’ to ‘sixes,’ speed was essential for both 
offense and defense, and it trumped concerns about reliability.  Thus, Theophrastus’ advised (as 
noted above) that warships be built of fir for speed, rather than pine for reliability.65  Merchant 
vessels could also shield their hulls from wood-eating ship-worm with lead sheaths, but such 
protection would slow down a warship and also make it difficult to haul the ship on shore, as was 
common practice for fleets.  As a result, such lead coverings appear not to have been commonly 
                                                 
63 M.H. Crawford dates the emergence of the semi-libral standard to c.217.  M. H. Crawford, Roman Republican 
Coinage, 2 vols. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 43, 596. 
64 Egadi 1’s inscription refers to officials called the sex viri, whereas Egadi 4, 6 and 7 refer to quaestors approving 
the ram.  Tusa and Royal, (2012), 42-45 
65 Theophrastus, Enquiry into Plants, 5.7.1-3. 
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used on warships.66  The myriad costs of maintaining a fleet are diffuse, and as such more 
difficult to attempt to quantify or assess than the more readily identifiable costs of ship-building.  
Nevertheless, these costs, both the costs of keeping a fleet in readiness for action and also the 
costs of ships kept mothballed for future use, were an important part of ancient naval warfare and 
deserve attention. 
                                                 
66 Morrison and Coates, (1986), 187. 
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Table 2.1: Ram Measurements and Tentative Ship-type Assignments67 
                                                 
67 Measurements and type assignments for the Belgammel, Bremerhaven, Piraeus and Athlit rams after Murray, (2012), 49-66 and Casson and Richard, (1991).  
Size measurements, inscriptions and type assignments for the Egadi rams are after Tusa and Royal (2012).  Masses for the Egadi rams kindly provided by Jeffrey 
Royal, with full publication forthcoming. 
 
 Belgammel Bremerhaven Piraeus Egadi 1 Egadi 2 Egadi 3 Egadi 4 Egadi 5 Egadi 6 Egadi 7 Athlit 
Height of 
Ramming 
Head 
13.1cm 27.5cm 35cm 22.2cm 19.9cm 21.5cm 21.8cm 21.5cm 24.0cm 24.0cm 41.4cm 
Max length 64cm 66.9cm 74cm 84cm 76.5cm 85cm 93.5cm 64.0cm 100.9cm 74.0cm 226cm 
Length of 
driving 
center 
64cm 43.5cm 59cm 58.8cm 66.3cm 74.4cm 83.4cm 59.5cm 85.9cm 69.0cm 168cm 
Fin width 12.6cm 
(upper) 
26cm 
(upper) 
36cm 
(est., 
upper) 
33.3cm 
(central) 
27.7cm 
(central) 
31.6cm 
(central) 
27.2cm 
(central) 
28.5cm 
(central) 
30.6cm 
(central) 
33.6cm 
(central) 
44.2cm 
(upper) 
Mass 19.7kg 53kg 80kg 
(est.) 
167.8(p) 
168.0 (r) 
75.8 (p) 184.5 
(p) 
185.6 (r) 
130.5 
(p) 
147 (r) 
57.4 (p) 154.0 (p) 
154.1 (r) 
164.1 
(p) 
164.2 (r) 
465kg 
Inscription    Latin  Punic Latin  Latin Latin  
Ship Type Unclear Three? Three? Three Three Three Three Three Three Three Four  
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 The first category of maintenance costs are what might be called ‘trierarchy costs,’ 
meaning the set of basic fitting, equipping, repair and organization tasks, most of which were 
entrusted to the trierarch of an Athenian warship.  Many of the same tasks and requirements 
would have held for Roman and Carthaginian warships, although we are not nearly as well 
informed about how those duties and costs were divided.  By contrast, we are relatively well 
informed about the duties of a trierarch through a number of surviving law court speeches from 
Athens that touch on the office, most notably Apollodorus’ Against Polycles, but also the 
anonymous Against Euergus and Demosthenes’ On the Trierarchic Crown.68  The trierarch was 
expected to provision the fittings for the ship such as oars, sails and ropes, which in theory could 
be obtained on loan from the ten publicly appointed dockyard overseers.69  The trierarch was also 
expected to enroll the ship’s officers, the hyperesia as well as the oarsmen; the latter which were, 
in theory, paid out of the public coffers by the strategoi.70 
 Ships also required continual maintenance when at sea, which in Athens was also the 
responsibility of the trierarch.  Warships would be beached regularly for ‘drying out,’ which 
probably included applying pitch to the bottom of the hull and caulking any seams, as well as 
probably applying caulk and a coating of pitch to any holes left by ship-worm.71  Ship-worm 
(teredo navalis and related species), which the Greeks called terēdōn, was a continual threat to 
warships.  As noted, warships were not fitted with metal coverings on their hulls to prevent 
damage due to speed concerns, and ship-worm damage was thus inevitable. While the damage 
                                                 
68 On reading these speeches for the duties of a trierarch, see Morrison and Coates, (1986), 120-127. 
69 Morrison and Coates (1986), 122-3. 
70 Morrison and Coates (1986), 123-4. 
71 Morrison and Coates (1986), 152-3, 187.  Morrison and Coates (1996), 329, 354-356. 
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could not be permanently repaired, coating the holes with pitch could reduce the impact to ship 
performance in the short-term.72  The negative impact of being unable to dry out warships is 
noted by Thucydides in the letter of Nicias to the Athenian assembly in 413.73  Likewise Arrian 
notes that Nearchos hauled up his fleet for repairs and maintenance on three separate occasions 
during his voyage from India to the Persian gulf.74  The labor for these repairs would presumably 
have been done by the crews of the ships themselves, but the materials (pitch and caulk) would 
have to be brought with the fleet or, perhaps less likely, acquired locally.  Aristophanes alludes 
to the expense in Knights when Cleon threatens a sausage-seller that he will “have you made a 
trierarch and you will get ruined through it; I will arrange that you are given an old vessel with 
rotten sails, which you will have to repair constantly and at great cost.”75 
 In addition, oared-warships seem to have had relatively short operational lives.  To a 
degree, this fact may explain the tendency of some fleets to seemingly evaporate between wars, 
one perhaps most notable among the Antigonids.  The fleet assembled by Antigonus Gonatus 
attested in 283/2 and probably involved in the Battles of Cos and Andros is nowhere to be found 
after Demetrius II dies.  Antigonus Doson builds an apparently new fleet, which in turn seems to 
have evaporated before Philip V’s failed efforts to reestablish an Antigonid naval power.76   
                                                 
72 Morrison and Coates (1986), 187. 
73 Thucydides 7.12.3-4. 
74 Morrison and Coates (1996), 355-6.  Arr. Indica 25.1, 33.9 and 38.9. 
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costs, Gabrielson (1994), 74. 
76 F. W. Walbank, “Sea-power and the Antigonids” in Polybius, Rome and the Hellenistic World: Essays and 
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 80 
The average lifespan of a trireme seems to have been around 20 years.77  The main cause 
of this limited service life seems to have been the aforementioned ship-worm.78  Such decay was 
even true of ships not at sea at all, as memorably implied in Aristophanes’ Knights by a trireme 
that is said to have declared she would “rather become an old maid here and be eaten by ship-
worm” than be sent on an expedition.79  There seems no reason to suppose that later, heavier 
warships would not be similarly affected.  As a result, a standing fleet, even when not in military 
operations, would have to be continuously replacing around 5% of its available ships every year.  
There is considerable evidence that this was done in Athens.  Christa Steinby has argued that 
prior to the First Punic War, such steady replacement of ships may have been what the duoviri 
navales were expected to undertake at Rome, although information on these officials, elected for 
the first time in 311, is limited.80  As a result, maintaining a continuous naval presence, even 
without an active conflict, required a significant continuous expenditure. 
 
Case Study – Fleet Costs in the First Punic War 
 The first step, then, in estimating the relative costs of the naval war for Rome and 
Carthage, is to establish a tentative reconstruction of active and reserve fleet strengths on a year-
by-year basis throughout the war. Because ships incurred costs regardless of whether or not there 
was a battle in a given year, and even ships in reserve had to be maintained and replaced, it is 
                                                 
77 Steinby (2007), 61.  D. Blackman, “The Athenian Navy and Allies Naval Contributions in the Pentecontaetia,” 
GRBS 10 (1969): 179-216.   
78 Morrison and Coates (1986), 187. 
79 Aristophanes, Knights, 1305-1310.  ὑπὸ τερηδόνων σαπεῖσ᾽ ἐνταῦθα καταγηράσομαι. 
80 On Athenian ship replacement see D. Blackman, (1969) and also note M. L. Cook, “Timokrates’ 50 Talents and 
the Cost of Ancient Warfare” Eranos 88 (1990): 69-97, and Diodorus 11.43.3.  On the duoviri navales, see Steinby 
(2007), 60-63. 
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necessary to keep track of both the active ships each year, and also what ship reserves each state 
was likely to have.  Athens frequently maintained ships in an inactive state, with no crews or 
trierarch assigned.  As will be outlined below, there is every reason to believe that Carthage, at 
least at the beginning of the war and again towards its end, did the same.81  So these ships too 
must be accounted for. 
Any study of ancient fleet activity also has to take into account the seasons.  Major 
repairs and new ship construction are almost always placed by Polybius in the winter months 
when the sea was closed, and it is only rarely that we hear of military operations during those 
months.  Likewise, there are strong indications that fleets tended, when there was no active 
blockade or operation, to return to their homeports during the winter months.  As a result, I have 
split every year into two seasons, a ‘summer’ season covering the 8 months from 11th of March 
to the 10th of November, when most military activity happens, and a ‘winter’ season covering the 
remaining four months of the year (November 11th to March 10th).82  We are not told that the 
crews of ships apparently inactive due to winter were demobilized, but for the purpose of 
calculating crew costs, I have assumed that they were.  Fleets are assumed to have returned to a 
home port and stood down for winter, unless some report of action or operation suggests 
otherwise as noted below. 
 It also seems necessary to account for the regular repair and replacement of ships long in 
service, particularly for the Carthaginian navy, which seems to have maintained a standing fleet.  
As noted above, the average service life attested for Athenian triremes was 20 years, and this I 
                                                 
81 Gabrielsen, (1990), 80-81. 
82 These dates for the mare clausum follow Vegetius Epitoma Rei militaris 4.39.  See also, J. Beresford, The Ancient 
Sailing Season (Leiden: Brill, 2013). 
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have used as a rough guide.  Thus, I have assessed, for each year, in the winter, the cost of 
replacement for aged hulls and repairs of younger ships at the replacement cost for 5% of each 
fleet’s strength, rounded to the nearest whole ship.  This replacement is listed in the charts below 
as ships ‘retired,’ which is to say old hulls decommissioned and replaced with fresh construction, 
or else extensively repaired and refit.  Since these regular replacements are assumed to be ‘made 
good’ on a rolling basis, they do not impact overall fleet strength, but will impact the final 
assessment of costs. 
 It must be noted that what follows is only one plausible reconstruction of the fleet 
strengths and costs for the war.  The sources are such that there are numerous places where 
different conjectures or interpretations might change the figures one way or the other.  As a 
result, nearly all of the following figures are approximations rather than exact tallies, even 
though they may not be rounded off and may appear to be rather more precise than they are.  As 
a result of this approach, while I have tried to be as accurate as possible, I have not attempted to 
make all of the fleet strength figures and loss figures add up perfectly.  Such a task appears to be 
quite beyond the quality of the sources with which we have to work.  What follows is not 
intended as a complete study of the First Punic War either; it neglects entirely numerous 
elements, including nearly the entire land war.  Rather, it is merely an attempt to approach, on a 
very approximate basis, a comparison of the costs of the naval war to both sides. 
 
2.2 Initial Fleet Strengths 
The first object, then, to consider is the starting strength of both fleets at the beginning of 
the war.  Polybius, however, is surprisingly little help on this point, never giving the size of the 
pre-existing Carthaginian fleet, although he does note its existence, and maintaining that Rome 
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had no navy to speak of.  Polybius notes a Carthaginian fleet active from the beginning of the 
war, initially making raids on the Italian coast (to apparently little effect) and successfully 
exerting control over the coastal areas of Sicily; but he gives no hint of its size.83  William Tarn 
assumes a standing Carthaginian fleet of around 130 ships, raised to 200 at times of “supreme 
national effort” based on pre-Punic War fleet figures related primarily by Diodorus.84  Tarn’s 
analysis of fleet figures throughout the war, which forms the basis of Johannes Thiel’s 
subsequent treatment of the war, is firmly rooted in Tarn’s conviction that “Rome was not going 
to challenge Carthage with deliberately inferior numbers.”85  This argument finds little support in 
Polybius, who tends in most cases to supply or imply slightly larger numbers of Carthaginian 
ships in most engagements.86  At the same time, it seems difficult to maintain that Polybius 
always shifts the numbers ad maiorem Romae gloriam, because he does not always do that.  The 
Roman fleet at Hermaeum is clearly substantially larger than the Carthaginian fleet, and Polybius 
does note situations where the Romans enjoyed the advantage, such as the loaded down 
Carthaginian ships at the Battle of the Aegates Islands87  Moreover, while it is certainly possible, 
it seems unlikely that, through the fog of war, the Romans would have been able to ascertain 
with any accuracy the size of fleet the Carthaginians would deploy, especially as the Romans 
would have to guess at Carthaginian deployments for the following year when they began 
construction.  Moreover, Tarn’s argument is fundamentally circular; Tarn assumes that the 
                                                 
83 Plb. 1.20.6-7. 
84 Tarn, “The Fleets of the First Punic War,” JHS 27 (1907): 49.   
85 Tarn, (1907), 50. 
86 See, for instance, Polybius’ figures for Mylae (Plb. 1.22.10), and Ecnomus (Plb. 1.27-28). 
87 Plb. 1.36, 1.60.1-4. 
 84 
Romans would not challenge Carthage with inferior numbers, and so he reduces the sizes of 
fleets to conform to this assumption, before concluding that “the Romans were throughout 
building to the Carthaginian numbers, not vice versa.”88 
Instead, recent scholarship has tended to converge around a notional strength of around 
200 ships for the standing Carthaginian fleet at the start of the First Punic War.89  Perhaps the 
most notable testimony is that of Appian, who notes that the dockyards at Carthage in the middle 
of the second century could fit 220 ships. While that figure is for a later period, it seems rather 
unlikely that the diminished Carthage of the second century would have maintained a larger fleet 
or fleet facilities than the naval power of the mid-third century.90  Moreover, it is not necessary 
to suppose, as Tarn seems to, that the Carthaginian fleet in battle would always represent the sum 
total of ships the Carthaginians possessed.  Here the Athenian comparison is instructive.  
Thucydides notes that Athens had some 300 triremes ready in 431 and that between three fleets 
in service, the Athenians maintained some 250 ships in 428; yet the largest fleets Athens ever put 
in a single place consistently fall far short of these high figures.91  The largest Athenian fleet 
concentrations in the war were the two fleets of the Sicilian expeditions, totaling 207, and the 
180 Athenian ships engaged at Aegospotami.92  We may assume the Carthaginians likely 
managed their fleet in a similar way, only manning and deploying the number they thought was 
                                                 
88 Tarn, (1907), 57. 
89 Dexter Hoyos, The Carthaginians (London: Routledge, 2010), 149-153.  Serge Lancel, Carthage (Paris: Fayard, 
1992), 126. 
90 App, Libyca 96. 
91 Thuc. 2.13.8, 3.17.  
92 Thuc. 6.43.1, 7.42.1.  The initial fleet totals some 134 ships when it arrives, and Demosthenes’ reinforcement 
group adds 73, for the total of 207.  For fleet sizes after 413, see Naiden, (2009), 729 – 744. 
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necessary at any given time in order to save the crushing expense of manning a very large fleet.  
Thus it seems prudent to allow for an initial Carthaginian fleet strength of around 200 ships, but 
with a smaller number of those ships active.  Assuming a roughly 20 year service life to match 
the information concerning Athenian warships detailed above, we should also allow for roughly 
5% of the Carthaginian fleet to be replaced yearly, so that Carthage would have to construct 10 
replacement ships annually to keep the fleet to strength. 
To figure the starting strength of the Romans is likewise quite difficult.  Polybius claims 
that the Roman fleet constructed in 261 was the first fleet built by the Romans, and that the 
Romans themselves at the opening of the war “had not any decked ships, but no long warships at 
all, not even a single boat,” and were thus forced to borrow the ships for crossing the strait to 
Sicily.93  This view was reinforced by Thiel, but the notion that the Romans had no significant 
naval involvement prior to 261 and were “clumsy beginners” has recently come under attack by 
Steinby.94  She notes evidence for a Roman navy, albeit likely a small one, going as far back as 
the Roman-Carthaginian treaty of 509, which contains conditions for Roman warships.95  Livy, 
although he doubts the story, reports Roman ships involved in the siege of Fidenae in 426, which 
Steinby understands as possibly being riverine transports rather than seagoing warships; but the 
Romans are also apparently able in 398 and 394 to send a single warship, “longa una nave,” to 
transport two embassies to Delphi.96  Steinby also supposes that, while absent in the sources, an 
                                                 
93 Polybius 1.20.9-14. 
94 Thiel, (1954), 3-5.  Steinby addresses Thiel’s arguments directly, see Steinby, (2007), 29-30. 
95 Steinby, (2007), 36-39. 
96 Liv. 4.34.6-7.  Liv 5.15-16, 5.28.1-5.  Plutarch, Cam. 8.3-4.  Steinby, (2007), 44-48. 
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early Roman naval presence, though small, may have been involved in occupation of Antium in 
338 or the occupation of Naples in 326, although this is more speculative.97 
The evidence for a Roman naval presence is better after 311, where we have definite 
testimony about two officials, the duoviri navales who were in charge of the equipment and refit 
of the fleet (classis).98  Each of the duoviri seems to have been in charge of 10 ships, giving a 
total strength of 20 ships for the squadron.99  Steinby suggests that the fleet may have been 
substantially larger, arguing that we might take a duovir’s assignment not as maintaining ten 
ships, but as refitting or rebuilding ten ships a year, which might be sufficient to maintain a fleet 
much larger than just 20 ships.100  However the fleet in 282 that sparked the war with Tarentum 
was only ten ships, which seems much more consistent with a fleet that consisted of a pair of 10-
ship squadrons.101 
Thiel suggests that by the time of the First Punic War the duoviri navales and their 
squadron had ceased to exist, and that the Romans instead relied entirely on ships contributed by 
the socii from 267 to 264.102  Tarn, by contrast, assumes that the 20 ships of the duoviri are 
represented by the 20 triremes reported by Polybius in the Roman fleet of 261, though Polybius 
seems quite clear that these ships too were fresh constructions.103  Given the service life of 
ancient warships, it is certainly possible that all of the ships of the flotilla of 282 would have 
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been unserviceable by 264, but this assumes that the duoviri had either been very lax in their 
duties or their office discontinued.  The latter seems unlikely, as Livy notes the existence of the 
duoviri and their squadrons in 181 and 178, though it is possible that the office was only 
occupied irregularly.104  Livy notes that in the military preparations of 181, “nor were naval 
matters forgotten, in this matter the consuls appointed two men (duoviri)” seeming to imply that 
in some years the office might have been left vacant when the consuls thought it unneeded.105  In 
that case, it is possible that the squadrons of the duoviri had faded from neglect prior to 264. 
Adding to the confusion, Polybius does note the existence of a fleet of ‘borrowed’ ships 
which enabled the initial Roman crossing to Sicily.  He gives no figures for the fleet of 
“penteconters and triremes” borrowed from the allies at the beginning of the war.106  The ships 
ought not to be discounted out of hand merely because they were provided by the socii and thus 
not ‘Roman.’  As noted in the previous chapter, the mechanism for paying the costs of warfare, 
in this case initially devolving those costs on to the allies, does not remove the costs.  Ships 
provided on loan from the socii still consumed resources, in this case, allied resources, that Rome 
could not put to other military use.  However, the contribution of allied ships was also likely to 
have been quite small.  As Tarn noted, where we do have figures for the contribution of ships by 
the allies, those figures are invariably small.107  In 210 D. Quinctius is able to compel Rhegium, 
Velleia and Paestum to provide ships, and twelve were forthcoming.108  In 191, the ships 
                                                 
104 Liv. 40.18, 41.1. 
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106 Polybius 1.20.14. 
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gathered from the Italian allies to bolster the Roman fleet seem to have consisted of only some 
twenty-five ships, all apparently undecked.109  Livy notes that Carthage’s own contribution at 
this time was only six decked ships.110  In 205, Scipio, relying on the resources of the allies 
rather than on Rome, is able to construct a fleet of thirty ships by drawing very widely for the 
materials and using volunteers to furnish the crews.111  It is hard to know how applicable these 
figures would have been to the Roman naval system in the 260s, but they do seem to suggest that 
any allied contribution to the Roman fleet would have been relatively small: no more than thirty 
ships and probably much less. 
 Returning to the problem of the starting strength of the Roman fleet in the first years of 
the war, we are left with a quandary.  The Romans clearly had access to some ships, as Polybius 
notes in the crossing to Sicily, but the number, likely assembled from a combination of whatever 
existed of the squadrons of the duoviri with allied contributions, was likely to have been quite 
small.  Any figure for this fleet is no more than an educated guess, but around thirty ships seems 
a reasonable maximum for its size.  It was certainly not large enough to contest the Carthaginian 
fleet.  As with the Carthaginian navy, the short service life of oared warships will mean that a 
small amount of continuous shipbuilding would have been necessary to maintain the fleet at this 
strength, roughly three ships every two years.  It seems likely, based on the formula Livy reports 
for their office, “duumviros navales classis ornandae reficiendaeque causa,” that the duoviri 
would have overseen that process.112 
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Fleet sizes and Shipbuilding in Polybius 
 Before moving on into the fleets of the war itself, however, it is necessary to address the 
issues surrounding the reliability of Polybius’ account of the war.  The size of these fleets and the 
speed with which they seem to be constructed have raised questions about the reliability of 
Polybius’ figures.  Most influential has been Tarn’s 1907 article, in which, taking a dim view of 
Polybius’ sources, he extensively ‘corrected’ the figures for the Roman and Carthaginian fleets, 
in almost all cases by reducing their size.113  Tarn’s revisions were largely adopted by Thiel and 
accepted, with some reservations, by Walbank.114  These ‘corrections’ aimed to solve the 
apparent implausibility of the very large fleets at Ecnomus and Hermaeum, to resolve some 
arithmetical inconsistencies in the account of the Battle of Hermaeum, and to have all the figures 
conform to Polybius’ final totals for ships lost in the entire conflict.  While the original figures as 
reported by Polybius have had their defenders, most notably Tipps and Lazenby,115  subsequent 
treatments of the First Punic War, such as by John Grainger and Steinby have tended to avoid 
taking a strong position on the figures one way or another.116  Moreover, Michael Pitassi has 
recently argued, on the basis of Thiel’s ‘corrected’ fleet size figures, for a model of continuous 
and steady Roman shipbuilding beginning in 267, markedly in contrast to the evidence Polybius 
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presents on Roman shipbuilding.117  As Grainger notes, the dispute over Polybius’ numbers is 
“largely based on incredulity,” so we ought first to establish the plausibility of his overall figures 
and narrative.118  The particular inconsistencies, such as with the fleet sizes at the Battle of 
Hermaeum, can then be dealt with in sequence as we establish year-on-year fleet strength 
estimates. 
 The first task is to distinguish between the construction of new ships and the refitting or 
repair of old ships.  Even ships that were already built often required preparation or refit prior to 
being launched.  Thus Thucydides notes that in 431 “a hundred ships were fitted out for an 
expedition against the Peloponnesus,” despite noting only a short while before that in the same 
year the Athenians had three hundred triremes available.119  He gives some clue as to the nature 
of these preparations, noting that in 435 the Corycreans manned their ships which “the old ones 
having been tightened such that they were sea-worthy and the others having been fitted out.”120  
Likewise, the full complement of equipment to make a ship battle worthy was not always at 
hand; Thucydides relates a Peloponnesian plan to raid the Piraeus in 429/8, which required the 
sailors and marines to bring the oars, rower’s cushions and rowlock thongs overland in order to 
launch ships that were at Nisaea.121   
 Fortunately, Polybius is fairly careful to make clear distinctions between these two 
activities, building and refitting, although this distinction is sometimes lost in some translations.  
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The process is described in the most detail for the first Roman fleet of 260, where Polybius notes 
that the Romans undertake to build ships (ἐπεβάλοντο ναυπηγεῖσθαι σκάφη), then do so with a 
Carthaginian model (ἐποιοῦντο τὴν τοῦ παντὸς στόλου ναυπηγίαν).122   Then, while the ships are 
being fitted out (ἐγίνοντο περὶ τὴν τῶν πλοίων κατασκευήν), the rowers are trained on land so 
that the fleet could be launched as soon as the ships were entirely finished.123   When both 
activities, refitting and building, are happening at once, Polybius is careful to note this, as with 
the Carthaginian fleet built in late 256, where Polybius notes that the Carthaginians both “refitted 
[old] ships” (ἐπεσκεύαζον) and “built new ones from scratch” (ἐκ καταβολῆς ἐναυπηγοῦντο).124   
Throughout his narrative of the First Punic War, Polybius uses ναυπηγέω and its noun form 
ναυπηγία along with the less technical ποιέω to refer only to shipbuilding, and never to the refit 
or repair of existing ships.125  By contrast, καταρτίζω is the most common word Polybius uses 
for ship repair or refit, but he also uses ἐπισκευάζω, παρασκευάζω and its noun παρασκευή for 
ship refits or pre-launch preparations.126  None of these words are used for the building of ships 
from scratch. Polybius also uses κατασκευάζω, but the usage is less clear, and we will return to it 
in connection to the Battle at Hermaeum. 
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 Reading for these distinctions, the picture 
of both Roman and Carthaginian shipbuilding that 
emerges is one in which fleets are built in short 
bursts of production.  Continuous shipbuilding 
would, of course, have been required to replace 
ships as they aged out of their service life, 
although given the high rate of losses, this may 
have posed less of a problem as the war went on.  
Polybius describes eight such bursts of production in his narrative of the war, six by the Romans 
and two by the Carthaginians.  Most of these bursts of production begin late in the year and 
probably continued early into the following year, but are often completed in time for major 
battles and seem chronologically confined to a single winter in the narrative.  This method of 
shipbuilding, focused on the rapid construction of large fleets, often in a single season, does raise 
the question of plausibility. 
Such fast production certainly seemed plausible to the Romans.  Polybius reports that the 
Romans in 255 built some 220 ships in only three months, though he admits such a feat difficult 
to believe.127 Livy reports that in 205, the Romans constructed a small fleet of thirty ships from 
fresh timber in only forty-five days.128  Pliny the Elder reports that the fleet of Duillius that 
fought at Mylae was itself completed in only sixty days.129 
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Table 2.2, Shipbuilding Bursts Reported 
in Polybius Book 1 
Reference: Year Roman or 
Carthaginian 
Plb. 1.20.9-
1.21.2 
261/0 Roman (1) 
Plb. 1.25.5-7 257/6 Roman (2) 
Carthaginian 
(1) 
Plb. 1.36.8-9 256/5 Carthaginian 
(2) 
Plb. 1.38.5-7 255/4 Roman (3) 
Plb. 1.39.15 251/0 Roman (4) 
Plb. 1.52.4-8 249 Roman (5) 
Plb. 1.59.1-8 243/2 Roman (6) 
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In all three cases, we must be on guard against exaggerations, but to be useful, even an 
exaggeration must remain plausible.  Rapid shipbuilding was not new with the Romans, but had 
been a key part of the later phases of the Peloponnesian War.  The Athenians, left with no fleet 
of note after the loss of the Sicilian expedition, began building in the winter of 413/2 and were 
able to risk a small engagement the following summer.130  In the next year, the Athenians both 
lost a fleet of thirty-six ships at Eretria and still had seventy-six ships the same summer at 
Cynossema, a rapid recovery indeed.131  Similarly rapid Spartan recoveries after Cyzicus (410) 
and Arginusae (406) are also to be noted.  Carthage was also able to rapidly build a fleet from 
scratch while during the Third Punic War; Strabo reports that they constructed 120 warships in 
merely two months.132  The same pattern also occurs with renaissance galley-warfare.  The 
arsenal of Venice was famed for being able to produce a galley not so dissimilar from an ancient 
trireme in only a day and the Ottoman Empire was able to rebuild a fleet of 150 ships and go on 
the offensive in only eight months after their catastrophic defeat at Lepanto (1571).133  Rapid 
production on the scale that Polybius suggests thus seems plausible, even though the examples 
from the First Punic War may rate as some of the largest bursts of oared-warship production in 
Mediterranean history. 
 Nor are the sizes of the fleets reported by Polybius and echoed in later sources inherently 
beyond reason.  In the largest engagement, Polybius reports 350 Carthaginian and 330 Roman 
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ships at Ecnomus.134  Part of the incredulity surrounding these numbers relies on the assumption 
that these fleets consisted almost entirely of quinqueremes, an assumption, as noted, drawn 
increasingly into question by the discovery of rams from the battle of the Aegates Islands, all of 
which appear to have belonged to smaller triremes.  The fleets reported at Ecnomus are 
comparable in size to reports of Naulochus and Actium although here, as with Polybius, we 
should be wary of exaggeration by sources seeking battles of a size to fit their importance.135  
The confused nature of the sources for Actium, in particular, leaves little confidence for 
establishing fleet strength figures for that battle.  Tarn dismissed these examples by noting that 
the Roman Republic was far smaller and less populous during the First Punic War, but his view 
seems unconvincing; fleet strength does not necessarily smoothly scale with the size of 
empire.136  Athens had, after all, 300 triremes ready at the start of the Peloponnesian War, and 
later deployed some 180 for the battle at Aegospotami in 405, despite a comparatively tiny 
empire.137  Such large fleets were also not confined merely to the ancient world; the Battle of 
Lepanto in 1571 involved nearly 500 ships.138  So while we may be on our guard against 
exaggerations in our sources, the figures Polybius reports, though quite high, are not so high as 
to be impossible a priori.  It thus seems prudent to give Polybius’ figures the benefit of the 
doubt; the alternative is more often than not a counsel of despair. 
                                                 
134 Plb. 1.25.5-9. 
135 Naulochus: Ap. Bel Civ. 5.188 gives 300 ships to each side.  Vel. Pat. 2.79 also provides a narrative, but no 
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The early phase of the war (264 – 255) 
 For the first three years of the war, the fleets seem little changed from the initial 
strengths.  The Carthaginian fleet seems to have been fairly active in the first years, whereas the 
small Roman fleet very nearly escapes notice entirely.  The presence of the Carthaginian navy 
seems to have compelled Appius to cross to Sicily in 264 by night, as Polybius notes.139  The 
account of this crossing is expanded upon by Dio and in turn by Zonaras, and although the 
additional details are of questionable veracity, it seems safe to say that the Carthaginian fleet did 
make some effort to prevent the Romans from crossing initially.140  Polybius also indicates that 
Carthaginian naval forces had launched extensive raiding on Italy, which he describes as 
“frequently plundered,” although, as noted above, naval raiding was rarely a decisive strategy.141 
 This state of affairs changes drastically with the construction of the first major Roman 
fleet in 261.  Polybius places this first burst of ship construction seemingly in the winter of 
261/260, given that the narrative of the construction of the fleet is placed prior to the 
appointment of the consul, although Polybius does not make this chronological relationship 
explicit.142  It is certainly plausible that fresh naval construction, along with any necessary 
repairs or refits, would take place during the winter months when warships, less seaworthy than 
merchant ships, could not sail.143  As will be seen, subsequent periods of shipbuilding also tend 
to occur in the narrative immediately before the selection of new consuls, suggesting that 
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beginning construction projects for the following year in perhaps November or December was 
normal.  Polybius cites the Roman response to the failure of the fall of Agrigentum in 262 to turn 
the tide of the war in Italy as the reason for building this first large Roman fleet, suggesting that 
the Romans resolved to build it as the campaigning season of 261 wound down without positive 
results.144  Lazenby suggests that Carthaginian naval raiding in Italy, reported by Zonaras, might 
also be dated to this period and be a factor in the construction of a Roman fleet, but the dating of 
these raids is difficult.145  Lazenby’s reckoning would place the raids in early 260, which seems 
too late to account for the construction of this first fleet. 
 Operations for the Roman fleet seem to begin early in the sailing season in 260, with a 
series of minor engagements before the major battle at Mylae.  These early engagements are 
valuable in particular for obtaining a sense of the strength of the Carthaginian fleet and its 
disposition, presumably representing how it had been deployed in the years prior to 260.  Several 
older scholars, most notably Beloch, Tarn and de Sanctis, have suggested that Polybius’ narrative 
in 260 is actually the result of confusion and that Polybius has reported the Battle of Mylae 
twice, having confused Philinus’ account of the battle with a separate engagement entirely.  
However this position has been rejected by later scholars, including Thiel, Walbank and 
Lazenby.146  Polybius’ account of the two fleets trying to come to grips with each other through 
the fog of war seems perfectly reasonable and cannot be rejected out of hand.  While the last of 
the ships of the fleet were being prepared, the consul in command, Cn. Cornelius Scipio, took 
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seventeen ships out on a scouting mission, with orders for the rest of the fleet to rejoin him when 
it was ready.147  The fact of this scouting mission makes it seem even less likely that the Romans 
would have been able to deliberately build to Carthaginian numbers in anything more than a 
vague approximation, given the apparent limits of both Roman and Carthaginian intelligence.  
Scipio is promptly baited into a trap and captured with his seventeen-ship flotilla, again 
illustrating how little information the Romans possess in terms of Carthaginian strength and 
disposition.148  The tables then turn almost immediately, with the Carthaginian commander, 
Hannibal, blundering into the rest of the Roman fleet with his own scouting flotilla of fifty ships, 
losing most of them.149  It is after this that the Romans install the famous corvus device, before 
meeting the main Carthaginian fleet off of Mylae.  Polybius gives the Carthaginian fleet strength 
at 130 ships but gives no strength figure for the Romans.150  The newly constructed Roman fleet 
was 120 ships strong, but 17 of these had been captured, leaving 103.  At the same time, the 
Romans may well have captured some of Hannibal’s scouting flotilla of 50 ships, and may have 
received some support from the allies of Southern Italy, as before with the initial crossing to 
Messana.  It seems reasonable, then, to suppose a Roman fleet of roughly equivalent size to the 
Carthaginian one.  Perhaps the most striking element in all of the operations of the year is how 
little both sides seem to have known about the strength and position of the enemy. 
 The operations of 260 give us a better sense of Carthaginian fleet strength and 
disposition.  The piecemeal series of engagements suggests that, to some degree, the 
                                                 
147 Plb. 1.20.3-5. 
148 Plb. 1.20.5-7. 
149 Plb. 1.20.10-11. 
150 Plb. 1.23.4 
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Carthaginian fleet was dispersed, possibly because the Carthaginian commander, according to 
Polybius the same Hannibal that had lost Agrigentum, does not seem initially to have expected 
the Roman fleet.  Hannibal, at Panormus, first detaches another commander, Boödes, with 
twenty ships to trap Scipio, which nets him the capture of Scipio’s seventeen ships.151  
Hannibal’s subsequent reconnaissance sortie is with fifty ships, of which he loses “most” (καὶ 
τὰς μὲν πλείους ἀπέβαλε τῶν νεῶν), perhaps thirty or so off of what Polybius calls the Cape of 
Italy (τὸ τῆς Ἰταλὶας ἀκρωτήριον, which Walbank tentatively identifies as the Taurianum 
promontory).152  Given the 130 Carthaginian ships at Mylae, the entire Carthaginian fleet must 
have been around 150 ships, assuming that some of Scipio’s captured ships were put to use by 
the Carthaginians.153  At no other point in the narrative do the Carthaginians break off such a 
large part of their fleet for reconnaissance as Hannibal does; it seems possible that, at that 
moment, fifty ships represented the entire squadron that Hannibal had with him, with the 
remaining fleet dispersed.  Having received his bloody nose from the reconnaissance sortie, 
Hannibal then seems to have concentrated his fleet prior to the engagement at Mylae. 
 The losses for the subsequent Battle of Mylae are unclear.  Polybius gives no figure for 
Roman losses, and notes Carthaginian losses at fifty ships, with thirty captured.  The annalistic 
tradition also gives figures for Carthaginian losses in the battle, and these are remarkably regular, 
with Eutropius recording thirty-one captured and fourteen sunk, Orosius thirty-one captured and 
thirteen sunk, and the anonymous De Viri Illustribus giving thirty captured and thirteen sunk.154  
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It seems likely at this point that Polybius’ figure may be a rounded one, with the figures from the 
annalistic tradition deriving from the columna rostrata of Duilius, although its surviving text has 
a lacuna at this point.155  Polybius also inserts into the narrative here a subsequent defeat suffered 
by the same Hannibal in 258, which seems to have been at the hands of the consul of that year, 
Sulpicius Paterculus.  Here Hannibal loses many of his ships in Sardinia and is arrested and 
executed by his own men for his failure.156  Of his fleet’s strength, Polybius only notes that he 
had the survivors of Mylae, and some additional ships; it seems reasonable to suppose perhaps 
100 ships for the venture, while the Roman fleet would include the survivors of Mylae and the 30 
captured ships from the battle as well. 
 The final action of this phase is the Battle of Tyndaris in 257.  Polybius gives no sizes for 
either fleet, although Polyainos reports 200 Roman ships and 80 Carthaginian, which Walbank 
rejects and Lazenby finds plausible.157  The battle, in any case, is effectively a draw, with nine 
Roman ships sunk, against eight Carthaginian ships sunk and ten captured.158  In both cases, the 
losses seem to have been a small part of either fleet, and Polybius reports that both sides felt they 
had fought evenly.159  Both sides then set to preparing for the larger naval showdown to come, 
but this is a good moment to pause and take stock of the first phase of the naval war. 
                                                 
155 Lazenby, (1996), 72. 
156 Plb. 1.24.6-7.  On this passage, note Oskar Leuze, “Die Kämpfe um Sardinien und Korsika im ersten punischen 
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 Even if Carthage initially possessed some 200 ships as previously suggested, it seems 
clear from the narrative of 260 that its entire fleet was not active at this point.  Given that 
Hannibal is able to have 130 ships available for the Battle of Mylae after losing ‘most’ of his 
fifty-ship flotilla (itself reinforced by the capture of Scipio’s seventeen ships), it seems 
reasonable to suppose that the Carthaginians had roughly 150 ships active at the beginning of the 
year.  Given that the Carthaginian fleet was already engaged in raiding and support operations 
from the beginning of the war, including the raiding at Mylae that occasioned the battle itself, it 
seems reasonable to suppose that the Carthaginian fleet had been active at or around this strength 
more or less from the beginning of hostilities.  That would leave the Carthaginian navy with 
perhaps 50 hulls in reserve.  In contrast, the small Roman forces, which may not even have been 
regularly marshalled year to year once the crossing from Messana was secure, will have 
remained unchanged until late 261. 
 The Romans then build 120 ships in the winter of 261/0, as related by Polybius.  To this 
must be added the allied ships used to cross the strait, although these were likely lighter ships.  
These allied ships numbered perhaps at most around thirty, bringing the total Roman fleet to 
around 150.  Scipio almost immediately loses seventeen of these ships, bringing the total strength 
of the Roman force down to around 133 for the Battle of Mylae.  Carthaginian losses at Mylae 
were probably less than 50, the round figure Polybius gives, perhaps the forty-three to forty-five 
given by later sources.  No Roman losses are reported, but what losses there were in ships would 
have been made up by the captured Carthaginian prizes.  At the end of the year’s sailing season, 
then, the Carthaginian force might have been reduced to around ninety active ships.160  On the 
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Roman end, it is likely that not all of the captured Carthaginian ships could be refitted, but the 
total Roman fleet might have increased to around 150 ships by season’s end.161  This is probably 
a conservative estimate as newer ships were faster, and so it stands to reason that losses were 
more likely to be concentrated among the older ships. 
 The Carthaginian fleet remains active in the following years, as Lucius Cornelius Scipio 
apparently encounters and flees from a Carthaginian fleet off of Sardinia, the same fleet 
commanded by Hannibal which Sulpicius Paterculus, as noted above, defeated in 258, with the 
loss of many of his ships; but no source gives a number.162  At Tyndaris, the Romans appear to 
have a rather large fleet, as a vanguard of ten ships is apparently a trivial component, while the 
Carthaginian fleet is also apparently large enough to consider giving battle to at least that 
vanguard.  Assuming that Carthage retained the same level of ship production which would have 
been required to maintain its standing fleet prior to the war (as noted, around ten ships per year), 
the decreased total fleet size and thus decreased need to replace aged ships would mean that 
Carthaginian strength would begin to trend slowly upwards, from perhaps 143 seaworthy ships 
immediately after Mylae to around 150 by the beginning of the sailing season in 258.  Polybius 
indicates that the fleet Hannibal takes to Sardinia consists of the survivors of Mylae, with some 
additional ships, making perhaps around 100 ships a reasonable guess for the size of his fleet; of 
this some unknown number, presumably less than half, were lost.  Evidently the fleet was large 
enough to scare off L. Cornelius Scipio.  As noted, the Carthaginian fleet at Tyndaris seems to 
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have been around eighty ships; at the very least it was inferior to the Roman fleet in numbers by 
some margin.  Assuming perhaps thirty-five losses at Sardinia, 257 is the first year that Carthage 
appears to have begun to diminish its existing reserve of ships, in order to field the fleet at 
Tyndaris.  The final Carthaginian strength at the end of 257, then, might have been very roughly 
sixty-two ships active (the survivors of Tyndaris) with another thirty-eight in reserve, before both 
sides completed the massive buildup prior to Ecnomus. 
 While the Roman fleet would have consisted mostly of new ships, it seems reasonable to 
still assume a replacement rate of 20%, given the continuous operations, which would have 
required, at the very least, the frequent repair of ships.  Although it accomplishes relatively little, 
the Roman fleet must be active between 260 and 257, and does not appear to be reduced in 
strength, as at Tyndaris C. Atilius Regulus clearly has the larger fleet.163  It is not clear if any of 
the ships Hannibal lost in Sardinia were taken over by the Romans, but it seems relatively 
unlikely, as the Romans were eventually repulsed from the island in the same year, and moreover 
would have found it difficult to crew captured ships in hostile territory.  Thus, the Roman fleet 
would have maintained a relatively stable strength, probably around 150, until Tyndaris, when 
the Roman fleet lost nine ships but captured ten more, leading to a net gain of a single ship, 
leaving the Romans with an active fleet of just above 150 ships in 257. 
 The year to year estimates are presented in the table below.  As noted above, each year is 
divided into an eight month ‘summer’ season when the sea was open and a four month ‘winter’ 
season when it was generally closed.  Ships ‘retired’ refers to ships reaching the end of their 
service life or otherwise requiring substantial repairs, assumed to be roughly 20% of the total 
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strength, active and reserve, in any given year.  Where that 20% figure produces fractional ships, 
I have rounded to produce whole numbers. 
Table 2.3: Carthaginian Fleet Estimates, 264-257 
Year        Season Active Reserve Built Lost Retired 
264 Summer 150 50    
264/3 Winter  200 
  10 
263 Summer 150 50    
263/2 Winter  200 
  10 
262 Summer 150 50    
262/1 Winter  200 
  10 
261 Summer 150 50    
261/0 Winter  200 
  10 
260 Summer 150 50  57  
260/59 Winter  143 
  7 
259 Summer 93 50    
259/8 Winter  143 
  7 
258 Summer 93 50  35  
258/7 Winter  114 
  6 
257 Summer 80 24  18  
257/6 Winter  86 
See next section 
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Table 2.4: Roman Fleet Estimates, 264-257 
Year        Season Active Reserve Built Lost Retired 
264 Summer 30     
264/3 Winter  30   1 
263 Summer 30     
263/2 Winter  30   2 
262 Summer 30     
262/1 Winter  30   1 
261 Summer 30     
261/0 Winter  30 120  2 
260 Summer 150   +3  
260/59 Winter  153   8 
259 Summer 153     
259/8 Winter  153   7 
258 Summer 153     
258/7 Winter  153   8 
257 Summer 153   +1  
257/6 Winter  154 
See next section 
 
 
The Great Fleets (257-253) 
 The fleets of 256 and 255 are the subject of much controversy and are sufficiently 
interrelated to be worth covering together.  Polybius relates that, starting in 257, presumably late 
in the year, both the Romans and Carthaginians significantly increased their naval programs.164  
The following year, in the summer of 256, the Romans launched an expedition to Africa, with a 
fleet Polybius reports at 330 ‘covered’ (καταφράκτοις) warships, while the Carthaginians 
opposed this crossing with a fleet of 350 warships.165  The fleets met at Ecnomus and the 
Romans won a great victory, with twenty-four Roman and ‘more than thirty’ Carthaginian ships 
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sunk, and another 64 Carthaginian ships captured.166  After the capture of Aspis, the Roman fleet 
deposited M. Atilius Regulus, the expedition, and forty ships at Aspis, while the rest of the 
Roman fleet returned to Italy.167 
 By the following year Regulus’ expedition had fallen into difficulties, and a Roman fleet 
was sent to retrieve it early in the summer of 255.  Polybius gives its strength as 350 ships, 
presumably the original fleet at Ecnomus enhanced by the captured Carthaginian ships, although 
it is worth noting that he seems to forget the forty ships supposedly left in Aspis.168  The 
Carthaginians, buoyed by their success against Regulus, reconstitute a fleet of 200 ships, with 
Polybius reporting both an expensive refit, presumably of ships damaged at Ecnomus, and also 
new construction; this fleet sails to intercept the Roman fleet, which it meets off the 
Hermaeum.169  Polybius’ narrative of the very lopsided battle is extremely brief, although he 
reports that some 114 Carthaginian ships were captured.  He then reports that the Roman fleet, 
which he now gives at 364 ships, was caught in a storm off Camarina, with only 80 ships 
surviving.  Clearly something has gone wrong, for we have added 350 to 114 and gotten 364 and 
misplaced the 40 ships left at Aspis besides.  We will return to this problem in a moment, but 
first it is necessary to advance a bit further in Polybius’ narrative, as the events immediately after 
Hermaeum can serve to shed some light on the possible resolutions of the textual problems. 
 The Carthaginians, encouraged by the Roman losses, again reconstitute a force of 200 
ships, while the Romans construct 220 new ships, bringing their fleet to a full strength of 300, 
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with which they capture Panormus in 254.170  Tarn and Thiel both question the existence of a 
Carthaginian fleet here, based on its apparent inactivity (Polybius reports no activity for the 
Carthaginian fleet immediately after being reconstituted), but it is not hard to see why the 
Carthaginians, after their rough treatment at Hermaeum, would have been reluctant to engage in 
battle badly outnumbered a second time.171  Moreover, it is hard to see what the Carthaginian 
fleet, numerically inferior as it was, was likely to have been able to do in 254 that would have 
attracted Polybius’ attention.  The Carthaginian strategy on Sicily was primarily reactive and 
defensive, aimed at wearing the Romans out rather than running them off the island.  That 
strategy fits fairly well with the indecisive nature of ancient naval warfare and the inability to 
‘command’ the sea, as noted above.  Unable to engage the concentrated Roman fleet at 
Panormus, it is not hard to believe the Carthaginian fleet would have had to busy itself 
resupplying other Carthaginian holdings, like Lipara and Lilybaeum; a set of actions very likely 
to have escaped Polybius’ notice.  This status quo is shaken up, however, when in 253 the 
Roman fleet is again caught in a storm and the Romans largely abandon large scale naval 
operations for two years.172 
 The discrepancy at Hermaeum and the storm off of Camarina has occasioned numerous 
efforts to make sense of Polybius, though perhaps the most enduring attempt to ‘correct’ him is 
that of Tarn, who proposed to solve the problem by removing 100 ships from the Roman fleet at 
Hermaeum and then, in order to keep the relation of the fleets of Hermaeum and Ecnomus 
correct, to remove 100 ships from the latter battle as well; hence Tarn proposes 230 Roman ships 
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at Ecnomus and 250 at Hermaeum.173  He accounts for the larger number of Roman ships given 
by Polybius as mistakenly including the transports among the warships.  Moreover, because Tarn 
was himself convinced that the Romans always built to exceed Carthaginian fleet numbers, he 
‘corrects’ the number of Carthaginian ships at Ecnomus to 200.  This solution was in turn largely 
adopted by Thiel and forms the basis for the ship counts recently used by Pitassi.174  Walbank 
accepts Tarn’s solution as the “most probable” of a set of options, but he also notes that “Tarn’s 
scheme is not watertight” and that “no help comes from the Roman tradition” of later sources.175 
 However, there are a number of problems with Tarn’s reconstruction, even beyond the 
degree to which such an extensive set of ‘corrections’ would seem to cast all of Polybius’ figures 
into irretrievable doubt.  As Lazenby notes, the landing force at Ecnomus seems to have been 
carried aboard the warships, with the only dedicated transports Polybius reports being horse 
transports (ἱππηγοὶ); the expedition’s 500 cavalry were nowhere near enough to occasion the 100 
transports Tarn envisions.176  As noted above, the size of the Roman and Carthaginian fleets, 
while exceptionally large, is not so large as to beggar belief.  Polybius also reports Roman fleets 
of comparable strength in 253 at Panormus, though that fleet too is struck by a storm.177  As both 
Lazenby and Tipps note, the Carthaginian fleet, while apparently the largest ever marshalled, is 
not so large as to be beyond belief, especially given the threat that the Roman expedition to 
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Africa posed to Carthage, nor is it necessarily inconsistent with subsequent reports of 
Carthaginian building and fleet strength.178 
 Moreover, Polybius’ narrative of the battle at Ecnomus seems to confirm that these fleets 
were of unusually large size, particularly given the Roman division of command.  The limitations 
to command and control in the absence of modern communications made effective command of 
very large fleets extremely difficult, with the usual response being to delegate command to 
specific ‘wings’ of a fleet to subordinates, who then operate with a significant degree of 
autonomy.  At Cynossema, the Athenian fleet of 80 ships was divided primarily between 
Thrasyllus on the left and Thrasybulus on the right, even though the other strategoi were present, 
as Thucydides notes.179  At Arginusae, while all eight of the strategoi present commanded 
squadrons, Xenophon’s account seems to privilege Aristocrates on the left wing and 
Protomachus on the right wing as the overall commanders, while Diodorus notes that 
Callicratidas, the Spartan admiral, entrusted his left wing to Thrasondas the Theban.180  This 
tendency to divide command in very large fleets continued into the early modern period and is 
quite notable at the Battle of Lepanto in 1571.  There, the 212 ship Christian Holy League fleet 
was divided into three main units, a left wing under Agostino Barbarigo, the center under Don 
John of Austria, and the right under Giovanni Andrea Doria, in addition to a smaller rearguard 
under Don Alvaro de Bazan.  The Ottoman fleet of 272 ships was in turn split into three main 
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units as well, with the left wing under Uluc Ali reis, the center commanded by Ali Pasha, and the 
right wing commanded by Mehmed Siroco.181   
The Roman fleet at Ecnomus, however, was divided, Polybius notes, into four 
commands, the right and left sides of the wedge, the back of the wedge, and a final warship 
squadron in the rear called the triarii after the back ranks of a legion.182  It is worth noting that 
this division did not include the transports, which Polybius treats separately, so we may regard 
the Roman fleet as having been divided into either four or even potentially five groups.  Polybius 
offers fewer details of the Carthaginian fleet and names no commanders, but Lazenby, in 
reconstructing the fleet, also notes that it appears to be divided in four parts.183  Such an 
extensively divided command strongly argues for both fleets being uncommonly large. 
 Moreover, Polybius’ description of the Roman formation seems consistent with his 
suggestion that the Roman fleet was somewhat outnumbered, a position presumably worsened by 
the need to tow and guard the horse transports.  As with the fleet numbers, Polybius’ formation 
for the Roman fleet has been questioned, most notably by de Sanctis, Tarn and Thiel, as being 
impractical to the point of impossibility; but the formation has been defended convincingly by 
Lazenby and Tipps, and is accepted as plausible by Steinby.184  Polybius notes that the Roman 
formation was conceived in part out of a desire to limit the potential damage caused by the faster 
Carthaginian fleet potentially flanking the Roman formation.185  But if the Roman fleet had 
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numerical superiority, as Tarn supposes, this compact and essentially defensive formation would 
hardly seem necessary, as the Roman commanders could have simply extended their line out into 
open waters and used their superior numbers to envelop the Carthaginian fleet.  Instead, it is the 
Carthaginian fleet that uses this strategy, extending its line out into the open sea and also closer 
shoreward at a forward angle to aid in encircling the Roman fleet and striking it from behind.  
Both the Carthaginian formation and the Roman counter-formation suggest a Carthaginian fleet 
that was at least roughly equal, if not superior, to the Roman fleet in numbers.186 
 No solution to this problem is likely to be completely satisfying, but to cut down all of 
the figures as Tarn does is clearly unsatisfactory.  Tipps suggests that the simplest explanation of 
the discrepancy at Hermaeum is to assume a mistake of precisely 100 ships in the total for the 
Roman fleet caught in the storm, bringing it from 364 to 464, noting that this sort of mistake 
would have been an easy one for a scribe to make.187  Lazenby, although noting that such a 
correction would be reasonable, opts instead to assume that the Roman fleet on arrival at Aspis 
had 504 ships, the original 350, plus the 114 Carthaginian prizes, plus the 40 ships left at Aspis; 
but departed only with the 364 most seaworthy ships, leaving behind or burning the rest.188  
These proposals by Tipps and Lazenby both have problems, although none so insurmountable as 
those created by Tarn’s solution.  The initial difficulty of where the crews for these ships come 
from is solved by Polybius, who notes that the ships were captured “αὔτανδρους,” men and all, 
which could very well have resolved the need for additional oarsmen.189  For the purposes of this 
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study, however, the precise number of Roman ships caught in the storm actually matters 
relatively little.  What matters is how many ships set out and how many returned, for both the 
Romans and the Carthaginians; with the adoption of that narrow focus, many of the questions 
can be dropped. 
 What remains, however, is the question of how many ships the Carthaginians lost at 
Hermaeum, a puzzle which impacts our understanding of the subsequent strength of the 
Carthaginian fleet.  The first possibility is that the battle happened as the preserved text suggests, 
with 114 prizes, in which case we might follow either Tipps or Lazenby’s suggestion in raising 
the size of the Roman fleet at Camarina.  In support of this notion, we might note that we know 
from Livy that a columna rostrata was set up for the two consuls in command, which seems to 
support a more dramatic victory, although the triumph, over the Carthaginians and the 
Cossurenses, appears to have been celebrated in January of 253, after their years as proconsuls in 
Sicily.190  The triumph alone, however, does not necessarily decisively argue for a large number 
of ships captured at Hermaeum.  Panormus was captured during the following year, and it seems 
plausible that the triumph was voted to the consuls, not for a single great victory, but for a 
progression of achievements including the routing of a Carthaginian fleet, some activities on 
Malta (implied by the triumph including the Cossurenses by name), and perhaps involvement in 
military operations in Sicily in the year that both consuls seem to have been proconsuls there.  
This solution of accepting the 114 figure does, however, have the virtue of preserving Polybius’ 
figure. 
 The second potential option is an emendation to a smaller number of prizes. As Tipps 
notes, an error of exactly 100 ships would be an easy one to make, and in this case, we might 
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point to a single errant ἑκατὸν as the source of the confusion.  Diodorus provides a hint in 
support of this reading, as he gives the total number of prizes at the battle as twenty-four, rather 
than 114, which perhaps combined with some Roman losses (Orosius reports nine), could put the 
Roman fleet at roughly the strength Polybius gives.191   
Further supporting this notion is Polybius’ own language about the subsequent 
Carthaginian recovery. After the storm off Camarina destroys all but eighty of the Roman ships, 
Polybius reports that the Carthaginians, elated, “got ready [κατεσκευάζοντο] two hundred ships 
and to make all the other preparations for a naval expedition.”192  As noted above, in Polybius, 
σκευάζω and its derivatives tend to refer to the refitting of already extant hulls, rather than the 
construction of new ships.  Polybius only uses κατασκευάζω of ship construction at one other 
point in his Punic War narrative, during the preparation of the initial Roman fleet of 261/0, 
where he notes that the crews were trained to row on shore “while those to whom the 
construction of the ships had been committed were busy in getting them ready [κατασκευήν].”193  
The actual construction of the ships, including their derivation from a Carthaginian model, 
however, seems to have already taken place, leaving the reference ambiguous.194  It is possible 
that Polybius here means to include the construction, but it is also possible that, having dispensed 
with the production of the hulls in the previous section, he understands κατασκευήν here to mean 
post-construction fitting and finishing. 
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Comparative examples for κατασκευάζω in naval contexts are fairly hard to come by.  
Arrian prefers ἐπισκευάζω, which in the Indica always has the sense of repair or refit, and never 
of construction.195  Thucydides prefers παρασκευάζω, but it less consistent with its use, typically 
using it to mean refit, but occasionally including fresh construction.196  More relevant, a passage 
from a speech of Apollodorus, Against Polycles, uses κατασκευάζω unambiguously to refer to 
the repair and refit that would be the duty of a trierarch.  Apollodorus declares that he “fitted 
[κατεσκεύασα] the ship with equipment all my own, taking nothing from the public stores,”197 
and he later challenges his Polycles to “take over the trireme and furnish [κατασκεύασαι] it 
yourself, along with sailors and marines and officers.”198  In both cases, the basic ship’s hull 
obviously already exists.  If the Carthaginians are mainly refitting ships, then Polybius seems to 
suggest that the damage to the Carthaginian fleet was less severe than the preserved text implies.  
Amending the Carthaginian losses from 114 to merely fourteen would neatly solve both the 
problem of the Roman fleet strength in the storm at Camarina, the brief description of the battle, 
and the otherwise inexplicable lack of Carthaginian shipbuilding for the fleet of 254.  
However, this emendation, changing the losses from 14 to 114, runs afoul of the evidence 
(such as the columna rostrata) that the victory was likely a great one.  While Diodorus reports 
only 24 ships captured, Eutropius and Orosius both give the figure of 104 ships sunk and thirty 
captured at the battle, suggesting losses higher than Diodorus admits and more in line with the 
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figure in the text.199  These figures suggests a third possible solution, that many of the ships were 
in fact sunk rather than captured, leaving the Romans with only perhaps fourteen prizes (or 
twenty-four prizes with around ten losses), but with the remainder of the 114 sunk or damaged 
beyond repair.  This proposal solves the problem of the Roman fleet size in the storm at 
Camarina, but not the issue of the lack of Carthaginian building late that year.  Possibly that the 
reason the Carthaginians engage in apparently minimal new ship construction after Hermaeum 
may be that the Carthaginian navy merely repaired and refitted additional ships still left damaged 
at Ecnomus, but that begs the question of why this step was not taken in the previous year.  This 
solution also fails to explain why Polybius dismisses in just a few lines what must have been one 
of the most commanding Roman victories of the war.  As is perhaps now readily apparent, no 
solution to this episode is likely to be entirely satisfactory.  What seems the limit of our secure 
knowledge is that the Romans won a notable victory at Hermaeum, no doubt because of their 
significant numerical superiority of 350 ships to only 200, but then lost nearly all of their ships, 
prizes and all, in the subsequent storm.  For this analysis, we must at least venture more specific 
figures, but it should be cautioned at this point that any such figures beyond this basic 
understanding are necessarily speculative. 
Carthage will have had, as noted above, around a hundred ships after the Battle of 
Tyndaris, so in order to bring its full fleet up to the reported strength of 350 it will have needed 
to construct some 250 warships plus five more to account for the retirement of old ships as 
before. A very high number indeed, but not necessarily an unbelievable one, and it is possible 
that the construction of these ships began well before the winter of 257.  To reach their reported 
strength of 330, the Romans would have needed to build some 178 warships plus eight more to 
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account for normal replacement, and some unknown, but presumably small, number of horse 
transports.  The Carthaginians lose sixty-four ships captured and ‘more than thirty’ ships sunk, 
for perhaps a total of 100 losses, leaving 250 ships in the winter, all of which appear to be 
temporarily mothballed when Carthage turns to fight Regulus on land.  The Roman fleet, by 
contrast, losing twenty-four ships but capturing 64 more, would have been increased to 370, 
forty of which would be left active at Aspis, and the rest returning to Italy to be retired for the 
winter.  A further twenty Roman ships would need to have been built for the fleet to depart at the 
350-ship strength Polybius provides for the following year, plus 19 to account for normal 
replacement. 
The Carthaginian fleet in the summer of 255 was 200 ships strong, but we should also 
account for the building Polybius describes for Carthage in the winter of 256/5, perhaps eighty 
ships or so, including the normal replacement of thirteen ships.  That would give the 
Carthaginians 317 total ships, of which only 200 are active for the Battle at Hermaeum.  The 
consensus of the sources seems to be that Carthaginian losses were somewhat over 100, with 
Polybius giving 114 and Eutropius and Orosius 134, leaving total Carthaginian strength around 
200 in the summer of 254, with the remaining ships from Ecnomus being refitted for combat 
after the reports of the storm off Camarina sinking the bulk of the Roman fleet.  The 
Carthaginian replacement building for the winter of 255/4 would then have stabilized again at 
10. 
The Roman fleet in 255 would have included the forty-ship squadron at Aspis, as well as 
the 350-ship relief force.  Whatever the solution to the problem of Hermaeum, only eighty of 
these ships survived to the end of the year.  The Romans then build some 220 ships in the winter 
of 255/4, and go on the offensive with all 300 ships they have in the summer of 254.  The 
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Carthaginian fleet is presumably still at 200 strength.  Diodorus indicates that the Carthaginian 
fleet does shadow the Roman fleet in 253 and possibly prevents it from mooring near Libya, so 
we should probably assume the Carthaginian fleet stays active, at least when the sea is open.200  
Finally, the Roman fleet is struck by a storm again in 253, losing 150 ships of its total of 300, 
leading Rome to mothball nearly its entire fleet. 
  
Table 2.5: Carthaginian Fleet Estimates, 257-253 
Year     Season Active Reserve Built Lost Retired 
257 Summer 62 24  18  
257/6 Winter  86 
264  5 
256 Summer 350  
 100  
256/5 Winter  250 
80  13 
255 Summer 200 130  114  
255/4 Winter  216 
  11 
254 Summer 200  
   
254/3 Winter  200 
  10 
253 Summer 200  
   
253/2 Winter  200 
  10 
 
Table 2.6: Roman Fleet Estimates, 257-253 
Year     Season Active Reserve Built Lost Retired 
257 Summer 154  
 +1  
257/6 Winter  154 176  8 
256 Summer 330   +50  
256/5 Winter 40 330 20  19 
255 Summer 390   310  
255/4 Winter  80 220  4 
254 Summer 300     
254/3 Winter  300   15 
253 Summer 300  
 150  
253/2 Winter  150 
  8 
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Carthaginian Recovery, Dominance and Defeat (253-241 B.C.) 
 After 253, we see no more monster fleets of 300 or more ships.  The shift to smaller fleets 
can almost certainly be attributed to the economic exhaustion of both sides.  Whatever the result 
of Hermaeum, such exhaustion on the Carthaginian side seems hinted at by the decision to refit 
only existing hulls in 254.  On the Roman side, the decision to temporarily suspend major naval 
operations after the disaster of 253 would suggest that here too energy was flagging.  Given that 
land-based operations in Sicily continued at a fairly high tempo, it does not seem to be a failure 
of political will in 253 (or again in 249).  Finance seems the more likely cause, although 
Polybius gives no hint of the state of the Roman treasury until a decade later, noting in 243 that it 
was empty.201  There does not seem to be evidence of any sort of currency devaluation in Roman 
coinage that we might associate with extreme financial distress.  However, it is just as likely that 
the Senate’s decision not to raise a large fleet for several years, and instead to rely on land 
warfare, represented a successful effort to bring income into line with expenditures.202  Roman 
soldiers provided their own equipment, could be paid a pittance and would serve for honor and 
duty, but ships and rowers cost money. 
 Following the storm in 253, Polybius reports that the Romans opted not to build a new 
fleet, but instead they revised their strategy to focus exclusively on land forces.203  Only sixty 
ships were kept active, Polybius notes, for supply purposes; both Orosius and Eutropius concur 
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with this figure.204 Roman operations in 252 and 251, largely passed over by Polybius but 
reported in the later sources, seem limited to land-based operations following the capture of 
Panormus.205 These operations then culminate in a major land engagement between a Hasdrubal 
and Roman forces under L. Caecilius Metellus near Panormus, which produced a significant 
Roman victory.206  Although land operations do not figure directly into this study, these 
operations are worth noting to avoid the impression that the war was ever really ‘on pause’ 
during this period.  The Romans had already begun preparing a new fleet in the winter of 251/0, 
apparently before the Battle at Panormus.207  Polybius reports the construction of fifty ships, 
resulting in a fleet of 200 ships when combined with the 150 ships that had survived the storm of 
253.208  This fleet then supports the subsequent siege of Lilybaeum in 250.209 
 Although Polybius reports the Carthaginian fleet as having been at a strength of 200 ships 
after 254, he gives few details of their activities until 250.  A fifty-ship squadron under the 
command of Hannibal does run the blockade into and out of Lilybaeum in 250 with relief forces 
and supplies, before removing his fleet to Drepana.210  The following year, a Roman fleet of 123 
ships under the command of P. Claudius Pulcher was badly mauled by a Carthaginian fleet, the 
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size of which Polybius does not provide, at Drepana.  The Romans lost all but 30 ships.211  
Following this victory, the Carthaginians sent a small squadron to attack the Roman blockade 
fleet at Lilybaeum, inflicting limited damage on the fleet.212  The Romans then sent L. Iunius 
Pullus with sixty ships and supplies to regroup what was left of the fleet.  After he regrouped 
with the ships at Lilybaeum, Iunius with 120 ships, which according to Polybius was the entire 
Roman fleet, was caught by a storm off of Cape Pachynus, and the fleet was lost in its entirety.213  
The Romans then gave up completely on the sea, leaving the Carthaginians freedom to again raid 
Italy.214 
 This status quo, with the Carthaginians having free rein over the sea and the Romans 
without a fleet, then holds until the construction of a fresh Roman fleet of 200 ships in the winter 
of 243/2.215  It seems to have arrived in Sicily in the summer of 242 and invested Drepana.  
Polybius notes that the Carthaginian fleet was still at Carthage.216  Despite his suggestion that the 
Carthaginians readied their fleet “at once” (παραυτίκα), it was only in the following year 
(Eutropius gives the date as the 10th of March) that the two fleets met off of the Aegadi Islands 
for what would be the final naval engagement in the war.217  Polybius reports no size for the 
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Carthaginian fleet, but notes that it lost fifty ships sunk and seventy captured, with no figures 
given for Roman losses.218 
 As noted before, both Thiel and Tarn discount Polybius’ report of a reconstituted 200 
ship Carthaginian fleet in 254 after the storm off of Camarina.219  Tarn assumes that the 200 
ships here mentioned must be transports, reasoning that if Carthage had a fleet of any size in 254 
it would have contested the siege of Panormus.220  Instead Tarn and Thiel both assume that 
Carthaginians only have perhaps 70 ships available in 254, a number raised to perhaps 170 total 
ships in 249.  However, Carthaginian inaction in 254 and 253 hardly seems sufficient proof for 
this fairly drastic change to Polybius’ narrative.  He notes that after the loss of 150 Roman ships 
(leaving 150 operational) in 253, the Carthaginians were encouraged that they “now controlled 
the sea without fear, the Romans having withdrawn from it.”221  It is hard to imagine this 
confidence if Carthage only had a small flotilla of seventy ships, while the Romans were sending 
only sixty ships to Sicily with another ninety in mothballs in Italy.  Moreover, it is hardly a shock 
that, after the disasters of Ecnomus and Hermaeum, the Carthaginians might have been reluctant 
to challenge the 300-ship Roman fleet at Panormus.  Lazenby offers another solution, noting that 
Polybius only has the Carthaginians “beginning to prepare” a fleet of 200 ships in 254, and that 
the fleet may not have been entirely ready right away.222  It does, however, seem necessary to 
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assume that the Carthaginian fleet had reached 200, or at least nearly 200, ships in strength by 
253 when the loss of 150 ships gives the Carthaginians untroubled control of the sea. 
 The events surrounding the Battle of Drepana give some sense of the disposition of the 
Carthaginian fleet.  Polybius gives no figures for the size of the Carthaginian fleet under 
Adherbal at Drepana, but we know that it was reinforced by seventy ships from Carthage under 
the command of Carthalo shortly after the battle.223  If we follow Polybius in assuming the 
Carthaginians had 200 ships at this point, it suggests a return to the Carthaginian dispositions at 
the beginning of the war, with 130 ships in the theatre of operations, with the rest (the 70 ships 
dispatched under Carthalo) in reserve at Carthage. 
 Roman fleet movements in 250 and 249 also appear to require some explaining.  Polybius 
reports the construction of only fifty ships in 251/0, which combined with the 150 ships that had 
survived the storm of 253, neatly gives the 200 ship fleet Polybius reports supporting the siege of 
Lilybaeum in the summer of 250.224  This fleet, however, appears to have been both augmented 
and dispersed at the beginning of 249.  Following Polybius, P. Claudius Pulcher had with him 
123 ships when he sailed against Drepana, of which only thirty returned.225  In addition, L. Iunius 
Pullus who Polybius probably incorrectly assigns as the consul of 248, when in fact he was 
Claudius’ colleague in 249, set out from Rome with sixty ships and a supply convoy for the 
siege.226  At Messana, Pullus joins up with “those of the ships that had assembled there from the 
                                                 
223 Plb. 1.53.1-2. 
224 Plb. 1.39.14-15, 1.41.3. 
225 Plb. 1.51.11-12. 
226 Plb. 1.52.4-6.  On Pullus’ consular year and the dating of Pullus’ disaster, see Walbank, (1957), 115-6 and 
Lazenby, (1996), 137. 
 122 
army and the rest of Sicily.”227  William Paton, in translating this passage, assumes these ships 
are from Lilybaeum, a mix presumably of Claudius’ survivors and ships left behind to continue 
the blockade.  However, as Walbank notes, if this were true, such ships would have had to have 
snuck past Carthalo, who is, after this point, positioned between Lilybaeum and Messana.228  
Lazenby instead figures that these ships must be part of the expedition of 250 which had returned 
to Italy for the winter, and thus that some of Pullus’ ships must be new construction in order for 
the Romans to have had both Pullus’ fleet of 120 and Claudius’ of 123.229  This position finds 
some support from Polybius’ language, for although he is clear that Pullus’ fleet was a complete 
loss with “not even the wrecks” being salvageable, he only concludes that the Roman fleets were 
“disabled” (ἀχρειωθῆναι), rather than completely lost.230  This statement makes sense if we 
assume that Claudius’ 30 surviving ships were still at Lilybaeum, but badly damaged and 
effectively useless. 
 The final question then, is the size of the Carthaginian fleet present at the Aegates 
Islands.  It clearly must have been larger than the 120 losses Polybius reports it sustained, for he 
also notes the survivors of the battle retreating.231  The Carthaginians ought to have had 
something like 293 ships at their disposal: the 200 ships prior to Drepana, plus the ninety-three 
ships captured from Claudius.  However, it seems hardly likely that all of the ships Claudius lost 
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were captured in a serviceable state.  In his account of the battle, Polybius notes that many 
Roman ships were sunk, so it seems likely that a good number of Claudius’ lost ships were in 
fact total losses.232  There were, evidently, at least some prizes, as Adherbal sends them back to 
Carthage with the prisoners, before sending Carthalo to raid the remains of the Roman fleet at 
Lilybaeum.233  Diodorus reports the Carthaginian fleet at the Aegates Islands to have been 250 
warships, which seems reasonable, assuming around fifty of the Roman ships captured at 
Drepana could be repaired.234  It is worth noting, with Lazenby, that there are signs that the 
Carthaginians were at this stage struggling to find adequate crews and especially marines for 
their ships, which may argue for a smaller fleet, though certainly not much smaller than 200.235  
In the absence of a figure from Polybius, the most reasonable course seems to be to assume that 
the Carthaginian fleet at the Battle of the Aegates Islands was around 200 ships, roughly the 
same size as the Roman fleet, not counting transports. 
 Now we may complete our speculative reconstruction of fleet strengths.   Of the 150 
Roman ships to survive the storm of 253, sixty are reactivated in the summer of 252, while the 
remaining ninety are kept in mothballs, with that pattern holding again for 252 and 251.  Given 
our standard formula to account for replacement building, this would have required the Romans 
to construct eight ships each year.  Finally, in the winter of 251/0, the Romans build fifty fresh 
ships, plus eight more to account for replacement, which are then activated together in the 
summer of 250 for a total fleet of 200, conforming to Polybius’ totals.  The following winter, 
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part of the fleet is left at Lilybaeum to be commanded by Claudius in 249.  Polybius reports the 
presence of the crews at the siegeworks over the winter.236  The strength of that still active fleet 
would presumably have been the same as Claudius’ strength at Drepana: 123 ships.  The 
remainder, seventy-seven, are mothballed.  In order to reach the roughly 240 Roman ships 
reported active in the following year, the Romans needed to build an additional forty ships, plus 
ten to account for replacement.  Then in 249, the entire Roman fleet is effectively lost, leaving 
the Romans with no ships, a situation that holds until the construction of a new fleet in the winter 
of 243/2.  This fleet of 200 ships is active in Sicily in the summer of 242 and engages the 
Carthaginian fleet, following Eutropius, on the 10th of March, 241, thus at the very end of the 
winter of 242/1. 
 On the Carthaginian side, we might assume that the entire Carthaginian fleet was active 
in the summer of 253, given the presence of the large Roman fleet, but that for the summer of 
252, only a part of the fleet, perhaps 130 ships, was active, as appears to have been the case in 
250 and 249.  The arrival of the Roman fleet of 250 causes the Carthaginians to activate their 
entire force of 200 ships for 249.  The Battle of Drepana furnishes them with an abundance of 
hulls, but it seems plausible, given the evidence of crew shortages, that the they might have 
merely used this abundance to select the most seaworthy hulls, and then have burned the rest.  
The slow response to the arrival of a Roman fleet in 242 suggests that the Carthaginians had 
again gone back to the habit of placing on reserve much of their fleet when the Romans were 
inactive, although reports of Carthaginian raiding by Hamilcar suggest that at least some of the 
fleet was kept active.237  It seems likely, in this case, that the active portion was smaller, given 
                                                 
236 Plb. 1.49.1-2. 
237 Plb. 1.56.10. 
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the slow response to the Roman fleet of 242.  Here I venture that the ratio of active ships to 
reserves might have been reversed, with seventy active and 130 mothballed in the summers, but 
it must be noted that this is mere speculation.  In either case, the Carthaginian fleet appears to 
have been retired back to Carthage in the winters, since the fleet that sails to the Aegates seems 
to come direct from Carthage, and Polybius does not report it rendezvousing with any squadron 
based on Sicily.238 
  
                                                 
238 Plb. 1.60.1. 
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Table 2.7: Carthaginian Fleet Estimates, 252-241 
Year   Season Active Reserve Built Lost Retired 
252 Summer 130 70    
252/1 Winter  200   10 
251 Summer 130 70    
251/0 Winter  200   10 
250 Summer 130 70    
250/49 Winter  200   10 
249 Summer 200     
249/8 Winter  200   10 
248 Summer 70 130    
248/7 Winter  200   10 
247 Summer 70 130    
247/6 Winter  200   10 
246 Summer 70 130    
246/5 Winter  200   10 
245 Summer 70 130    
245/4 Winter  200   10 
244 Summer 70 130    
244/3 Winter  200   10 
243 Summer 70 130    
243/2 Winter  200   10 
242 Summer 70 130    
242/1 Winter 200   120 10 
241 Final 80     
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Table 2.8: Roman Fleet Estimates, 252-241 
Year   Season Active Reserve Built Lost Retired 
252 Summer 60 90    
252/1 Winter  150   8 
251 Summer 60 90    
251/0 Winter  150 50  8 
250 Summer 200     
250/49 Winter 123 77 40  10 
249 Summer 240   240  
249/8 Winter      
248 Summer      
248/7 Winter      
247 Summer      
247/6 Winter      
246 Summer      
246/5 Winter      
245 Summer      
245/4 Winter      
244 Summer      
244/3 Winter      
243 Summer      
243/2 Winter   200   
242 Summer 200     
242/1 Winter 200   +70 10 
241 Final 270     
 
 
Case Study Analysis and Conclusions 
Polybius reports that in the course of the war Carthage lost some 500 warships and Rome 
700.  However, these figures must be inexact, and efforts to reconstruct the narratives to verify 
them have not achieved complete success.239  Although the human cost implied by those figures 
                                                 
239 Plb. 1.63.6-7.  Polybius refers in this passage to all of the lost ships as quinqueremes (πεντήρεις), although it is 
increasingly clear that many of the lost ships would have been lighter quadremes and triremes.  I take these loss 
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is immense, it is ironically not lost ships that prove financially ruinous to would-be naval 
powers.  Apart from sunk costs, a sunken ship is, by its loss, rendered no longer a liability on the 
treasury.  Rather it is ships built, maintained, and crewed month after month that drain the 
treasury. 
Carthage, starting with 200 ships, only builds perhaps 350 (344 in the above 
reconstruction) during the entire war.  By contrast, Rome, starting with a very limited fleet of 
perhaps 30 ships, probably built more than 800 ships (826 in the above reconstruction) over the 
course of the war.  To this new construction should be added the replacement costs as estimated 
in the tables above, amounting to 219 ships for Carthage and 119 for Rome, narrowing the gap 
between total ship construction and representing the Carthaginian habit of keeping a standing 
fleet in the years when Rome made no effort to contest the sea. 
To these costs must also be added the basic maintenance of ships at sea, which I will 
collectively refer to as ‘trierarchy costs,’ given that they were covered by the duties of a trierarch 
in Athens, and it is Athens which provides the bulk of our evidence for the nature, extent and 
scale of these costs.  Trierarchy costs should only be assessed on ships that were active for at 
least some part of the year.  As Gabrielsen notes, inactive triremes in Athens were not generally 
assigned trierarchs for years in which they would be inactive, and we have covered the 
estimation of the basic maintenance of the hull in storage (for which a trierarch was not, in 
theory, responsible) above.240  Thus, for this measure, a ship incurs its full trierarchy cost for any 
year in which it was activated at all.  Following the above tables, Carthage, with a standing fleet 
                                                 
figures to be quite inexact, although it is worth noting that it is an effort to use them as quite precise figures that 
undergirds Tarn’s effort, Tarn, (1907). 
240 Gabrielsen, (1990), 80-84. 
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and some active ships in every summer of the war, incurred the costs of some 3,378 ship 
activations.  Rome’s costs in this regard are somewhat lower, only 2,963 activations.   
Finally, crew costs should be accounted for on a seasonal basis, as the ‘winter’ season in 
the tables above during the mare clausum is only half the length of the summer season.  Ships 
active during summer seasons are thus assumed to have cost 8 months’ pay for their crews, while 
ships in the winter only 4.  Because many of the battles of the war cannot be securely dated to 
the month, it is impossible to pro-rate this figure for ships lost before the end of the season.  
Given that limitation, adding together the tables above and accounting for the lengths of each 
season, Carthage paid for some 26,224 crew-months, whereas Rome was slightly less at 25,156 
crew-months. 
 
Estimating Cost 
 Quantifying these various costs poses special challenges.  The sources for the First Punic 
War, unfortunately, are largely uninterested in matters of finance.  Although Polybius notes that 
by the end of the war the Roman treasury was exhausted and the Romans had to privately 
finance their final fleet, he gives no figures for the cost of any of the fleets of the war, contenting 
himself only to count ships.241  Instead it is necessary to turn to Athenian comparanda to attempt 
to estimate at least relative costs.  Studies of the cost of the Athenian navy have generally broken 
costs into three parts: the construction of hulls, the costs assumed by the trierarch, and the cost of 
paying the crew of the ship.  Frank Robbins made probably the most thorough effort to estimate 
the cost of the Athenian navy in his 1918 article, “The cost to Athens of her Second Empire” 
though his figures have been subsequently updated by more recent scholars, perhaps most 
                                                 
241 Plb. 1.59.6-7. 
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notably Gabrielsen.242  David Pritchard has revisited Robbins’ figures in light of current thinking 
on Athenian naval costs.  He concludes that Robbins’ estimate of the cost of a trireme’s hull at 2 
talents is much too high, concluding that the actual cost of the hull would be very close to the 
5,000 drachmae penalty imposed on a trierarch for the loss of a warship, with an additional 
2,169 or 2,299 drachmae for the equipment, as attested in epigraphic sources, bringing the total 
cost of a new ship to 1 talent, 1,234 drachmae.243  Pritchard reports the average attested cost of 
holding the trierarchy at 4,436 drachmae, and accepts the gross pay for a sailor at 1 drachma a 
day, or 1 talent per ship per month.244 It is worth repeating that ships not on active duty seem 
generally not to have been assigned trierarchs.245 
 This rough scheme of cost is, of course, not perfectly applicable to the First Punic War.  
The main warship of the First Punic War seems to have been the quinquereme, rather than the 
trireme.  As noted above, the quinquereme was a significantly larger and more expensive 
warship, with a larger crew as well.  Moreover, adjusting for the differences between 
quinqueremes and triremes in the preserved narrative of the war is impossible; Polybius rarely 
distinguishes between the two, preferring instead to give numbers of ships.  The traditional 
assumption, that both fleets were dominated by quinqueremes and that smaller ships were 
comparatively rare, has been undermined by recent archaeology which suggests that lighter ships 
                                                 
242 F. E. Robbins, “The Cost to Athens of Her Second Empire” CP 13.4 (1918): 361-388.  Gabrielsen (1994).  Note 
also on this topic M Cook, (1990): 69-97; Blackman, (1969): 179-216; and Pritchard (2015), 92-113. 
243 Pritchard (2015), 105. 
244 Pritchard (2015), 97-8, 110-111.  On the pay of the sailors, see W. T. Loomis, Wages, Welfare Costs and 
Inflation in Classical Athens (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1998), 57-8. 
245 Gabrielsen (1994), 70. 
 131 
may have been far more common than Polybius indicates.246  However, for the purposes of a 
comparison of the costs of the Carthaginian and the Roman exertion at sea, we may make do 
with an approximate ratio of costs.  Pritchard’s figures suggest that building and fitting a new 
ship might have cost some 7,234 drachmae, while the maintenance of that hull for a year, 
roughly equal to the duties of a trierarch, when active, would cost about 4,436 drachmae; the 
crew costs for that year would run some 72,000 drachmae (6,000 drachmae per month), the costs 
for a year being in a ratio of roughly 3:2:32.247  It is perhaps better, however, to express the crew 
costs on a per-month basis, so that is how I have calculated them, making the ratio of build cost 
to yearly trierarchy cost to monthly crew cost 3:2:2.6 
It must, of course, be noted that the key Athenian warship, the trireme, is rather smaller in 
both size, crew and ram than the largest ships in use during the First Punic War.  With a normal 
crew of around 200 and a typical mass of around 45 tons, the trireme had two-thirds the crew and 
45% of the weight of a quinquereme, which appear to have had a crew of around 300 and mass 
around 100 tons.248  Likewise, the ram, almost certainly the single most expensive part of the 
warship, for a quinquereme would have been as heavy if not heavier than the Athlit Ram 
(believed to be the ram of a ‘four’) at 465kg, whereas trireme rams (such as the recovered Egadi 
rams) tend to mass between 150 and 190kg.249  As a result, any fleet using a significant number 
                                                 
246 For the assumption that quinqueremes dominated the naval landscape, see Tarn (1907), 60, Thiel (1954), 96-100, 
Lazenby (1996), 64-66.  On the archaeological evidence calling this conclusion into question, see Tusa and Royal 
(2012), 39-42. 
247 This assumes that crews were kept on and paid through the four months when the seas were closed.  It seems 
clear that, at least for the Romans, this was not always the case, as the crews of the fleet participated in the siege of 
Lilybaeum, Plb. 1.49.1-3. 
248 Morrison and Coates (1986), 107-8.  Morrison and Coates (1996), 285-303. 
249 See Table 2.1 
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of quinqueremes would not only have been much more expensive than an equivalent trireme 
fleet, but the cost structure of the fleet would also have been more tilted towards construction 
costs, since the difference in required construction materials is significantly larger than the 
differences in crew requirements.  However, the emphasis on the requirements of the 
quinquereme too can be overstated, as the Egadi rams seem to suggest quite strongly that Roman 
and Carthaginian fleets were not so quinquereme heavy as Polybius claims, and in fact still had 
significant numbers of triremes in them.  As imperfect a solution as it is, I will split the 
difference, assuming that a First Punic War warship would cost about 50% more to build, and 
25% more to crew than an Athenian trireme.  These calculations would bring our ratio of 
building, trierarchy and monthly crew costs to 4.5:2:3.3. 
Applying that ratio to the figures generated in the case study then allows us to estimate 
the rough cost structure for both navies for the entire war.  Although it is tempting to try to 
convert these costs to some ancient unit of currency, like the talent, the lack of price evidence 
from the period of the First Punic War should warn us against this effort, and so the calculations 
will be presented in ‘ship-cost-units,’ one unit being roughly equal to the construction cost of a 
single warship.  Thus the construction of a new ship or the replacement of an old one would be 
valued at a single ship-cost-unit, while the trierarchy costs for an existing active ship would be 
4/9ths (0.4̅4) a ship-cost unit, and the crew costs for a month would be 11/15ths (0.73̅3) of a 
ship-cost unit.  The results, rounded to the nearest whole number, are shown in the table below: 
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Table 2.9: Estimated Total Costs of Naval Warfare, 264-241 
 Carthaginian Ship Costs 264-
241 B.C. 
Roman Ship Costs 264-
241 B.C. 
Activity Total Ship-Cost-Unit Total Ship-Cost-Unit 
Building 344 344 826 826 
Replacement 219 219 119 119 
Maintenance 
(‘Trierarchy Costs’) 
3,378 1,501 2,963 1,317 
Crew Costs 26,224 19,406 25,156 18,448 
Total Costs  21,470  20,710 
Ship construction and replacement accounts for a shockingly small portion of total costs, 
only 2.6% of the total cost to Carthage and 4.5% for Rome.  While the maintenance costs of the 
trierarchy exceed shipbuilding, both of these costs are absolutely dwarfed by the staggering cost 
of crewing so many ships for so many seasons.  Crew costs make about 90% of both Roman and 
Carthaginian total expenses.  It should be noted, however, that these figures must represent a 
ceiling for crew costs, as the sources do not consistently provide the means to pro-rate crew costs 
for ships and fleets that were lost during any given season; one does not have to pay drowned 
rowers.  However, even with this caveat, it is quite clear that the greatest drain on the resources 
of both sides was the cost of keeping so many thousands of rowers out at sea, year after year. 
This cost structure also reinforces the general indecisiveness of naval warfare, because, 
paradoxically, fleets were expensive to keep, but cheap to lose.  The short service lives of oared-
warships meant that any state looking to maintain long-term naval dominance would have to 
rebuild their entire fleet every 20 years or so, even if the fleet saw little combat.  Moreover, in an 
extended naval conflict, building a fleet and putting it into action for a single season was far less 
expensive than maintaining a continuous naval presence, year-on-year.  Given the proportions of 
cost discussed above, the running costs of an active, crewed and combat-ready fleet would 
outstrip the building costs of the same fleet more than 6-fold in a single summer sailing season.  
Surprisingly, therefore, the best strategic decisions the Roman Senate ever made in the war may 
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be reckoned as those in 253 and again in 249 to temporarily abandon major naval operations.  
Without those pauses, Rome might well have hit the limit of its resources far earlier in the 240s, 
while Carthage still had reserves and untouched coastal bases left to fall back upon. 
 
Conclusions 
At the end of the war, both Rome and Carthage were clearly financially exhausted.  
Polybius notes that in the winter of 243/2, there were no funds in the public treasury in Rome to 
provide for a fleet, and instead the fleet that won the war had to be privately financed.250  It thus 
seems likely that, had Rome lost this fleet, there would not have been another for some 
considerable time.  Carthage was, likewise, at the end of its resources.  Polybius notes that after 
the Battle of the Aegates islands, the Carthaginians remained willing to carry out the war, but 
lacked the means to marshal another fleet to resupply the army in Sicily and, if that army were 
lost, no means to raise another.251  The destitution of Carthage becomes all the more clear when, 
unable to pay the mercenaries it had used in Sicily, it faced a revolt of the army soon reinforced 
by a revolt of some of Carthage’s North African subjects.252  Hoyos figures that the pay in 
arrears to the Carthaginian army might have numbered some 4,368 talents, based on evidence for 
the pay of Greek mercenaries in the period.253  The Roman state too was likely in debt, as 
                                                 
250 Plb. 1.59.6-7. 
251 Plb. 1.62.2-3. 
252 Plb. 1.65-88.  On the war in general, see Hoyos, (2007).   
253 Hoyos (2007), 31. 
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Polybius notes that the Romans who financed the fleet of 243 expected to be repaid if all went 
well; however, this debt was likely covered by the indemnity that Rome placed on Carthage.254 
What of the insistence that, as Grainger phrases it, “it was not that Rome and Carthage 
were generally equal in manpower and resources,” or that, as Lazenby puts it, “in a slogging 
match, Rome could simply outslog Carthage?”255  Of course it must be observed that Rome won 
this war, and would win the next one, so in a very literal sense Rome did outslog Carthage.  But 
the forgoing analysis lends credence to the argument that in accepting Polybius’ vision of dogged 
and inexperienced Romans bravely striving against an entrenched power all too happy to sit on 
its laurels, we are underrating the scale at which Carthage directed resources towards the war.  
Polybius himself, of course, admits that Carthaginian losses were not so short of Roman losses at 
sea, even accounting for the storms.256  But beyond losses, Carthage’s need to keep at least some 
fleet active every year, if for no other reason than to supply its armies in Sicily, represented a 
tremendous expense.  The Carthaginians cannot be said to have exerted themselves much less 
strenuously in their effort to keep their hold on Sicily than the Romans did in their effort to take 
it.  The resources and the ‘slogging potential’ of these two great states appear not to have been so 
different after all.  What was different was the strategic geography they were forced to contend 
with. 
Moreover, the tremendous scale of Carthaginian expenditure also calls into question the 
notion that Carthage was passive or complacent in the war.  Lazenby, for instance, declares that 
“it was left to Rome to make the last effort, and to Carthage, as usual, merely to respond…Rome 
                                                 
254 Plb. 1.59.7, 63.1-3. 
255 Grainger, (2011), 98.  Lazenby, (2004), 270. 
256 Plb. 1.63.6-7. 
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deserved to win.”257  Lazenby goes further in berating the Carthaginians for strategic failure, 
declaring that “no Carthaginian seems to have had the slightest inkling how to defeat Rome, 
except in the short term.”258  Lazenby’s criticism of Carthaginian inaction echoes Thiel, who 
attributes “Punic quietism, which manifested itself in a kind of paralysis, in sluggishness, in 
spoilt opportunities” to the fact that the “Carthaginians were peaceful merchants who tended to 
avoid wars.”259  But decisive Carthaginian action, perhaps in 249 after the Battle of Drepana and 
the related disasters, would have required an exertion of resources that by that point in the war, 
neither Carthage nor Rome had.  To, for instance, attack Syracuse, as Thiel suggests, would have 
certainly required Carthage to activate all of its ships and substantially enlarge its army in Sicily, 
something that it is worth noting that even the Roman hydra would be incapable of doing for the 
years following.260 
Carthage’s strategy should also not be so easily dismissed.  In fact, it came terribly close 
to succeeding.  Carthage appears to have assumed at the outset that the best it could hope for was 
a perpetuation of the status quo, which given the events of the Second Punic War, seems 
practically prescient.261  Instead, Carthage seems to have employed the same strategy as it had 
against Syracuse and the other Greek cities in the fifth and fourth century.262  In these wars, the 
navy was rarely the decisive arm, but instead merely a necessary tool for maintaining a land 
                                                 
257 Lazenby, (1996), 170. 
258 Lazenby, (1996), 167. 
259 Thiel, (1954), 334. 
260 Thiel, (1954), 332-3. 
261 Hoyos, (2015), 29-71. 
262 Hoyos, (2010), 149-77. 
 137 
presence in Sicily.  These wars had often been long and bloody, but indecisive, and Carthage had 
often adopted a defensive posture with significant success.  In the wars of the 480s, Carthage was 
able to outlast the Greek bloc of Theron and Gelon.263  Carthage had outlasted Dionysius I and 
later Agathocles.264  Throughout this period, Carthage seems to have gained more by defensive 
fighting in Sicily than by taking the offensive, with the notable exception of the aggressive 
campaign from 409 to 405 under the command of a Hannibal and Himilco, although this too had 
left Carthage overextended when, in 397, Dionysius struck back.265  Finally and most notably, 
Carthage had outlasted Pyrrhus, who, like the Romans, had captured Panormus and Eryx and left 
the Carthaginians holed up in Lilybaeum; but then his energy flagged in 276 and he returned to 
Italy.266  If in hindsight it is clear that this defensively oriented strategy could not have worked 
against Rome, it would not have been so clear in Carthage before the fact. 
                                                 
263 Hoyos, (2010), 165. 
264 Hoyos, (2010), 166-76. 
265 Hoyos (2010), 166-7. 
266 Hoyos (2010), 177. 
 138 
 
CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY AND METALLURGY
 
 Moving on from naval warfare, the remainder of this dissertation focuses on the costs of 
land warfare.  As discussed in the first chapter, the traditional approach to this topic, 
emphasizing manpower as the sole or key resource required for land warfare, neglects important 
economic costs involved in equipment and supply.  This chapter addresses those costs in broad 
strokes, before laying the foundation for more detailed attention to the cost of battlefield 
equipment.  In essence, this chapter aims to confront what might be considered ‘confounding 
variables’ for a comparison of battlefield equipment.1  In order to draw conclusions out of such a 
comparison, it must first be shown that the other costs of warfare, the confounding variables, 
while important to understand, are not likely to alter the final conclusions significantly.   
 In trying to gauge these confounding variables, it is useful to begin by breaking them 
down by type, which in turn means breaking down the major costs of fielding an army.  First, 
manpower costs, the costs of obtaining and paying the soldiers themselves, have already been 
discussed in the first chapter.  The second major group of costs is for non-durable supplies which 
the army must regularly consume.  For ancient armies, supply concerns were dominated by food 
and water.2  In addition to this, animals must be considered, which sit at an uncomfortable 
juncture between supplies and equipment.  Animals have both battlefield and non-battlefield 
                                                 
1 Confounding or ‘third’ variables are variables in an experiment that the experimenter has failed to consider or 
control for, which may alter the results and thus invalidate the study. 
2 Landers, (2003), 205-217.  Water supply is a badly understudied facet in ancient military operations, but see G. 
Moss, (2015). 
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uses, and while generally durable in and of themselves, also consume substantial amounts of 
food supplies.  Although the division is somewhat arbitrary, this chapter will address the issue of 
the number of animals required for the baggage train, along with the cost of feeding all of the 
animals, including warhorses and war-elephants, under the heading of supply costs.  The cost of 
acquiring sufficient warhorses for the cavalry, however will be dealt with in the subsequent 
chapters as an element of battlefield equipment.  Finally, the last major type of costs is 
equipment costs.  Equipment consists of those things which are durable goods, such as tools, 
weapons, and armor.  Equipment may then be further subdivided into non-battlefield or 
campaigning equipment, such as cooking and entrenching and siege tools, and battlefield 
equipment, such as a soldier’s weapons and armor. 
 This chapter, then, will proceed first to discuss supply costs, which will be dominated by 
food and animal costs, and then it will discuss costs of non-battlefield equipment, in order to 
show that these potentially confounding variables are not likely to throw off the conclusions of 
subsequent chapters concerning comparisons of the overall level of investment in warfare by 
Mediterranean societies.  Finally, this chapter will introduce and explain the methodology for the 
following three chapters, which will in turn explore the costs of battlefield equipment. 
  
Supply Costs 
Food Supply 
 The food supply of ancient armies has been the topic of extensive study and so may merit 
only brief comment here.  While the evidence for the logistics of the Roman army is substantial 
enough to allow for reconstruction, the far more limited evidence for the logistics of 
Macedonian, much less Carthaginian or pre-state, armies makes direct comparison difficult.  
 140 
Studies on Roman logistics in both the Republic and the Empire are, for instance, able to 
reconstruct with some accuracy the Roman military diet.3  In contrast, Donald Engels in his 
study of the logistics of the Macedonian army under Alexander, is forced to estimate a figure 
from comparative evidence and caloric intake, and settles on a ration weighing 3lbs to match the 
rations carried by Union soldiers in the American Civil War.4  As a result, without firm figures 
for both sides of a comparison, a quantitative approach can only give the illusion of certainty. 
 It is still possible, however, to draw some general conclusions from the literature 
concerning logistics in this period.5  The nutritional requirements of soldiers for marching and 
fighting are likely to vary only within a relatively narrow range, at least in the long-term.  
However, as Landers notes, soldiers, unlike machines or vehicles, do not simply shut down when 
not fully supplied.  Armies frequently operated in the face of logistical shortages in the short-
term.6  Moreover, within the range of subsistence, there can be considerable variance in how 
varied and expansive an army’s rations are.  Roman rations seem to have been unusually ample 
in this regard.  Polybius gives the Roman and Allied grain ration at two-thirds of an Attic 
medimnos of wheat per month, or 2990 calories per day, supplemented by an unknown quantity 
                                                 
3 J. Roth, The Logistics of the Roman Army at War (264 B.C. – A.D. 235) (Leiden: Brill, 1999).  Erdkamp, (1998). 
4 Engels (1978), 125.  This despite the ration explicitly including products like coffee which were not available in 
the Old World until the 15th century. 
5 Logistical studies of other pre-modern armies can provide valuable comparanda, but often differences in the 
logistical systems and capabilities make direct extrapolation impossible, as above with the use of data from the 
American Civil War.  Some pre-modern armies lacked the ability, for instance, to mill grain and bake bread 
internally (unlike the Romans), e.g. the Spanish army in Flanders, see: G. Parker, The Army of Flanders and the 
Spanish Road, 1567 – 1659: The Logistics of Spanish Victory and Defeat in the Low Countries’ Wars, 2nd edition 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 61-64, 75-81.  See also: N. Y. Harari, “Strategy and Supply in 
Fourteenth-century Western European Invasion Campaigns,” JMH 64:2 (2000): 297-333; J. G. Moore, “Mobility 
and Strategy in the Civil War,” Military Affairs 24 (1960): 68-77.  For a general overview, note Landers (2003), 
205-226. 
6 Landers (2003), 205-6. 
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of meat.7  Notably, Roman rations for soldiers seem to have been exclusively in wheat, with 
barley used for animals, in contrast to Greek rations which regularly included barley even for 
soldiers.8  Assessing Macedonian rations, especially in the Hellenistic period is difficult in light 
of the sources, except to note that Macedonian armies seem to have been substantially more 
logistically sophisticated than Greek armies of the classical period.9 
 Logistics costs may also be a function of distance and situation, as supplies need to be 
gathered locally or moved over long distances.  Not only do armies need to be supplied as they 
move from one theater of operation to the next, but supplies then must either be gathered locally 
or be transported to the army for continued operations.  Foraging for supplies locally, it should 
be noted, does not make those supplies free, rather foraging entails real costs in military activity 
and reductions in operational mobility.10  In many cases, maintaining the continued goodwill of 
the local population required paying for supplies locally.11  As a result, two armies with the same 
logistical needs may impose very different costs depending on the distance at which they operate 
and the availability of local supplies.  It is in this context that Paul Erdkamp notes, “the 
accomplishment of the Romans in military food supply surpassed that of their opponents, 
especially in the organization of acquisition and distribution.”12  The Roman preference for 
                                                 
7 Foxhall and Forbes (1982), 86-7.  Erdkamp (1998), 27-45.  Note also Roth (1999), 43, who calculates a daily 
Roman military ration of 3,390 grams, though most of his evidence dates from the imperial period and the precise 
quantities of non-grain products are speculative. 
8 Foxhall and Forbes (1982): 41-90.  Erdkamp (1998), 28. 
9 Engels (1978).  Cf. J. W. Lee, A Greek army on the march: soldiers and survival in Xenophon’s Anabasis 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008). 
10 Landers (2003), 214-216.  Erdkamp (1998), 122-140.  Engels (1978), 120-1. 
11 Roth (1999), 141-148. 
12 Erdkamp (1998), 297. 
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forward deployment meant that Roman armies frequently operated far from Italy, so the Romans 
were often forced to ship supplies over considerable distances or expend effort to acquire them 
locally.13  Roman mastery of this art was not free, but would have involved the efficient 
mobilization of large amounts of both agricultural resources and transportation.  Given the long 
range of Roman deployments and the Roman reputation for logistical excellence, it thus seems 
likely that the overall logistics cost of Roman forces was higher on average than that of Rome’s 
rivals, even if the difference in cost is impossible to quantify. 
 
Animal Costs 
 In addition to food supplies, ancient armies needed to acquire and feed animals, both 
pack animals and war-horses.  Contrary to the popular perception, Roman armies were not 
unusually short on cavalry.  The Roman legion of Polybius, with 4,200 infantry and a 300-strong 
cavalry detachment was thus 6.7% cavalry.14  With allied contingents, which Polybius claims 
come with the same infantry force but three times as much cavalry, the percentage of the total 
force that was cavalry rises to 12.5%.15  Michael Dobson notes, in surveying Roman army size 
figures, that these ratios represent at most a rule of thumb, with the ratio of allied to Roman 
cavalry ranging from 3:1 to merely 5:3.16  The size of Roman cavalry detachments will then have 
varied within the roughly 6% to 12.5% range, but tend towards the upper end of this range.  In 
                                                 
13 Erdkamp (1998), 155 notes Roman success in this in the East and in Spain on the Mediterranean coast, but also 
notes the limits of Roman logistics in the western parts of Iberia. 
14 Keppie (1984), 34-5, Plb. 6.20.9. 
15 Plb. 6.26.5-9.   
16 M. Dobson, The Army of the Roman Republic: The second century BC, Polybius and the camps at Numantia, 
Spain (Oxford: Oxbow Books, 2008), 51. 
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contrast, cavalry ratios for Antigonid forces tended to be somewhat lower, with 2,000 cavalry out 
of an army of 23,000 at Cynoscephalae in 197 (8.7%), 4,000 cavalry out of an army of 43,000 at 
the review at Citium in 171 (9.3%).17  Seleucid armies seem to have been somewhat more 
cavalry-heavy than Antigonid armies, with 60,000 infantry and 12,000 cavalry at Magnesia in 
190 (16.6%), though the smaller army at Thermopylae in 191 had only 500 cavalry and 10,000 
infantry (4.8%).18  The Seleucid force at Raphia in 217 consisted of 6,000 cavalry and 62,000 
infantry (8.8%) compared to the Ptolemaic army of 5,000 cavalry and 70,000 infantry (6.7%).19  
Carthaginian armies seem to have been the most cavalry-heavy by a considerable degree.  
Polybius reports that the Carthaginians had 12,000 infantry and 4,000 cavalry at the Bagradas 
River in 255 (25%) and 40,000 infantry and 10,000 cavalry (20%) at Cannae.20  Thus compared 
to the other major Mediterranean powers, Roman cavalry deployments seem typical, if rather 
higher than the major Hellenistic states;21 Carthage is the true standout with a far more cavalry-
focused army.  It thus seems likely that Roman costs in obtaining, deploying and feeding war-
horses were unlikely to have been significantly less (and may have been somewhat more) than 
other armies, notwithstanding Carthage. 
 The other war animal of note in this period must also be considered: the elephant.  
Elephants feature particularly highly in Carthaginian, Ptolemaic and Seleucid armies, although 
                                                 
17 Liv. 33.4.4-6; 42.51.4-7.  Plut. Aem. 13.3.  On the numbers, see also N. Sekunda, The Antigonid Army (Gdansk, 
Akanthina, 2013), 74-5; Hatzopoulos (2001), 33-34. 
18 Liv. 36.19.11, 37.37.9.  App. Syrian Wars, 17, 32. 
19 Plb. 5.79.1-13. 
20 Plb. 1.32.9, 3.114. 
21 The amount of cavalry deployed by pre-state peoples, particularly Gauls, Celtiberians and Iberians, is difficult to 
estimate, due a general lack of reliable army composition figures for them.  The cavalry of pre-state peoples will be 
considered in greater detail in chapter 6. 
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the Romans too made use of them in smaller numbers during the second century.  Carthage 
deployed nearly a hundred elephants at the Bagradas River in 255, and Hannibal crossed the 
Rhone with 37 elephants.22  At Magnesia, the Seleucids had 54 elephants; the Romans 
uncharacteristically brought 16 of their own smaller African elephants to the battle.23  At Raphia, 
the Seleucids fielded 102 elephants against 73 in the Ptolemaic army.24  Notably, Seleucid 
elephants tended to be the larger Indian elephant, while Carthaginian, Ptolemaic and occasionally 
Roman armies employed smaller African elephants.  Elephants are estimated to require around 
1.5% of their body weight in dry fodder every day, though this can include forage such as tall 
grasses.25  Estimates for the food consumption of specific types of elephants vary considerably, 
but can range from 135-300kg for adult males of the larger Asian elephant.26  By contrast, the 
Roman barley ration for a horse was 7 medimni of barley, or around 7kg per day, which would 
have to have been supplemented by an equal amount of green or dry fodder.27  A single elephant, 
depending on how much of their feed was forage, would consume as much food as anywhere 
from 10 to 20 horses.28  The Seleucid elephants at Raphia might thus have consumed a third as 
                                                 
22 Plb. 1.32.9.  Plb. 3.42.11.  On war elephants generally, note J. M. Kisler, War Elephants (Westport, CT.: Praeger, 
2006). 
23 Livy 37.39.13. 
24 Plb. 5.79.1-13. 
25 R. Sukumar, The Asian Elephant: ecology and management (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 78-
9. 
26 A review of estimates is set out in P. R. Guy, “The daily food intake of the African elephant, Loxodonta Africana 
Blumenbach, in Rhodesia” Arnoldia 7 (1975): 1-8.  See also Sukumar (1989), 78-9, who suggests 135-300kg fresh 
weight as a reasonable range for elephant food consumption.  Note also:  T. R. Trautmann, Elephants and Kings: An 
Environmental History (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2015), 54-5.  Trautmann suggests that domesticated 
elephants require a greater proportion of hard-fodder (grains and rice) compared to wild elephants. 
27 Plb. 6.39.13.  Erdkamp (1998), 37-8.  Roth (1999), 62-4. 
28 This assumes that roughly half of the elephant’s food intake was in the form of green or dry fodder, as with the 
horses. 
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much fodder as the entire cavalry corps of the Seleucid army.  War elephants thus represented an 
enormous investment, although likely less overall than maintaining large numbers of traditional 
cavalry. 
 In addition, pack animals, consisting primarily of mules, must be considered.  No figures 
from the ancient world survive to provide a firm basis for estimating the number of pack animals 
which would have accompanied an army, hence there have been a wide range of estimates, often 
relying on better attested early modern armies for comparative evidence.  Engels, assuming that 
most portage in Alexander’s army was done by servants, reckons only 2,421 pack animals for an 
army of 65,000 men.29  Paul Erdkamp provides no systematic estimate for pack animals, but 
suggests a typical example Roman army with 40,000 men, 4,000 horses and 3,500 mules.30  
Jonathan Roth suggests a much higher figure of 1,400 mules for a late Republican legion of 
4,800 men.31  In practice, the number of pack animals will have varied, dictated by the needs of 
the army.  The food consumption of this part of the baggage train would have been considerable. 
Erdkamp, using statistics from the Peninsular War (1807-1814), estimates each mule might have 
required 2.27kg of barley and 4.54kg of hay (or straw) per day; the baggage train for his typical 
Roman army would thus require 7,945kg of barley per day.32  The cost of feeding these animals, 
however, is not likely to have varied much between armies.  Thus, although the evidence permits 
little confidence, it seems safe to assume that the Romans would have on the whole required as 
many, if not generally more, pack animals than other powers, given the greater distance of 
                                                 
29 Engels (1978), 15-19, 144-5. 
30 Erdkamp (1998), 59. 
31 Roth (1999), 83.  Roth notes that scholarly estimates for the number of mules per Roman legion range from as low 
as 60 to as high as 1,500. 
32 Erdkamp (1999), 38, 45, 55. 
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Roman deployments and the Roman need to haul greater amounts of equipment, particularly for 
the construction of fortified camps discussed later in this chapter.33 
 
 Thus, when it comes to supply costs, all ancient armies will have operated under similar 
constraints.  The cost of food supply, the paramount logistical concern for ancient armies, is 
likely to have been broadly similar for all of the major states of the Mediterranean.  Where Rome 
stands out was its ability to manage larger deployments at greater distances, even as they 
remained constrained by the same climatic, technological and geographic realities as their 
opponents.34  As Erdkamp notes, “the Romans made full use of the political and economic 
institutions of the areas under their control to build up a logistical apparatus…in this field they 
surpassed most of their enemies, which contributed not insignificantly to their success in war.”35  
Pushing the limits of logistics meant establishing magazines, using long-distance transport and 
maintaining larger and more expensive logistics systems.36  This effort is likely to have incurred 
greater logistical costs for the Romans, although quantifying those costs is beyond our evidence. 
 
Non-Battlefield Equipment 
 Much as with supply costs, while the available evidence gives some hints as to the scale 
of the cost of non-battlefield equipment, a quantitative comparison runs the danger of presenting 
false precision.  Non-battlefield equipment will have consisted, in the main, of cooking tools and 
                                                 
33 Erdkamp (1998), 297-8. 
34 Erdkamp (1998), 297-301. 
35 Erdkamp (1998), 297. 
36 Erdkamp (1998), 46-83. 
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tools for making camps and fortifications.37  As with supply costs, the evidence permits rather 
more knowledge of Roman military practice than for other armies in this period, although most 
reconstructions focus on the post-Marian legion.38  Vegetius reports that a Roman soldier carried 
some 60 Roman pounds (20kg) of supplies and gear in addition to his weapons, but it is hard to 
know how much this will have applied to the pre-Marian period.39 Plutarch reports that Scipio 
Aemilianus restricted his soldier’s cooking supplies to a pot, a spit and an earthen cup, but 
permitted metal cups weighing not more than two pounds, presumably for wealthier soldiers; it is 
hard to know how far to credit this report.40  Early imperial sites turn up a remarkable array of 
metal cooking and drinking vessels belonging to soldiers.41  Some of the heavier cooking 
equipment, particularly hand-mills, but also possibly a cooking pot, would have been shared by 
the contubernium, the Roman tent-group; Roth supposes these were likely to have been carried 
by a mule assigned to the contubernium.42  This assumption gains some support from a comment 
by Plutarch, who notes that during Antony’s Parthian campaign, the hand-mills had to be 
                                                 
37 Roth (1999), 72. 
38 Efforts to reconstruct the weight of the Roman soldier’s pack (or sarcina) with rations: 41k (including 22kg of 
equipment): F. Stolle, Der römische Legionar und sein Gepack (Mulus Marianus) (Strassburg: Verlag von Karl J. 
Trübner, 1914). 30kg: J. Kromayer and G. Veith, Heerwesen und Kriegsführung der Griechen und Römer (Munich: 
C.H. Beck, 1928), 426.   G. R. Watson, The Roman Soldier (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1969), 62-3 suggests 
Stolle is low by 10-20%. 54.8kg (including 29.4kg of equipment): M. Junkelmann, Die Legionen des Augustus: Der 
römische Soldat im archäologischen Experiment (Mainz am Rhein: Verlag Philipp von Zabern, 1986), 197-8. 
40.8kg (including 18kg of equipment): N. Fuentes, “The mule of a soldier” JRMES 2 (1991): 65-99. See Roth 
(1999), 71-77, for an overview.  The estimates of Junkelmann and Fuentes, made with the benefits of modern 
archaeological finds and reconstructed and tested, are to be preferred. 
39 Veg. Epit. 1.19.  Roth (1999), 71-2.  Marius famously was said to have begun the practice of having his soldiers 
carry all their own baggage (Plut. Marius 13.1), but it is worth noting that similar changes are attributed to other 
Roman generals somewhat earlier (e.g. Plut. Moralia 201C on Scipio Aemilianus). 
40 Plut. Moralia 201B-C. 
41 M.C. Bishop and J. C. N Coulston, Roman Military Equipment: From the Punic Wars to the Fall of Rome, 2nd ed. 
(Oxford: Oxbow, 2006), 119-120. 
42 Roth (1999), 77-8. 
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abandoned after the pack-mules had died.43  Marcus Junkelmann reconstructed a stone mill at a 
total weight of 27kg, mostly in stone with some wooden elements.44 
The second major type of non-combat equipment is for the construction of the camp.    
First and foremost, the tent (papilio), shared by the tent-group, along with tent-stakes.45 Bishop 
and Coulston note that Roman tent-stakes were made of wood rather than of metal, which would 
have made for easier transport; the metal stakes with rings found in Republican era sites are 
thought to be tethering pegs for animals.46  Roman soldiers also carried a range of tools for the 
construction of the camp fortifications.  Josephus reports of the Roman army in 69 CE that the 
soldiers each carried “a saw, a basket, and a pick-axe, a leather strap, a sickle and a hook with 
three days’ provisions” in addition to his weapons, an assemblage Josephus clearly intends to 
impress.47  In addition to this, the army carried large stakes, the pila muralia, for constructing the 
camp’s palisade; these might have been carried by mule.48  The Roman dolabra or pick-axe is 
quite well represented in the archaeological evidence for the early imperial period and also 
appears in Republican sites.49  It is hard to know exactly how much of this equipment would 
have been carried by the legion of the third and second centuries; Polybius, though extensive in 
                                                 
43 Plut. Ant. 54.4. 
44 Junkelmann (1986), 210-1. 
45 Roth (1999), 77-8. 
46 Bishop and Coulston (2006), 69-70, 116. 
47 Josephus BJ 3.95.  πρὸς οἷς πρίονα καὶ κόφινον ἄμην τε καὶ πέλεκυν, πρὸς δὲ ἱμάντα καὶ δρέπανον καὶ ἅλυσιν, 
ἡμερῶν τε τριῶν ἐφόδιον. 
48 Roth (1999), 74.  Fuentes (1991). 
49 Bishop and Coulstson (2006), 69-70, 117-118. 
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his detail of Roman encamping procedure, does not elaborate on the tools used.50  However, 
calculating the precise resource requirements of this equipment is difficult.  It seems unlikely 
that every soldier required one of each of the above tools; more probably they were shared 
among the contubernium.51  Roman camps of this period, particularly the siege camps at 
Numantia, have been recovered archaeologically, and their layout and construction follow 
Polybius’ description to a considerable degree.52 
 Comparing Roman practice with Hellenistic or Carthaginian practice is made difficult by 
the lack of similarly robust descriptions of their equipment. Greek armies of the Classical period 
do not seem to have carried hand-mills, but Macedonian armies do seem to have carried them, at 
least in some cases.53  It is not clear if such portable milling tools were carried by Carthaginian 
or pre-state armies.  Alexander’s army carried tools for fortification and construction, a practice 
likely to be continued by the Successors, although it is not clear how many tools would have 
been carried.54 
 A related question is if armies regularly fortified their camps, as this would demand a 
greater quantity of tools and materials to be carried with the army to enable rapid fortification 
each evening.  Fortified camps do not appear to have been unusual for Macedonian armies, but it 
is hard to tell if camps were fortified all of the time or only in close proximity to the enemy.  
Engels contends that Alexander regularly fortified his camps, but the instances where this is 
                                                 
50 Plb. 6.27-42 
51 Fuentes (1999). 
52 Most notably at Numantia, Dobson (2008), 120-1.  Dobson does note some changes in layout, which he attributes 
to the beginnings of the shift from the manipular to the cohortal legion. 
53 Engels (1978), 12.  Front. Strat. 4.1.6.  Cf. Greek armies, J. Lee (2008). 
54 Engels (1978), 17.  E.g. Curtius 5.6.14, 6.5.20, 6.6.28.  Arrian, Alex. 1.26.1. 
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mentioned always come under specific circumstances.  Arrian reports that Alexander fortified his 
camp before Gaugamela, but gives the specific reason that Alexander wanted to be able to leave 
the baggage train behind for the impending battle.55  Likewise Ptolemy sets up a fortified camp 
at Aornos Rock before signaling for Alexander, but Ptolemy expects to be attacked once he gives 
the signal, so this too can hardly be taken as typical practice.56  Thus while it seems likely 
Alexander fortified his camps as standard practice, it remains possible that they were only 
fortified occasionally when there was thought to be a danger. 
Assessing later practice poses similar issues.  Engels argues, based on Frontinus, that the 
Romans adopted their fortified camps from the Macedonians by way of Pyrrhus, but Plutarch 
presents the situation as the other way around, with Pyrrhus amazed by the Roman camp.57  Livy 
has Hannibal claim that Pyrrhus was the first “to teach the measuring out of camps,” but then 
also has Philip V stand in amazement at Roman field camps.58  Such confusion in the sources is 
hardly cause for confidence.  Polybius does mention, in his lead up to the battle of 
Cynoscephalae, that Macedonian armies carried stakes for entrenching, but compares the 
Macedonian system unfavorably to the Roman one, noting that Macedonian palisades are more 
easily broken because the weight of the sarissa forces the Macedonians to use less suitable 
stakes.59  Most battle narratives with Macedonian armies feature fortified camps.  Antigonid 
                                                 
55 Arr. Alex. 3.9.1.  Likewise, Curtius 4.12.2, 4.12.17, 4.12.24.   
56 Arr. 4.29.1-3. Likewise, Curtius 5.5.1 notes that Alexander builds a fortified camp only because his way forward 
was blocked and there was potential for ambush. 
57 Engels (1978), 17, n. 19.  Front. Strat. 4.1.15.  Plut. Pyrrhus 16.4. 
58 Hannibal’s claim: “castra metari primum docuiise” Livy 35.14.8.  Philip’s amazement at the Roman camp, Livy 
31.34.8. 
59 Plb. 18.18.1-17. 
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camps feature at the Aous River and Cynoscephalae, although the former camp is incompletely 
fortified, relying on the terrain to cover some angles and thus vulnerable to Flamininus’ eventual 
flanking maneuver.60  At Pydna, Perseus pitched camp before the Romans, but no part of his 
army seems to have attempted to hold out in it; it is possible it was only lightly fortified.61  
Antiochus III’s camp at Magnesia was also fortified, and an effort was made to defend it as the 
Seleucid army collapsed.62  Carthaginian practice is even more difficult to gauge, but Polybius’ 
narrative of Regulus’ expedition seems to suggest that Carthaginian camps were not generally 
well-fortified.  Outside Adys, the Carthaginians are easily dislodged from their camp on a hill, 
and later Xanthippus’ advice to advance the army and camp on level ground (presumably with a 
palisade, although Polybius does not say) is treated as a bold new strategy.63  
 What is clear is that the sources find the Roman practice exceptional.  Polybius presents 
the Roman habit of building a fortified camp every night as notable and different, going so far as 
to say that the Romans “pursue a course diametrically opposite to that usual among the Greeks” 
who “shirk the labor of entrenching.”64  Two centuries later, Josephus likewise presents the 
Roman camp and the variety of tools carried by the Roman army as exceptional.65  Without a 
better archaeological record for Carthaginian or Hellenistic army camps to match that of the 
Roman army for the republican and the early imperial periods, a firm conclusion does not seem 
                                                 
60 Plb. 18.24.1. Livy 32.5.11-13. 
61 Plut. Aem. 21-22. 
62 Livy 37.38.6-43.10. 
63 Plb. 1.30-34. 
64 Plb. 6.42.1-2.   
65 Josephus BJ 3.70-98. 
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possible.  What does seem fair to say is that the cost of Roman non-combat equipment, both for 
personal use and for entrenching, is not likely to have been less than that of Rome’s rivals.  
Indeed, given the attitude of the sources towards the plethora of Roman equipment and 
fastidiousness of Roman entrenchment, what seems most likely is that Roman armies required 
significantly more non-combat equipment than other armies of the period in order to 
accommodate their style of warfare. 
 
Towards Assessing Battlefield Equipment 
Summing up so far: the difference between Roman and non-Roman supply costs and non-
battlefield equipment costs are impossible to quantify with any precision given the current state 
of the evidence.  However, the Romans developed a reputation for logistical excellence, and over 
the third and second centuries, they increasingly deployed armies for extended periods at greater 
distances, which is likely to have increased Roman supply costs.  Moreover, contemporary 
sources during the Middle Republic and subsequent periods recognized Roman field 
fortifications and logistical independence as exceptional.  These habits came with significant 
equipment costs in building materials, tools and food preparation equipment such as hand-mills.   
The weight of the evidence then strongly suggests that Roman costs in these regards were likely 
somewhat greater than, and certainly not significantly less than, Rome’s rivals.  That leaves the 
cost of battlefield equipment to be examined. 
Battlefield equipment offers a number of advantages for systematic study.  As Erdkamp 
has noted, ancient sources are often surprisingly uninterested in the quotidian details of logistics 
or finance; weapons and armor are subjects on which the sources are far more helpful.66  
                                                 
66 Erdkamp (1998), 3-4. 
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Battlefield equipment is often the subject of extended digressions in the textual sources.67 as well 
as of passing mentions such as in Livy’s description of the terrible wounds inflicted by the 
gladius Hispaniensis or Varro’s description of the construction of the Roman scutum.68  
Battlefield equipment is also more commonly depicted in surviving artwork from the period, 
examples of which will be discussed in the following chapters.  Most importantly, while ancient 
military equipment was rarely uniform, it was generally standardized to a degree, with tactical 
systems that required soldiers to carry broadly similar equipment, making it possible to 
extrapolate the likely equipment needs for ancient armies whose strength is often described by 
listing the number of soldiers of each type.  Although such descriptions must be treated with 
care, as they are often riddled with inaccuracies or anachronisms, nonetheless when combined 
with representational and archaeological evidence, the documentary evidence is far more 
substantial than the comparatively scant evidence for logistics or finance, and it can provide a 
firm basis for reconstruction. 
The primary limitation in discussing the cost of battlefield equipment is the lack of 
preserved price-data from the ancient world.  Because of this limitation, it is necessary to begin 
any discussion of the cost of equipment at the other end, assessing inputs rather than outputs: not 
with the price of a final product, but with the costs of raw materials and the process of 
production.  Military equipment, as will be demonstrated in subsequent chapters, was composed 
of four primary materials: metal, wood, textile and leather.  It is thus worth discussing the 
production process for each of these materials, in order to get a sense of the costs in resources 
and labor that each entails. 
                                                 
67 E.g. Plb. 3.114., 6.22-23; Liv., 8.8.3-18. 
68 Livy, 31.34.1-4. Varro, de lingua Latina 5.115. 
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Metal Production in the Ancient World 
Mining and Smelting 
Worked metal will have proved in nearly all cases to have been the most expensive 
material in a soldier’s panoply.  Metal equipment, unlike cloth, leather or wooden equipment, 
could not be produced within the household economy.  Instead, its production required 
specialized facilities and skilled workers.  Despite this increased cost, due to the comparative 
advantage metal presented as a material over other materials, replacing metal equipment with 
non-metal alternatives typically meant compromising the overall effectiveness of a soldier’s 
equipment, where such replacement was feasible at all.  Metal production was remarkably time- 
and resource-intensive, requiring multiple stages of preparation with specialist labor and 
facilities.  Understanding this process is important for understanding the tremendous 
mobilization of resources required for the mass of iron and bronze weapons and armor that 
ancient armies carried into battle. 
The process of producing a weapon begins with the mining of ores.  Iron, by the 
Hellenistic period, could be mined and processed out of several ores.  Easily the most common 
of these is hematite, but magnetite and limonite were also used.69  Mining for iron ores in Italy is 
attested in Etruria during this period, but the most important iron mines for Italian iron-working 
in the Republican period seem to be those on the island of Elba, which were worked at 
Populonia.70  Bronze and other copper alloys, still used in the second century for certain 
elements of the panoply such as helmets, required both copper and, typically, tin, although other 
                                                 
69 J. F. Healy, Mining and Metallurgy in the Greek and Roman World (London: Thames and Hudson, 1978), 62-65.  
P. Craddock, Early Metal Mining and Production (Washington D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1995), 234-5. R. 
F. Tylecote, The Early History of Metallurgy in Europe (London: Longman, 1987), 47-53. 
70 Healy (1978), 63.  Livy 28.45 notes Populonian iron being used to equip Scipio’s African expedition. 
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alloys, such as copper-arsenic and copper-zinc (brass), were known.71  Pliny the Elder notes that 
copper deposits had been exploited in Italy in Campania and also at Bergamum in the Po Valley, 
though in his day most copper in Italy was imported.72 Tin, however, would almost certainly 
have to be nearly all imported.73  The mining itself seems to have been done primarily by slaves 
working under very harsh conditions and was very labor intensive, although systematic estimates 
of the scale of production for the period of the Republic are probably not possible.74 
Following mining, the ore undergoes a variety of processes, collectively called ‘dressing’ 
in preparation for smelting, with the full preparations being somewhat different depending on the 
metal to be produced, the ores involved, or even the local ore quality.  Ore might require 
crushing before preparation, either by mortars or mills.75  Ore could also be washed to remove 
lighter waste materials, a process attested for precious metals such as gold and silver in the 
Mediterranean world and possibly used for iron, bronze and tin as well.76  Sim and Kaminski 
note that the limited evidence for ore-washing comes mostly from the Near East, but that it is not 
clear if this process was considered necessary in iron production in Roman Europe.77   
                                                 
71 Healy (1978), 209-214.  Early copper and tin production: Tylecote (1987), 29-40. 
72 Pliny, Natural History 34.2.  Healy (1978), 58-9. 
73 Healy (1978), 60-61. 
74 R. Shepard, Ancient Mining (London: Institution of Mining and Metallurgy, 1993), 59-68.  Healy (1978), 132-
138.  D. Sim and J. Kaminski, Roman Imperial Armor: The Production of Early Imperial Military Armor (Oxford: 
Oxbow Books, 2012), 6-11.  D. Sim and I. Ridge, Iron for the Eagles: The Iron Industry of Roman Britain (Stroud: 
Tempus, 2002), 25-34. 
75 Healy (1978), 142-3.  Tylecote (1987), 53-64. 
76 Healy (1978), 144-148. 
77 Sim and Kaminski (2012), 13 
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 After any ore dressing, iron ore would then be roasted and finally smelted into a bloom, a 
sponge-shaped mass of iron metal.  The roasting process involves applying heat to the ore to 
transform the iron-carbonate ore (FeCO3) to smeltable iron-oxide (FeO, Fe2O3 or Fe3O4), as well 
as driving out any remaining water in the ore.  The exact heats the Romans might have used for 
this process have not been firmly established, with estimates ranging from 300˚ C to 550˚ C.78  
Sim and Kaminksi, while observing that there is no definitive evidence, suggest that it is likely 
that dry wood, rather than charcoal, would be used for the roasting of ores, because excessively 
high temperatures would produce unusable ores.79  The roasting process is necessary to 
chemically prepare the ore for reduction in a bloomery, with the application of significantly 
higher heat, produced by charcoal.  The result of this process was a bloom that is a mix of iron 
and some quantity of mineral impurities called slag.80  Diodorus describes this process taking 
place on Elba: 
For the island possesses a great amount of iron-rock, which they quarry in order 
to melt and cast and thus to secure the iron, and they possess a great abundance of 
this ore.  For those who are engaged in the working of this ore crush the rock and 
burn the lumps which have thus been broken in certain ingenious furnaces; and in 
these they smelt the lumps by means of a great fire and form them into pieces of 
moderate size which are in their appearances like large sponges.81 
The pieces like “large sponges” Diodorus describe are the blooms themselves, which are 
relatively brittle sponge-like masses of iron and slag (see fig. 3.1).  The iron bloom is still not, 
                                                 
78 Sim and Kaminski (2012), 13.  Healy (1978), 183-4.  On roasting ore generally, Craddock (1995), 167-189. 
79 Sim and Kaminksi (2012), 13. 
80 Sim and Kaminksi (2012), 14-16.  Healy (1978), 184-189.  Craddock (1995), 235-6.  Tylecote (1987), 151-152, 
160-161.V. F. Buchwald, Iron and Steel in ancient times (Copenhagen: Det Kongelige Danske Videnskabernes 
Selskab, 2005), 90-94. 
81 Diodorus, 5.13.1.  πέτραν γὰρ ἔχει πολλὴν σιδηρῖτιν, ἣν τέμνουσιν ἐπὶ τὴν χωνείαν καὶ κατασκευὴν τοῦ σιδήρου, 
πολλὴν ἔχοντες τοῦ μετάλλου δαψίλειαν. οἱ γὰρ ταῖς ἐργασίαις προσεδρεύοντες κόπτουσι τὴν πέτραν καὶ τοὺς 
τμηθέντας λίθους κάουσιν ἔν τισι φιλοτέχνοις καμίνοις: ἐν δὲ ταύταις τῷ πλήθει τοῦ πυρὸς τήκοντες τοὺς λίθους 
καταμερίζουσιν εἰς μεγέθη σύμμετρα, παραπλήσια ταῖς ἰδέαις μεγάλοις σπόγγοις. 
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however, in a workable state and requires further refining.  The bloom would then need to be 
heated and hammered into a bar-shape of metallic iron fit for further blacksmithing, called a 
billet (see fig. 3.2).  The process may also have functioned to remove some of the slag impurities 
which would otherwise weaken the metal.82   
Bronze (and other copper-alloy) processing was more direct as bronze, unlike iron, could 
be more easily smelted and even melted and cast with the technology available in the ancient 
world.  Copper ore, particularly malachite, could be reduced to produce copper metal at 
temperatures of 700-800˚C, although the melting point of fine copper was higher, 1038˚C.83  
That ancient copper furnaces could reach the melting point is demonstrated by Roman ‘bun’ 
ingots, although Healy notes that the copper would likely have to be poured quite quickly, given 
that it would be very close to the melting point and would rapidly harden.84  Tin ore required 
washing and roasting because of its quartz matrix, but then could be smelted fairly easily due to 
tin’s low melting point of 231˚C.85  The main concern, Healy notes, was that too high a heat 
would cause much of the valuable tin to enter into the slag, requiring precise heat control through 
the smelting process.86  The tin and copper could then be melted together; tin content in ancient 
bronzes generally ranges between 5 and 11%.  Healy supposes that quality-control for tin content 
                                                 
82 Sim and Kaminksi (2012), 17-18.  Healy (1978), 184. 
83 Healy (1978), 159.  Tylecote (1987), 125-132. 
84 Healy (1978), 160. 
85 Healy (1978), 176-8. 
86 Healy (1978), 178. 
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could be achieved by a comparison of color, which he thinks more likely, or, less probably, by 
hardness tests of the bronze after it had been annealed.87 
Despite the somewhat simpler production method, bronze and other copper-alloys as 
materials were generally more expensive than iron.  Michael Treister notes that during the 
Hellenistic period, silver commanded 120 times the value of bronze; although chronological 
distance makes the comparison fraught, it is worth noting that the early Greek iron obeloi traded 
at 1/2000th the value of silver per unit weight.88  Vindolanda tablet 183, which records a purchase 
of 90 Roman pounds (29kg) of iron for 32 denarii suggests a silver-iron value ratio of 1:318, 
substantially higher than the Greek obeloi, but still far less than the value of bronze.89  However, 
while bronze was generally a more expensive material, it should be noted that the greater ease of 
producing artefacts in bronze, combined with the greater utility of iron and especially steel 
artefacts, makes it impossible to propose any general rule for the value of finished goods based 
merely on the prices of their materials. 
 In addition to the staggering amount of labor implied by the above process, the 
consumption of fuel was also very high.  Pliny and Theophrastus note that pinewood was 
considered the best wood for producing the charcoal to smelt iron with, with Theophrastus 
adding that chestnut is also used for smelting, but fir for smithing.90  Healy notes that 
                                                 
87 Healy (1978), 210-211.  Annealing, a process by which the metal is heated and allowed to cool slowly to soften it, 
is discussed below. 
88 M. Treister, The Role of Metals in Ancient Greek History (Leiden: Brill, 1996), 96, 341-2. 
89 L. Bray, “‘Horrible, Speculative, Nasty, Dangerous’: Assessing the Value of Roman Iron,” Britannia 41 (2010): 
175-185.  The calculation assumes a denarius of 3.41g at 83.5% purity, so containing 2.85g of silver each (91.1g 
total), compared to the 29kg of iron purchased.  This value of iron, while higher than the obeloi, fits well with the 
range of iron values Treister notes for the 6th century B.C. Near East, Treister (1996), 96. 
90 Pliny, NH 33.30.  Theophrastus HP, 5.9.1-3.  Note also Buchwald (2005), 94-96, who notes pine and birch used in 
medieval Sweden and Norway.  
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“experiments have shown that 8 kg. of iron can be produced from 50 kg. of ore” and that a single 
bloomery-furnace might yield 16kg of iron from 100kg of ore and 80 kg of charcoal a day.91  
That 80 kg of charcoal may have represented the product of about 320kg of raw wood.92  A more 
detailed and rather more pessimistic estimate by Sim and Ridge argues that the estimated 5,400 
tonnes consumption of Roman Britain in the second century CE would have required 93,650 
tonnes of ore and 112,5000 tonnes of charcoal produced from 787,500 tonnes of raw wood.93  
Sim and Ridge estimate, very roughly, that this level of production might have required some 
150,000 laborers at all stages of production to maintain.94 
Putting these bulk figures in the context of a single artefact does much to clarify the 
tremendous resource cost.  Because material is lost at every stage of production, the total 
resources required can be quite a bit larger than at first consideration.  Consider a gladius 
Hispaniensis of moderate (c. 700g) weight.  In an experiment, Sim and Kaminksi note 34.27% 
material loss in the forging and finishing of a gladius; assuming that an ancient smith would have 
been more practiced, we might assume perhaps 30% material loss.95  This would mean the sword 
would have required a billet of at least 1kg of iron.  Smelting for such a billet would have 
required c. 6.25kg of ore and 5kg of charcoal (from 20kg of wood), following Healy’s figures.  
Sim and Ridge’s rather more pessimistic figures would suggest that the same process might 
                                                 
91 Healy (1978), 151, 196. 
92 Healy (1978), 150-1. 
93 Sim and Ridge (2002), 23. 
94 Sim and Ridge (2002), 23-4. 
95 Sim and Kaminksi (2012), 44. 
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require 12.3kg of ore and 14.56kg of charcoal (from 101.5kg of wood).96  That tremendous 
expenditure in labor and fuel would only produce a billet, which would require further labor to 
shape into usable equipment. 
 
Copper-Alloy, Iron and Steel 
 Having laid out the mining and smelting process, it is worth discussing the primary 
metals and alloys used in the production of military equipment.  Nearly all of the metal available 
to ancient armorers and weapon-smiths will have been, to some degree or another, a mixture of 
multiple metallic elements, as the smelting technology did not permit a higher degree of 
purification.97  Defining the term alloy in this absolute way renders it useless; on the other hand, 
defining alloys narrowly as only the intentional mixture of metals is also perilous, as the ancients 
sometimes recognized that certain ores produced high quality metals which, unbeknownst to 
them, were natural alloys.  For instance, the credit given to iron from Noricum may in part be 
because the iron ores of the region had high manganese content, producing a natural alloy with 
greater hardness.98  It is also difficult to draw a line based on the total content of alloyed metals; 
a sample of copper with around 1% tin content is generally classified as impure copper, while 
iron with only 0.5% carbon content is a mild steel.99  As a result, the distinction between a ‘pure’ 
metal and an alloy depends heavily on the materials involved. 
                                                 
96 Sim and Ridge (2002), 23. 
97 Healy (1978), 199.  As Healy notes, even modern processes do not allow for the production of some metals 
completely ‘pure.’ 
98 Sim and Kaminksi (2012), 58.  Tylecote (1987), 168-9. 
99 Healy (1978), 199-201, 209-210. 
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 Copper has a wide array of potential alloys and was not generally used in an unalloyed 
form in this period for the production of military equipment.  The most common such alloy for 
military equipment was bronze, a copper-tin alloy.  Bronzes can be defined as having more than 
2% tin content, although bronzes used in military equipment generally have a much higher tin 
content, usually between 5 and 11%.100  However, it is worth noting that standard bronze (a 
copper-tin alloy) was not the only copper-alloy produced.  Alloys of copper, tin and lead are also 
common, for instance, in Roman helmets.101  The primary ore of lead, galena, also contains 
smaller amounts of silver, with the result that lead production was often a byproduct of silver-
smelting, although some ancient mines seemed to have produced lead as a primary product as 
well.102  Lead content in alloys intended to be wrought, a category which includes nearly all 
battlefield equipment in this period, tends to be quite low, typically well under 10%.103  Some 
copper-alloy equipment is also made out of copper-zinc (brass) alloy, although this seems to be 
comparatively rare (e.g. cat. R95).104  The production of pure metallic zinc would not have been 
possible in the ancient world because the temperatures required to reduce the ore were already 
above the boiling point of the metal.  However, brass could be produced by mixing zinc 
carbonate (calamine) with copper heated by charcoal.105  It is often impossible to tell the exact 
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composition of a copper-alloy artefact without metallurgical tests.  For the sake of avoiding false 
specificity, this study will use the term copper-alloy as a general term, although it may be noted 
that most copper-alloy military equipment seems generally to have been either standard bronze 
(i.e. copper-tin) or lead-bronze (i.e. copper-tin-lead) alloys.  Catalogue entries presented at the 
end of this work retain whatever terminology was used in publication or museum catalogue 
entries. 
 The primary alloy of iron is with carbon to form steel.  As noted, iron can be considered a 
mild steel at carbon contents as low as 0.5%.  Above 2% carbon content, steel becomes pig iron; 
the high carbon content makes the metal brittle and effectively useless for military equipment.106  
The most likely process for the production of steel in the ancient Mediterranean was case 
hardening, also called carburization.107  In this process, iron, when heated between 900 and 
950˚C, will absorb carbon if placed in a carbon-rich environment, such as a charcoal fire.  
Because the carbon is absorbed through the edges of the iron, thicker pieces will take 
dramatically more time to absorb sufficient carbon.  This process could be accomplished in small 
scale by an individual blacksmith in his own forge.  However, case hardening is not a natural 
process of the forging process; it would have to be done with some intent.  During forging, iron 
is exposed to the carbon-rich forge-fire for only a few minutes at a time.  Moreover, the process 
of forging in an oxidizing environment will actually tend to decarburize the edges of the weapon, 
and hammer blows will tend to strip off any carburized iron on the surface.  A gladius with 
surfaces apparently decarburized in this way is discussed in the following chapter. 
                                                 
106 Sim and Kaminski (2012), 59. 
107 Sim and Kaminski (2012), 59-61.  Tylecote (1987), 271-278.  On the production of steel in a forge hearth, see D. 
Wagner, “Ancient Carburization of Iron to Steel: A Comment” Archeomaterials 4 (1990): 111-117. 
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 A homogenous, high quality steel can also be produced by the use of a crucible.  This 
was the process used to produce high quality crucible steel, called Wootz, in India and later 
Persia.108  In this process, bloomery iron is sealed in a crucible with organic material and heated 
above 1400˚C.  The iron absorbs carbon from the organic material, lowering the melting point 
until the iron becomes liquid; the impurities and slag in the iron rise to the top and can be 
removed.  The crucible then cools and is broken open, leaving an ingot of high quality steel with 
fairly high carbon content.  Such steel was available as an expensive import good, although the 
height of the trade came later, during the first and second centuries CE.  Pliny the Elder, 
mistakenly believing this steel was produced in China, refers to it as Seric iron.109  The peoples 
of the Mediterranean did not, however, master this production method; any Wootz steel available 
would have to have been imported. 
 In both the use of copper-alloy and steel, the third and second centuries represent a period 
of transition.  The transition is mostly a result of the gradual replacement of copper-alloy with 
iron and steel, as the technology of iron-working improved.110  Copper-alloy use in this period is 
restricted mostly to equipment made from sheet metal such as helmets, armor-rings for mail, 
greaves and some Hellenistic shield-coverings.  Some of these uses, such as the thin copper-alloy 
facing of Hellenistic shields, diminished as the Roman military system steadily supplanted other 
Mediterranean systems as the result of Roman expansion.  At the same time, while copper-alloy 
does not completely vanish straight-away, Roman mail and helmets are increasingly made of 
iron, while evidence for the widespread use of greaves continues to decline in the early imperial 
                                                 
108 Craddock (1995), 275-283.  The crucible process was used for non-ferrous metals, but not iron, in Europe, see: 
Tylecote (1987), 183-189. 
109 Healy (1978), 215; Sim and Kaminski (2012), 58, 61.  Plin. NH 34.143. 
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period.111  Evidence for the use of steel, particularly by the Romans, in this period is very 
limited.  However, it seems that Roman steel working is still in a fairly early stage of 
development and lacks the full sophistication apparent in the Imperial period.112 
 
Forging 
 The process of reshaping a billet of either iron or copper-alloy into a useful piece of 
equipment involves a wide range of processes and could include a number of laborers, both 
skilled and unskilled.  Ancient depictions of smiths and workshops generally show multiple 
laborers engaged in the task.  In addition to the skilled smith, such depictions show assistants 
working the bellows, and engaged in finishing (figure 3.3).113  Of particular note were strikers 
(figure 3.4), assistants to the smith who used heavier hammers, typically with both hands.  
Because the skilled smith typically had to hold the bar being forged in one hand, semi-skilled 
strikers could provide additional striking power, thus speeding up manufacture without requiring 
another skilled smith.  Unskilled laborers could also assist in tasks like polishing and filing 
finished products.114   
Some kinds of equipment, particularly helmets, shield bosses and covers, greaves and 
some solid armor rings, required the raw metal to be reshaped into sheet metal as an intermediate 
                                                 
111 Bishop and Coulston (2006), 95-106.  M. Feugère, Les Armes des Romains: de la République à l’Antiquité 
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112 See Ch4 at n66 
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process before the final production of the artefact.  We are not well informed about the method 
of producing sheet metal in this period.  Sheet metal could be produced by hammering a billet or 
ingot flat, either by a single man with a hammer or using a team of strikers; however, this 
method is difficult and the resultant sheet tends to be substantially thicker in the center than on 
the edges.115  In a series of experiments that compared preserved Roman sheet metal (in iron) 
from the imperial period with a series of proposed methods for the manufacture of sheet metal, 
Sim and Kaminski concluded that the most likely methods of making sheet metal was the use of 
heavy rollers; the iron is fed into a pair of rollers and compressed between them, producing a 
metal sheet of uniform thickness.116  These experiments, however, focused on producing sheet 
iron consistent with Roman armor of the first two centuries CE.  Close examination of the 
properties of preserved examples from the Republic has not yet occured.  As a result, the 
applicability of Sim and Kaminski’s results to the third and second centuries BCE, especially to 
work with copper-alloy rather than iron sheets, is unclear.  Notably, the equipment that was still 
produced in copper-alloy in this period (helmets, shield coverings, some mail rings, and greaves) 
relies on the production of sheet metal.  Due to the greater malleability of copper-alloys, 
producing sheet metal in copper-alloy would be significantly easier than accomplishing the same 
in iron.  As noted, this may explain the continued use of copper-alloy for these products; the 
improvement in iron sheet metal manufacture may explain the subsequent shift to iron for these 
components in the imperial period. 
It is also worth addressing casting as a method of production, as it is the most apparently 
direct method of reshaping raw metal.  The metal is melted, and the molten metal poured into a 
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mold to cool and solidify in the desired shape.  As noted in the previous chapter in the context of 
bronze rams, ancient bronze-casting was a sophisticated process by the third century, capable of 
producing both very large casts of high quality and also complex shapes.117  Despite this, 
military equipment made by casting is very rare in this period.118  This is due in no small part to 
the shift to iron as the primary material for most military equipment, particularly spear-head, 
dagger and sword blades which would have lent themselves to casting in bronze.119  As noted 
above, ancient furnaces could not achieve the necessary temperatures to melt iron, making 
casting impossible.  Most of the equipment that continued to be produced in copper-alloy in the 
third and second centuries was worked from sheet metal, such as helmets, Hellenistic shield 
facings, and greaves.  Casting such objects, while not impossible, would have proved more 
difficult than simply cold-working a bronze sheet into the desired shape.  Moreover, the casting 
process would make the final product very brittle, in both iron and copper-alloy.  Due to how 
thin the metal of such a cast would be, even subsequent annealing and cold-hammering is 
unlikely to produce a sufficiently durable helmet, and the whole process would have been more 
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difficult than simply cold-working.120  One exception to this rule were sling bullets, which were 
made in lead and could be cast.121 
 Cold-working, as the name implies, is the process of reshaping metal by hammering the 
metal, as the name implies, ‘cold’ or at room temperature.  Cold-working is the primary method 
of working copper-alloys like bronze, but can also be used to a limited extent on iron, especially 
with sheet iron.122 Cold-working consists of hammering the metal into the desired shape without 
heating, but it also has an important secondary effect: work-hardening.  The process of 
hammering produces cracks in the individual grains of the metal, which produces a distortion in 
the crystalline structure of the metal.  The result is that, as the metal is hammered, it becomes 
harder, but also less malleable and ductile and thus, harder to work.123  Eventually a cold-worked 
piece of metal would become impossible to shape further without annealing.  Annealing is a 
process where in the metal is heated and then allowed to cool slowly; this process resets the 
crystalline structure of the metal and thus returns it to its originally malleability.124  Work-
hardening was also a desirable outcome, since both blade-edges and armor generally need to be 
hardened in order to function.  Work-hardening is particularly important on very low-carbon 
content iron, which will not be hardened by heat-treatment (see below).125 
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 Of particular note in the cold-working process is the production of bowl or dome-shapes, 
such as for the main body of copper-alloy helmets.  The bowl of the helmet could be produced 
from a copper-alloy sheet using the related processes of sinking and raising either by hammering 
the metal sheet over a dome-shaped tool, or by hammering the metal sheet into a hemispherical 
depression, a doming-block (figure 3.5).126  Both raising and sinking will tend to cause the metal 
to thin at the crest of the helmet, although the weakening of the metal is somewhat compensated 
for by the work-hardening effect of the hammering.127  These methods also leave tool-marks on 
the helmet from the shaping process, and while the tool marks on the outside of the helmet were 
generally polished off, the tool-marks on the inside of the bowl, which would have been 
concealed by the helmet liner, were usually left in place.  The opposing method is spinning, 
where the bowl is formed by turning the metal on a lathe and pressing it down against a wooden 
former.128  Spinning allows for the mass-production of a larger number of identical objects.  Its 
introduction in the manufacture of Roman helmets at the end of the second century, which 
coincides with the Marian reforms, is also connected to a general collapse in manufacturing 
standards in helmets.129  Spinning leaves no tool marks on the interior of a helmet, making it 
possible to distinguish spun helmets from raised helmets. 
 Hot-working is a more fuel intensive, but faster, method of reshaping metal that is all but 
required for working iron and steel.  In this process, the iron is heated to a red heat (typically 
between 1000-1100˚C), when it is malleable, and then hammered until enough heat is radiated 
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away that the iron requires reheating.130  At higher temperatures, iron objects can also be welded 
together in a technique known as fire welding to form a single, solid mass.131  In addition to the 
fuel and labor required, material loss during this process is significant.  Above 700˚C, iron will 
react with the oxygen in the air of the smithy to produce iron-oxides on the surface of a piece of 
iron.  The resulting coating of oxides is called mill-scale or just scale.132  This coating is 
dislodged when the iron is hammered and the iron content of the iron-oxides is lost; welding in 
particular tends to eject greater amounts of material.133  In a series of experiments producing 
Roman armaments from the imperial period, Sim and Kaminski found material losses ranging 
from 10 to 27.5% in the forging process.  Subsequent finishing, including polishing, cleaning and 
sharpening, raised the final material loss figures to between 14 and 38%, depending on the 
weapon produced.134 
 For many pieces of equipment in iron and steel, hardening through heat-treatment was 
also required.  In this method, the metal is hardened by being heated to red heat and then rapidly 
cooled in oil or water, making the metal very hard but also quite brittle.  This brittleness can then 
be removed through tempering, whereby the object is heated to a lower temperature (typically 
around 300˚C) and then rapidly cooled; the result is the loss of a small amount of hardness, but a 
significant increase in the malleability of the metal.135  Different types of equipment will require 
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different balances of hardness and malleability; a sword’s edge, for instance, must have 
considerable hardness in order to hold an edge and cut effectively, but excessive hardness will 
make the sword too brittle to withstand the considerable strains of use in combat.  One solution 
to this problem was pattern-welding (sometimes called damascening), which involved welding 
together the blade of a sword from multiple pieces of iron with different levels of carbon content 
to produce a superior blade.  Pattern-welded blades are known in La Tène swords (discussed in 
chapter 6) and in Roman gladii from the imperial period; in both cases the labor required seems 
to have kept these weapons rare.136 
 
The Cost of Metal 
Quantifying these costs further is quite difficult, due to the limited nature of ancient price 
data.  The data that does exist, however, tends to reinforce the high cost of worked metal.  
Because of the limited nature of preserved ancient price data, it is impossible to quantify the high 
value placed on worked metal, although fragments of such data may offer hints.  Perhaps the best 
evidence is prices recorded in Vindolanda tablets 183 and 186, which record the purchase of 90 
Roman pounds of iron (29kg of metal) for 32 denarii and 100 hobnails (for use in caligae, 
military sandals) for 12 asses.137  Lee Bray estimates the value added by processing the nails to 
have represented a 23% increase over the value of the iron, noting that, with a 10% material loss, 
an experienced smith could produce approximately 180 hobnails from 1kg of iron, with a total 
value of 1.35 denarii.138  The value added on nails should be taken to represent a relatively low 
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amount of value-added for the final production of metal objects, given that, as Sim and Ridge 
note, nails of this type could be produced fairly quickly, and often by only semi-skilled labor.  
Their own experiments yielded manufacture times as short as 3-4 minutes per nail for smaller 
nails, as compared to a staggering 10.4 hours for the metal elements of a pilum and 34 hours for 
a gladius.139  Much of the value then, of any finished piece of metal military equipment would 
come from the final stages of forging and finishing. 
Nevertheless, even unsmithed iron could command surprising value.  Bray compares the 
price of the unsmithed iron at Vindolanda to a range of other attested prices in the Vindolanda 
tablets, noting that iron “was significantly more valuable than even exotic, imported foodstuffs 
such as anise and caraway and more expensive, by a factor of four or five, than the enigmatic 
‘spices’ recorded on Tablet no. 193.”140  Prices for finished goods at Vindolanda compare more 
favorably to raw iron, with a cloak recorded in tablet no. 596 being worth nearly 5kg of iron 
when priced at 5.38 denarii.  No prices, however, for worked iron objects (apart from the nails) 
are preserved, and the tablets offer few clues as to the quality of the goods discussed.141 
Comparative evidence from the Middle Ages also supports the high cost of metal 
equipment.142  Jan Frans Verbruggen estimates that the cost of heavy infantry equipment, which 
he figures at around £21 for the heavy infantry militia of Bruges in 1304, would have amounted 
to more than half a year’s wage for the typical artisan.  The most expensive item by far, which 
Verbruggen notes normally cost between £10 to £15, was a tunic of mail, just as in the Roman 
                                                 
139 Sim and Ridge (2002), 113-114. 
140 Bray (2010), 180. 
141 Bray (2010), 181. 
142 On this, note Landers (2005), 296. 
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panoply of 15 centuries earlier.143  Lighter armed infantry could be much cheaper to outfit.  A 
contemporary Yorkshire village in 1300 paid merely 5 shillings per man to equip a light infantry 
force required of it, whereas when Edward II demanded even minimally armored infantry, the 
cost rose four-fold to £1; yet this only covered a padded jack and a metal helmet without any 
mail body-armor.144  Non-metal weapons like bows were often far cheaper than metal 
equipment; Robert Hardy puts the cost of a good quality 14th century longbow at around 1s 6d, 
which at the longbowman’s wage of 2d per day, could be earned back in only 9 days.145 
The only sort of battlefield equipment whose costs regularly exceeded that of metal arms 
and armor on a per capita basis, as John Landers notes, was the cost of warhorses.146  The 
Frankish Ripuarian Law placed the value of a warhorse at 12 solidi in the middle of the eighth 
century, but valued the horseman’s armor, which would have been mail, at 33 solidi; the price of 
warhorses would grow dramatically in subsequent centuries.147  Comparative evidence from the 
Late Empire suggests that the cost to equip an armored cavalryman, including acquiring his 
horse, might about double the cost to equip an armored infantrymen; at such a ratio, the cost of 
the heavy infantry, far more numerous than the cavalry, would still dominate.148  Papyri records 
for land settlments (cleruchies) for soldiers in Ptolemaic Egypt tends to support this basic ratio of 
cost: plots for Greek and Macedonian cavalry in Egypt range from 70 to 100 arouras, while 
                                                 
143 J. F. Verbruggen, The Art of War in Western Europe during the Middle Ages, from the Eight Century to 1340 
(Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 1997), 170-1. 
144 M. Prestwich, Armies and Warfare in the Middle Ages: The English Experience (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1996), 134, 138-9. 
145 R. Hardy, Longbow: A Social and Military History (New York: Bois d’Arc Press, 1992), 44. 
146 Landers (2005), 296.   
147 Landers (2005), 295.  Verbruggen (1997), 23. 
148 Elton (1996), 122. 
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infantry land grants typically range around 25 to 30 arouras.149  It thus seems almost certain that 
the largest part of the cost of equipping an infantryman in the ancient world was the production 
of the metal elements of his equipment, and that the cost of the infantry dominated the total cost 
of the army. 
 
Other Materials – Wood, Textiles and Leather 
Wood 
 Wood too, was an important material in equipment, and the wooden elements in most sets 
of equipment will actually outweigh the metal ones.  The main uses for wood were in shields and 
the shafts for spears, javelins, bows and arrows, all applications where wood provided a balance 
of strength at a low weight and cost premium.  As with ship construction, different woods were 
suited for different purposes and often carefully chosen.  For the making of shields, Pliny the 
Elder suggests poplar for its flexibility and ash for spear-shafts, where he noted the Homeric 
precedent.150  The Macedonian sarisa is noted as using Cornelian cherry (or cornel) wood by 
both Theophrastus and Arrian; the latter specifically highlights the advantage offered by cornel’s 
strength as a material.151  Cornel was also used for javelins.152  Cornel wood is denser (and thus 
heavier) than ash, but also quite a bit stronger, making it ideal for applications like the sarissa or 
javelins, where strength is valued over flexibility or low weight.153  Once chosen, any of these 
                                                 
149 Fischer-Bovet (2014), 120-121. 
150 Pliny, NH, 16.24, 16.77.  Ash (μελία) is used by Homer as synecdoche for a spear, Il. 19.390, 22.225; Thus, also 
in Homer, ἐυμμελίης, comes to mean “well armed with an ashen spear” as Ody. 3.400. 
151 Theophrastus, Historia Plantarum 3.12.1; Arrian, Alex., 1.15.5. 
152 Homeric Hymn to Hermes, 460. 
153 M. M. Markle, “The Macedonian Sarissa, Spear and Related Armor.” AJA 81.3 (1977): 323-339.  
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woods would have to be first felled and then seasoned to remove the sap and moisture.154  Shafts 
for weapons could then be shaped with a lathe.155  The construction of shields is somewhat more 
complex, and will be discussed in more detail in subsequent chapters. 
 Although an important material, wood was also relatively inexpensive.  As noted above, 
comparative evidence from the Middle Ages indicates that wooden equipment often cost only a 
fraction of the cost of metal.  Partly this may be explained with reference to the fuel requirements 
of metal equipment.  A typical pilum, for instance might require only 0.3kg of iron for the tip 
compared to the 1kg wooden haft.156  However, the fuel requirements merely to smelt the iron 
for that tip would have been around 43.5kg.157  Woodworking was a skilled profession in the 
ancient world, but many wooden elements of military equipment, like spear or javelin hafts, are 
relatively simple and could have been produced within the household economy with only semi-
skilled labor.158  One of the few items of military equipment explicitly listed in Diocletian’s price 
edict is a finished spear-shaft in cornel wood, for only 30 denarii, less than a day’s labor for a 
blacksmith.159  Unfortunately, bulk iron is not listed in the edict, but if the spear was fitted with a 
                                                 
154 Hodges (1989), 113-114. 
155 Hodges (1989), 115. 
156 This reconstruction is discussed in the following chapter in more detail, but follows P. Connolly, “Experiments 
with the Sarissa – the Macedonian pike and cavalry lance – a functional view” JRMES 11 (2000a): 103-112. 
157 Sim and Ridge (2002), 23.  Sim and Kaminski (2012), 44, notes a material loss during the fashioning of the metal 
elements of a pilum at 37.91% in addition, when finishing is included. 
158 R. B. Ulrich, Roman Woodworking (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007), 6-12. 
159 Edict of Dicoletian 7.11, 14.4-5.  Notably, more complex items like wheels and wagons, which would have 
required a skilled joiner, are far more expensive. 
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tip and ferrule in bronze, the raw, unworked metal (roughly 300g) alone would cost 50 
denarii.160 
 
Hide Products: Leather, Parchment, Rawhide and Cuir Bouilli 
 Leather (here and following understood to include rawhide unless specified) has a wide 
variety of uses in military equipment, although more often as a material used in fittings or 
secondary elements than as a primary material.161  Tanned leather (as distinct from rawhide, cuir 
boulli, or parchment) is generally flexible and supple, but of little value as armor.  Leather is 
produced from hides; first the fat layer underneath the hide is scraped away using a paring knife, 
and any hair and remaining epidermis is removed.  The hide may then undergo intermediate 
treatments, as with oils such as dubbin, or by way of a salt or alum dressing called tawing.  The 
hide is then tanned, that is treated with tannins, to produce tanned leather.  Parchment, by 
contrast, is only tawed and stretched but not tanned, and produces a very thin surface of 
leather.162  Very thin hide surfaces could be used for the facings of shields such at the scutum.163  
On the other hand, rawhide, which is not tanned but may be soaked in lime, is quite hard and 
inflexible and may have been used as a primary material in certain armors.164  Finally, cuir 
                                                 
160 Edict of Diocletian 15.66. 
161 On the general details of producing various hides and leathers, see: Hodges (1989), 148-152; M. Kite and R. 
Thomson, Conservation of Leather and Related Materials (London: Routledge, 2005), 1-65; A Michel, “Skin deep: 
an outline of the structure of different skins and how it influences behavior in use.  A practitioner’s guide” in Why 
Leather? The Material and Cultural Dimensions of Leather ed. S. Harris, and A. J. Veldmeijer, (Leiden: Sidestone 
press, 2014), 23-40. 
162 Hodges (1989), 151. 
163 Plb. 6.23.3. 
164 Jarva (1995), 36-3, but note also Aldrete et al. (2013), 57-63.  The issue of leather as a primary material for 
various kinds of armor will be discussed in subsequent chapters. 
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bouilli, sometimes called boiled leather was most likely actually boiled rawhide.  It is extremely 
rigid and hard and can make for quite effective rigid armor.165 
 Confusion between these various types of leather and hide materials has led to leather, 
often of an unspecified variety, being frequently proposed as a potential primary material for 
Greek and Roman armor, often as an explanation of last resort.  Eero Jarva, for instance, 
proposes leather as the normal material for the construction of the composite Type IV corselet, 
generally identified as the linothorax; the problems with this reconstruction are discussed in 
more depth in chapter 5.166  Raffaele D’Amato also proposes reconstructions in leather for 
Roman armor, particularly when the representational evidence appears to him to present armor as 
flexible.167  The evidence, or lack thereof, for the use leather or textile armor by the Romans is 
an issue which will be discussed in greater depth in the following chapter.  However it should be 
noted at this juncture that leather which has been treated for use as armor is not, in fact, supple or 
flexible.  For leather to effectively resist weapons it must be hardened (as with rawhide and cuir 
bouilli above); flexible tanned leather will provide little resistance to an arrow or a spear-head.168  
Both rawhide and hardened leather like cuir bouilli could provide significant protection, but are 
far less flexible. 
                                                 
165 Hodges (1989), 151.  L. Davies, “Cuir Bouilli” in Conservation of Leather and Related Materials, eds. M. Kite 
and R. Thomson (London: Routledge, 2005), 94-102.  E. Cheshire, “Cuir Bouilli armour” in Why Leather? The 
Material and Cultural Dimensions of Leather eds. S. Harris, and A. J. Veldmeijer, (Leiden: Sidestone Press, 2014), 
41-76. 
166 Jarva (1989), 36-40. 
167 R. D’Amato, Arms and Armour of the Imperial Roman Soldier: From Marius to Commodus 112 BC – AD 192 
(London: Frontline Books, 2009), 39-43, 68, 82. 
168 Cheshire (2014).  L. Davies (2005).  This has been well-known among medieval armor specialists for some time, 
cf. C. Foulkes, The Armourer and his Craft: From the XIth to the XVIth century (New York: Benjamin Blom, 1929), 
96-103.  C. Blair, European Armour, circa 1066 to circa 1700 (London: B.T. Batsford Ltd, 1958), 37-40. 
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 The leather used in equipment, while important, was not likely to be as expensive as 
worked metal components.  Leather could be produced within the household of a moderately 
well-off free-holding farmer, who might well tan the hides and skins of his own animals.169  
Beyond the hides, tannins for tanning could be readily obtained from the bark of oak trees.170  
The bulk of leather production in the ancient world appears to have been handled by professional 
tanners and leatherworkers, who often organized into professional associations.  As a class, 
leatherworkers often faced stigma from the elite, in particular because the occupation was seen 
as smelly and dirty, but successful individuals and associations also became prominent in their 
communities.171  The quantity of leather required for the civilian economy was considerable, 
with production being perceived as important enough to merit the emperor’s attention in the 
imperial period.172  Thus as a secondary material for straps and fittings, leather products would 
have been readily available. 
As a primary material in armor, leather would have represented a low-cost alternative to 
metal, but with reduced battlefield performance, even for hardened leathers like cuir bouilli.173  
A sense of the relatively lower cost of leather products is given by Diocletian’s price edict, with 
the price of an untanned ox hide at 500 denarii, and the same hide, tanned suitably for fittings, at 
                                                 
169 R. D. Higham, “The social position of leatherworkers” in Conservation of Leather and Related Materials, eds. 
M. Kite and R. Thomson (London: Routledge, 2005), 82-7.  Small leather items like simple shoes were regularly 
produced domestically by poor peasants in the Middle Ages, see Q. Mould, “The home-made shoe, a glimpse of a 
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172 Bond (2016), 115-118. 
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600 denarii, which Jarva suggests would provide enough leather to be suitable for two complete 
corselets.174  In comparison, a soldier’s tunic “of the third quality” (the lowest listed) is priced at 
1,000 denarii.175  A blacksmith making wagon fittings, at the listed wage of 50 denarii a day, 
would have been able to afford the tanned ox-hide in just 12 days of labor.  The comparison with 
the cost of a mail shirt in fourteenth-century Bruges, which would amount to more than nine 
months labor by a skilled artisan, is instructive even at such great chronological distance.176   
 
Textiles 
 Textiles would also make up an important part of any ancient panoply, but as with 
wooden elements, a relatively small portion of the total resource and labor intensity.  Helmets 
were designed to be used with a lining of wool or linen for absorbing impacts and for increased 
fit and comfort; without such a liner, the effectiveness of a metal helmet would be drastically 
reduced.  Likewise, most forms of metal body-armor would be worn over a quilted or felt 
garment where multiple layers of cloth quilted together would serve to absorb impacts against 
the armor.  The evidence for this form of protection in the panoplies of each culture-group are 
discussed in later chapters.  Finally, textiles could be used as the primary material for body-
armor, most notably in the Greek and Macedonian linothorax.  Textiles were thus an important 
part of the soldier’s equipment. 
 Nevertheless, textiles were not likely to be major drivers of the cost of equipment.  
Textile production, as noted in the first chapter, could take place within the household economy, 
                                                 
174 Edict of Diocletian, 8.6-8.  Jarva, 153.   
175 Edict of Diocletian 26.28-30. 
176 See above at n. 136.  Edict of Diocletian 7.11. 
 179 
making use of skills and equipment that individuals in the household already possessed.177  
Moreover, textiles for quilted or felt liners and armor-padding did not need to be of particularly 
high quality.  Diocletian’s price edict lists prices for coarse linen ranging as low as 72 denarii 
and basic unwashed wool at only 25 denarii per Roman pound, making low-quality raw textiles 
some of the cheapest goods listed in the edict.178  In comparison, while a pound of linen or wool 
was likely to prove more than sufficient for a helmet liner, the 1.5kg of bronze sheet-metal 
necessary for a helmet would cost 274 denarii.179  The labor time necessary in spinning and 
weaving in order to turn that raw material into useful textiles was considerable, although still 
significantly less than the labor requirements of worked metal.  Experiments in reproducing the 
linothorax by Aldrete et. al. suggests around 170 hours of labor to produce 1kg of woven fabric 
from raw flax, so the time investment in the production of textiles was not trivial.180  Despite 
this, Aldrete et. al. note that textile body armor such as the linothorax would have been a 
substantially less expensive alternative to a metal cuirass.181 
 
 In summary then, the high labor, material and especially fuel costs of worked metal 
meant that, for most infantrymen in the ancient world, the largest part of the cost of equipment 
was the production of the metal elements of his panoply.  The primary exception to this rule are 
soldiers who have substituted less expensive equipment, like textile armor, in place of more 
                                                 
177 See Ch. 1 at n. 102 and following. 
178 Edict of Diocletian, 25.5, 26.10-12. 
179 Based on a price of 60 denarii per Roman pound of bronze plate, Edict of Diocletian 15.65. 
180 Aldrete, et al. (2013), 150-151. 
181 Aldrete, et al. (2013), 153-159.  Jarva (1995), 153-4 makes much the same point concerning leather. 
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expensive (but also more effective) metal options.  Thus, based on the tremendous resource 
intensity of worked metal, the following chapters will focus primarily on the metal-content of 
battlefield equipment, in so far as it can be reconstructed.  While other materials (wood, leather 
and textile) will be considered, worked metal will serve as the primary comparative tool and as a 
proxy for the production cost of the overall panoply.  Each chapter will focus on the 
reconstruction of the battlefield equipment of a particular army: Chapter 3 on the equipment of 
the Roman legion of the second century, and Chapter 4 on the armies of the Hellenistic world 
with a particular emphasis on the Macedonian sarissa-phalanx. Finally, Chapter 5 will focus on 
the armies of the pre-state peoples that came into conflict with Rome through the second century, 
specifically the Iberians, Celtiberians and Gauls.  The final chapter will then draw the results of 
these investigations into comparison and assess the performance of the underlying mobilization 
systems of each. 
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Figure 3.1: Iron bloom182 
 
 
Figure 3.2: Iron Billet183 
 
  
                                                 
182 Sim and Ridge (2002), pl. 6. 
183 Sim and Ridge (2002), pl. 8. 
 182 
Figure 3.3: Cherub smiths and assistants184 
 
                                                 
184 Sim and Ridge (2002), pl. 3-4. 
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Figure 3.4: Strikers185 
 
Figure 3.5: Raising, Sinking and Spinning to create bowls for helmets186 
 
                                                 
185 Sim and Ridge (2002), 56. 
186 Hodges (1989), 75. 
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CHAPTER 4: THE ROMANS 
 
 This chapter discusses the equipment of the Roman army of the third and second 
centuries, in order to provide a basis for comparison with the equipment of Hellenistic (Chapter 
5) and pre-state (Chapter 6) armies of the period.  As discussed in the previous chapter, the 
primary quantitative tool for this comparison will be metal-weights, which are used as a proxy 
for cost, although in the conclusion non-metal resources will be discussed as well.  In this 
chapter, I first discuss the main sources of evidence on which the reconstructions will be based, 
before turning to a discussion of the classes of soldiers in the Roman army.  After this, the 
reconstructions themselves, the main body of the chapter, present the evidence for the metal-
weights for each equipment type.  Finally, preliminary conclusions are from these figures. 
 
Sources 
 As noted in the previous chapter, military equipment is a subject in which the literary 
sources do show some interest and provide invaluable information.  Two authors in particular, 
Polybius and Livy, dominate the available information about Roman military equipment in this 
period.  Some general notes, then, about the advantages and pitfalls of these sources are useful at 
the outset.  Polybius was a contemporary and an eyewitness to the army he describes, at least for 
the latter part of his history.1  He thus avoids much, though not all, of the danger of anachronism 
                                                 
1 For background on Polybius’ life, see generally Walbank (1957), 1-6.  Too much has been written on Polybius to 
recount all of it here, but see esp. P. Derow, A. Erskine, J. Quinn, Rome, Polybius and the East (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2015), 85-206; A. Erskine, “How to Rule the World: Polybius Book 6 Reconsidered” in Polybius 
and his World: Essays in Memory of F. W. Walbank, eds. B. Gibson and T. Harrison (Oxford: Oxford University 
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when describing the Roman army, and his outsider’s perspective, as a Greek writing about 
Romans, leads him to describe in detail what might be left unsaid by a Roman source like Livy.  
However, Polybius’ portrait of the Roman army is an idealized one meant to explain Roman 
success, and his description is a snap-shot rather than a developmental history.  In contrast, Livy 
has a tendency to date changes in military equipment or organization, often with suspicious 
precision; but he also has a strong tendency towards anachronism, which renders many of these 
details less reliable.  Livy’s Roman patriotism also colors his work, and his reliance on Italian 
sources can lead to distortions in his account of the Roman socii in particular.2  Despite their 
weaknesses, these two authors must provide the core of any reconstruction of Roman equipment 
in this period.  Later sources, while often providing tantalizing details, must be regarded as less 
reliable and in some ways inherently suspect, given their greater chronological distance.   
 For reconstructing military equipment, representational depictions of Roman soldiers and 
equipment provide valuable evidence and act as a useful check on the descriptions in the literary 
evidence.3  The representational evidence for the Roman soldier of the third and second centuries 
is dominated by two monumental friezes, the Aemilius Paullus Pydna Monument and the so-
called Altar of Domitius Ahenobarbus.  While other pieces of representational evidence will be 
dealt with in the reconstructions, in light of the tremendous import and significant difficulties 
these two monuments pose, it is necessary to discuss both before embarking on the 
reconstructions. 
                                                 
Press, 2013), 231-245; and A. Erksine, “Polybius among the Romans: Life in the Cyclops’ Cave” in Imperialism, 
Cultural Politics and Polybius, eds. C. Smith and L. M. Yarrow (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 17-32. 
2 On this latter tendency, see: P. Erdkamp, “Polybius and Livy on the Allies in the Roman Army” in The Impact of 
the Roman Army (200 BC – AD 476) eds. L. de Blois and E. Lo Cascio (Leiden: Brill, 2007), 47-74. 
3 On representational evidence generally, see Bishop and Coulston (2006), 1-22. 
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Aemilius Paullus’ Pydna Monument 
 The dating of the Aemilius Paullus monument is rendered secure by connection to the 
Battle of Pydna (which it depicts) in 168 B.C.E.; the monument was constructed by Paullus 
before his return to Rome in the following year.4  What remains of the monument is a heavily 
damaged frieze in four panels, which would have served as a base for an equestrian statue of L. 
Aemilius Paullus, the victor at the Battle of Pydna; the monument was set atop a pillar originally 
erected by the Macedonian king Perseus and repurposed by Aemilius.  The frieze depicts the 
Roman victory over the Macedonians, although damage to the monument makes identifying the 
figures and their equipment difficult.  Several attempts have been made to evaluate the figures; 
the recent one by Michael Taylor is perhaps the most successful and persuasive.5  His 
interpretation relies heavily on each figure’s equipment; he argues that the artists responsible 
went to some lengths to distinguish between the various sub-units of each army, displaying not 
only Macedonian infantry and cavalry, but also Gallic mercenaries in Philip’s army, as well as 
drawing a distinction between Romans and Italian allies within the Roman army.6  I follow 
Taylor’s identifications of the figures on the monument, although it is still necessary to exercise 
caution, as not all of them are secure. 
 
                                                 
4 Plut. Aem. 28.4; Polybius 30.10.2; Livy 45.27.7. 
5 M. J. Taylor, “The Battle Scene on Aemilius Paullus’s Pydna Monument: A Reevaluation” Hesperia 83.3 (2016): 
559-576.  Previous efforts on the monument, note esp., H. Kähler, Der Fries vom Reiterdenkmal des Aemilius 
Paullus in Delphi (Berlin: Verlag Gebr.Mann, 1965); D. Boschung, “Überlegungen zum Denkmal des Aemilius 
Paullus in Delphi” in Rome et ses Provinces: Genèse & diffusion d’une image du pouvoir, hommages à Jean-
Charles Balty eds. C. Evers and A. Tsingarida (Brussels, Le Livre Timperman, 2001), 59-72. 
6 Taylor (2016), 569-70.  Gauls in Perseus’ army, Plut, Aem. 9.6; Livy 42.51.7. 
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The Altar of Domitius Ahenobarbus 
By contrast, the so-called Altar of Domitius Ahenobarbus, really a pair of friezes, one 
now in Munich and the other now in Paris, presents a greater range of difficulties, encompassing 
the date of the monument, its context and the identities of the depicted figures.  The Paris frieze 
depicts four Roman infantrymen, a cavalryman and a standing figure dressed as a Roman 
general.   Its excellent preservation makes it extremely valuable for reconstructing Roman 
military equipment (fig. 4.1).  The primary difficulty is dating the frieze, a crucial task for 
determining the period to which the soldiers depicted belong.7  Unfortunately, efforts to date the 
friezes by art historians and by Roman military historians have largely proceeded in isolation 
from each other.  Art historians have favored tying the context of the mythological scenes on the 
Munich frieze (a scene of the wedding of Poseidon and Amphitrite) to a naval triumph in order 
to determine the political-religious event (assumed to be a lustrum) on the Paris frieze.8  The 
dates that emerge from this approach are necessarily tied to the individuals put forward as the 
sponsor of the monument, originally thought to have been Cn. Domitius Ahenobarbus (cos. 122).  
Filippo Coarelli and more recently Ann Kuttner propose Marcus Antonius, grandfather of the 
triumvir, as the sponsor, suggesting a date shortly after his censorship in 97 B.C.E.9  Others 
                                                 
7 The friezes, which were probably not part of an altar, but rather a monumental statue base, generally retain the 
nickname ‘the Altar of Domitius Ahenobarbus’ in English, although European scholars now generally refer to it as 
the Paris-Munich reliefs, and Ann Kuttner terms it the ‘Marcus Antonius’ Base.’  Here, I retain the customary 
English usage and refer to both friezes together as the Altar of Domitius Ahenobarbus. Ann Kuttner, “Some New 
Grounds for Narrative: Marcus Antonius’s Base (The Ara Domitii Ahenobarbi) and Republican Biographies” in 
Narrative and Event in Ancient Art, ed. Peter J. Holliday (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 199-200. 
8 On the long bibliography pertaining to dating the monument, see Florian Stilp, Mariage et Suovetaurilia: Etude sur 
le soi-disant “Autel de Domitius Ahenobarbus” (Roma: Giorgio Bretschneider Editore, 2001), 16-23. 
9 Filippo Coarelli, “L’ara di Domizio Ahenobarbo e la cultura artistica in Roma nel II sec. AC.” Dialoghi di 
archeologia 2 (1968): 302-68.  Ann Kuttner (1993), 198-229. 
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suggested as the sponsor are L. Gellius Poplicola (cos. 72) or the younger Domitius Ahenobarbus 
(cos. 32).10 
Scholars with a more military focus have generally avoided linking the monument to a 
specific individual, instead looking to date it by the appearance of the soldiers on it.  Lawrence 
Keppie places it in the latter half of the second century and notes that “the presence of an eques 
by itself could suggest a date before the time of Marius.”11  To Keppie, the presence of this 
cavalryman, presumably an eques, in particular seems to argue strongly against many of the 
suggested dates in the first century, unless the depictions of the men are intentionally archaizing, 
as the Roman citizen cavalry is generally thought to have been discontinued in the late second 
century (fig. 4.2).  Florian Stilp, one of the few scholars to consider both the art-historical 
context of the monument and the equipment and soldiers depicted on it, rejects any linkage to a 
specific person as impossible, but dates the monument broadly to the second century.  In my 
view, this broad dating to the second century generally is as much precision as can be adopted 
with confidence. 
 The identity of the figure standing behind the altar in the suovetaurilia scene, one of the 
central figures there, is another important puzzle, as his armor and weapons are unique on the 
monument.  The figure stands holding a spear upright, resting his arm on a round shield (fig. 
4.3).  He wears a breastplate with pteryges (leather strips protecting the groin and upper thigh), 
decorated by a band around the waist.  His helmet, while damaged on the relief, appears to be in 
a somewhat different style from those of the infantrymen, as it lacks cheek-guards.   Historians 
                                                 
10 L. Gellius Poplicola: H. Kähler, Seethiasos und Census (Berlin: Verlag Gebr. Mann, 1966); T. P. Wiseman, 
“Legendary Genealogies in Late-Republican Rome” Greece & Rome 21.2 (1974): 153-164.  Domitius: S. Lattimore, 
The Marine Thiasos in Greek Sculpture (Los Angeles: Institute of Archaeology, University of California, 1976). 
11 Keppie (1984), 224.  Keppie notes that he follows Coarelli in this, but Keppie’s pre-Marian date and Coarelli’s 
attribution to Marcus Antonius are incompatible. 
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of the Roman army, including Keppie, Raffaele D’Amato and Peter Connolly, have tended to 
identify this figure as a military tribune, with little discussion.12  In contrast, art historians, such 
as Heinz Kähler, Steven Lattimore, Kuttner, and Stilp tend to identify the figure as the god Mars, 
often in an equally cursory manner.13  Stilp, however, presents the case for an identification with 
Mars, noting that the position of the figure and his role in the composition fit well within a Greek 
tradition of showing a human performing a sacrifice and a god accepting it.14  Dressed as a 
Roman general, Mars also seems to mirror the sacrificing magistrate on the other side of the 
altar, perhaps providing an opportunity to show the monument’s dedicator in both his civic role 
(as a magistrate carrying out a lustrum) and military role (as a general); the two figures have the 
same sightline and are a nearly exact match in position, height and posture (fig. 4.4).  In my 
view, the figure should be understood as a representation of Mars, dressed as a Roman general; 
as such, his equipment should not be considered as typical for the rank-and-file Roman soldiery.  
 
Archaeological Material 
 Military equipment is also increasingly well-attested in the archaeological record.  
Archaeological evidence for the Republican period, just as with the representational evidence, 
has always been more limited compared to later periods, but a steady pace of discoveries has 
served to fill in many gaps.15  Moreover, the amount of Hellenistic material available for 
                                                 
12 Keppie (1984), 224.  P. Connolly, Greece and Rome at War (London: Macdonald Phoebus, 1981), 214.  Bishop 
and Coulston follow the same identification, but only tentatively, see Bishop and Coulston (2006), 49.  Note also 
D’Amato, (2009), 27.  The drawn reconstruction presented by D’Amato, dating from 1883 and presenting the figure 
in a linothorax with a pectoral, is wildly inaccurate. 
13 Kähler (1966), 25.  Lattimore (1976), 17.  Kuttner (1993), 199.  Stilp (2001), 52-3. 
14 Stip (2001), 52-3. 
15 Bishop and Coulston (2006), 48-50. 
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comparison (see Chapter 5) and our knowledge about it has increased dramatically, while the 
archaeological evidence for Gallic and Iberian arms and armor (see Chapter 6) is surprisingly 
extensive.  Moreover, battlefield military equipment, particularly the personal arms and armor 
that the next several chapters will focus on, tends to consist of specialized pieces of equipment 
with little civilian use, making military objects readily identifiable and distinguishable, with a 
clear purpose.  In the Roman infantry panoply, perhaps the only exception to this pattern is the 
dagger, although its inclusion in the panoply during the Middle Republic is in doubt.16 
 Archaeological evidence does, however, pose a number of challenges.  Most notably, 
preserved specimens vary widely in how intact they are; some objects come down to the present 
remarkably well preserved, while others are so heavily damaged as to require extensive 
reconstruction.  Moreover, due to the limited nature of the archaeological evidence, it is often not 
possible to restrict the evidence base to artefacts with secure recovery contexts or provenance.  
Where possible, this study aims to use evidence that can be securely tied to the Middle Republic, 
but for certain kinds of equipment it has been necessary to draw on comparative evidence either 
from earlier artefacts, as in the case of the pectoral, or later from the early imperial period, as 
with mail armor rings.  In all cases it must be stressed that the state of the archaeological 
evidence is always evolving.  Given the narrow evidence base, it is entirely possible that new 
discoveries may substantially change our understanding of the material. 
 
Reconstructions 
My reconstruction will begin by reviewing the structure of the legion, the classes of 
soldiers within it, and the equipment attributed to each type, with a focus on the legion in the 
                                                 
16 Bishop and Coulston (2006), 56-55. 
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second century B.C.E.  Although the reconstructions will consider the equipment for light 
infantry (velites) and the cavalry (equites), emphasis is placed on the heavy infantry (in the 
Roman case, hastati, principes and triarii), which formed the largest and most dominant part of 
not only the Roman army, but also of Hellenistic armies and many pre-state ones.  Having 
established what equipment the soldiers carried and wore, I then discuss and present 
reconstructions of each item, with a particular eye towards the metal-weight of each piece.  
Roman equipment was never uniform, particularly in the Republic, so it is necessary in the 
reconstructions to establish a range of possible metal-weights.  Accordingly, each item will be 
assigned three reconstructed weights: a minimum case figure representing a lower-bound for the 
likely metal content of each type of equipment, and a maximum case figure representing an 
upper-bound; in addition, each type of equipment will be assigned a median case figure, 
representing a ‘best guess’ estimate at a ‘typical’ or ‘average’ piece of equipment.  The median-
case estimates are necessarily more speculative, but they serve to suggest where in the range 
between the lightest and heaviest examples the average seems to fall, based on the current 
evidence.  Once all of this is done, reconstructed metal-weights can be produced for all of the 
potential variants of the Roman panoplies, allowing conclusions about the resource-intensity of 
Roman warfare to be drawn at the end of the chapter. 
 
Classes of Soldiers 
 Reconstruction of Roman equipment should begin with an outline of the equipment used 
by each of several classes of Roman soldier, before proceeding to a detailed item by item 
discussion of the characteristics and costs of each piece of equipment.  As noted earlier in this 
chapter, Polybius’ description of the equipment of the Roman army remains the starting point for 
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any discussion, although the passage is not without its problems.17  Placement of his description 
in Book 6 puts it chronologically in the early years of the Second Punic War, but it is not entirely 
clear to what degree he is attempting to describe the Roman military c. 216 or if he is 
generalizing from the Roman army as it looked in the latter half of the second century.18  As a 
result, an awareness of dating when discussing the development of the Roman ‘panoply,’ in 
reality several Roman panoplies, will be necessary. 
 Modern descriptions of the organization of the Roman army in the third and second 
centuries generally follow Polybius’ description.  He breaks the Roman forces into five groups, a 
front rank of light skirmishers called the velites, two middle lines of sword-shield-and-javelin 
heavy infantry called the hastati and the principes respectively, a back rank of spear-and-shield 
heavy infantry called the triarii, and finally the citizen cavalry, the equites.19  Polybius presents 
the normal size of the legion as a whole at 4,200, with 1,200 each of hastati and principes, 600 
triarii and the rest (another 1,200 men) being velites.20  The equites numbered 300 in addition to 
this.21  Polybius has fewer words for the socii, but notes that “the total number of allied infantry 
is usually equal to that of the Romans, while the cavalry are three times as many.”22 Michael 
Dobson argues, however, that army-size figures reported by both Polybius and Livy show that 
                                                 
17 Polybius 6.23.6 
18 E. Rawson, “The literary sources for the Pre-Marian Army” PBSR 39 (1971): 13-31, argues the description dates 
to c. 160s.  Dobson, (2008), 55 argues for placing it c. 216.  Dobson’s case is persuasive, but certainty seems 
impossible. 
19 Polybius 6.24-25. 
20 Polybius 6.21.7-9.  Keppie (1984), 34-5.  Dobson (2008), 48-9. 
21 Polybius 6.25.1-2.  Keppie (1984), 35.  Dobson (2008), 50. 
22 Plb. 6.26.7.  τὸ μὲν τῶν πεζῶν πάρισον τοῖς Ῥωμαϊκοῖς στρατοπέδοις ὡς τὸ πολύ, τὸ δὲ τῶν ἱππέων τριπλάσιον.   
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this correspondence was at most a general rule of thumb, and that there was no fixed ratio of 
allied to citizen troops.23 
 Livy’s description of the organization of Roman and Latin forces in 340 is less reliable.  
It is largely in accord with the three lines of the heavy infantry that Polybius describes, but the 
rest of Livy’s account is mired in difficulties.24  Livy omits the velites, but adds two new classes 
of soldier, the rorarii and the accensi.25  As Stephen Oakley notes, Livy’s description requires 
multiple emendations in order to make sense of the passage and even then, Oakley argues, “a 
rational interpretation of his figures is probably impossible.”26  Lawrence Keppie concludes that 
“it is difficult to suppose that the legion he [Livy] describes ever existed as a reality,” and that 
“solid ground is reached only with Polybius.”27  Livy’s omission of the velites, may be explained 
by his later note that the velites emerged as a distinct arm during the siege of Capua in 212-211 
as a response to Campanian cavalry tactics.28  Michael Sage doubts this reasoning, instead seeing 
the velites as an effort by the Romans to reach more widely for manpower, while Oakley regards 
the entire rationale for the introduction of the velites as questionable, instead arguing that the 
rorarii and the velites are to be seen as different names for the same unit.29  Polybius notes the 
                                                 
23 Dobson (2008), 51-52. 
24 Livy 8.8.3-8. 
25 S. P. Oakley, A Commentary on Livy: Books VI-X (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998), 469-71, is persuasive in 
arguing that the rorarii are light-armed, but the accensi were non-combatants.  Keppie (1984), 20, takes the same 
view. 
26 Oakley (1998), 462-4. 
27 Keppie (1984), 20.  Connolly (1981), 126-128, tries heroically to salvage Livy’s description, but the result is less 
than convincing. 
28 Livy 26.4.3-10.   
29 M. Sage, The Republican Roman Army: A Sourcebook (New York: Routledge, 2008), 89.  Oakley (1998), 469-
471. 
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presence of light-armed troops prior to the Battle of Trebia (218), and Michael Bell reads these 
as velites, pushing the introduction of the unit potentially to this year at the latest.30  On the 
balance it is not hard to see the velites emerging, as Livy suggests, out of the hastati’s attached 
leves milites either gradually or as a response to the pressing need for support troops in the 
Second Punic War.  Functionally they would replace the rorarii in that role, but otherwise little 
confidence can be placed in the details of Livy’s description. 
 My reconstruction, then, will proceed along the lines of Polybius’ description, with an 
army comprising five kinds of common soldier.  As with the basic structure of this force, 
Polybius’ description of their weapons remains the starting point for any discussion of the 
equipment of the Roman army in this period.  His description of the heavy infantry is largely 
uncontroversial.  The hastati and principes carried a sword (the gladius Hispaniensis), a large 
shield (the scutum), and two heavy javelins (pila); they were armored with a helmet and body 
armor (either a pectoral or the mail lorica hamata).31  Polybius also mentions greaves as part of 
the armor, but here he is at variance with some of the representational evidence; the issue will be 
discussed below.  The triarii were equipped the same, except that they substituted a long 
thrusting spear (the hasta) in place of the pair of pila.   
 Polybius’ descriptions of the arms for the velites and equites require more discussion.  He 
says the velites had a sword, javelins (γρόσφους) and a small round shield (πάρμην).  Polybius 
also notes that they wear a “simple headcovering” (λιτῷ περικεφαλαίῳ), sometimes reinforced 
with a wolf’s skin.32  That the wolf’s skin is taken to add significant protective value seems to 
                                                 
30M. J. V. Bell, “Tactical Reform in the Roman Republican Army,” Historia 14.4 (1965): 404-22. 
31 Polybius 6.23.1-14. 
32 Polybius 6.22.3. 
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imply that the normal helmet of the velites was cloth or leather, rather than metal.  Following this 
reasoning, Walbank suggests that the simple headcovering of the velites represents the leather or 
textile galea or galerus, rather than the metal cassis, a distinction mentioned by Propertius and 
Vergil.33  Polybius also gives a description of the lighter javelins of the velites, identified by 
Frank Walbank and Connolly with the hasta velitaris.34  Finally, Livy confirms the sword which 
Polybius notes the velites as possessing to have been the gladius.35 
 Polybius’ description of the equipment of the cavalry of his own day is less detailed, as 
the description is presented as part of the motif of the Roman adoption of foreign weapons, 
presenting the Roman cavalry of his day as “armed like that of Greece” in contrast to an older 
and lighter model of cavalry equipment, which he does not date.36  Polybius also offers no date 
for this transformation.  Eduard Meyer dated the reform to the second century, and John Eadie 
argued for the transition being the result of the Roman encounter with eastern cataphract cavalry 
at Magnesia in 189.37  Elizabeth Rawson suggested a date during the Second Punic War.38  
Jeremiah McCall has recently taken up the question, siding with Rawson, although he admits the 
issue can never be settled conclusively.39  He notes that Roman cavalrymen in the early second 
                                                 
33 Walbank (1957), 703.  Vergil, Aeneid 7.688; Prop. 4.10.20.  The distinction is made explicit by Isidore in his 7th 
century encyclopedia where he notes, “cassis de lamina est, galea de corio”; Isidore, Origines 18.14. 
34 Walbank (1957), 703.  P. Connolly, “The reconstruction and use of Roman weaponry in the second century BC” 
JRMES 11 (2000b): 43-46. 
35 Polybius 6.22.1.  Livy 38.21.13.  Here and subsequently, gladius should be understood as the gladius 
Hispaniensis, unless otherwise specified. 
36 Polybius 6.25.3.  ὁ δὲ καθοπλισμὸς τῶν ἱππέων νῦν μέν ἐστι παραπλήσιος τῷ τῶν Ἑλλήνων. 
37 E. Meyer, “Das römische Manipularheer, sine Entwicklung und seine Vorstufen” Kleine Schriften II (1924), 193-
329.  J. W. Eadie, “The Development of Roman Mailed Cavalry” JRS 57 (1967): 161-173. 
38 Rawson, (1971): 13-31. 
39 J. B. McCall, The Cavalry of the Roman Republic (London: Routledge; 2002), 27-45. 
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century seems to have already been a match for their Greek opponents, while earlier against 
Hannibal the cavalry seemed to suffer.  McCall also seeks to associate a coin issue in 211, 
connected with the sack of Syracuse, with the reform of the cavalry, as it features the Dioscuri, 
long associated with the Roman equites, armed as Greek heavy cavalry on the obverse.40  Such a 
date would put Roman cavalry reform in almost exactly the same period as the emergence of the 
velites as a distinct arm of the Roman legion, which, as noted, Livy claims was also in response 
to Roman vulnerability to cavalry.  As with the emergence of the velites, however, gradual 
change should not be discounted.  It is reasonable to suppose that Roman cavalry became heavier 
armed and armored over a period of years, as individual cavalrymen altered their own equipment 
in response to perceived battlefield realities.  Whether gradual or sudden, it seems plausible, if 
not conclusive, to suppose (as McCall does) that the process of Roman cavalry reform described 
by Polybius was completed well before the end of the Second Punic War.  As a result, it is the 
heavier mailed cavalry that will be presented in this reconstruction. 
 
Weapons 
Gladius Hispaniensis – Date and Adoption 
 The primary weapon of the Roman legionary in the Middle and Late Republic was the 
gladius hispaniensis, a sword, as the name implies, of Spanish origin.  The date and 
circumstances of its adoption are not entirely clear.41  The only source that explicitly mentions 
these points is the 10th century Byzantine lexicon, the Suda, which places the adoption of the 
                                                 
40 McCall (2002), 43. 
41 For a complete discussion of the documentary evidence, see: F. Quesada Sanz, “Gladius hispaniensis: an 
archaeological view from Iberia” JRMES 8 (1997a): 251-270. 
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sword in the context of the Second Punic War.42  Livy, apparently drawing on a passage by Q. 
Claudius Quadrigarius which survives as a fragment preserved in Aulus Gellius, describes T. 
Manlius Torquatus as girding on a Spanish sword, Hispano cingitur gladio, in the dictatorship of 
T. Quinctius Pennus in 361; however, it seems likely that the reference to a Spanish sword at this 
date is an anachronism.43  Livy later notes that by 200 the Roman cavalry carried the gladius 
hispaniensis, but gives no date for its adoption.44  At least one of the Roman cavalrymen on the 
Pydna monument appears to be positioning for a downward strike with a sword, although the 
weapon itself is lost.45  Livy notes that the sword was also carried, at least by 189, by the 
velites.46 
To parse Polybius for a more precise date for the adoption of the sword does not 
necessarily bring clarity.  In his description of the Battle of Telamon c. 225 he notes the 
effectiveness of Roman swords.47  Fernando Quesada Sanz has argued that Polybius may not yet 
mean the gladius hispaniensis, because these swords are not specifically referred to as Spanish, 
although in a later passage Polybius does note the decisive thrusting advantage of the weapon, 
which was certainly a merit of the gladius hispaniensis.48  In his description of Cannae, Polybius 
contrasts the effective cut-and-thrust swords of Hannibal’s Iberian mercenaries with those of his 
                                                 
42 Suda: μ 302, machaira. The passage appears to be a quotation of a fragment of Polybius, fr. 182 (179) in Polybius, 
The Histories, Volume VI: Books 28-39. Fragments, ed. and trans. S. Douglas Olson, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2012), 582-83.  
43 Livy 7.10.5.  Claudius Quadrigarius, Fr. 10b.  Aulus Gellius 9.13. 
44 Livy 31.34. 
45 Taylor (2016), 567.  Kähler (1965), 26. 
46 Livy 38.21.13. 
47 Plb. 2.30, 2.33.   
48 Quesada Sanz (1997a), 251-270. 
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Gauls, making a clear distinction between the sword-types, one which is generally supported in 
the archaeological record (discussed in chapter 6).49  However, when he describes the Roman 
panoply, dating the description apparently to the Hannibalic war, Polybius expressly notes that 
the Roman sword of choice is the Spanish (Ἰβηρικήν) one, seeming to confirm the Suda’s 
placement of its adoption no later than the last two decades of the third century.50 
 Thus, there is no prospect of dating the introduction of the gladius hispaneisis precisely 
without a marked improvement in the archaeological record for the late third century.  The 
terminus ante quem must be reckoned as the end of the third century, given Livy’s explicit 
reference to the swords in use in 200 and 187, and the recovery of two gladii from Grad near 
Šmihel, dated to the first half of the second century.51  It is worth noting, however, that the 
introduction of a specifically Spanish sword seems not to have occasioned any identifiable 
revolution in Roman tactics or organization.  Polybius’ description of Roman fighting against the 
Gauls in the 220s and Livy’s description of the Roman army in 340 suggest that the Romans’ 
fighting methods had emerged before the introduction of the Spanish sword.52  That the 
introduction of what became the quintessential Roman weapon should prove less than 
revolutionary seems at first surprising. However, its design was not a radical departure from the 
design of other Hellenistic or Iberian weapons, as will become clear in later chapters.  It thus 
seems plausible that the adoption of, at least, a Spanish-style sword might have been a gradual 
                                                 
49 Plb. 3.114.2-4. 
50 Plb. 6.23.6 
51 Livy 31.34; 38.21.13.  J. Horvat, “Roman Republican weapons from Šmihel in Slovenia,” JRMES 8 (1997), 105-
120; J. Horvat, “The Hoard of Roman Republican Weapons from Grad near Šmihel,” Arheološki Vestnik 53 (2002), 
117-192; D. Kmetič, J. Horvat, and F. Vodopivec, “Metallographic examinations of the Roman Republican weapons 
from the hoard from Grad near Šmihel,” Arheološki Vestnik 55 (2004): 291-312.  
52 Plb. 2.30.8; 2.33.1-9.  Livy 8.8.3-8. 
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process, well underway before the arrival of Hannibal and his mercenaries spurred its universal 
adoption. 
 After adoption, the gladius hispaniensis seems to have been used by all parts of the 
Roman army.  Polybius explicitly attests the weapon for all three lines of the heavy infantry 
(hastati, principes, triarii).53  He also notes the velites as carrying a sword, but does not note the 
type; however, Livy states that the velites too carried the gladius hispaniensis.54  Polybius’ notes 
on the equipment of the cavalry are less helpful, as he focuses on the contrast between the lighter 
“old” (τὸ δὲ παλαιὸν)  Roman cavalry and the Roman cavalry of his own day, which he regards 
as more akin to the Greek model; he makes no mention of swords here.55  Livy, however, 
explicitly mentions the gladius hispaniensis as the sword of the Roman cavalry in 200.56  Of the 
five common soldiers (four infantry, one cavalry) on the Altar of Domitius Ahenobarbus, four 
can be seen wearing a sword, including the cavalryman, while the remaining infantryman’s 
sword is obscured behind the shield of one of his fellows; the breastplate-wearing central figure, 
identified as Mars, does not wear a sword.57  The Pydna Monument, heavily damaged, is less 
helpful, because weapons and scabbards on the monument appear to have been represented by 
metal attachments which are now lost, with only the small holes for them remaining.58 
                                                 
53 Plb. 6.23. 
54 Plb. 6.22.1.  Livy 38.21.13. 
55 Plb. 6.25. 
56 Livy 31.34. 
57 Stilp (2001), 83, fig. 46-49. 
58 Taylor (2016), 559-576. 
 200 
 Finally, while my reconstruction will focus on the hispaniensis type, as it was both the 
archetypal Roman weapon of the period and by far the most common, there is strong evidence 
that individual soldiers still had significant latitude in weapon choices.  Other weapon types do 
show up in Republican contexts.  A sword from the Roman camps at Numantia identified by 
Schulten (cat. G1) as a gladius hispaniensis is probably more correctly identified as a Middle La 
Tène sword.59  Likewise excavation at Caminreal revealed both a falcata, a native Iberian sword 
type, and a Late La Tène sword from a Roman context.60  These weapon types will be dealt with 
in greater detail in subsequent chapters, but it is worth keeping in mind that Roman equipment in 
this period was never entirely uniform. 
 
Gladius Hispaniensis – Reconstruction 
 Over the past several decades, an increasing number of examples of Republican-period 
gladii have emerged, in various states of preservation, allowing for a much better understanding 
of the weapon and making reconstruction possible, if challenging.  My reconstruction, because it 
aims primarily to establish a range for the metal-weight of Roman swords, is most concerned 
with the metal elements of the gladius, namely the blade and the tang; the guard, grip and 
pommel of Roman swords were generally wooden (see Fig. 4.5).  The earliest of the current 
wave of discoveries and identifications was the 1987 identification of the Delos gladius (cat. 
                                                 
59 A. Schulten, Numantia: Die Ergebnisse Der Ausgrabungen 1905-1912.  Band IV. Die Lager bei Renieblas 
(Munich: F. Bruckmann A.-G., 1929), 209, Taf. 25.9.  On La Tène sword type chronology, see: J. M. Navarro, The 
finds from the Site of La Tène I: Scabbards and the Swords found in them (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1972), 
360-410; J.-L. Brunaux and B. Lambot, Armement et Guerre chez les Gaulois (Paris: Editions Errance, 1987), 120-
121; T. Lejars, La Tène: La Collection Schawb (Bienne, Suisse) (Lausanne: Cahiers d’archéologie romande, 2013), 
149-151. 
60 J.D. Vicente, M. P. Punter and B. Ezquerra, “La catapulta tardo-republicana y otro equipamiento militar de ‘La 
Caridad’ (Caminreal, Teruel),” JRMES 8 (1997), 167-199. 
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R1), dated to 69.61  It is 76cm long and is fairly complete, rusted into the remains of its 
scabbard.62  The remains of a charred wooden pommel adorned with rivets were still evident, and 
serve to connect the weapon-type to the sword depicted on Roman officers’ tombstones of the 
Republic.63 
The earliest-dated preserved examples are a pair of swords from Grad near Šmihel, 
Slovenia, as part of a larger hoard of weapons and tools discovered around 1890 but 
subsequently dispersed.  It has recently been more extensively published and analyzed by Jana 
Horvat, who dates it tentatively the first half of the second century.64  Of the four swords in the 
deposit, one has been lost in the intervening time, and a second appears to be of a sword of the 
Middle La Tène type, but the two remaining fit the pattern of the gladius Hispaniensis type.65  
The longer of them, which I term Šmihel-1 (cat. R10), has a blade-length of 66cm and a 
maximum width on the blade of 4.2cm; the tang is not fully preserved.  The shorter of the two, 
which I term Šmihel-2 (cat. R11), has a blade length of 62.2cm and a maximum width on the 
blade of 4.5cm; like its fellow, the tang is not fully preserved.  Notably, Šmihel-1 underwent 
metallographic testing, revealing a carbon content in the iron that ranged from 0.01% on the 
surface to 0.3% in the center of the blade.  Horvat suggests that this metal content, indicative of a 
                                                 
61 G. Siebert, “Quartier de Skardhana: la fouille,” BCH 112.2 (1987), 629-42. Bishop and Coulston (2006), 56; P. 
Connolly, “Pilum, Gladius and Pugio in the Late Republic,” JRMES 8 (1997), 49 and Feugère (1993) mark the 
Delos gladius as the first recognized gladius of the Hispaniensis type.  The rather precise date offered by Siebert is 
in connection to the pirate sack of the sanctuary in 69 B.C.E. 
62 Bishop and Coulston (2006), 56. Siebert, (1987), 637-8. 
63 Bishop and Coulston (2006), 56. 
64 Horvat (1997), 105-120.  Horvat (2002), 117-192. 
65 On the identification of the swords by type, note: Horvat (1997), 105-120; Connolly (1997), 49-57. 
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loss of carbon around the edges during forging, points to Šmihel-1 being an inferior product, 
especially compared to Roman swords of the Augustan period.66 
A number of other finds allow for the parameters of the weapon-type to be better 
established, although there is still significant individual variation between the examples.  A fairly 
complete example from Mouriès Bouches-du-Rhône (cat. R3), dated tentatively to c. 100 B.C.E. 
by Michel Feugère, has a blade length of 63.7cm and a 12.8cm long tang.67  Another example 
found in Berry-Bouy à Fontillet (cat. R4), dated by Feugère to the late first century has a blade 
length of 66.7cm, with an incomplete tang.  Another undatable sword (cat. R5) of the same type 
from Boyer has a blade length of 67.5cm; the tang is incomplete.68  Assuming a roughly 13cm 
tang, the latter two swords would have had a total length of 79.7cm and 80.5cm respectively.  
Another sword discovered in grave 119 at Guibiasco in the Ticino valley in the Swiss Alps (cat. 
R6) has a blade length of 68cm, a 13cm tang and a total length of 81cm.  It has been dated to the 
early Augustan period, although Connolly suggests an earlier date in the early first or even 
second century B.C.E. based on the Gallic artefacts present with the sword in the grave deposit.69  
A second sword from Guibiasco (cat. R7), from grave 471 has a blade length of 69cm, an 
unusually long example.70   
                                                 
66 Kmetič, Horvat, and Vodopivec, (2004): 291-312. 
67 M. Feugère, “L’équipement militaire d’époque républicaine en Gaule,” JRMES 5 (1994), 10-11. 
68 Feugère, (1994b), 15.  Connolly supposes the sword to date between 58 and 20 BCE, Connolly (1997), 49. 
69 M. Primas, “Grab 119 von Giubiasco und die Romanisiergung der Poebene” in Festschrift zum 50jähringen 
Bestehen des Institutes fur Ur- und Frühgeschichte der Leopold-Franzens-Universität Innsbruck (Bonn: In 
Komission bei R. Habelt, 1992), 473-83.  Connolly, (1997), 49-50.  Feugère (1994b), 15. 
70 Connolly (1997), 49. 
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Thickness and blade-shape also vary within a fairly narrow range.  Many examples are 
waisted, meaning that the blade curves inward at the center then broadens out again, but typically 
only slightly.71  This feature is present, but far less pronounced in the gladius than it is in the 
Roman dagger (pugio) or the Greek xiphos (see Figs. 4.5 and 4.6).  Both of the Šmihel examples 
above show signs of slight waisting, as does the Boyer sword and both Guibiasco swords; 
however, this design element is missing from the Mouriès, Berry-Bouy and Delos gladii.  A 
Caesarian sword from Osuna (cat. R8), broken into two parts, has been reconstructed by 
Connolly with a width along the blade of between 6 and 5cm and is a more strongly waisted 
example.72  Connolly also notes nine badly damaged gladii from Gracurris (Alfaro, La Rioja in 
Spain) dating to the Sertorian war which show a blade width around 5cm at the shoulders of the 
hilt and narrowing to around 4.5cm in the main part of the blade.73  Another sword from Es 
Soumâ, Algeria (cat. R9) dated to 118 shows a blade width of around 4.5cm, although the 
remains of this sword are broken into fragments and badly damaged.74  The three remaining 
fragments suggest a total length of at least 74cm. 
Based on the growing number of examples, it is possible to understand the genealogy of 
the gladius.  Connolly, assessing a range of swords, suggests a gradual development from a 
longer, pointed and relatively slim multipurpose cut-and-thrust sword, as in the Šmihel 
                                                 
71 This is often referred to as the blade being ‘leaf shaped;’ however here, as with spear-heads, I have opted to 
generally avoid the term ‘leaf-shaped’ as it can be unclear.  ‘Leaf-shaped’ swords, for instance, do not share a shape 
with ‘leaf-shaped’ spear-heads. 
72 Connolly (1997), 50. 
73 Connolly (1997), 50. 
74 G. Ulbert, “Das Schwert und die eisernen Wurfgeshoßspitzen aus dem Grab von Es Soumâa,” in Die Numider: 
Reiter und Könige nördlich der Sahara, eds. H. G. Horn and C. B. Rüger (Köln: Kunst und Altertum am Rhein, 
1979), 333-338.   The tomb is believed to be that of the Numidian king Micipsa, giving a fixed date for the 
deposition.  Also mentioned Connolly (1997), 50-51, who criticizes Ulbert’s reconstruction of the weapon, but 
accepts the dating. 
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examples, to a broader, and eventually shorter sword (Fig. 4.7).75  It, in turn, transitions into the 
early Imperial gladii types, which tend to be broader and shorter than the Republican examples, 
probably prioritizing thrusting attacks over cutting, although they maintain a great deal of the 
weapon’s versatility.76  Looking to the sword’s origins, Fernando Quesada Sanz argues that the 
gladius should be understood as a descendant of Iberian-made third and second century La Tène 
I swords that themselves represented a Gallic design taken over by local smiths in the Meseta 
(Fig. 4.8).77  
One recently discovered sword represents a significant outlier to the type and deserves 
some discussion.  This remarkably well preserved and unusually large example, dated to the late 
first century from Soknopaiou Nesos in El-Fayyum, Egypt (cat. R2), has a blade length of 77.3 
and a 17.2cm long tang.78  The blade is rather strongly waisted, with a width of 5.8cm at the 
shoulders, narrowing to 4.19cm at the waist and then broadening to 5.68cm before narrowing to 
the point.  The sword is both rather longer and wider than other examples of the type, which tend 
to have blade lengths between 60 and 70cm, and widths at the thickest point between 4 and 5cm.  
Unsurprisingly, given the oversized dimensions, the Soknopaiou Nesos sword is quite heavy at 
1.3kg, including a large decorated pommel.  The unusually large dimensions of the weapon led 
Paola Davoli and Christian Miks to resist classifying it as a gladius, preferring instead to classify 
it as a spathe; but this identification creates more problems than it solves.79  The terms spatha 
                                                 
75 Connolly, (1997), 53-6. 
76 Bishop and Coulston (2006), 78-80. 
77 Quesada Sanz, (1997a): 251-70. 
78 P. Davoli and C. Miks, “A new ‘Roman’ Sword from Soknopaiou Nesos (El-Fayyum, Egypt)” ISAW Papers 9 
(2015). 
79 Davoli and Miks, (2015). 
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and σπάθη were descriptions of a shape, rather specifically a weapon, and could be used for a flat 
wooden weaving instrument,80 a flat wooden stirring spatula,81 or the stem of a palm-frond.82 
Hence the traditional identification of the spatha with the archaeological type, distinguished by 
greater length, parallel edges (meaning that it is unwaisted) and a less pronounced point, reflects 
the meaning of the word.83  In short, the spatha, as a sword, was called such by the Romans 
because it was spatha-shaped, making the identification of a weapon, like the Soknopaiou 
gladius, with a different blade shape, as a spathe doubtful.  The spatha appears to have derived 
from later La Tène III swords (discussed in chapter 6), rather than from variations on earlier La 
Tène I swords, making the spatha and the gladius related, but still very distinct swords.  Given 
the characteristics of the Soknopaiou Nesos sword, with its strongly waisted blade and very 
pronounced stabbing point, it seems far better to classify it as an unusually large example of the 
Hispaniensis type, rather than as a descendant of the La Tène III swords.  As such, it fits into a 
study of the gladius Hispaniensis type. 
  
                                                 
80 Plato, Lysis 208d.  Aeschylus, Choephoroi 232.  Seneca Ep. 90.20. 
81 Columella, 12.42.3.  Pliny Nat. Hist. 34.11.26. 
82 Hdt. 7.69.  Pliny Nat. Hist. 16.26.48 
83 Bishop and Coulston (2006), 82. 
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It remains to estimate the metal content, measured in mass, that a ‘typical’ gladius would 
have.  Unfortunately, most of the swords of this type recovered, as noted, are damaged or badly 
corroded, often heavily so, making it difficult to determine their original weights.  For this 
purpose, I have reconstructed, the swords digitally in order to accurately estimate the iron 
required for creating one.  The two swords from Šmihel, a notably small example (Šmihel-2), the 
other a rather typically sized (Šmihel-1), were digitally reconstructed (Fig. 4.9 and 4.10) and 
analyzed using SolidWorks, producing a reconstructed mass of 680g for the larger Šmihel-1, and 
Table 4.1: Measurements for Republican Gladii 
 Catalogue 
Number 
Date Total Length Blade 
Length 
Tang Length Blade 
Width 
Šmihel-1 R10 Early 
second 
century 
83 
(reconstructed) 
66 14 
(reconstructed) 
4.2 
widest 
Šmihel-2 R11 Early 
second 
century 
78 
(reconstructed) 
62.2 14 
(reconstructed) 
4.5 
widest 
Es Soumâ 
(fragments) 
R9 118 Fragmentary, 
c. 75cm 
 
  4.5 
Mouriès R3 c. 100 76.5 63.7 12.8  
Delos R1 69 76 63.1 12.9 5.7 
Soknopaiou 
Nesos 
R2 Late first 
century 
94.5 77.3 17.2 5.8-
4.19 
Fontillet R4 c. 20 75.7 
(incomplete) 
c. 80 (est. 
original) 
66.7 9 (incomplete)  
Guibiasco 
119 
R6 Augustan? 81 68 13  
Guibiasco 
471 
R7 Augustan?  69 (incomplete)  
Boyer R5 Undateable 71.5 
(incomplete) 
c. 80 (est. 
original) 
67.5 4 (incomplete)  
 
 207 
530g for the smaller Šmihel-2.84  Although this analysis is focused on the metal weight, it is 
worth noting that the weight of the entire weapon would be higher once the non-metal elements 
of the grip, guard, and pommel were added, probably bringing Šmihel-1 to c. 800-900g and 
Šmihel-2 to c. 700g.  At the high end of weight, the Soknopaiou Nesos sword, the largest 
example of the Hispaniensis type, is one of the few well enough preserved for the weight to be 
reliable.  The sword was measured at 1.3kg with the large pommel and wrapping; without these, 
the blade would likely fall just under 1kg.  Thus, the minimum case reconstruction for metal-
weight can be set at 530g, and the maximum just under 1kg, with the median case suggesting a 
‘typical’ gladius around 680g. 
 
Javelins – Pilum, Hasta Velitaris 
The other offensive weapon for the bulk of the heavy infantry was the pilum, carried in 
pairs by the hastati and principes.  Polybius describes it at some length, presumably because this 
weapon would have been unfamiliar to a Greek audience.85  He notes that pila come in two 
varieties, heavy (παχεῖς) and light (λεπτοί), which, he notes, have the same length of wood haft, 
but differ in thickness.86  This distinction is borne out in the archaeological evidence, with the 
heavy pilum generally having a flat-haft or tang connecting it to the wooden haft, while the 
lighter pilum is typically socketed (fig. 4.11a and 4.11b).87  Although the pilum has often been 
treated as a secondary weapon, according to Alexander Zhmodikov, a closer reading of Roman 
                                                 
84 Thanks to Christopher Crapuchettes and WASK Engineering for the use of their software and expertise. 
85 Plb. 6.23.8-11. 
86 Plb. 6.23.9-10. 
87 Bishop and Coulston (2006), 52. 
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battle narratives suggests that battles often involved longer exchanges with missile weapons, in 
addition to the volley-and-charge assault method.88 
 Fortunately, the number of archaeologically preserved pila datable to the Republic is 
fairly substantial, likely due to their status as disposable weapons, with finds often numerous 
enough to be published as type-groupings rather than individual pieces.  Thus some 59 examples 
from Grad near Šmihel in Slovenia, likely from the first half of the second century, are broken by 
Jana Horvat into four groups: tanged pila with relatively short 22-30cm tips and two rivet holes 
(12 examples, cat. R12); tanged pila with mid-sized 33-40cm tips and single rivet holes (7 
examples, cat. R13); tanged pila with long 44-57cm tips and two rivet holes (10 examples, cat. 
R14); and socketed pila (of any length) with a single connecting rivet hole (47 examples, cat. 
R15), likely the lighter pila of Polybius.89  Although it is tempting to draw conclusions from the 
rough balance of 31 heavy and 47 light pila, it should be remembered that the Šmihel hoard was 
not kept intact after discovery in 1891.  Horvat notes that “it cannot be established how many 
weapons have been lost.”90 
 In addition, there have been a number of smaller finds from Italy and especially Spain 
which serve to further illustrate the various types and styles of pilum.  Some 19 pila, dated to the 
second century (cat. R16 and R17), of the same type as the relatively short Šmihel pila have been 
                                                 
88 Pilum as secondary weapon, volley-and-charge see: Sage (2008), 81-2; Roth (2009), 53; P. Connolly, (1981), 128.  
For extended missile exchanges, see, A. Zhmodikov, “Roman Republican Heavy Infantrymen in Battle (IV-II 
Centuries B.C.), Historia 49.1 (2000):  67-78. 
89 Horvat (1997): 105-120.  The lengths of the socketed pila were difficult to determine, as most of the points were 
broken off.  Most were between 30 and 38cm, but a single better-preserved example was over 74cm long. 
90 J. Horvat (1997), 106. 
 209 
found in Talamonaccio, south of Grosseto in Italy.91  All of the pila found there are flat-tanged 
with two rivet holes, where the tangs are fully preserved. Like the shorter Šmihel pila, most of 
the examples fit between 25-32cm long, although the longest, at 35.3cm total length, may be 
considered mid-sized.  The earliest Republican pila finds from Spain are those from the camps at 
Numantia: 37 pila-tips (all missing most of the shank and tang) and 35 more or less complete 
pila, a mix of tanged and socketed types.92  Schulten attempted to reconstruct one of the tanged 
types, resulting in a weight of some 2.25kg, almost certainly too heavy, but of the right general 
shape (see below).93  Another eight examples of Republican pila come from Caminreal, dated 
between the end of the second century to the first quarter of the first century.  Of these pila, there 
are four examples (two of which are incomplete) of the flat-tanged ‘heavy’ pilum (cat. R18), and 
four of the socketed ‘light’ pilum (cat. R19).94  The two complete ‘heavy’ pila were 95.1 to 
100.2cm in total length; Connolly groups these together with the Renieblas types.95  The lighter 
pila, which are in fairly good shape, have total lengths of 32.4, 32.9, 41.4 and 50.5cm; one 
preserves the space for the rivet that would have fixed it to the wooden component of the pilum.  
The Caminreal examples of the socketed pilum are mostly the same basic dimensions as the 
Šmihel examples (cat. R15), which mostly range from 30-38cm in length (although some are 
shorter).  
                                                 
91 Martin Luik, "Republikanische Pilumfunde vom 'Talamonaccio'/Italien" Archäologisches Korrespondenzblatt 30 
(2000): 269-277 
92 Schulten (1929), 205-6.  
93 Schulten (1929), 206; taf. 25c. 
94 Vicente et al (1997): 167-99.  
95 Connolly, (2000b), 43. 
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 Due to the relatively robust archaeological evidence, and Polybius’ uncommonly 
extensive description, reconstructions of the various types of pilum can be made with a fair 
degree of confidence.  Connolly has published 5 proposed pila reconstructions based on different 
archaeological types.96  His reconstructions cover four types of heavy pila: the short 
Talamonaccio tanged-type (which corresponds to Šmihel type 1, cat. R12, R16 and R17), the 
slightly longer tanged single-rivet Šmihel type 2 (cat. R13), the quite long tanged double-riveted 
Šmihel type 3 (cat. R14), and the largest type, based on the heavy Renieblas pila.  Connolly also 
reconstructs the light pila based on the longer socketed examples from Šmihel, although he 
assigns the shortest examples of the socketed type of pila to the hasta velitaris.  Connolly then 
field-tested all of the reconstructions except for the socketed type, in order to estimate their 
effective ranges.  The weights suggested by Connolly are included in table 4.2 below: 
Table 4.2: Reconstructed Roman pila 
 Mass - 
Iron 
Mass - 
Wood 
Total Mass Maximum 
Range 
Effective 
range (est.) 
Talamonaccio 
Type 
0.265kg 1.015kg 1.280kg 34m c. 25m 
Smihel type 2 0.340kg 1.040kg 1.380kg (est. c. 34m) c. 25m 
Smihel type 3 0.250kg 0.960kg 1.110kg (est. c. 35m) c. 25m 
Renieblas type 0.660kg 1.050kg 1.710kg 33.7m c. 25m 
Socketed pilum 0.325kg 0.620kg 0.955kg Not tested <30m 
Hasta velitaris 0.090kg 0.140kg 0.230kg 54.5m c. 40m 
 
 
 Connolly’s reconstruction reflects the relatively wide range of sizes and lengths for 
various kinds of pila. It should be stressed that, compared to other military equipment in the 
Roman arsenal, the variety of pila is quite wide.  Polybius’ note that there were generally two 
types of pila has often been taken to mean that each soldier would have carried one of each type, 
                                                 
96 Connolly, (2000b): 43-46. 
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which is a reasonable suggestion, although Polybius only notes that there are two sorts and 
mentions differences in their design, not the context of their uses.97  However, since most of the 
difference in weight between the lighter socketed pilum and the heavier tanged types comes from 
the wooden elements, nearly any possible combination, excluding the uncommonly heavy 
Renieblas type, would be likely to lie within a fairly limited range for metal-weight.  At the low-
end, a soldier carrying, for instance, a Šmihel type-3 and a socketed pilum would require 575g of 
worked iron and carry a total mass (including the wooden haft) of 2.065kg; this may serve as a 
minimum case.  Perhaps more typically, a soldier carrying a Smihel type-2 and a socketed pilum 
would require some 665g of worked iron, and carry a total mass of 2.335kg; this may serve as a 
reasonable median estimate for a ‘typical’ soldier.  At the top end, combining the very heavy 
Renieblas type with a socketed pilum would require 985g of worked iron and have a total mass 
of 2.665kg; this may serve as an effective maximum case.  It seems unlikely that soldiers would 
have commonly carried the very heavy Renieblas type in pairs, as this would mean carrying 
some 3.42kg in pila. 
 Beyond the simple metal-weight of the weapons, the apparent disposability of the pilum, 
both noted in the sources and expressed by the archaeological record, is worth noting.  Although 
Plutarch’s statement that pila at the time of Marius were fitted with a wooden rivet in order to 
intentionally break is generally considered a misunderstanding, the tendency of pila to bend on 
impact is well-attested both in literary and archaeological sources.98  The bending action does not 
appear to have been the primary goal of the design, but rather was a consequence of the long 
                                                 
97 Assumption that each infantryman carried a pilum of each type, e.g. Keppie (1984), 35.  Plb. 6.23.8 notes only 
that there are type types, one heavy and one light, “τῶν δ᾽ ὑσσῶν εἰσιν οἱ μὲν παχεῖς, οἱ δὲ λεπτοί.” 
98 Plut. Marius 25.  Plb. 6.22.4.  Pila bending in combat: Caesar De Bello Gallico 1.25.1-4. 
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shank, designed itself to penetrate a target behind a shield.  The pilum would impact the shield, 
and the point would be driven through by the weight of the heavy wooden haft, with the long 
shank permitting the point to travel the distance to the target behind the shield.99  This 
penetrative function has been successfully reproduced in field experiments, particularly when 
used with a bodkin head (fig. 4.12).100  Of course, bent pila could be repaired by being 
hammered back into shape by a smith, although this would have required the expenditure of 
labor and, if the metal was to be hammered hot, fuel; many pila are found bent, possibly 
discarded rather than being repaired.  The quantity of pila finds from the Middle and Late 
Republic, especially compared to the relative scarcity of other weapons, also serves to 
demonstrate the expendability of the weapon: some 76 examples from Šmihel, nearly 19 from 
Talamonaccio, 37 from the camps at Renieblas, and another 8 from Caminreal.101 
 The apparent disposability of the pilum is remarkable.  A pair of pila, as noted above, 
contain almost as much worked iron as a gladius.  A gladius, however, was hardly expendable, a 
point demonstrated perhaps most vividly in the famous vignette of M. Porcius Cato Licinianus, 
son of the Censor, struggling to recover his sword, lost in the confusion at Pydna.102  Part of the 
difference must have been the symbolism of the weapon; the pilum was meant to be thrown 
away, after all, but the loss of a sword might suggest some dereliction on the part of the soldier, 
something Cato clearly feared.  Moreover, the amount of labor required to craft the weapons was 
very different; David Sim’s experiments suggest a production time for the pilum of around 10 
                                                 
99 Bishop and Coulston (2006), 50-52. 
100 Junkelman, (1986), 186-9.  P. Connolly, (2000b). 
101 Schulten, (1929), 205.  Vicente et al. (1997): 167-199.  For a general review of finds, see Connolly (1997). 
102 Plut. Aem. 21.1-5.  Cato the Elder, 20.7.  Lendon, (2005), 208.   
 213 
hours, whereas for a gladius, it took 33.3 hours.103  Nevertheless, a disposable weapon with so 
much worked iron and such a long production time is a remarkable statement about both the 
resources expended in Roman warfare and the willingness of the Romans to devote so much to 
amassing sufficient weapons for that style of warfare. 
 
Hasta 
 The thrusting spear, the hasta, has received comparably less study, at least for the 
Republic.104  As Polybius notes, the hasta, which Polybius terms δόρυ, was the weapon of the 
triarii.105  Bishop and Coulston write that “the spearheads of the period are unremarkable and it 
is impossible to distinguish Roman from allied or enemy weapons,” and that the basic types of 
Roman spearhead shapes continue into the imperial period.106  This is true in the main, but there 
are some important reservations to note before moving onto a reconstruction of the hasta of the 
Republic. 
 Although a typological system for Roman spear-head shapes has been advanced by  
William Manning for the imperial period, this typology fits the available Republican period 
evidence imperfectly.107   Manning, rejecting earlier efforts to type spear-heads by the quality of 
construction, instead identifies four main size-groupings based on the length of the spear-blade 
                                                 
103 Sim (2012), 44.  The exact times recorded were 600 minutes for the pilum and 2,048 minutes for the gladius, but 
production times would have varied considerably. 
104 Feugère (1993), for instance, has no section on the infantry spear in the Republic.   
105 Plb. 6.23.16. 
106 Bishop and Coulston (2006), 53.  Note also M. C. Bishop, “The evolution of certain features” in Roman Military 
Equipment: The Accoutrements of War.  Proceedings of the Third Roman Military Equipment Research Seminar, ed. 
M. Dawson, (Oxford: BAR International Series, 1987), 109-39. 
107 W. H. Manning, Catalogue of the Romano-British Iron Tools, Fittings and Weapons in the British Museum 
(London: British Museum Publications Limited, 1985), 160-168. 
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(excluding the socket) from the spear-heads, dated to the first century CE, excavated from the 
Roman fortifications on Hod Hill in Dorset, England.  Manning distinguishes between both the 
length of the spear-heads and also their shape, dividing them into tear-drop or ‘leaf’ shaped 
spear-heads (see figure 4.13 for example) and square stiletto or ‘bodkin’ point spearheads (see 
fig. 4.16 for an example).108 Group I in Manning’s typology comprises spearheads with blades 
between 4.5 and 6.5cm (total lengths c.7-12.2cm) and typically has teardrop-shaped blades; 
Group II blades range between 8-10cm (total lengths c.12-16cm) and have teardrop-shaped 
blades; Group III blades range between 13 and 15cm (total lengths c. 17-22cm), and have long 
bodkin-point cross-sections; Group IV blades range between 17 and 25cm (total length c.14-
34.9cm) in length and tend to have teardrop-shaped blades.  Republican spearheads appear to be 
substantially larger on average; apart from one incomplete example, the spear-heads from 
Caminreal published by Jaime Vicenti et al. range from 14.6 to 44cm in total length.109  Spear-
heads recovered from Numantia generally conform to this size, ranging between c. 15-30cm in 
total length.110  As a result, nearly all of the Republican spears reviewed here would fall into 
Manning’s Group II-IV.  Thus, while Republican spear-types do, in fact, continue into the 
Empire, some of the smaller imperial types do not appear to be heavily represented in the 
Republic. 
                                                 
108 Manning uses the terms leaf-shaped and stiletto point; here I have opted instead to use teardrop-shaped (as it is 
less ambiguous) and bodkin point rather than stiletto (as many stilettos had a rounded, rather than squared cross-
section). 
109 Vicenti et al (1997). 
110 Schulten (1929).  See esp. taf. 25d, 26 and 32.  Numantia spearheads as measured from scale drawings, Schulten 
provides no measurements.  Cf. also the significant variation in imperial spearpoints, Bishop and Coulston (2006), 
77, fig. 38, compared to Republican spear-points, Bishop and Coulston (2006), 54, fig. 24. 
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Instead, given the greater diversity of types and sizes in the Republic, a broader typology 
of Republican spearheads based on blade-shape, with particular reference to cross-section, makes 
more sense and suggests three major types.  Type A (examples Fig. 4.13) consists of a teardrop-
shaped blade with a strong central ridge, mounted on a circular socket, typically with a concave 
section when viewed from above.  This type is very common in other cultures, forming the 
majority of Gallic examples, as well as the Macedonian sarisa-point (e.g. cat. H7-H12), and the 
Greek dory (e.g. cat. H13, H14 and H15).  This type does not dominate to the same degree in 
Roman sites, but is still very common, with a number of examples from Numantia (cat. R28, 
R29, R30, R33) and Cáceres el Viejo (cat. R40).  Although no weights were published for the 
examples from Numantia and Cáceres, weighed spear tips of the same size and type from Gallic 
contexts tend to mass between 100-300g, with most examples falling between 150g and 250g.   
 Type B consists of teardrop-shaped blades, but without a strong center mid-ridge, instead 
with either a lenticular (or biconvex) cross-section, or a rhombic (or diamond shaped) cross-
section (Fig. 4.14).  The lenticular cross-section does appear in Gallic contexts (cat. G30, G31, 
G34, G35), but it seems to be a minority type there and examples of it, often quite small, are 
sometimes identified as javelin heads.111  Variation in Roman examples within this type is 
relatively wide, as the cross-sections of the spear-tips range from relatively thicker lenticular 
sections in some cases to other spear-tips that are nearly flat.  On the thicker end of the spectrum, 
a number of examples from Caminreal have lenticular cross-sections, but are rather larger than 
Gallic examples, with the specimens of this type from Caminreal ranging from 16.2 to 31.6cm in 
length.112  Four of these examples (cat. R20-R23) have been digitally reconstructed (see table 4.3 
                                                 
111 Identification as Javelins, see Lejars, (2013), 162-3.   
112 Vicente, (1997), 167-99. 
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and fig. 4.15), with masses of 225g, 337g, 292g and 237g respectively, the greater weight 
resulting from the thicker cross-section of the blade.  Four examples from Es Soumâa (cat. R41-
R44) found in what is believed to be the tomb of Micipsa along with Roman style mail armor 
and a gladius, show a thinner rhombic cross-section: the two most complete examples (cat. R41 
and R42) mass 77g and 73g, while two more damaged specimens (cat. R43 and R44), mass 68g 
and 66g.113  Günter Ulbert interprets these spear tips as throwing weapons (Wurfgeshoßspitzen), 
but it seems more likely, given the general similarity of blade-shape, that they are thrusting 
spears, as the wide leaf-shaped blades are not typical of javelins and would have limited 
effectiveness as a thrown weapon.  Other examples of this type with relatively thin cross-sections 
include three spear-tips from Cáceres el Viejo (cat. R37-R39).114  Of the three, the most complete 
(cat. R92) has a lenticular cross-section like the Caminreal examples, while the remaining two 
(cat. R37 and R38) seem to have very flat cross-sections, but are badly damaged. 
 Finally, Type C comprises a set of long, stiletto or ‘bodkin’ spear-tips, typically with 
square or narrow rhombic blade 
cross-sections, which resemble a 
long spike and are generally not 
much wider than their sockets.  
These correspond to Manning’s 
Group III type for the imperial period.  The type occurs in Republican contexts both at Numantia 
(cat. R26, R32, R35, R36), at Caminreal (cat. R24), and Es Soumâa (cat. R45 and R46, Fig. 
                                                 
113 Ulbert (1979), 333-338. 
114 G. Ulbert, Caceres el Viejo: Ein spätrepublikanisches Legionslager in Spanisch-Extremadura (Mainz am Rhein: 
Verlag Philipp von Zabern, 1985), 105, 224-5, taf. 24. 
 
Table 4.3: Digitally Reconstructed Spear Points from 
Caminreal 
Cat. Type Total 
Length: 
Blade 
Length: 
Max 
Width: 
Reconstructed 
Mass: 
R20 B 21.6cm 11.5cm 3.6cm c. 225g 
R23 B 19.5cm 11.6cm 3.5cm c.237g 
R22 B 27.4cm 18.3cm 4.1cm c. 292g 
R24 C 44cm 34.5cm 2.6cm c. 318g 
R21 B 31.6cm 20.4cm 4cm c. 337g 
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4.16).  The examples from Numantia and Es Soumâa fit together in a range from 17.4cm to 
28.4cm, with the Es Soumâa examples being the smallest.  The example from Caminreal is very 
much an outlier with a length of 44cm.  Manning speculates of this type during the imperial 
period that they are “ideally suited” to serve as cavalry lances; however, a long and narrow 
pointed weapon might be equally as effective on foot.115  The shape recalls bodkin point arrow-
heads, which seem to have been designed to defeat mail armor; it seems plausible to suggest then 
that this type had a similar purpose.  Some Gallic points seem to show experimentation towards 
this same goal by extending the square-cross-sectioned mid-ridge out beyond the leaf of the 
spear-blade.  The two Es Soumâa examples both have attested weights of 66g, while the largest 
example from Caminreal has been digitally reconstructed at a mass of 318.5g (see table 4.3). 
The other metal element of the spear is the metal-reinforced butt or ferrule.  Republican 
spear ferrules consist of a simple conical metal socket, with finds from Numantia,116 Caceres,117 
and Caminreal; another 10 are reported from Grad near Šmihel.118  This socketed type also 
occurs in Gallic contexts (e.g. cat. G86), but seems to be less common than a second Gallic 
ferrule-type driven into the base of the spear like a nail, which does not seem to appear in Roman 
contexts.  Two Roman ferrules from Caminreal (cat. R47 and R48) were also digitally 
reconstructed, yielding a mass of 81.4g and 69.5g respectively.  Two ferrules from Es Soumâa 
(cat. R49-R50) are rather lighter at 47g and 58g respectively, due mostly to a much narrower 
                                                 
115 Manning (1985), 166.  Indeed, the use of such points on horseback may have posed challenges in recovering the 
spear after a strike. 
116 Schulten (1929), taf. 21.22, 21.24-26, 21.28-31; taf. 26.7-10; taf 32.20-23; 45.23-25.  
117 Ulbert, (1985), 105, 226-7, taf. 25. 
 
118 Horvat (1997), 108.  10 spear butts are reported, but not discussed or pictured. 
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cross-section.  The Gallic example (cat. G86), somewhat shorter than the Roman examples, has a 
published mass of 72g. 
 Because of the wide range in styles and sizes of spear-points, reconstruction of the metal-
weight of the hasta is an exercise more in establishing a normal range than in pinpointing exact 
weights.  The lightest spears by far are the examples from Es Soumâa, which feature unusually 
narrow hafts and relatively light tips and butts.  This may be a consequence of the Numidian 
find-context, although the other weapons in the deposit were of identifiably Roman, rather than 
Numidian, types.  The Es Soumâa tips suggest a lower bound to the reconstruction of c. 130g, 
assuming roughly 80g for the tip and 50g for the ferrule.  At the heavy end, the heaviest 
examples of spear-tips are the very long stiletto point (cat. R24) and the thick leaf-shaped point 
(cat. R21) from Caminreal, both just above 300g, putting them in the same range as the heaviest 
Gallic leaf-shaped mid-ridge types.  Assuming a relatively heavy ferrule of c. 80g, in order to 
balance the weight of the tip, we might suggest a maximum metal weight for the hasta of around 
420g.  More typically, it seems the bulk of Roman spear-points would fall between 150 and 
300g; accounting for a ferrule, 300g is perhaps a reasonable median case for the reconstruction 
of the hasta.  This must be presented as a more tentative estimate, given the wide variety of sizes 
and shapes of spear-point.  A more secure estimate would require measured weights for a 
relatively larger and more diverse sample of spear-heads than is currently available.  A more 
thorough and extensive typological study of spear-tips from the Roman Republic is clearly called 
for, but such an effort is beyond the scope of this work. 
 
Scutum 
 The scutum, the characteristic shield of the Roman heavy infantry, was a large and quite 
heavy horizontal-center-grip body-shield, with a central boss (umbo) made of iron.  Livy assigns 
 219 
the scutum in the Servian constitution to the second and third classes (the first class was to use a 
hoplite shield) and notes its full-scale adoption by all of the heavy infantry only in the fourth 
century; however, as noted above, the reliability of this account is doubtful.119  Representational 
evidence seems to confirm that the scutum first emerged in Italy in the eighth century.120  The 
shield spread from Italy into Gaul in the sixth century and into the East in the second, acquiring 
both chronological and regional variations.121  This chapter is concerned with the Roman scutum, 
but subsequent chapters will discuss those regional variants. 
 Polybius describes the construction of the Roman scutum in an unusual amount of detail, 
presumably because it was still relatively unfamiliar to his audience: 
The Roman panoply consists first of a shield (θυρεός), the curved surface of 
which measures two and a half feet wide (0.74m) and four feet long (1.18m), the 
thickness at the rim being a palm’s breadth (c. 10cm).  It consists of two layers of 
wood glued together with bull’s hide glue; the outer surface is covered first with 
canvas and then with calf-skin.  The upper and lower rims are bound with iron in 
order to resist the downward cuts of swords and wear when resting on the ground.  
In the center is fitted an iron shell (κόγχος), which turns aside the heavy impact of 
stones, sarisae (σαρισῶν) and heavy missiles in general.122 
                                                 
119 Livy 1.43, 8.8 
120 M Eichberg, Scutum: Die Entwicklung einer italisch-etruskischen Schildform von den Anfängen bis zur Zeit 
Caesars (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 1987), 171-175.  Feugère (1993), 76-77. 
121 Feugère (1993), 76-77.  On chronological and regional variations, see P. F. Stary, “Urspung und Ausbreitung der 
eisenzeitlichen Ovalschilde mit spindelfor̈migem Schildbuckel” Germania 59 (1981a): 286-307. 
122 Plb. 6.23.2-5. ἔστι δ᾽ ἡ Ῥωμαϊκὴ πανοπλία πρῶτον μὲν θυρεός — οὗ τὸ μὲν πλάτος ἐστὶ τῆς κυρτῆς ἐπιφανείας 
πένθ᾽ ἡμιποδίων, τὸ δὲ μῆκος ποδῶν τεττάρων, τὸ δ᾽ ἐπ᾽ ἴτυος πάχος ἔτι καὶ παλαιστιαῖον — ἐκ διπλοῦ 
σανιδώματος ταυροκόλλῃ πεπηγώς, ὀθονίῳ, μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα μοσχείῳ δέρματι περιείληται τὴν ἐκτὸς ἐπιφάνειαν. ἔχει 
δὲ περὶ τὴν ἴτυν ἐκ τῶν ἄνωθεν καὶ κάτωθεν μερῶν σιδηροῦν σιάλωμα, δι᾽ οὗ τάς τε καταφορὰς τῶν μαχαιρῶν 
ἀσφαλίζεται καὶ τὰς πρὸς τὴν γῆν ἐξερείσεις. προσήρμοσται δ᾽ αὐτῷ καὶ σιδηρᾶ κόγχος, ἣ τὰς ὁλοσχερεῖς 
ἀποστέγει πληγὰς λίθων καὶ σαρισῶν καὶ καθόλου βιαίων βελῶν.  Measurements follow Bishop and Coulston, 61.   
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A shield found at Kasr al-Harit, in the Fayyum in Egypt provides a partial parallel for this 
description (fig. 4.17).123  It is 1.28m long and 0.635m wide, featuring a large central spina like 
the shields depicted on the Altar of Domitius Ahenobarbus.  The shield notably lacks any of the 
metal reinforcements, such as the boss or reinforced rims described by Polybius, and instead has 
a wooden ‘barleycorn’ boss that covers the handgrip.  The informative value of the Kasr al-Harit 
shield, however, is somewhat diminished by the lack of a secure find context, making it 
impossible to securely associate the shield with Roman, Hellenistic, or even auxiliary use.  The 
basic scutum design, with local modifications, was adopted in the East as the thureos and it 
appears frequently in Ptolemaic artwork.124   
 The best piece of representational evidence for the shield of the second century is the 
Paris Relief on the Altar of Domitius Ahenobarbus, which shows three such shields head on, 
with a fourth viewed in profile.  It has been asserted that the shields on the Altar show no 
evidence of central bosses, thus matching the Kasr al-Harit shield; however, this is likely due to 
wear.125  Close inspection of the two best preserved shields on the monument do show raised 
detailing above and below the core of the spina consistent with a boss (fig. 4.18).  It seems likely 
that only the detailing sheltered by the raised ridge of the spina escaped being worn down.  The 
third shield is split by a break in the statue-base which makes it impossible to tell if the shield 
                                                 
123 W. Kimmig, “Ein Keltenschild aus Ägypten” Germania 24 (1940): 106-111.  The Kasr al-harit shield has been 
discussed in a variety of places.  Note especially, Bishop and Coulston (2006), 61-62.  Feugère (1993), 77-78.  
Eichberg (1987), 43-47, 157-9. 
124 N Sekunda, Seleucid and Ptolemaic Reformed Armies 168-145 BC, 2 vols. (Stockport: Montvert Publications, 
1994/1995).   N. Sekunda Hellenistic Infantry Reform in the 160’s BC (Lodz: Oficyna Naukowa MS, 2001a).  The 
Hellenistic thureos is classified by Eichberg as a Type D scutum, Eichberg (1987), 164-166. 
125 Assertion of shields without umbones, D’Amato (2009), 25.  Cf. Stilp (2001), 79, who does detect umbones on 
the shields. 
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originally had an umbo.  Wear makes it difficult to tell if any of the shields originally had an iron 
rim, although the shield of the second infantryman from the right seems to preserve some trace 
of the shield of a rim of some sort on the lower left-hand (from the soldier’s perspective) side 
(fig. 4.18).   
Other representational evidence is of mixed value.  The Osuna relief shows two soldiers 
carrying trapezoidal shields with clear rims and bosses.  There is no knowing if this shape is 
meant to represent some of the more angular and less curved Gallic and Iberian shield designs, or 
if it was merely an artistic choice to ensure that the shields fit the space for the relief.126  The 
Aemilius Paullus monument also serves to illustrate the type, although damage makes it difficult 
to discern fine details.  Taylor identifies several scuta, one held by infantryman (13) in Taylor’s 
numbering, another by infantryman (20), and the back of scuta on infantrymen (6), (7), (24) and 
(27).127  Damage to the monument means that, while the central ridge of the spina and the 
general oval shape of the shield are clearly visible, finer details, like the presence or absence of 
iron umbones, seem to have been lost. 
Archaeological examples of the iron bosses of Roman shields in this period seem to come 
in two main types, round ‘spindle-shaped’ shaped bosses and more angular ‘butterfly’ bosses 
(fig. 4.19).  Both types also appear in Gallic contexts.128  The former type completely encloses 
the central bulge of the spina in iron, with only a relatively narrow band of metal running around 
the edges of the boss for attachment onto the shield.  Ronald Bockius has documented this type, 
                                                 
126 D’Amato (2009), 18, fig. 8a. 
127 Taylor (2016), 562-568. 
128 Brunaux and Lambot, (1987), 130-1.  
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including a fragment of one example from Numantia.129 The second type of boss, sometimes 
referred to as a butterfly boss, serves as a central band of iron running horizontally over the 
center bulge in the spina, with wider flanges or wings on either side of the spina serving as the 
attachment points.  Two fairly well-preserved butterfly bosses (cat. R52 and R53), dating to the 
late second or early first century, were recovered from Caminreal and provide a good example of 
the type.130    Using digital reconstruction, as with the Šmihel gladii above, I have estimated the 
mass of the two bosses at c. 280g and c. 265g respectively (fig. 4.20).  Some Gallic examples of 
this type (e.g. cat. G101-G106) could be lighter, with complete examples around c. 200g, 
although two examples in the British Museum (cat. G99 and G100) are actually heavier, at 298g 
and 335g respectively.  The evolution of types observed in Gaul suggests that the more rounded 
completely enclosed barleycorn type is in fact a development from the earlier butterfly type.131 
 The other metal elements of the shield are the metal rims described by Polybius, and a 
metal bar reinforcing the handgrip.  Because these elements would have consisted of relatively 
thin metal plates and rivets, they are difficult to identify, especially as fragments, and no 
confirmed examples from the period have yet come to light.132  Examples from the early imperial 
period offer more insight.133  Shield rims from the imperial period have been noted from 
Aislingen, Spettisbury, Carnuntum and Vindonissa; the rims could be both plain edging strips or 
                                                 
129 R. Bockius, “Ein Römisches Scutum Aus Urmitz, Kreis Mayen-Koblenz: Zu Herkunft und Verbreitung 
Spindelförmiger Schildbuckelbeschläge im Gebiet Nördlich der Alpen” Archäeologisches Korrespondenzblatt 19 
(1989): 269-282.  Eichberg also notes this type, Eichberg (1987), 47-49. 
130 Vicenti et al. (1997), 195-6. 
131 Brunaux and Lambot (1987), 130.  Feugère likewise associates the round umbo, distinct from the ‘winged’ type, 
with the imperial period, Feugère (1993), 87. 
132 Manning notes this difficulty, Manning (1985), 147. 
133 Bishop and Coulston (2006), 92.  Sim and Kaminski (2012), 148.   
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have semi-circular tabs for attachment.  In either case, they were attached by being bent over the 
rim and then nailed into place (fig. 4.21).134  Two broken off examples (cat. R54, R55), both in 
copper-alloy, in the National Museum of Wales suggest a width for the metal strip of c. 2cm, and 
a thickness of c. 0.5mm.135  To cover the entire top or bottom rim of a shield, as Polybius 
suggests, such a rim would need to be c. 80cm long, suggesting a total weight for a single 
reinforcing rim of c.60g.136 
 The potential for variation is greater for the handgrip, as the evidence for handgrip 
reinforcements for the Middle Republic is very limited.  Handgrips on imperial period shields 
often include d-sectioned metal bars of significant size and thickness (fig. 4.22).137  The 
handlebars of the imperial period are often quite long as well, running from 60-80cm, in contrast 
to the much smaller handles that appear on the Aemilius Paullus monument.  These seem cover 
the gap in the main shield structure in turn covered by the umbo, although the damage and wear 
to the monument make it impossible to be certain.138  Examples of the imperial period type from 
the National Museum of Wales (cat. R56 and R57) are 16 and 15mm wide, with thicknesses c. 6 
and 8mm respectively; the examples are both broken off with preserved lengths of 120 and 
220mm.139  At a length of c. 70cm, such a handlebar, with a D-shaped or half-cylinder cross-
                                                 
134 Bishop and Coulston (2006), 92, 137.  Sim and Kaminski (2012), 148. 
135 Evan Chapman, A Catalogue of Roman Military Equipment in the National Museum of Wales (Oxford: 
Archaeopress, 2005), 105-6. 
136 Assuming a rim 80cm long, 2cm wide, 0.5mm thick, in iron with no tabs.  Tabs and nails might add significant 
weight. 
137 Bishop and Coulston (2006), 92-3, 137-8.  Manning (1985), 147.  Chapman (2005), 105.  For a reconstruction of 
the reinforcement system based on the Dura-Europus shield, see Connolly (1981), 231. 
138 Note especially Taylor (2016), 562, figure (6).  On the length of imperial handlebars, note Manning (1985), 147. 
139 Chapman (2005), 105. 
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section, might mass c. 80g in iron.  However, the shields of the early imperial period largely lack 
the vertical wooden reinforcing central ridge, the spina, of the Republican period shields, and it 
seems possible that the larger and more robust horizontal handlebar served as a compensating 
structural reinforcement.140  If this were the case, we should not expect the more robust imperial-
style handlebars to be typical during the Republic. 
Another alternative is the relatively lighter and smaller handlebar-strips used in Gallic 
shields (cat. G107-G113), which consist of a thin metal plate 1-3mm thick, 12.5 – 16.3cm long 
and c. 1cm wide with small wings for the rivets on each end.141  These far lighter reinforcements 
range from 6.3 to 24.5g in weight, and seem to be exclusively made in iron. Three metal strips 
(cat. R58, R59 and R60) found at Numantia and classified as iron fittings of unknown purpose 
are of the right rough size and shape to be this sort of hand-grip, but such an identification is 
highly uncertain at best.   The handle reinforcement and boss in Gallic shields were often joined 
elements, with rivets passing through the boss and handle, binding the two together.  A fragment 
of a butterfly boss with the handle still attached in this way from the Nouveau Musée Bienne 
illustrates the design (Fig. 4.23), with a single rivet passing through the ‘wing’ of the boss (the 
rest of the boss is lost) to connect to the handle.142    The design connection, then, between the 
‘butterfly’ boss and the Gallic style handle would tend to argue against the use of long 
reinforcing bars in the Republic.    Without a robust sample of surviving Republican handlebars, 
it is impossible to be sure which forms were used or were most common.  However, it seems 
likely, given the depictions of the scutum from behind on the Altar of Domitius Ahenobarbus and 
                                                 
140 Connolly (1981), 231-3.  Junkelmann (1986), 175-6. 
141 Lejars (2013), 170. 
142 Lejars (2013), 170. 
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the Aemilius Paullus Monument, that the handles of this period were typically of the shorter, 
Gallic variety, paired with the typical Gallic-style ‘butterfly’ boss. 
 To reconstruct the metal-weight of the shield, then, requires combining the metal 
elements.  A relatively light, Gallic style handle, a butterfly boss and rims on the upper and lower 
edges of the shield suggest a median case around 420g of metal.143  A minimum case, assuming a 
boss along the lines of some of the lighter Gallic examples, might suggest a minimum around c. 
335g.  An upper-case, assuming the heavier imperial-style reinforced handle might suggest a 
maximum of c. 500g metal weight.144 
 
 
Parma – Cavalry and Light Infantry Shields 
 In Livy’s usage, the shield carried by both the cavalry and the velites was called 
parma.145  Notably, for the shield of the cavalry, he does not use clupeus, the Latin term 
corresponding to the Greek aspis and denoting the hoplite’s traditional double-strap-gripped 
round shield, although he does use clupeus when he means specifically to imply a hoplite 
shield.146  However, the description offered by Polybius implies that he saw these shields as 
clearly distinct; for the shield of the velites, he gives a transliteration of the Latin parma (πάρμη), 
whereas the shield of the cavalry he calls thureos, connecting the cavalry shield more closely 
                                                 
143 Assuming 280g of iron for the boss, 60g each for the rims, and c. 20g for the handle. 
144 Minimum case: 120g iron rim as before, c. 14g for the handle (e.g. cat. G108), c. 200g for the boss (e.g. cat. 
G102 or G103).  Maximum case: 120g iron rim, c. 500g for the handle with reinforcing bar, c. 300g for the boss 
(e.g. cat. G99, G100). 
145 Of the cavalry: Livy 2.6.9, 2.20.10.  Of the velites Liv 31.35.6. 38.21.12. 
146 Of a Carthaginian shield, Livy 25.39.13.  Of early Roman hoplite-armed soldiers, Livy 1.43.2. 
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with the shield of the heavy infantry, which he also calls thureos.147  The evidence for both 
shields during the Republic is probably too limited to allow for a confident reconstruction, but 
some basic design considerations may be noted. 
 The Roman cavalry shield was probably a center-grip round or oval shield with a metal 
central boss, more like the scutum than the Greek aspis (Latin, clupeus).  Polybius describes the 
older Roman cavalry shield as shaped like a round boss cake (τοῖς ὀμφαλωτοῖς ποπάνοις), but he 
then notes that this shield, made of ox-hide, was not very useful and at some point was 
replaced.148  Polybius’ comment about the adoption of Greek-style cavalry spears has often been 
taken to mean that he intends the reader to understand that the Romans have adopted Greek style 
shields as well, but he does not actually say this.  Instead he notes, “So too (ὁ δ᾽ αὐτὸς λόγος) 
concerning the thureos (περὶ τῶν θυρεῶν), for being solid and firm are of use both defending and 
attacking.”149  As noted, thureos is the term Polybius uses for the Roman infantry shield, without 
any direct connection between it and Greek shields, unlike in his previous statement about 
spears.  The ὁ δ᾽ αὐτὸς λόγος could refer to the adoption of Greek fashioned weapons, but also to 
the adoption merely of stouter and more durable weapons in general. 
 In practice, the evidence argues strongly against the full-scale adoption of Greek-style 
cavalry shields.  There is some representational evidence of the Greek double-strap-gripped aspis 
in use by Roman cavalry, although it is important to be on guard against overly Hellenized 
depictions of Roman soldiers, especially in Greek contexts.150  The Roman cavalryman on the 
                                                 
147 Plb. 6.21.1, 6.25.6. 
148 Plb. 6.25.7. 
149 Plb. 6.25.10.  ὁ δ᾽ αὐτὸς λόγος καὶ περὶ τῶν θυρεῶν: καὶ γὰρ πρὸς τὰς ἐπιβολὰς καὶ πρὸς τὰς ἐπιθέσεις ἑστηκυῖαν 
καὶ τεταγμένην ἔχουσι τὴν χρείαν. 
150 D’Amato (2009), 49. 
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Lacus Curtius relief, however, appears to carry a fairly small round, center-grip shield with a 
circular boss (fig. 4.24).151  Most importantly, Roman cavalry shields from the Empire, far better 
attested than for the Republic, were consistently center-grip shields, usually round or oval 
(though sometimes hexagonal or rectangular).152  A copper-alloy round domed boss found at 
Numantia (cat. R51) may belong to this type, as it roughly matches the shape suggested by the 
Lacus Curtius monument.153  No measurements are provided for the boss, but the scale drawing 
suggests a metal disc of approximately 15cm in diameter, raised in the center.  If the boss was 
made in bronze (copper-tin with 10% tin) at a thickness of 1mm, it would have a mass c. 140g. 
 The parma of the velites is even more difficult to suggest a reconstruction for, since the 
velites as a formation did not survive into the better documented imperial period.  Livy notes that 
the shield is three Roman feet (c. 88cm) across.154    The size matches fairly well with the 
apparent size of the cavalry parma on the Lacus Curtius monument, suggesting that the two 
shields may, in fact, be functionally the same, as implied by the single word in Latin, parma, 
being used to describe both. It is generally assumed from the term parma that the shield is round, 
yet it is worth noting that the parmula of the thraex is often depicted as rectangular.  At present, 
however, the evidence permits little in the way of confidence as to the construction and form of 
the velites’ parma.  The most likely case is that the shields of the velites and the equites were 
functionally the same, but this is far from certain. 
 
 
 
                                                 
151 P. Connolly (1981), 133. 
152 I. P. Stephenson & K. R. Dixon, Roman Cavalry Equipment (Stroud: Tempus, 2003), 33-42. 
153 Schulten (1929), 210, taf. 26.22 
154 Livy 38.21.12. 
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Armor 
Body Armor – Types 
 Unlike Roman weapons, where one or a few types tend to predominate, Roman body 
armor was varied enough for the differences to be acknowledged in the ancient sources.  
Polybius notes that the cavalry and the wealthy infantrymen wore mail armor, a θώραξ 
ἁλυσιδωτός, literally a ‘chain cuirass,’ which in Latin is generally rendered as the lorica hamata, 
a ‘hooked armor,’ referring to the individual armor rings hooked into each other.155  In contrast, 
the poorer infantry wore what Polybius calls a καρδιοφύλαξ, literally a ‘heart-protector’ which in 
Latin was a pectorale.156 
 It is also likely that at least some of the Romans and their allies wore the lorica 
squamata, or scale armor, although evidence for this armor from the Republic is very limited.  
Plutarch reports Lucullus wearing impressive armor of iron scales (θώραξ σιδήρεος φολιδωτός) 
at Tigranocerta in 69 B.C., although he places some emphasis on its unique and impressive 
nature, rather than presenting it as typical.157  A single coat of doubtful origin purported to have 
been assembled from pieces found at Lake Trasimene is at the Royal Ontario Museum, and is 
noted by Robinson, although Bishop and Coulston express doubts as to the dating of this armor, 
which is by no means secure.158  Although evidence for scale armor from the imperial period is 
extensive, Bishop and Coulston note that no examples of Republican armor scales from secure 
contexts have been recognized, and the representational material from the period does not depict 
                                                 
155 Plb. 6.23.15. 
156 Plb. 6.23.14. 
157 Plut. Luc. 28.1. 
158 Robinson (1975), 153-4.  Bishop and Coulston (2006), 64. 
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it.159  Although it seems likely that at least some Romans wore the lorica squamata during this 
period, the evidence does not seem sufficient to consider it a common or typical body-armor 
type. 
 Somewhat more complicated is the question of the use of textile armor, either of linen or 
leather, as a primary armor for the heavy infantry.  It is important here to make a distinction 
between body armor where the primary or sole component is textile, such as the Greek 
linothorax (discussed in the following chapter), and situations where metal armor is 
supplemented by a textile undergarment, such as an arming jacket or the Roman thoracomachus 
or subarmalis, which will be discussed later in this chapter.   
In a survey of Roman arms and armor, Raffaele D’Amato has recently argued for a far 
greater prevalence of textile armor than is generally supposed, but the evidence he presents is 
less than convincing.160  In a reconstruction, he refers to Roman linen armor as a thorax linteus, 
but in the sources for the Republic this term seems to be used to refer only to non-Roman 
armors.  For instance, the term is used by Livy of the armor of the Etruscan king Lars Tolumnius 
and by Cornelius Nepos in reference to the reforms of Iphicrates of Athens, suggesting that 
thorax linteus or lorica linteus were simply handy translations into Latin of the Greek θώραξ 
λίνεος or λινοθώραξ, suitable for describing what was, in fact, a foreign armor-type, rather than a 
home-grown term of art for a common type of armor.161  D’Amato cites several references from 
                                                 
159 For evidence of scale armor from the imperial period, see Bishop and Coulston (2006), 95.  Robinson (1975), 
153-163.  On the lack of evidence from the Republic, see Bishop and Coulston (2006), 64. 
160  D’Amato, (2009). 
161 D’Amato (2009), 8, pl. Ib.  Livy, 4.19.2-20.7.  Nepos, Iph.  1.  The phrase is used by Suetonius of an armor worn 
by Galba (Suet. Galba 19), but in the context of armor against assassins rather than battlefield armor.  The ancient 
Greek terminology for the armor is unclear (see following chapter) but both θώραξ λίνεος (Hdt. 2.182; 7.63) and 
λινοθώραξ (Homer, Illiad 2.529; 2.830; Strabo 3.3.6; 13.1.10) seem common enough to form the basis for the 
natural translation to either lorica linteus or thorax linteus. 
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the ancient sources to support the assumption of widespread use of textile armor in the Republic, 
but all are problematic.  In the first, Caesar notes that when his men, engaged in digging 
defensive works, were continuously harassed by missile troops, they made “tunics and coverings 
either of felt, quilt or hide.”162  But this is clearly a reference to ad hoc protections rather than 
battlefield armor, and Caesar refers to these garments as tunicas aut tegimenta rather than as 
loricae or thoraces.  It seems more likely that Caesar’s soldiers were out of their normal, 
probably mail, armor in order to do the heavy labor of fortification, and were forced to improvise 
protections that were light enough to allow them to continue to work.  D’Amato also points to a 
passage of In Pisonem where Cicero notes L. Calpurnius Piso Caesonius as having collected 
cattle from his province of Macedonia for leather for a manufactory of arms (armorum officina), 
but no direct connection in the passage is made to armor specifically, and leather would have 
been useful for a variety of functions beyond leather armor.163  Finally, D’Amato also notes 
Plutarch’s description of the battle of Carrhae, in which the Parthians’ arrows pierced armor both 
“hard and soft” (ἀντιτύπου καὶ μαλακοῦ).  However, Plutarch has just made a distinction 
between Crassus’ light armed (ψιλοὺς, unarmored, bare) troops and his heavy infantry 
(ὁπλίταις).  It is thus presumably the “bare” troops who have the “soft” coverings, contrasted 
with the heavy infantry who have the “hard” coverings, while Plutarch notes that both are 
vulnerable to the storm of Parthian arrows, at least once the disordered light infantry disrupt the 
formation of the legion.164 
                                                 
162 Caesar, Bel Civ. 3.44.6.  atque omnes fere milites aut ex coactis aut ex centonibus aut ex coriis tunicas aut 
tegimenta fecerant, quibus tela vitarent. 
163 D’Amato (2009), 39.  Cic. In Pisonem 36.87.  Leather was used in the facings of shields and in cavalry 
equipment, for instance. 
164 Plut. Crass.  24.4. 
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The representational evidence for extensive Roman use of textile armor is also 
problematic, as most of the examples in artwork appear to have heavy Greek influence, and thus 
may not accurately depict Roman equipment.  D’Amato cites the Glanum reliefs from the Julian 
Mausoleum in Saint-Rémy de Provence as a primary example, but the monument depicts Roman 
soldiers not only with what may be Hellenistic-style textile armor (although mail over a 
thorocomachus with pteryges is also a possible interpretation), but also shows the Roman 
soldiers with Hellenistic ‘Phrygian’ type helmets and deeply dished round shields with a porpax 
and antilabe grip, rather than the Roman center-grip style (fig. 4.25).165  In short, the monument 
shows the Roman soldiers equipped as hoplites or hippeis, with Greek armor, helmets and the 
Greek aspis shield, rather than in typical Roman kit, perhaps because of the monument’s own 
location outside of Italy and the close proximity of Massalia.  Likewise, a second relief D’Amato 
presents, “from an unknown monument” showing a supposedly Roman soldier in a linothorax, 
presents the soldiers as wielding what appears to be a shorter Greek xiphos (see next chapter) and 
an aspis, rather than a gladius and scutum.166  In both cases, the typology of the shield provides a 
handy barometer as to the reliability of the depiction, because the Roman scutum is so distinctive 
compared to the Greek aspis: a sculptor who is not able, or does not care to represent the 
distinctive Roman shield accurately, is unlikely to be a reliable source for the rest of the military 
equipment either.  It seems likely enough that some Roman soldiers might have adopted forms of 
textile or leather armor in Hellenistic style.  However, as with scale armor, the evidence seems 
insufficient to support the argument that such armor was widespread among either the cavalry or 
heavy infantry in the absence of direct attestation by textual sources. 
                                                 
165 D’Amato (2009), 10-11. 
166 D’Amato (2009), 39. 
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Body Armor - Prevalence 
So the question that remains is the balance between the two more common kinds of 
armor noted by Polybius, which is to say how many soldiers might normally have worn the Italic 
pectoral or the lorica hamata in battle.  Although it is likely that there was a ratio between these 
armors that was probably fairly consistent between legions, that ratio, at least estimated with any 
precision, is lost to us.  No such figure is preserved in the literary evidence, and there are 
multiple distortions in the rates of archaeological preservation and discovery.  However, it is 
possible, by examining the evidence that does exist, to ascertain some sense of the range in 
which such a ratio must have existed, as an exercise more in eliminating wrong answers than 
arriving at the right one.  This section, then, will present a review of the surviving evidence for 
the prevalence of Roman armor, focused on the common soldiers of the heavy infantry, before 
suggesting a range of possibilities consistent with that evidence. 
Polybius connects the distinction between the lorica hamata and the pectoral to census 
class, which provides a tempting way to extrapolate the prevalence of the armors.  He notes that 
the common soldiers (οἱ πολλοί) wear the pectoral, while only those rated above 10,000 
drachmae wear the lorica hamata.167  The use of οἱ πολλοί to describe those wearing the pectoral 
certainly seems to imply they were in the majority even in Polybius’ day, but what it less clear is 
by how much.  His figure for 10,000 drachmae corresponds suspiciously well, however, with the 
figures offered by Dionysius of Halicarnassus and Livy for the division between the first class of 
the pedites.  Livy gives the 80 centuries of the first class as having a property rating of 100,000 
                                                 
167 Polybius 6.23.14. 
 233 
asses, while Dionysus reports the property rating as 100 minae.168  Assuming that a mina was 
worth 100 drachmae, Dionysius’ valuation for the first classes matches perfectly with Polybius’ 
demarcation of which soldiers wore the lorica hamata.169  Livy’s figure of 100,000 asses also 
falls into line, assuming he is using the sextantal as.170  The correspondence makes sense, given 
that both Livy and Dionysius note that the first class, in contrast to the lower classes, were 
expected to provide themselves with a full panoply including a cuirass, which was not required 
of the lower classes. 
 However, something clearly must be said about the anachronism of the passages and the 
problems with attempting to compute directly the equipment of a legion on this basis.  Both Livy 
and Dionysius place the establishment of this system in the sixth-century reign of the legendary 
Servius Tullius; however, the sextantal monetary standard that Livy bases the so-called Servian 
Constitution on did not exist until 211.171  As Robert Ogilvie notes, this is a “pious fraud,” and 
both constitutions, in their essential details, must be anachronistic reconstructions.172  Moreover, 
the division of centuries appears to have changed by Cicero’s day, with De Re Publica’s brief 
and somewhat enigmatic description of the assembly noting only 70 centuries of the first class, 
compared to 100 centuries of the lower classes of infantry.173  Finally, the centuries of the 
comitia centuriata did not reflect the balance of the Roman citizen population; indeed, this was 
                                                 
168 Dionysius, RA 4.16.2.  Livy 1.43.1. 
169 Mina to drachma conversion: Arist. Ath. Pol. 10.2. 
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173 Lintott (1999), 56-7.  Cic. De Re Publica 2.39. 
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the entire point, as Cicero notes in De Re Publica.174  Dionysius, somewhat optimistically, claims 
that soldiers were levied according to centuries such that the wealthy, being split into fewer 
centuries, were forced to serve more often.  Andrew Lintott is skeptical that this system would 
have still been in force in Rome in the Middle Republic, if it had ever existed at all.175  
Moreover, the property qualifications, especially the ‘floor’ beneath the fifth class of infantry, 
may not have been stable during the third and second centuries, although, as John Rich notes, the 
evidence for potential reductions in the census requirements is deeply uncertain.176  It is probably 
impossible to salvage a clear history of the census requirements.  
None of this is to say that the evidence provided by Polybius’ figure of 10,000 drachmae 
for the requirement to provide a lorica is entirely useless, even if it is deeply fraught.  Even 
though it is impossible to reconstruct the exact ratio of infantry equipped with the lorica hamata, 
this sort of evidence can give us a sense of a reasonable range for conjecture.  Livy and 
Dionysius represent the first class as 80 out of the 170 centuries of infantry, or 47%, while 
Cicero’s somewhat different number suggest that only 70 of the 170 centuries, or 41%, would 
have been of the first class.  While not all centuries were of the same size, some weight ought to 
be given to the ideal expressed by Dionysius that military service was evenly distributed by 
centuries.  Even if this ideal was never fully reached in practice, it seems reasonable to suppose 
that the army might have, in a very rough way, looked like the balance of the comitia centuriata. 
Moreover, there is considerable evidence to suggest that the lorica hamata was the armor 
predominantly associated with the Romans by their rivals, particularly in the East.  In a fragment 
                                                 
174 Cic. De Re Publica 2.39. 
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preserved only partially, but “reasonably completely” by Athenaeus, Polybius describes a 
Seleucid military parade in which there are five thousand men “trained [or equipped] in the 
Roman manner, having mail cuirasses.”177  Significantly, mail armor then serves as the signifier 
to back up Polybius’ claim that these five thousand men “in the prime of life” were organized 
Roman-style, although this unit is clearly an elite one (it leads the parade), and so may have been 
given access to very high-status armor.  But the broader evidence for Roman-style Hellenistic 
military reform in the 160s seems to reinforce the primacy of mail armor.  Nicholas Sekunda 
supplies a number examples in period artwork from the East of soldiers bearing Roman 
equipment, many of whom wear mail.178  For instance, the Stele of Salmas shows the deceased 
carrying a thureos, a shield patterned off of the Roman scutum, and wearing mail armor (Fig. 
4.26).179  Likewise the stele of Dioskourides of Balboura, which shows the figure with a thureos 
and possibly a gladius, and again in mail armor.180  By contrast, none of the various forms of the 
pectoral, either the rectangular anatomical, single or triple-disk styles, seems to appear in 
Hellenistic contexts as a result of this Roman-style military reform trend.  So while Polybius 
notes that the οἱ πολλοί of his day still wore the cheaper pectoral, it seems that the East strongly 
associated Roman-style warfare with mail armor. 
The surviving representational evidence for the equipment of the Middle and Late 
Republic, although admittedly very limited, argues very strongly for a relatively high prevalence 
                                                 
177 Plb. 30.25.3.  Sekunda (2001a), 87.  καθηγοῦντό τινες Ῥωμαϊκὸν ἔχοντες καθοπλισμὸν ἐν θώραξιν ἁλυσιδωτοῖς, 
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mean “equipped,” but it seems like reading it as “trained,” “organized,” or “led” would be just as probable.  It seems 
likely to me that Polybius intends all of these meanings. 
178 Sekunda, (2001a).  Sekunda, (1994/5).  
179 Sekunda (1994) vol 2, 73, fig. 67. 
180 Sekunda (1994), vol 2, 73, fig. 71. 
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of the lorica hamata.  Mail appears to have been the standard armor used to depict common 
Roman soldiers in the Middle and late Republic.  All four of the common soldiers on the Altar of 
Domitius Ahenobarbus, along with the one eques, wear the lorica hamata.  Likewise on the 
Pydna monument, all of the figures which Taylor identifies as Roman with traces of armor still 
visible wear the lorica hamata.181  A first century relief from Osuna, Spain, shows two Roman 
soldiers, one in mail and the other in a tunic which may be a subarmalis.182  In contrast, although 
the pectoral is absent from artwork of the second century, it is prominent in earlier periods, back 
to the sixth century warrior of Capestrano statue.183  Michael Burns notes that the rectangular 
pectoral described by Polybius first appears in artwork in Campania, Lucania and Apulia during 
the fourth century, and seems to derive from the Samnite triple-disk cuirass.184  Burns associates 
the introduction of this armor to Campania with the Samnite wars.185 By the third century and 
second centuries, however, the appearances of the pectoral and related armor-forms in the 
representational evidence thin to total silence.  That said, we should be on guard against 
overinterpreting this lopsided representation in artwork, as the strong tendency in ancient art is to 
disproportionately depict high status soldiers and equipment, meaning that the lorica hamata is 
likely to be oversampled in surviving artwork.   
                                                 
181 Taylor, (2016): 559-576.  Taylor does not several figures apparently on the Roman side wearing breastplates, but 
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182 D’Amato (2009), 18.  Robinson (1975), 164. 
183 For the high visibility of the pectoral in earlier periods, see P. Connolly (1981), 91-111. 
184 M. T. Burns, “The Homogenisation of Military Equipment Under the Roman Republic” in Romanization? 
Digressus supplement 1 (London: Institute of archaeology, University College London, 2003), 60-85.   
185 Burns (2003), 73. 
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The archaeological evidence, however, tends to reinforce the impression that the balance 
between the native Italic pectoral and related armor types and the lorica hamata seems to have 
begun to shift decisively in favor of the lorica.  Burns notes 19 examples of the rectangular 
cuirass and 38 examples of the triple-disk cuirass dating to the fifth or fourth century, with 
examples of the rectangular cuirass dated as late as the 330s and 320s.186  After this, however, 
the evidence of the armor begins to dry up, although Polybius’ testimony confirms that it was 
still in common use in his own day.187  In contrast, as noted below, the number of armor ring 
finds likely from fragments of the lorica hamata increases over time, with a relatively small 
number of such finds from the Middle and Late Republic. These nevertheless outnumber finds of 
pectorals from the same period, even though we might expect, based on the reparability and 
reusability of mail, the armor to be preserved at a lower rate.  The preserved examples of 
fragments of the lorica hamata increase greatly in the Early Empire, while, by that point, the 
pectoral has vanished completely from the archaeological record.  Thus, the archaeological 
evidence seems to confirm the picture suggested by the representational evidence that the 
prevalence of Italic pectorals and related armor types markedly declined in the second century.  
By the era of the civil wars these Italic armor-types were no longer major components of the kit 
of Roman heavy infantry. 
The question then remains as to how to incorporate this evidence into a reconstruction 
that is concerned with the resource intensity of the legion as a whole.  To incorporate the 
distinction between those infantrymen who were loricatus, and those who were not, into the 
maximum and minimum case framework so far established could have the unwelcome side 
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effect of overwhelming more subtle variations in equipment weights, since the gap between the 
metal-weight of a high-quality lorica hamata and a basic pectoral is quite large.  Instead, a range 
of potential prevalence for body armor will be accounted for as a separate variable in the 
reconstruction, thereby generating, maximum, minimum and median cases for a range of 
assumptions about how common the lorica hamata and the pectoral were.  In this case, four 
potential cases will be computed in the qualitative analysis section.  The first will assume, 
somewhat pessimistically, that only one-third of all Roman heavy infantrymen wore the lorica 
hamata.  This figure seems like a prudent lower-extreme; it is well below what the census figure 
and representational data would lead us to expect, but it fits with Polybius’ statement that the hoi 
polloi still wore the pectoral.  The second will follow the implications of Polybius’ assigned 
wealth classification, matching the balance of centuries in the comitia centuriata, and assuming 
that 41% of Roman heavy infantrymen wore the pectoral.  The final two cases will be set at an 
even one-half distribution, and finally at a distribution where two-thirds of Roman heavy infantry 
wore the lorica hamata.  These latter two cases should be taken to represent likely stages, 
perhaps in the mid-to-late second century, in the process by which the armor of the legion was 
standardized around mail armor. 
 
Lorica Hamata – Reconstruction 
 No complete Roman lorica hamata survives from any period, but the nature of mail 
armor makes confident reconstruction possible if we combine the shape of the armor in 
representational evidence with the armor rings which do survive.  It is particularly important in 
this case to reconstruct carefully from ancient evidence, as weights for body armor of all types 
suggested in scholarship are often far too high, based perhaps on outdated assumptions about the 
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weight of body-armor in the ancient world.  Connolly suggests between 12 and 15kg for the 
weight of the lorica hamata, a figure subsequently repeated by Feugère, which as will be shown, 
is far too heavy.188  This tendency is not limited to mail armor; Eero Jarva’s figures for the 
weight of Greek breastplates at between 4kg and 8kg are also likely far too heavy.189  As a result, 
especially with body-armor, it is important to root all reconstructions solidly in the ancient 
evidence, in order to avoid grossly inaccurate ‘estimates’ of weight.  
The best source of representational evidence for the lorica hamata remains the Paris 
frieze of the Altar of Domitius Ahenobarbus, which shows five soldiers, four heavy infantry and 
one eques, wearing variations of the armor.  In all of the figures on the monument, the armor is 
represented as what would have been known in the Middle Ages as a hauberk, a tunic of mail 
extending to just above the knees, with little or no sleeves.  All four of the infantrymen’s armor 
shows the distinctive pattern of ‘shoulder doubling,’ where a second layer of mail covers the 
shoulders, which would otherwise have been particularly vulnerable to downward strokes from 
La Tène swords or the Iberian falcata (see chapter 6).  It is clear, to judge by the second soldier 
from the left on the frieze, that the shoulder doubling is in addition to the mail shirt, rather than 
being a pull-over clasp in the fashion of the linothorax (see chapter 5), meaning that areas 
covered by shoulder-doubling would, in fact, be covered by two overlapping layers of mail 
armor (fig. 4.27).  This can be seen even more clearly from the statue of the Vacheres warrior, 
where a relatively short sleeve protrudes from beneath the shoulder-doubling (fig. 4.28).190  
Hilary and John Travis note two distinct styles of shoulder doubling.  In the former, which they 
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term the ‘Gaulish-style,’ the doubling is provided by a ‘cape’ of mail which extends over the 
shoulders and is fashioned in front.  In the latter, which they term the ‘Greek’ style, more popular 
in the Late Republic and early Empire, the shoulder protectors are a pair of separate mail 
coverings, tied down to the body of the mail.191  A badly corroded iron-age British mail shirt 
from Kirkburn suggests that the shoulder attachments on some mail shirts did function in the 
fashion of the shoulder-guards of the Greek linothorax; however, this method does not seem to 
have been common in Roman armor.192 
 In addition to the basic shape of the lorica hamata, reconstruction requires a sense of the 
range of sizes for the armor rings used.  The fabric of Roman mail armor is produced by joining 
metal rings, either of iron or copper-alloy, in a four-in-one pattern, where each ring is joined to 
four others.193  The rings are closed by one of three methods: they are either solid (stamped as a 
single ring or fire-welded together from a wire), closed with a rivet, or have the ends simply 
abutted without any closure device.194  Abutted or riveted rings could be alternated in rows with 
solid rings, since only one of the two rings in any join needs to be opened and closed during 
construction.  The combination, in alternating rows, of riveted and solid rings is likely to produce 
the strongest armor and is generally the most common type in Roman examples.195  In contrast, 
abutted mail is markedly inferior, and uncommon in Roman examples from any period, but 
easier to make (and consequently common in modern reproductions).  Rings with smaller 
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diameters and thicker wires would lead to the creation of higher quality armor with a greater 
degree of resistance to penetration, but smaller rings would also require the use of more rings to 
create a complete coat.  The potential difference in protective quality is greater than it may at 
first appear, as smaller high-quality rings will not sit perfectly flat against each other, but end up 
at an angle due to the ratio between their thickness and diameter; hence the mail presents more 
material to resist an incoming strike.  The smaller internal diameters of smaller rings also makes 
it more difficult for weapons to wedge into the gap and split the ring open.  As noted below, the 
use of smaller rings increases the total weight and metal requirements of a single lorica. 
 Preserved examples of armor rings from any period are generally scarce, as mail was 
relatively easy to repair and reuse, making preservation in the archaeological record 
infrequent.196  Still, a handful of ring finds are known from the Republic.  A scrap of mail with 
123 joined copper-alloy armor rings was found in Lager III at Numantia (cat. R61), between 0.8 
and 1.1cm in diameter, with the metal wire comprising them approximately 1mm thick.197  A 
second set of 48 rings, also in copper-alloy, unmeasured but of roughly the same size in scale 
drawings, were found loose in the same context by Schulten.198  A fragment of mail is also 
reported from the Tomb of the Scipiones in Rome, but the measurements for those rings have not 
been published.199 
 Because of the relative scarceness of preserved examples of Republican rings, it is worth 
also considering the evidence from the imperial period in order to gauge the normal size and 
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Civiltà Romana di Roma” JRMES 8 (1997): 25-40. 
 242 
construction of armor rings.  David Sim notes a set of six gilded copper-alloy armor rings from 
Ouddorp, Leiden (cat. R62).  These are some of the smallest armor rings, with an outside 
diameter range of 3.062 to 3.197mm, inside diameters from 2.123 to 2.268mm, and a wire-
thickness ranging from 0.51 to 0.63mm.200  Sim also presents another set of ten rings, otherwise 
unpublished, dating to the second century C.E. from Caerleon, with outside diameters from 6.6-
7.8mm, inside diameters from 4.4-5.4mm, and wire thickness from 0.8-1.4mm.201  Another set of 
iron rings from Thorsberg dates between 150 and 250 C.E..  Two of the rings, pictured by Sim 
and Jamie Kaminski, appear to be between 3.8 and 4.2mm in diameter, based on the scale image 
(fig. 4.29).202 Sim and Kaminski also picture in the same volume a concretion of rings from 
Arbeia with an outside diameter of 7.5mm, and a thickness of 1.3mm, closer to the 
measurements of the Numantia rings (fig. 4.30).203  In addition, a large number of ring finds from 
a legionary fortress in Usk, Wales, currently housed in the National Museum of Wales, have 
been measured and catalogued by Evan Chapman; some of these are also listed in the table 
below.204  Eight fragments catalogued by Chapman as Ma07, thought to be from two different 
pieces of armor, are split here; two of the fragments with no intact rings surviving are omitted. 
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Table 4.4: Roman Armor Rings: 
 Cat. 
Number 
No. of 
Rings 
Material Date/Period Outside 
Diameter 
(mm) 
Thickness 
(mm) 
Numantia, 
Lager III 
R61 123 Copper-
Alloy 
153 or 137 
B.C. 
8-11 c. 1 
Leiden R62 6 Copper-
Alloy 
Imperial 3.062-3.197 0.51-0.63 
Caerleon R63 10 Iron Second 
century CE 
6.6-7.8 0.8-1.4 
Thorsberg R64 2 Iron 150-250 CE c. 3.8-4.2  
Arbeia R65  Iron Imperial 7.5 1.3 
Usk – Ma03 R66  Iron Pre-Flavian 4.3 (±0.3) c. 1 
Usk – Ma04 R67  Iron Pre-Flavian 5.4(±0.8) c.1.1 
Usk – Ma05 R68 6 
fragments 
Iron Pre-Flavian 2.1-3.0 0.6-0.8 
Usk – Ma06 R69  Iron Pre-Flavian 8.0(±0.4) c. 1.6 
Usk – Ma07(a) R70 3 
fragments 
Iron Pre-Flavian 2.6(±0.2) c. 0.5 
Usk – 
Ma07(b) 
R71 3 
fragments 
Iron Pre-Flavian c. 4.6-6.9 c. 1.0-1.2 
 
 Sim and Kaminski note, and the Table confirms, that the rings within any particular 
lorica tend to be made to fairly tight tolerances.205  However, there is wide variation between 
different pieces in terms of the quality of the armor as expressed by the size of the rings.  As 
noted above, smaller rings generally mean a higher quality armor, but would also substantially 
increase the cost, as more rings would be required.  The loricae hamatae shown on the Altar of 
Domitius Ahenobarbus and the Aemilius Paullus monument show a core armor comprised of a 
mail shirt with little or no sleeves, extending down to just above the knees; a mail shirt of this 
size might, with significant variation for the size of the wearer, require around 0.9m2 of joined 
rings.  The distinctive shoulder-doubling might add an additional 0.1-0.15m2 of joined rings, 
although certain styles of shoulder doubling, such as the long shoulder armor of the Vacheres 
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warrior, would require more.  It seems reasonable, then, to suppose roughly 1m2 of joined rings 
to reconstruct the Republican era lorica hamata. 
 The total ring counts, and thus metal-weight, of such a reconstruction would vary 
significantly based on the size of the rings used, however.  At the low end, the rings (cat. R61) 
found at Lager III at Numantia represent some of the largest recovered, at between 8-11mm of 
diameter.  Taking the average at c. 10mm, it might require roughly 19,000 rings to produce the 
square meter of mail required for the lorica hamata.  With each ring consisting of roughly 3.1cm 
of wire 1mm thick, the volume of metal for each ring would be 0.024cm3, with a mass, if made 
out of bronze of c. 0.2g, and if made out of iron c. 0.19g.206  A lorica hamata made of such rings 
might thus weigh around 3.8kg in bronze and 3.6kg in iron.  A fairly typical lorica, following the 
Caerleon rings (cat. R63), with an average outer diameter of around 7mm, might take some 
29,000 rings.  Each ring would have consisted of 2.2cm of wire an average of 1.10mm thick, 
giving a volume per ring of 0.021cm3 and a mass per ring in iron of c. 0.165g.  The full lorica 
hamata would then weigh around 4.8kg total.   
Relatively small differences in the size of the rings could substantially increase the ring-
count and thus the weight of the lorica.  For instance, a finer, but still fairly typical lorica with 
rings at an average outer diameter of 6mm and a thickness of 1.2mm, might require around 
35,500 rings, with a volume per ring of 0.02131cm3 and so a mass per ring of 0.168g.207  The 
entire lorica then would weigh around 5.95kg.  Ring-counts increase rapidly as rings grow 
smaller, although the overall weight of the armor relates more to the ratio of wire-thickness to 
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ring-size.  A very fine lorica with rings like the copper-alloy Leiden (cat. R62) or Usk Ma07(a) 
(cat. R70) rings would have required a staggering number of them.  Assuming a 3mm diameter 
ring 0.6mm thick, it might take nearly 200,000 rings.  The wire for each ring would only have a 
volume of 0.00266cm3 and a mass of 0.0209g, but the coat overall would still weigh around 
4.2kg.  For the purpose of the reconstruction, it seems reasonable to assign the reconstructed 
copper-alloy Numantia lorica, at 3.8kg, as the lower bound of the reconstruction, and the much 
heavier 5.95kg reconstructed lorica as an upper bound, at least for common soldiers.  The 4.8kg 
lorica based roughly on the Caerleon rings probably represents more closely a ‘typical’ lorica 
hamata, and will serve as my median case. 
 
Pectoral – Types, Origins, Reconstruction 
 Polybius describes the pectoral as a breastplate one span square, or roughly 23cm2, but 
recovered pectorals show a wider range of shapes and style, including not only the square (or 
rectangular) armor plate described by Polybius, but also small disks covering only the center of 
the chest and larger triple-disk plates.208  Because no representational evidence of any of these 
types of armor is preserved from the third or second centuries, it is necessary to make extensive 
use of older examples in order to gain a sense of the range of defensive options available to 
poorer Roman soldiers.  Fortunately, various kinds of pectoral armors are well documented in the 
archaeological and representational evidence from Italy from the eighth to the fourth centuries.  
So we may divide pectoral armors by shape: circular pectorals, the rectangular or square pectoral 
described by Polybius, and the common Samnite triple-disk pectoral. 
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Circular or round pectorals begin to appear in Etruscan contexts starting in the seventh 
century, with finds extending south into Latium and east into Umbria.209  The armor is also 
prominent in the archaeological record for the Oscans in the sixth and fifth centuries.210  Such 
pectorals are perhaps most famously depicted on the sixth century statue of the warrior of 
Capestrano (fig. 4.31), although recovered examples tend to be larger than this, typically 
between 20 and 24cm wide as noted by Connolly.211  There could be included a matching back 
plate, as with both the Capestrano warrior and a fairly well preserved example from the 
necropolis at Alfedena.212  P. F. Stary terms this armor a “Herzpanzer (kardiophylakes),” 
suggesting an association with the armor described by Polybius, although this may not be 
secure.213  In particular, the armor-type seems to have become scarce by the fourth century, 
especially in Central and Southern Italy.  No examples have emerged from the tombs at Paestum, 
nor does Helle Horsnaes note any examples in a study on North-Western Lucania from 600 to 
273, although rectangular and triple-disc cuirasses are common there.214  Instead, by the fourth 
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century, as Horsnaes notes, the triple-disk and rectangular pectorals dominate, while the older 
circular type appears to have fallen out of use.215 
However, a circular disk armor (cat. I24), 17cm across with perforations around the 
edges, found by Adolf Schulten in the Roman camps near Numantia, has been identified as part 
of this older type.216  Even so, this find could also easily be representative of a native Celt-
Iberian armor-type, which consisted of armor-discs mounted in a harness.  A complete harness, 
discovered in the Necropolis de El Altillo and now in the Museo Arqueológico Nacional in 
Madrid (cat. I28), is of similar size and type, dating to the fourth or third century, and having a 
main plate 18cm across with perforations around the edges.  The main pectoral disk and the 
smaller shoulder disks on the harness show similar geometric circle patterns as the Numantia 
pectoral.  Likewise a set of front and back plates (cat. I25 and I26) from the Necropolis de la 
Osera near Chamartín, Spain, dated to the fourth century are each somewhat larger at 26cm in 
diameter, but maintain the same shape and pattern with perforations around the edges.  Given the 
similarities between these types, it is not clear that the Numantia pectoral can be securely tied to 
a Roman or Italian origin.  Of particular note, the concentric circle decoration with a central 
raised knob or bulb of the Numantia pectoral does not seem to appear on previous Italic single-
disc pectorals (which more often feature scenes or animal motifs); but it does closely resemble 
the decoration of some Iberian pectorals (such as cat. I28), which are decorated by a series of 
overlapping sets of concentric rings with a central bulb (fig. 4.32).  Unless further examples of 
                                                 
215 Feugère (1993), 87, also notes that the small circular pectoral survives into the fourth century, but not, 
apparently, beyond it. 
216 A. Schulten, Numantia: Die Ergebnisse der Ausgrabungen 1905-1912.  Band III.  Die Lager des Scipio 
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this type of armor appear in Roman contexts, it seems more likely that the Numantia pectoral is 
representative of Iberian, rather than Italian, armor styles. 
Rectangular pectoral plates have perhaps the longest history in Italy, with examples 
dating from the eighth century in Etruria and Latium.217  Connolly notes, however, that the 
pectoral of Polybius corresponds to the later rectangular anatomical cuirasses, so named because 
the rectangular plate is frequently decorated with chest muscles, much like the Greek muscle 
cuirass. The rectangular anatomical cuirass seems to share an origin with the Samnite triple-disc 
cuirass, rather than earlier central Italian rectangular types.218  All of the examples of the type are 
made of copper-alloy.  The British Museum has a remarkably well-preserved example of the 
type (cat. R72), dated to the fourth century (fig. 4.33).  Comprising both a breastplate and a back 
plate, the armor is 27.94cm high and 30.48cm wide, making it somewhat larger than Polybius’ 
description, and approximately 2mm thick.  The front plate weighs 877g, the back plate 707g, 
although Connolly notes that the side and shoulder plates are missing, so the original metal-
weight would have been somewhat higher.  Other examples in the British Museum (cat. R73, 
R74, R75), identified as examples of the type by Connolly, are too damaged to make a weight 
measurement useful, but they serve to outline the type, each just over 30cm high and about as 
wide.219   Another example, from Tomb 2 at Paestum (cat. R76), which includes a front plate 
(30cm by 28cm), a back plate (32cm by 28cm) and one of the side plates (10.4cm by 7.9cm).  
Another example of this type in the Paestum Museo Archeologico Nazionale and cited by 
Giovanni Carratelli (cat. R77) is of a similar size, with both a front plate (37 by 27.6cm) and a 
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back plate (29.5 by 29.5cm) along with two connecting plates (8.6 by 11.6 and 8.9 by 
12.6cm).220  Although no weight is given for the piece, the thickness is 1.5mm, which would 
suggest a mass around 2.5kg for the entire armor.221  At the lower end, Polybius’ suggested size 
for the pectoral is a single span (c. 23cm) square; at a fairly typical thickness of 1.5mm it would 
result in a front plate weighing only c. 650g in bronze.222 
 The triple-disk pectoral, developed in the central Apennine region and generally 
associated with the Samnites, may be the direct predecessor of the Roman armor Polybius 
describes.  It was no doubt still used by many Roman socii during the second century.223  The 
armor, like the rectangular pectoral, was a harness, consisting of at least a front plate, and 
potentially a back plate and shoulder plates, held together by shoulder and side straps.224  The 
armor is frequently depicted in artwork from Campania, such as on a warrior on a lekythos in the 
British Museum (Fig. 4.34) and also on a fresco dated to the fourth century from Paestum in 
Lucania.225  A heavily damaged example in copper-alloy (fig. 4.35) dating to the fourth century 
in the British Museum lacks a back plate or shoulder harness, but shows the basic shape.   The 
preserved thickness of the plate is c. 1mm, and the plate itself in its current state weighs 352g, 
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although it would have doubtless been heavier at the time of construction, perhaps around 0.8-
1kg, once side-plates, shoulder-plates and the back plate are accounted for.  Another example 
from Alfedena (cat. R79), has a front plate 28 by 26.5cm, a back plate 27.5 by 27cm, two side 
plates each 19cm long, and a single preserved shoulder plate 10cm long; the second shoulder-
plate is missing. 
 Reconstructing metal-weights for ‘typical’ examples of this kind of armor is necessarily 
speculative.  As the armor of poorer Romans, it seems likely that the size and quality of pectorals 
in the third and second centuries would have varied widely.  This variation is compounded by the 
modular nature of both the triple-disc and rectangular cuirasses, which could include metal plates 
protecting the sides, back and shoulders, but could also conceivably be worn simply as a single 
front plate. Such an arrangement does not seem to occur in the archaeological or representational 
evidence, but it cannot be ruled out, especially as the evidence is likely to favor the armor of elite 
individuals.  Thus, although no such example appears in the representational evidence, it seems 
prudent to assign as the minimum case a metal-weight of c. 650g, corresponding to Polybius’ 
description and assuming a relatively small single plate with no attachments.  For the median 
case, the British Museum rectangular anatomical cuirass (cat. R72) seems the most typical at 
1.584kg, although this is a conservative estimate as the cuirass is missing side and shoulder 
plates.  The estimate for the rectangular Paestum cuirass (cat. R77) at 2.5kg can serve as a 
maximum case. 
 
Helmets – Types, Origins and Reconstruction 
 The Montefortino-type helmet, sometimes mistakenly referred to as a ‘jockey-cap’ 
helmet (along with the Coolus type), first appears in Gallic contexts in France and Austria in the 
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late fifth century, before arriving in Cisalpine Gaul towards the end of the fifth and the beginning 
of the fourth century.226  Although in Gallic contexts this helmet type was often made of iron, 
Roman examples were exclusively produced in copper-alloy during the period of the Republic.  
Widespread adoption in Roman sites begins in the late fourth and early third centuries, such that 
the Gallic-inspired Roman Monteforinto type eclipsed all other helmet-types in use by the mid-
third century.227 
The speed with which the Montefortino helmet was adopted throughout Roman Italy is 
remarkable in a context where other helmet-types (pilos, Samno-Attic types, etc) provided sound 
alternatives.  Burns has suggested that this speed was the result either of the need for a “neutral 
form of helmet, which did not carry any ethnic or political overtones,” or of a “need, or a trend, 
to associate certain types of equipment with all forces serving the Roman Republic.”228  
However, it should also be noted that this helmet, close-fitting with hinged-cheek plates, 
provides excellent protection.  Moreover, the shape is economical to produce (although 
decorated rims and crest-knobs are typical embellishments) while not inhibiting vision or breath; 
so it seems plausible that the Montefortino-type dominated because it was perceived, correctly, 
as a superior helmet.  As a result of its ubiquity among Roman soldiers, it tends to surface in the 
archaeological record wherever they went.  John Paddock notes, “the spread of the Montefortino 
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helmet therefore acts almost as barometer of Roman troop movements and the expansion of the 
Roman Empire.”229 
 The form of the Montefortino helmet shows some variation over the long period of its 
use. Although Paddock identified 12 distinct types from the fourth century B.C.E. to the first 
century C.E., the basic form of the helmet remains fairly consistent.230  It is typified by a round 
conical bowl shape with a pronounced crest-knob, a thickened rim and attachment points for 
hinged cheek-guards.  The rim often, but not always, has a cable design on the thickened portion 
(see fig. 4.36).231  The design is a remarkably effective one for its simplicity, particularly for use 
in close-combat.  The thickened rim provides strong structural support against overhand blows, 
such as might be expected from the classic Middle and Late La Tène type swords; much the 
same function is performed by the brow-ridges which begin to appear on Hellenistic helmets, 
apparently in response to Gallic threats (discussed in chapter 5).  Moreover, the cabled brim 
serves to deflect away from the face a sword-strike that is gliding down the face of the helmet.  
The open face may have made the wearer more vulnerable to missile weapons, but the ability of 
a Roman soldier to hunker down behind his large scutum probably mitigated this risk.  The 
unrestricted breathing that the helmet allows has been an underappreciated feature, but would 
have been invaluable under actual combat conditions.  Finally, the helmet would have been worn 
with a textile (probably felt) liner, which may have reduced the concussive force of blows.232 
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During the third and second centuries, Montefortino helmets were produced by a process 
called raising, where a metal sheet is gradually hammered out over a wooden block with a 
hemispherical depression, called a doming block.  This process often leaves the crest of the 
helmet somewhat thinner than the lower portions, a tendency accentuated by the Montefortino 
type’s characteristic thickened rim.233  Manufacturing standards, and thus weight, steadily 
declined during the second and first centuries.  This trend culminated in the introduction of 
spinning as a form of mass production, where the helmet bowl is formed by being rotated and 
pressed against a wooden former.234  Paddock suggests that the initial decline in weight from 
some of the very heavy early examples may have been motivated by a desire to produce a more 
effective and comfortable helmet, but subsequent weight reductions, especially towards the end 
of the second century, are connected with a more general collapse in manufacturing quality.235   
In Paddock’s view, this collapse in standards may be related to the rapid increase in the size of 
Roman armies in the Late Republic, but that hardly seems likely when the tremendous military 
exertions of the third century produced no matching collapse in apparent quality.236 Paddock also 
links the decline in quality with the so-called Marian reforms, a position which Bishop and  
Coulston share, representing a shift from individually supplied arms and armor to state supply or 
subsidy.237 
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As implied by its rapid adoption and wide dissemination, this piece of armor represents 
the single best-attested type of armor from the Republican period.  In 1993, Paddock noted 143 
examples; more have since come to light and so the parameters of the type are well established, 
although weight data is often omitted when helmets are published.238  My objective in presenting 
examples is not to provide a comprehensive list of all, or even most, preserved examples, but 
merely a sufficient sense of the type to allow for reconstruction.  A table of weighed examples 
(Table 4.5) is presented below, with the tendency towards lighter and thinner helmets over time 
clearly visible. 
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Table 4.5: Montefortino-type Helmets by Date 
Cat. 
No. 
Date Height Width Weight Metal 
Thickness 
Cheekguards? 
R80 Mid-4th to 
mid-3rd cent. 
180mm 160-215mm 2010g 2-3mm Intact 
R81 Mid-4th to 
mid-3rd cent. 
200mm 170x205mm 1895g 2-3mm Intact 
R82 Mid-4th to 
mid-3rd cent. 
183mm 165x210mm 2204g 2-3mm Intact 
R83 late-4th to 
early-3rd cent. 
185mm 170-200mm 1180g 1-3mm Lost 
R84 Late-4th to 
mid-3rd cent. 
 164x205mm 868g 1-1.15mm, 
rim 3.5mm 
Lost 
R85 3rd cent. 220mm 185mm-
206mm 
1315g 2.5mm; rim 
5mm. 
Lost 
R86 Mid-to-Late 
3rd cent. 
255mm 170-227mm 1180g 1-2mm; rim 
4.5mm 
Lost 
R87 Mid-2nd to 
early-1st cent. 
227mm 194x212mm 984g 1-2mm Lost 
R88 Late 2nd – 1st 
cent.  
168mm 210-216mm 680g 1-1.5mm Lost 
R89 Late 2nd – 
first half of 1st 
cent. 
193mm 183-210mm 960 1.5-3mm Lost 
R90 300 – 100 203.2mm 228.6mm 1,180g  Lost 
R91 250 - 150 203.2mm  1,270g c. 3-6mm Lost 
R92 220 – 170 192mm 217mm 1,090g 2-3.5mm Lost 
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 Although most of these helmets do not retain cheek-guards, all of them had attachment 
points and would have originally included cheek-guards.  So the examples without their cheek-
guards still extant would have been significantly heavier than their listed weights.  The thickness, 
and thus weight, of cheek-guards seems to have declined in step with the helmet bowl itself, 
beginning to fall in the late second century.  Marcus Junkelmann has published a very well-
preserved pair of cheek-guards (cat. R94, fig. 4.37), dated to between the middle of the third and 
the beginning of the second century.239  They range between 2 and 2.5mm thick and weigh 350g 
each.  Another right cheek-guard (without the matching left piece) dated from the late first 
century B.C.E. to the first half of the first century C.E. (cat. R95) was only 0.8 to 1.4mm thick, 
and massed only 92g.240 
 The relatively wide variation over time makes it a challenge to establish weights for the 
purpose of reconstructing the Roman heavy infantry panoply.  Given my study’s reliance on 
Polybius, I focus my reconstruction on the period for which his description is most likely to 
apply, namely the end of the third century and the first half of the second century.  A 
reconstruction focused on the earlier third century would likely suggest a significantly heavier 
weight for the Montefortino-type helmet, while a reconstruction focused on the post-Marian 
army would, in turn, posit a substantially lighter weight.  Of note here is the effect that this 
chronological choice has on the other Gallic type, the Coolus helmet, which is to exclude it.  This 
type of helmet was in use by the Gauls starting in the fourth century.  However, as Paddock 
notes, it was only adopted by the Romans in the mid-first century, placing its use by them 
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outside of this period.241  The Coolus type will, however, be discussed in more depth as a Gallic 
helmet in chapter 6. 
Given this chronological focus, reconstruction of some of the heavier late third century 
examples (eg. cat. R83, R85 and R86), with a pair of cheek-guards of around 350g each 
(consistent with cat. R94), would suggest a maximum case around 2kg.  At the low end, some of 
the lightest helmets (e.g. cat. R88, R89) from the end of the period with a pair of cheek-guards 
around 100g each (consistent with cat. R95), would suggest a minimum case of around 0.9-
1.2kg.  Because this study is mostly focused on the earlier second century, the median case is 
likely to fall closer to the heavier examples, with a helmet bowl probably around 1.2kg and 
cheek-guards at c. 200g each, suggesting a median case c. 1.6kg. 
 
Greaves – Prevalence and Reconstruction 
 Polybius notes that, in addition to body armor and a helmet, the Romans wore προκνημίς, 
or leg protection, generally translated as greaves, although the word here is singular.242  Greaves 
also figure into the panoplies of the first and second class described by Livy and Dionysius for 
the reign of Servius Tullius; the difficulties with those accounts have already been discussed.243  
The apparently uncomplicated picture presented by the textual evidence is, however, 
complicated by the representational evidence.  Only the figure of Mars on the Paris relief of the 
Altar of Domitius Ahenobarbus wears greaves; neither the infantrymen nor the cavalryman 
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does.244  Although damage makes firm identification difficult, none of the figures on the 
Aemilius Paullus monument appears to have had greaves either.  Taylor, in reconstructing the 
monument, does not supply any.245  The Macedonian figures on the monument also lack greaves, 
despite an inscription from Amphipolis, discussed in more depth in the following chapter, which 
seems to suggest quite strongly that greaves were a mandatory piece of equipment in the 
Antigonid army.246  Thus the possibility must be admitted that greaves might have been omitted 
in sculpture even when they were present on the battlefield, perhaps out of a desire to display the 
musculature of the leg.  At the same time, the possibility that many soldiers simply went without 
greaves should not be discounted.  Greaves were the least essential part of the Roman panoply, 
as the legs could be protected from missiles with the scutum, and actually striking the lower leg 
in combat is difficult with most melee weapons. 
 Greaves are not, however, entirely absent from artwork of the period.  The two figures of 
the Osuna relief both wear a single greave on their left legs (fig. 4.38).247  As Bishop and 
Coulston note, this was a sensible arrangement, as the soldier’s stance would present the 
(shielded) left side of the body with the right leg back so that he could step forward while 
striking with his own weapon; the left leg was thus more vulnerable than the right.248  With a 
greave on the left leg, the soldier could present a solid front of armor when on the defensive.  
Walbank suggests that the use of a singular greave may explain Polybius’ use of προκνημίς in 
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the singular.249  Two ivory reliefs from Palestrina show greaves, this time in pairs, but the 
figures, in muscle-cuirasses and carrying spears, although without swords, do not seem to be 
equipped in Roman fashion, and so these reliefs cannot be securely tied to the Roman military 
(fig. 4.39).250  A wall painting in Paestum dated to the early fourth century shows two foot-
soldiers, each wearing a pair of greaves.251  Likewise, greaves commonly occur in combination 
with the triple-disc cuirass, as with a bronze figurine in the Louvre depicting a warrior, possibly 
a Samnite, and a warrior wearing a triple-disc cuirass on a squat lekythos now in the British 
Museum; both wear full pairs of greaves.252 
 Because of the contradictory evidence, the presence or absence of greaves in 
reconstructions of Roman soldiers in the Republic varies significantly, and there is no consensus 
in the scholarship.  Feugère suggests that greaves were probably the preserve of centurions and 
officers before being phased out during the first century CE.253  Connolly presents soldiers in all 
three possible states, with greaves, without them, and with only a single greave, but suggests that 
the wearing of one greave was the Roman style.254 D’Amato presents a late Republican centurion 
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in greaves, but otherwise omits greaves from his reconstruction, despite presenting them as part 
of the standard equipment in his text.255  In practice, the evidence permits no certainty as to how 
common or uncommon greaves were in the Middle Republic, except to say that some soldiers 
wore them and some did not.  It may perhaps be added that they must have been fairly common 
at least early in the second century for Polybius to include them, but beyond this, the evidence 
permits little confidence. 
 Reconstructing the likely metal-weight of greaves is also difficult.  None have yet been 
found from the period in a Roman context, although a set of metal fittings from Cáceres el Viejo 
in Spain are thought to have been presses for them.256  So it is necessary to rely on comparative 
evidence in assessing the likely metal-weight of Roman greaves.  Three sets of greaves found in 
Italy or thought likely to have originated there, now in the British Museum, are presented in 
Table 4.6.  Unfortunately, one pair of copper-alloy greaves (cat. H48) could not be removed 
from their mounting in order to measure their mass, as they were bolted in; although displayed 
together, they do not appear to have originally been paired.257  These measurements fit with 
weights suggested by Eero Jarva for greaves in the Archaic period in Greece, which ranged from 
0.5 to 1.1kg, growing generally lighter over time.258 
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Table 4.6: Greaves in the British Museum 
Cat. No. Date Length Mass Thickness Notes: 
H50 500-450 45.72cm 759g 2.2mm Pair w/ H51 
H51 500-450 45.72cm 773g 2.4-4mm Pair w/ H50 
H48a 6-5th cent. 46.9cm  1.9mm  
H48b 6-5th cent. 46.2cm  2.5-4mm  
H49a 550-500 43cm 580g 1.6-
2.5mm 
Pair w/ H49b 
H49b 550-500 42cm 623g 2.1-3mm Pair w/ H49a 
 
 Because the prevalence of the use of greaves is so unclear, the metal-weight 
reconstruction, as a matter of assessing the ‘typical’ soldier, will be more tentative than has been  
the case with other kinds of equipment.  The minimum case must clearly be set at the complete 
omission of greaves, strongly attested in the representational evidence.  As a maximum case, a 
full pair of greaves at c. 1.5kg (following cat. H50 and H51) in copper-alloy seem a reasonable 
supposition.  For the median or ‘typical’ case, we may assume a single greave worn on the left 
leg, following the Osuna relief, of perhaps 650g in copper-alloy, although it must be stressed 
how tentative this median case is. 
 
Quantitative Analysis 
Metal-Weights for the Heavy Infantry 
 Table 4.7 presents the estimated metal-weights for each piece of the Roman heavy 
infantry panoply.  Taking these into account, Table 4.8 then presents the resulting metal-weights 
for the Roman heavy infantry in the minimum, maximum and median cases: 
 
Table 4.7: Reconstructed Metal-Weights for Roman Heavy Infantry by Equipment Type 
 Minimum Median Maximum 
Gladius  530g 680g 1,000g 
Pila (as a pair) 575g 665g 985g 
Hasta 130g 300g 420g 
Scutum 335g 420g 500g 
Lorica Hamata 3,800g 4,800g 5,900g 
Pectoral 650g 1,580g 2,500g 
Helmet 1,000g 1,600g 2,000g 
Greaves 0g (none worn) 650g (single greave) 1,500g (pair) 
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The infantrymen are divided between the front two lines (hastati and principes) and the 
triarii, and between those who are loricatus (wearing the lorica hamata) and those wearing the 
pectoral.  The extreme measurements implied by the maximum and minimum cases are meant to 
serve only as the 
outer bounds for 
reconstruction; few 
soldiers would have 
been equipped in all of the heaviest or all of the lightest gear.  The median case, again, represents 
a ‘best guess’ based on the available evidence of what the ‘average’ or ‘typical’ soldier might 
have carried. 
 It is then necessary to aggregate these figures to represent the larger units in which 
Romans fought.  This calculation requires computing an average of the above metal-weights 
based on the ratios of each class of soldier.  The ratio between the three lines of heavy infantry is 
given by Polybius.  There were 1200 hastati, 1200 principes and 600 triarii in a legion 
generally.259  How many men would have worn the lorica hamata is not known, but the evidence 
does permit a range of reasonable estimates to be tested.  Average values for the heavy infantry 
of the legion (excluding velites and equites) are presented below in table 4.9: 
Table 4.9: Reconstructed Average Per-Soldier Metal-Weights for the Roman Heavy Infantry: 
Prevalence of the 
lorica hamata 
Minimum Case 
Reconstructions 
Median Case 
Reconstructions 
Maximum Case 
Reconstructions 
1/3 loricatus 4,051g 6,595g 9,505g 
40% loricatus 4,279g 6,810g 9,732g 
1/2 loricatus 4,576g 7,132g 10,072g 
2/3 loricatus 5,101g 7,668g 10,638g 
 
 
 
                                                 
259 See above at n. 21. 
Table 4.8: Reconstructed Metal-Weights for Roman Heavy Infantry 
by Soldier Type: 
 Minimum Median Maximum 
Hastatus/Princeps 3,090g 5,595g 8,485g 
Hastatus/Princeps, loricatus 6,240g 8,815g 11,885g 
Triarius 2,645g 5,230g 7,920g 
Triarius loricatus 5,795g 8,450g 11,320g 
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Non-Metal Equipment Requirements – Wood and Textiles 
 Although worked metal will have represented the most expensive element of the Roman 
heavy infantry panoply, wooden elements actually make up the majority of the weight of the 
panoply.  Reconstructed scuta generally have wooden elements at or just under 10kg.260  
Connolly’s reconstruction of the pilum, detailed above, suggest around 2kg of wood for a pair, 
bringing the total weight of wooden equipment to c. 12kg for a hastatus or princeps.261  While 
this figure exceeds by weight the total metal-weight of any projection, it probably represented a 
relatively smaller portion of the total cost of the equipment.  It is important to keep in mind the 
tremendous fuel costs underlying the much smaller metal-weight figures.  The lowest metal-
weight figure for a non-loricatus hastatus or princeps, 3.09kg, would require c. 430kg of raw 
wood for fuel in the smelting process alone, with more required for forging.262  While finished 
wood products, particularly the scutum, would certainly require more labor than an equivalent 
mass of wood turned into charcoal, the tremendous fuel and labor demands of worked metal 
vastly exceed those of wooden equipment. 
 Textiles would also make an important part of the Roman panoply, but, as with wooden 
elements, a relatively small portion of the total resource and labor intensity.  Roman helmets 
were designed to be used with a lining of wool or linen both for absorbing impacts and for 
increased fit and comfort.263  Likewise, it is generally assumed that the lorica hamata was worn 
                                                 
260 Junkelmann (1986), 174-179.  Connolly (1981), 131, 233. 
261 Connolly (2000), 43-46. 
262 Sim and Ridge (2002), 23.  Using J. F. Healy’s figures would result in a much lower consumption of fuel wood 
around c. 86kg, but still well in excess of the requirements for wooden equipment.  As a matter of accuracy, Sim and 
Ridge’s larger fuel consumption number is probably to be preferred. Healy (1978), 151, 196. 
263 Paddock (1993), 67-71. 
 263 
over a quilted or felt garment, called a thoracomachus or a subarmalis.264  Attestation for 
padding worn under mail armor, however, comes only in later sources, such as the fourth century 
C.E. anonymous De Rebus Bellicis.265  While we cannot be certain that such a padded garment 
was used during the period of the Republic, it seems very likely.  Clear examples of the 
subarmalis from the Republic are rare, although a sculpture from Volterra may depict a quilted 
variant, and the second soldier in the Osuna relief appears to be wearing some kind of padded 
textile garment.266  Without effective padding, the defensive value of the lorica hamata would 
have been significantly reduced.  As Paddock notes, we have ample evidence for the use of felt 
or linen padding worn beneath helmets.267  The potential defensive properties of felt or quilted 
textiles were also clearly known, exemplified by Caesar’s soldiers’ use of such garments while 
constructing siege works at Dyrrachium.268  Thus, despite the lack of clear evidence for a padded 
or quilted garment beneath the lorica hamata during the Republic, it seems very likely that such 
garments were worn. 
To accurately reconstruct the resource and labor requirements for any additional padding 
worn under the lorica hamata is impossible.  We lack a sense of the number of quilted layers or 
the thickness of felt and the method by which the garment was assembled, for instance with thick 
felt, or by quilting multiple layers of fabric.  A comparison with the reconstruction of the Greek 
and Macedonian linothorax, discussed in more depth in the next chapter, however, is instructive.  
                                                 
264 Bishop and Coulston (2006), 63.  D’Amato (2009), 38.  Note also G. Sumner, Roman Military Dress (Stroud: 
The History Press, 2009), 170-175 and Junkelmann (1986), 154-157. 
265 De rebus Bellicis 15.  Note also SHA Severus 6.11. 
266 Volterra: Sumner (2009), 100, fig. 4.  Osuna: D’Amato (2009), 18-19. 
267 Paddock (1993), 61-71. 
268 Caesar, B.C. 3.44.6. 
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An order for a soldier’s clothing preserved on papyrus in Egypt dating to c. 138 C.E. gives a 
weight of c 1.6kg for a rather large and surprisingly thick soldier’s tunic, possibly indicating a 
subarmalis.269  In contrast, the linothorax has been reconstructed at around 3.5 to 4kg of textiles, 
or around 2-2.5 times as much fabric, with an estimated production time, including spinning and 
weaving, of some 715 hours.270  The comparison suggests that the spinning, weaving and 
construction time for a subarmalis might have been in the range of 280-350 hours, requiring 
labor skills that were already readily available within a normal Roman household.  In 
comparison, Sim estimates that to produce a lorica hamata of around 40,000 rings would require 
around 2,300 hours, not including mining, smelting, or bar-smithing, with finer coats of mail 
requiring dramatically more time.271  This manufacture time encompasses not only work by 
semi-skilled apprentices making the wire, but also skilled labor assembling the final coat.  As a 
result, while the addition of a subarmalis beneath the lorica hamata would have significantly 
improved the protective qualities of the armor, it was unlikely to be a major driver of cost, as the 
labor and resource intensity of the metal components of the panoply would have been much 
higher. 
 
 
 
Light Infantry and Cavalry 
Reconstructions for the velites and 
equites in the legion of the Roman Republic 
are necessarily more speculative, as there is far 
                                                 
269 Sumner (2009), 23. 
270 Aldrete, et al. (2013), 146, 152. 
271 Sim and Kaminski (2012), 132.  Mail with higher ring-counts: Sim (1997), 370-371. 
Table 4.10: Reconstructed per-soldier Metal-
weights for the equites and velites 
 Minimum Median Maximum 
Equites 5,620g 8,190g 10,980g 
Velites 1,320g 1,470g 1,790g 
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less evidence of their equipment.  However, some conclusions, albeit tentative ones, may be 
suggested.  The personal battlefield equipment of the Roman equites would have included a 
helmet of either the Montefortino or, as on the Altar of Domitius Ahenobarbus, a Boeotian type 
(discussed in more detail in chapter 5), the lorica hamata, a hasta, a gladius, and a parma.272  
Fittings and tack for the cavalryman’s horse would also have included some metal elements, but 
the reconstruction of equestrian equipment, although its importance is not to be overlooked, is 
outside of the scope of this project.  For the velites, Livy notes the use of the parma, the gladius, 
and seven lighter javelins, the hasta velitaris.273  Polybius notes that the velites supplemented 
their helmets, “sometimes with a wolf’s skin or something like it, both to protect and to act as a 
distinguishing mark.”274  Based on that statement, it has generally been supposed that the helmet 
of the velites was probably a textile helmet (a galea), rather than a metal one (a cassis), as a 
wolf’s hide would have little reinforcement to offer a copper-alloy helmet.275  The metal-weights 
in table 4.10 and subsequently follow this conclusion.  However, the idea that some velites might 
have used a metal helmet, likely to have been of the Montefortino type, cannot be ruled out.  The 
addition of a metal helmet would have effectively doubled the metal requirements of an 
individual veles, meaning that the adoption of a metal helmet by even a relatively small number 
of velites would have had a large impact on the average metal requirements of the velites as a 
collective group. 
                                                 
272 McCall (2002). 
273 Shield and gladius: Livy 38.21.12-13.  Number of javelins: Livy 26.4. 
274 Plb. 6.22.3, προσεπικοσμεῖται δὲ καὶ λιτῷ περικεφαλαίῳ: ποτὲ δὲ λυκείαν ἤ τι τῶν τοιούτων ἐπιτίθεται, σκέπης 
ἅμα καὶ σημείου χάριν.   
275 Walbank (1957), 703, likewise concludes that Polybius is expressing the distinction between leather or textile 
galea or galerus and metal cassis, a distinction also made in Propertius (Prop 4.10.20) and Vergil (Verg. Aeneid 
7.688) and made explicit by Isidore (Isidore, Origines 18.14): “cassis de lamina est, galea de corio.” 
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Reconstructions of the metal-weight requirements for the velites and the equites based on 
these assumptions are presented in the table 4.10.  For the parma, in both cases, a boss is 
assumed following the circular boss found at Numantia (cat. R51) and a small handgrip 
reinforcement of c. 20g.  The hasta velitaris follows Connolly’s reconstruction presented above, 
assuming c. 90g per hasta velitaris.276  The much smaller amount of metal required to equip a 
veles is consistent with their recruitment from relatively poor citizens.  In contrast, while the 
equites do require somewhat less worked metal than their loricati infantry counterparts, this 
difference would be more than compensated for by the cost of the cavalryman’s horse.  
Comparative evidence from the Late Empire suggests that the cost to equip an armored 
cavalryman, including acquiring his horse, might be about double the cost to equip an armored 
infantryman.277   
 
Metal Requirements for a Legion 
 The legion was fundamentally a combined-arms unit composed of cavalry, light infantry 
and heavy infantry.  While this analysis is focused on the latter, it is worthwhile to consider the 
material requirements of the entire legion.  It was typically composed of 1200 each of hastati, 
principes, and velites, 600 triarii and 300 equites.278  Assuming 40% of the heavy infantry wore 
the lorica hamata, equipping an entire legion would require (following the median cases) some 
20,565kg (22.6 tons) of worked metal in iron and copper-alloy.  Higher prevalence-rates for the 
lorica hamata, likely reached later in the second century, would result in higher figures; with 
                                                 
276 Connolly, (1997), 43-46. 
277 Elton (1996), 122. 
278 Plb. 6.21.6-9; 6.25.1-3.  Keppie (1984), 34-5. 
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two-thirds of the legion’s heavy infantry loricatus, the total rises to 22,626kg (25 tons).  Each 
Roman legion thus represented a truly astounding investment in labor and resource-intensive 
metal equipment.  The vast majority of this investment went into the heavy infantry.  Even if we 
assume, as suggested above, that because of the cost in horses and feed, an eques cost roughly 
twice as much to field and equip as a heavy infantryman, the equites collectively would still only 
represent some 18% of the total equipping cost of the legion.279  As subsequent chapters will 
show, Roman soldiers, especially in the heavy infantry, were more heavily and expensively 
equipped than their Mediterranean rivals.  This result is quite startling, because the Roman 
Republic’s commitment to maintaining larger military deployments, as well as its willingness to 
suffer larger casualties than the other major states of the Mediterranean, are well established.   
 
Conclusions 
The matériel intensity of Roman troops, especially the heavy infantry, likely contributed 
to the Roman qualitative edge.  Recent scholars have sometimes been hesitant to attribute clear 
advantages to specific combinations of armor and weapons in the ancient world, instead noting 
that, in a general sense, it is not typically possible to demonstrate a meaningful technological 
edge in warfare.280  Mail armor, however, probably did represent a genuine technological 
advance that gave the Romans, as early adopters, a real advantage.  Mail armor would continue 
                                                 
279 Assuming an average eques cost twice as much as the average infantryman would suggest a total cost to field an 
eques as being equivalent to the cost of around 13.62kg of worked metal.  Thus the 300 equites of a legion, with a 
combined ‘all included’ cost equivalent to roughly 4,000kg of worked metal would represent around 18% of the 
total cost of equipping a legion. 
280 On this, particularly on charges of ‘technological determinism,’ note for instance F. Rey, “Weapons, 
Technological Determinism and Ancient Warfare” in New Perspectives on Ancient Warfare edited by G. G. Fagan 
and M. Trundle (Leiden: Brill. 2010), 21-56.  In practice, Rey’s argument, which fails to recognize meaningful 
distinctions within weapon and armor classes, is reductive to the point of uselessness. 
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to serve as the ‘gold standard’ of body-armor in Europe and the Middle East until the late Middle 
Ages, because it offered an excellent mix of protection and mobility, albeit at a very high cost 
premium.  Other elements of the panoply, particularly the pilum, provided an advantage that was 
economic in origin rather than technological; the pilum was not a particularly advanced weapon, 
but it demanded a willingness to invest significant time and resources into producing large 
numbers of disposable weapons with large metal components.  Ultimately, Roman soldiers may 
have rightly drawn a measure of confidence from the greater protection and offensive potential 
afforded by their equipment. 
The advantages of the Roman panoply were certainly not lost on Rome’s rivals.  Polybius 
notes that Hannibal, after his early victories, used the spoils to equip his African troops entirely 
in Roman fashion.281  Likewise, Nicholas Sekunda has assembled an impressive body of 
evidence suggesting that the Ptolemaic and Seleucid kingdoms attempted to reform their armies 
along Roman lines beginning in the 160s, and to adopt Roman equipment, at least for elite 
units.282  Roman equipment also shows significant diffusion in the western Mediterranean, with 
the appearance of Roman-style weapons and armor in the Tomb of Micipsa in Numidia, as well 
as the appearance of Montefortino-type helmets that seem to have been manufactured in 
Spain.283  This diffusion comes in spite of the resource intensity of Roman equipment.  This high 
resource intensity meant that to adopt Roman equipment would have been an expensive choice 
                                                 
281 Plb. 3.114.1. 
282 Sekunda, (2001a); Sekunda, (1994/5).   
283 Roman-style mail armor and weapons in Numidia: G. Waurick, “Die Schutzwaffen im numidischen Grab von Es 
Soumâa” in Die Numider: Reiter und Könige nördlich der Sahara, eds. H. G. Horn and C. B. Rüger, (Köln: Kunst 
und Altertum am Rhein, 1979), 305-35; Ulbert (1979).  Montefortino helmets from Iberia: F. Quesada Sanz, 
“Montefortino-type and related helmets in the Iberian Peninsula: a study in archaeological context” JRMES 8 
(1997b), 151-166. 
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for both the individual or the state.  Thus, adopting Roman arms suggests that the qualitative 
edge they provided was perceived as significant, perhaps even decisive, by Rome’s rivals. 
The Roman military system, then, invested as much in quality as it did in quantity.  
Roman equipment was very effective, but also very expensive in both labor and materials.  
Roman soldiers also show themselves to be highly motivated and capable on the battlefield.  The 
Roman army was thus one composed of high quality soldiers, equipped with high quality gear.  
This observation demands fresh examination of the Roman system for mobilizing men and 
resources for war.  How is it possible that Rome fielded not only such high quality heavy 
infantry, but also so much of it? 
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Figure 4.1: Paris Frieze from the so-called Altar of Domitius Ahenobarbus
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Figure 4.2: Detail of eques on the Paris frieze: 
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Figure 4.3: Detail of Mars on the Paris frieze:
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Figure 4.4: Mars and magistrate from the Paris frieze 
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Figure 4.5: Elements of a Roman gladius 
 
Fig. 4.6: Waisting in Roman gladii.  From top to bottom, gladius from Osuna, Spain; Šmihel-2; 
Šmihel-1; Xiphos, the ‘Sword of Beroia’ with more strongly pronounced ‘waisting.’284 
 
                                                 
284 Scale drawings: P. Connolly (1997), 52.  L. Touratsoglou, “Τὸ ξῖφος τῆς Βεροιας: Συμβολὴ στὴ Μακεδονικὴ 
ὁπλοποιία τῶν ὕστερων Κλασσικῶν Χρὸνων,”Ancient Macedonia IV (Thessaloniki, Institute for Balkan Studies, 
1968), 617.   
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Fig. 4.7: Development of the gladius Hispaniensis.285 
 
                                                 
285 Connolly (1997), 54, Fig. 11. 
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Fig. 4.8: Evolution of the Gladius type.286 
 
                                                 
286 F. Quesada Sanz, (1997a), 265. 
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Fig. 4.9: Digital Reconstructions of two gladii from Grad near Šmihel287 
 
                                                 
287 Scale drawing of the swords from Bishop and Coulston (2006), 55. 
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Fig. 4.10: Three-Dimensional Projections of the reconstructed gladii from Grad near Šmihel 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Šmihel-1 (680g) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Šmihel-2 (530g) 
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Figure 4.11: Pila from Grad near Šmihel 288 
4.11a: Flat Tanged pila  
 
4.11b: Socked pila 
 
 
                                                 
288 Horvat (1997). 
 280 
 
Figure 4.12: Pila tips reconstructed by Connolly; 3 and 4 are squared off ‘bodkin’ type points.
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Fig. 4.13: Type A (Mid-Ridge) Spear-Heads (not to scale): 
  
Left to right: cat. R40 from Cáceres El Viejo, cat. R33 from Numantia.289   
 
Gallic Examples (not to scale):  
  
From left to right: cat. G75 (British Museum ML 2403), cat. G55-G56.290 
  
                                                 
289 Images: Ulbert (1985), taf. 24. Schulten, (1929), taf. 45.5. 
290 Images: Left: British Museum ML.2403.  Right: Thierry Lejars, (2013). 
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Fig. 4.14: Type B spearheads from Es Soumâa with rhombic cross-sections291 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
291 Ulbert (1985), 355 
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Fig. 4.15: Digitally Reconstructed Spear Points from Caminreal (to scale): 
 
 
Left to Right: cat. R20-R24.292 
 
Fig. 4.16: Type C (Bodkin Point) Spear-Heads from Es Soumâa: 
 
Left: cat. R45, Right: cat. R46.293 
                                                 
292 Scale drawings from Vicente, et al., (1997), 167-99. 
293 Image: Ulbert, (1979), 337.. 
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Fig. 4.17: Kasr al-Harit shield, from the Fayyum, Egypt294
 
                                                 
294 Bishop and Coulston (2006), 62. 
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Fig. 4.18: Detail for the Paris Frieze.  Red arrows point to raised detailing consistent with a boss; 
green circle marks traces of what may have been detailing for a metal rim.
 
Fig. 4.19. Roman shield bosses (umbones)  Top: Butterfly bosses from Caminreal; Bottom: 
spindle-shaped bosses, including a fragment from Lager III at Numantia.  Images not to scale 
with each other.295
                                                 
295 Bishop and Coulston (2006), 62; Bockius (1989), 272.   
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Fig. 4.20: Digital Reconstruction of the Caminreal umbones: 
 
Left: cat. R52, Right: cat. R53.296 
Fig. 4.21: Early Imperial shield rims from Aislingen and Spettisbury297 
 
Fig. 4.22: Early Imperial handgrips from Newstead:298 
 
                                                 
296 Scale drawing from Vicente, et al. (1997). 
297 Bishop and Coulston (2006), 93. 
298 Biship and Coulston (2006), 93. 
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Fig. 4.23: Shield Boss with Attached Maniple (NMB2902)299 
 
Fig. 4.24: Horseman for the Lacus Curtius, showing the cavalry parma as a round, center-bossed 
shield:300 
 
  
                                                 
299 Scale drawing: Lejars, (2013). 
 
300 Connolly (1981), 133. 
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Fig. 4.25: Details from the Glanum relief, showing ‘Roman’ infantry and cavalry with Greek-
style double-strap (porpax-antelabe grip) shields and Hellenistic ‘Phrygian’ helmets.301
  
  
                                                 
301 D’Amato (2009), 12. 
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Fig. 4.26: Hellenistic soldier in Roman-style equipment with a Hellenistic variant of the scutum 
(the thureos) and mail armor.  From the stele of Salmas in Sidon.302
 
  
                                                 
302 Sekunda (1994) vol 2, 73, fig. 67. 
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Fig. 4.27: Detail from the Paris Frieze.  Note especially that the soldier’s shoulder-doubling 
appears clearly as an extra-layer of mail over the main mail shirt of the lorica hamata when 
viewed from the side. 
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Fig. 4.28: Statue of the Vacheres warrior.  Note especially that his mail sleeve protrudes beyond 
the second layer of mail provided by the shoulder-protection. 
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Fig. 4.29: Armor rings from Thorsberg (150-250 C.E.):303 
 
 
Fig. 4.30: Imperial period armor rings from Arbeia and Leiden.  Top-left image shows a rusted-
together concretion of rings, which is a common find-condition for many iron armor rings.304
 
                                                 
303 Sim and Kaminski (2012), 125. 
304 Sim and Kaminski (2012), Plate 4.  
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Fig. 4.31: Capestrano Warrior statue.305 
 
  
                                                 
305 Drawing from Connolly (1981), 101. 
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Figure 4.32: Iberian pectoral harness with circular-ring motifs in the Museo Arqueológico 
Nacional, Madrid (cat. I28) 
 
Fig. 4.33: Italic Rectangular Anatomical Cuirass (front plate and back plate) in the British 
Museum (cat. R72): 
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Figure 4.34: Warrior on squat lekythos, 350-330 B.C.E. (British Museum 1986,0403.4) 
  
 297 
 
Fig. 4.35: Remains of a triple-disc pectoral in the British Museum (cat. R78): 
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Fig. 4.36: Montefortino helmet, basic features.306 
 
 
Fig. 4.37: Cheek-Guards (cat. R94) from a Montefortino Helmet.307 
 
  
                                                 
306 From Paddock (1993), 472, fig. 123. 
307 Junkelmann (2000), 163. 
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Figure 4.38: Osuna Relief, showing greaves worn on the left legs.308
  
 
 
  
                                                 
308 D’Amato (2009), 18. 
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Fig. 4.39: Reliefs from Palestrina.309 
 
                                                 
309 Feugère (1993), 4. 
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CHAPTER 5: THE MACEDONIANS 
 
 This chapter presents resource-intensity reconstructions for the equipment of the major 
Hellenistic states, in the same manner as the previous chapter did for the Roman Republic.  As 
with the reconstructions of both Roman equipment (Chapter 4) and that of pre-state peoples 
(Chapter 6), the primary quantitative tool for this comparison is metal-weights, used as a proxy 
for cost, although non-metal equipment factors into this reconstruction and analysis of it rather 
more than in the previous chapter.  Part of the core purpose of this chapter is to provide a 
comparative benchmark against which to measure the Roman evidence.  Thus the comparison 
focuses on Hellenistic armies as organized and deployed during the period of open conflict with 
Rome, which is to say the last quarter of the third century and the first half of the second century.  
This does mean that certain trends in the composition and organization of Hellenistic armies after 
c. 160 BCE (such as ‘Romanizing’ organizational or tactical reform, or further changes in the 
ethnic composition of these armies) fall outside of this limited chronological scope and are not 
discussed in depth here. 
This chapter, then, first discusses the main sources of evidence on which the 
reconstruction is based, before identifying the many types of regular, mercenary and auxiliary 
soldiers available to Hellenistic kings.  The core ‘Macedonian’ elements of these armies, which 
make up the heaviest and most resource intensive parts, are the focus of this chapter and are 
reconstructed in detail.  After the reconstructions, preliminary conclusions are drawn from the 
final figures for the resource requirements of these soldiers, especially as compared to the figures 
for the Roman army generated in the previous chapter.  The evidence for the Hellenistic armies 
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of this period poses significantly greater difficulties than the Roman evidence.  This 
chapter thus also endeavors to clarify which conclusions are to be considered more secure, and 
which are necessarily more speculative.   
 
Sources 
 While the main problem in reconstructing the equipment of the Roman legion was 
reconciling the many, often unclear or conflicting, sources, the problem for major Hellenistic 
powers is the opposite: to assemble a complete reconstruction out of the fragmentary and often 
patchwork descriptions that survive.  No outsider’s full description of Hellenistic armies, of the 
sort that Polybius composed for the Roman legion, survives.  Instead, descriptions of Hellenistic 
military equipment in the sources tend to be dispersed and often frustratingly lacunose. 
 The main contemporary description of the Hellenistic phalanx is that of Polybius, who 
offers a comparison of the Roman and Macedonian fighting styles.1  He does disclose a number 
of key details for the phalanx, such as the spacing of individual soldiers, and the length of the 
sarisa, but he does not discuss the organizational structure of the formation or the other 
equipment used.2  Moreover, his comparison poses an interpretive problem, given his argument 
that the Hellenistic sarisa-phalanx was an altogether inferior formation to the Roman legion.  As 
a result, we should hesitate to credit some of what he claims.  Polybius’ insistence, for instance 
on the inflexibility and vulnerability of the phalanx seems to run counter to the Seleucid 
phalanx’s ability to form a defensive square successfully when pressed.3  Polybius himself 
                                                 
1 Plb. 18.28-32. 
2 Plb. 18.29.1-5. 
3 Plb. 18.31.7-12.  Cf. App.  Syr. 35, where the Seleucid phalanx “nevertheless put forth their close-packed sarisae 
at all four angles” ὅμως δὲ τὰς σαρίσσας ἐκ τετραγώνου προβαλλόμενοι πυκνὰς. 
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admits that Pyrrhus’ formation, combining a Hellenistic phalanx with Italic heavy infantry, was 
more flexible and effective than the unalloyed form he criticizes; it had been a match for third 
century Roman legion in the field.4  Thus Polybius’ criticisms, while valuable, must be treated 
with some care.  However, his primary limitation as a source for these purposes is that he 
assumes a reader already familiar with Hellenistic warfare, and perceives no need to explain 
exactly what is entailed in equipping soldiers ‘in a Macedonian manner.’   
 For a more complete rendering of Hellenistic equipment and tactics, we are thus often 
forced to rely on later sources.  The most valuable of these is Asclepiodotus’ Tactics, which 
provides a complete organizational summary of a model Hellenistic phalanx, and occasional 
brief descriptions of the expected armaments of the traditional parts of a Hellenistic army.  
Asclepiodotus, however, was no commander himself, but a philosopher, and the phalanx he 
presents, along with its equipment, is idealized.  The date of composition is uncertain, but it 
likely to be during the first century B.C.E., when the phalanx outlined was very nearly a defunct 
formation.5  Perhaps the most valuable evidence Asclepiodotus provides is his detailed 
organizational summary of the normal divisions of a Hellenistic phalanx, which seem generally 
to map well onto the inscriptional evidence for the Antigonid army, though this sometimes uses 
different terminology.6  Further information on the formations and equipment of the period is 
                                                 
4 Plb. 18.28.10-11. 
5 Connolly (1981), 76.  K. K. Müller, “Asklepiodotus” RE ii col. 1637-1641.  Note also the useful introduction and 
discussion of the author in the Loeb edition, Aeneas Tacticus, Asclepiodotus, and Onasander, trans. Illinois Greek 
Club (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1928), 230-243.  On the reliability of Asclepiodotus and the genre of 
philosophical military manuals in general, note esp. G. Wrightson, “To Use or Not to Use: The Practical and 
Historical Reliability of Asclepiodotus’s ‘Philosophical’ Tactical Manual” in Ancient Warfare: Introducing Current 
Research eds. G. Lee, H. Whittaker and G. Wrightson (Newcastle on Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2015), 
64-93. 
6 Asclepiodotus 2.1-10.  Sekunda (2013), 88-98.  Hatzopoulos (2001), 76-80. 
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occasionally preserved in Plutarch’s Parallel Lives, most notably in the Life of Philopoemen, 
where Plutarch contrasts the equipment and fighting style of the Greek thureophoros with heavy 
infantry equipped in Macedonian style.7  Plutarch, too, must be treated with significant care, 
however, as he is writing at even greater chronological distance than Asclepiodotus and, like 
him, is no soldier. 
 Another major type of literary evidence for Hellenistic armies is figures preserved for 
specific battles and deployments by the major Hellenistic powers.  Polybius presents figures for a 
number of important events, most notably for the Battle of Sellasia (222), the Battle of Raphia 
(217), and a Seleucid military parade at Daphne (166).8  Livy provides figures for the 
Macedonian army raised for the Third Macedonian War when it formed up at Citium (171), as 
well as providing, along with Appian, figures for the Battle of Magnesia (190).9  These orders of 
battle are particularly important given the lack of a full organization summary of actual (rather 
than idealized) Hellenistic armies, since they offer a sense of the scale of particular units, and the 
types of auxiliary troops typically present.  These orders of battle can be of limited use insofar as 
the equipment of each component of the battle is often not specified and must instead be inferred 
from other evidence.10  Moreover, many units are simply described with ethnic markers; it can be 
unclear if these classifications indicate ethnic origin, or equipment style, or both.11 
                                                 
7 Plut. Philop. 9.1-5. 
8 Sellasia: Plb. 2.65.2-4.  Raphia: Plb. 5.65, 79-87.  Daphne: Plb. 30.25. 
9 Liv. 42.51, 37.40.  App. Syr. 32.  Appian and Livy are clearly working from the same source, likely Polybius. 
10 Sekunda (2013), 108-127 does this for the Antigonid armies at Sellasia and Citium, but is compelled by the 
limited evidence to allow for a great deal of uncertainty, especially in the ‘ethnic’ contingents. 
11 Fischer-Bovet (2014), 169-195. 
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 Given the weaknesses and lacunas of the literary evidence, we are forced to rely even 
more heavily on the representational evidence to correlate weapons and armor mentioned by our 
sources with the surviving archaeological evidence.  One important source is Hellenistic funerary 
artwork.  A number of painted tombs and funeral stelae, most notably the painted tomb of Lyson 
and Kallikles, provide valuable representational evidence for the equipment of the Macedonian 
soldiery.12  In addition, state artwork of equipment provides a valuable resource, especially as it 
is often datable.  The depiction, for instance, of helmets and shields as common motifs on 
Hellenistic coins provides the basis for understanding chronological change and variation in both 
equipment types, given the limited archaeological evidence.13 
 One representational artwork of particular note is the Alexander Mosaic from the House 
of the Faun in Pompeii, now in the Naples Archaeological Museum (fig. 5.1a).  Though 
damaged, the surviving image depicts not only Alexander fighting on horseback, but also the 
Macedonian cavalry behind him, as well as the row of sarisae from his infantry which loom over 
Darius in the composition. The mosaic itself likely dates to the early first century BCE, but it is 
thought to be a copy of a third century original.14  Although the mosaic is damaged, elements of 
it, in particular the horse equipment, which is of accurate, late fourth century style, strongly 
                                                 
12 S. Miller, The Tomb of Lyson and Kallikles: A Painted Macedonian Tomb (Mainz am Rhein: Philipp von Zabern, 
1993).   Sekunda also discusses this tomb at length, though some of his conclusions seem questionable, Sekunda 
(2013), 9-20.  Painted funeral stele, note esp. Sekunda (1995). 
13 P. Dintsis, Hellenistiche Helme (Rome: Giorgio Bretschneider Editore, 1986).  K. Liampi, Makedonische Schild 
(Bonn: R. Habelt, 1998). 
14 A. Cohen, The Alexander Mosaic: stories of victory and defeat (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).  
J. K. Anderson notes the accuracy of the horse equipment for the late fourth century depicted in the mosaic, J. K. 
Anderson, Ancient Greek Horsemanship (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1961), 75.  Palo Moreno argues 
for the Alexander Mosaic’s lost original to be attributed to Apelles, which would make the original contemporary 
with Alexander, P. Moreno, Apelles: The Alexander Mosaic, trans. D. Stanton (Milan: Skira editore, 2001).  
On the use of the mosaic for reconstruction, note also Connolly (2000a), 106-7. 
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suggest that the original composition was produced with well-informed attention to late fourth 
century Macedonian equipment.  As a result, despite the late date of the actual mosaic, it remains 
a uniquely valuable representational source. 
 Finally, epigraphic evidence can be an important element for the study of Hellenistic 
armies.  Militiades Hatzopoulos’ study of the Antigonid army rightly puts the inscribed evidence, 
his documents nouveaux, up front in the title.15  Of particular importance for this study is the 
inscribed Antigonid military regulations from Amphipolis, dated to the reign of Philip V (r. 221-
179), which list the fines for failure to appear at muster with each piece of equipment required 
for both officers and regular soldiers.16  The inscription is not without difficulties, as some terms 
for equipment used in it are of uncertain meaning.  However, it provides the only official listing 
of equipment for a Hellenistic army to survive, and as such is of tremendous value. 
 One bias in the distribution of these sources must be mentioned: they come 
disproportionately from Macedonia proper or the Aegean, rather than from the larger Hellenistic 
states in the Greek East.  This limitation is present to one degree or another in nearly all of the 
evidence types, and is intensified by the outsized impact and preservation of material from the 
reigns of Philip II and Alexander III, which tend to further bias the material towards practice in 
Macedonia proper and away from the successor states of the Near East.  The literary sources, 
focused on Roman expansion, give far more attention to the Antigonid armies than they do to the 
Seleucid or Ptolemaic ones.  At the same time, the balance of representational evidence heavily 
favors the Antigonid kingdom, with no ready Ptolemaic or Seleucid match for the tomb paintings 
                                                 
15 Hatzopoulos (2001). 
16 The inscription is SEG 40.524.  M. Hatzopoulos, Macedonian Institutions Under the Kings, vol. 2 (Paris: De 
Boccard, 1996), 32-36.  Hatzopoulos (2001), 161-4. 
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at Lefkadia, the tomb of Lyson and Kallikles, the royal tombs at Vergina/Aigai, or the 
Amphipolis military regulations.17  The archaeological evidence likewise tends to come from 
Greece, Macedon and Southern Italy.  Southern Italy in particular provides an outsized 
proportion of preserved Greek military equipment for the third century, as the custom of burying 
warriors in armor remained common there long after it had fallen out of favor in Greece.  It is not 
always clear how typical the equipment from Southern Italy would have been; heavier armor and 
equipment seems to have consistently survived longer and remained more popular in Southern 
Italy than in Greece proper.18 
 The consequence of this westward skew in the evidence is that many of our assumptions 
about Hellenistic armies in general derive almost exclusively from evidence about the Antigonid 
army in particular.  While we are comparatively better informed about the organization of the 
Seleucid and Ptolemaic armies, any regional variations in their equipment remain obscure to us.  
Using the Antigonid army as a basis for understanding the equipment and tactics of the other 
major Hellenistic states is not an entirely foolhardy approach.  Polybius is willing, as noted 
below, to use Antigonid unit terminology to describe Ptolemaic and Seleucid formations, which 
implies a great deal of similarity between them.  Likewise, nearly all of the literary sources 
describe sarisa-phalanx units using some variation of the phrase “armed in the Macedonian 
manner,” suggesting that the equipment of these units varied little and that they were broadly 
interchangeable.19  That assumption is not implausible a priori; all of these systems not only had 
                                                 
17 However, Sekunda does note a number of painted grave stelae from the Ptolemaic Levant featuring thureophoroi 
which are quite valuable for this troop type, Sekunda (1995). 
18 T. Everson, Warfare in Ancient Greece: Arms and Armour from the Heroes of Homer to Alexander the Great 
(Stroud: Sutton Publishing, 2004), 112, 144.  A. M. Snodgrass, Arms and Armour of the Greeks (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1967), 128. 
19 Polybius uses variations of εἰς τὸν Μακεδονικὸν τρόπον to mean sarisa-phalanx troops, e.g. of Ptolemaic troops 
Plb. 5.65.8, of Seleucid troops Plb. 5.79.4-5.  Plut. Philop. 9.2 contrasts Greek fighting techniques with the sarisa-
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common descent from Alexander’s army, but also seem to have changed and evolved relatively 
little since then.  It is thus not unreasonable to suppose they would have remained broadly 
comparable in terms of equipment, even as regional variations in organization and recruitment 
became increasingly entrenched.  That said, this basic limitation to the source material, and thus 
the need to frequently extrapolate from only one of the major Hellenistic states, and the smallest 
one at that, should be noted at the outset.  It remains entirely possible that future archaeological 
discoveries could show more substantial regional variation than the current limited state of the 
evidence indicates. 
 
Composition of Hellenistic Armies 
 Even more so than Roman armies in this period, Hellenistic armies tended to be 
composite forces, with troops representing the full reach of each king’s influence.  In 
consequence it is necessary to discuss the composition of these armies on campaign in greater 
depth.  Despite their differences, elaborated on below, the armies of the three Hellenistic great 
powers functioned similarly in that they consisted of a core phalanx, generally the heaviest part 
of the army, usually composed of ethnic Greeks and Macedonians (often simply called ‘the 
Macedonians’ as a collective group in the sources), supported by a diverse array of ‘ethnic’ and 
mercenary contingents, fighting in local style.  Reconstructing the full panoplies for all of these 
ethnic contingents is beyond the scope of this work, and in many cases beyond the strength of the 
surviving evidence.  The section following this one will attempt, however, to give an overview of 
                                                 
phalanx which he terms ‘Macedonian.’  App. Syr. 32 refers to the core Seleucid phalanx as ἡ φάλαγξ ἡ Μακεδόνων 
and describes it as “arrayed after the manner of Alexander and Philip” (ἐς τὸν Ἀλεξάνδρου καὶ Φιλίππου τρόπον), 
suggesting little tactical change.  Livy 37.40.1 note the men of the Seleucid phalanx “were armed after the manner 
of the Macedonians” (more Macedonum armati fuere).   
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such contingents and what is known of their equipment.  However, it is the ‘Macedonian’ 
portions of these armies, which typically composed the heaviest infantry as well as the heavy 
cavalry, which will be fully reconstructed in the pattern of the previous chapter.  This section 
will proceed first to lay out the organization of the main units of the common Macedonian core 
of these armies (their equipment will be reconstructed later in the chapter) and then of the 
various special contingents of each. 
 
The Macedonian Core 
  By the third century, the heavy infantry component of Hellenistic armies, the sarisa-
armed phalanx, had become the dominant force in the army; the role of the cavalry, while still 
important, was much diminished from the days of Alexander.20  In the Antigonid army, the 
phalanx was recruited from the local Macedonian population, although the territorial regiments 
of Alexander’s day seem to have been done away with.21  The phalanx itself consisted of two 
types of soldiers: the common phalangites, called chalkaspides, and the elite peltasts (peltastai), 
of which the elite was the agema.  The peltasts (called caetrati by Livy), named for their smaller 
shield (the pelte), were not the light skirmishing infantry of the classical period, but rather a force 
of phalangites, only somewhat lighter than the regular heavy infantry, who could fight in the 
phalanx with the sarisa.22  The chalkasipides were named for their use of a larger, bronze-faced 
                                                 
20 This trend is widely noted, see Connolly (1981), 80; Hatzopoulos (2001), 33-35, Sekunda (2013), 67; Fischer-
Bovet (2014), 125.  
21 Sekunda (2013), 102. 
22 Hatzopoulos (2001), 71.  Sekunda (2013), 95.  On the origin of these troops, and their possible connection to the 
reformed peltasts of Iphicrates, see N. Sekunda “Land Forces” in The Cambridge History of Greek and Roman 
Warfare eds. P. Sabin, H. van Wees, M. Whitby (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 327-8.  Livy’s 
term ‘caetrati’ is effectively a direct translation of peltastai; the caetra was a round shield smaller than the clupeus 
(that is, the Greek aspis) common in Spain.   
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shield, and made up the bulk of the heavy infantry of the Antigonid armies.23  The Antigonid 
cavalry were divided between standard regiments of cavalry (which Livy calls alae for the Greek 
ἴλη) and an elite royal guard consisting of what Livy calls the ‘sacred squadrons’ (equitumque 
sacrae alae); both of these units seem to have had similar equipment and battlefield function.24 
 The Seleucid army likewise featured a core of ethnically Macedonian sarisa-armed 
infantry, often simply called ‘the phalanx’ or ‘the Macedonians’ in the sources.25  These troops 
were recruited from the military settlements composed of Greek and Macedonian military 
settlers.26  At the Daphne parade, Polybius divides the phalanx into three groups: chalkaspides, 
chrysaspides and argyraspides; of these, the first two seem to be the traditional core of the 
phalanx and the organizational equivalent of the Antigonid chalkaspides.27  The argyraspides 
were an elite guard, corresponding to Alexander’s royal hypaspists or the Antigonid peltastai, 
and were in fact the organizational continuation of the hypaspists.28  Bar-Kochva argues that this 
body of troops, maintained at roughly 10,000 men, represented a standing force organized 
around the king, and that the Seleucid hypaspists sometimes mentioned in the sources were an 
                                                 
23 Hatzopoulos (2001), 73-76; Sekunda (2013), 78-87. 
24 Liv. 42.66.5, 44.42.3.  Sekunda (2013), 76-7.  Hatzopoulos (2001), 36-38. 
25 Bar-Kochva (1976), 56-7. 
26 Bar-Kochva (1976), 20-48.  S. Sherwin-White & A. Kuhrt, From Samarkhand to Sardis: A new approach to the 
Seleucid Empire (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), 53-6, argues that the Seleucids did in fact make 
fuller use of Syrian and Mesopotamian troops than Bar-Kochva’s simplification allows for.  Aperghis (2004), 195-7, 
suggests that these troops would have served in the phalanx, and questions if any ethnic Greek or Macedonian 
settlers were required to serve, as Bar-Kochva envisages.  Aperghis instead suggests that the phalanx was primarily 
a standing force of ‘regulars.’  The precise ethnic makeup of this force does not matter for the present study, 
whereas the question of their pay is discussed in the final chapter. 
27 Plb. 30.25. 
28 Bar-Kochva (1976), 58-67. 
 311 
elite force within the argyraspides.29  In any case, on the battlefield the argyraspides served in 
the sarisa-phalanx. 
 The Seleucid cavalry, like the Antigonid, was organized into both regular and elite units, 
but with added ethnic distinctions.  Of the elite units, there was a cavalry agema (in contrast to 
the infantry agema formations in the Antogonid and Ptolemaic armies) and a regiment of 
Companions, both typically 1,000 strong.30  Livy notes, with Polybius as his likely source, that 
the agema “were Medes, select men, and a mixture of the many other nations from that region,” 
while the companions were “many Syrians, with Phrygians and Lydians mixed in.”31  Bar-
Kochva takes this to mean that the agema was made up of Iranian peoples, whereas the 
companions were composed of Greek and Macedonian military settlers from settlements in Syria 
and Asia Minor.32  Livy contrasts both of these elite cavalry units with the heavier cataphract 
cavalry at Magnesia, which was deployed in two formations of 3,000 each.  Bar-Kochva 
supposes these to have been recruited from military, settlers and so that they formed part of the 
regular army rather than an auxiliary unit, which does seem the most likely solution.33  Seleucid 
cataphract cavalry will thus be treated as part of the regular cavalry, albeit with different 
equipment, for the purposes of this reconstruction. 
                                                 
29 Bar-Kochva (1976), 60-67.  Bar-Kochva envisages the argyraspides as a standing force that promising young 
soldiers would be processed through, making the rest of the phalanx a sort of reserve force; this suggestion is 
plausible, but the evidence to support it is limited. 
30 Liv. 37.40.  Bar-Kochva (1976), 68-72. 
31 Liv. 37.40.5-11.  “addita his ala mille ferme equitum; agema eam vocabant; Medi erant, lecti viri, et eiusdem 
regionis mixti multarum gentium equites…regia ala levioribus tegumentis suis equorumque, alio haud dissimili 
habitu; Syri plerique erant Phrygibus et Lydis immixti.” 
32 Bar-Kochva (1976), 69. Mariusz Mielczarek makes the same judgment, noting the lack of ethnic names attached 
to the Seleucid cataphracts, M. Mielzcarek, Cataphracti and Clibanarii: Studies on the Heavy Armoured Cavalry of 
the Ancient World (Lodz: Oficyna Naukowa, 1993), 69. 
33 Liv. 37.40.5-11.  Bar-Kochva (1976), 74. 
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 The Ptolemaic phalanx is unusual in that it began to include native Egyptians alongside 
Macedonian and Greek soldiers; the Antigonid and Seleucid phalanxes seem to have largely kept 
their ethnic character.  Polybius seems to have applied Antigonid organizational terminology to 
the Seleucid and especially Ptolemaic armies, leaving us in the dark as to any internal regimental 
names (like chalkaspides and such above) that the Ptolemaic kingdom may have had.34    
Polybius refers to the Ptolemaic sarisa-phalanx as ‘the phalanx’ and its members as phalangites, 
but the terms phalanx and phalangite are never used in Egyptian documentary sources in this 
way, which tend instead to use generic terms such as pezoi (“infantrymen”) or stratiotes 
(“soldiers”).35  Nevertheless, for the purpose of assessing battlefield role and equipment, these 
equivalences are useful; Polybius divides the sarisa-infantry of the Ptolemaies into the phalanx 
(meaning the chalkaspides) and the peltasts, the same as with the Antigonid army.36  Much of 
these forces, especially prior to c. 220, would have consisted of Greek or Macedonian military 
settlers (cleruchs) or mercenaries.  There is evidence for the recruitment of native Egyptian 
troops from the beginning of Ptolemaic rule, but the trend towards local recruiting increases 
dramatically in the second century, when Egyptian troops paid in land grants, called machimoi, 
begin to make up a larger and larger portion of the infantry.37  Polybius’s narrative focuses on the 
Raphia campaign (217 BCE) as the catalyst for this process, but the Egyptian evidence suggests 
a longer process spurred to completion by the military strain of the late third century.38 
                                                 
34 Bar-Kochva (1976), 63.  Fischer-Bovet (2014), 134-138. 
35 E.g. Plb. 5.65.  Fischer-Bovet (2014), 134. 
36 Fischer-Bovet (2014), 133-138.   
37 Fischer-Bovet (2014), 121. 
38 Plb. 5.63-64. 
 313 
 We are less well informed about the divisions of cavalry in the Ptolemaic army.  
Polybius’ description of them at the Battle of Raphia is the only source for upper-level 
organization, and it is unclear how typical this arrangement was, as the army was substantially 
reorganized prior to the Raphia campaign.39  As with the Seleucid army, disentangling 
Macedonian and native cavalry proves difficult.  At Raphia, Polybius divides the cavalry 
between the cavalry of the court (ἱππεῖς περὶ τὴν αὐλήν), 700 strong, and the native Libyan and 
Egyptian cavalry, 2,300 strong.40  These were deployed in a single formation and had been 
trained together, suggesting that they may normally have been a composite unit.41  Another 2,000 
cavalry were Greek mercenaries, a mix of both mercenaries hired from Greece and misthophoroi 
hippeis, professional cavalry living in Egypt.42  Somewhat strangely, at Raphia Ptolemy IV 
fought initially on the left with the former group, while the Greek mercenaries were stationed on 
the right.43  Such an arrangement keeps the normal order of placing the Greek and Macedonian 
cavalry on the right and allied or native cavalry on the left, but inverts the position of the king, 
placing him with his native troops rather than on the right in the position of honor.  It is not clear 
from the evidence how typical that arrangement would have been for the Ptolemaic army. 
  Finally, all three armies employed a common type of Hellenistic mercenary, the 
thureophoros, which although not part of the regular army, is worth discussing in general before 
moving on to the special units of each state.  These soldiers were named for the shield they 
                                                 
39 Fischer-Bovet (2014), 132. 
40 Plb. 5.65.4-6. 
41 Plb. 5.65.5. 
42 Plb. 6.65.6; Fischer-Bovet (2014), 132. 
43 Plb. 5.84.1. 
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carried, the thureos, a Hellenistic variant from the same family of center-grip shields as the 
Roman scutum and the Gallic shield.44  In the third century thureophoroi seem to have replaced 
the peltast as the common type of Greek mercenary soldier, as well as the common soldiers of 
many of the smaller Greek states and leagues.45  These soldiers were what we may call ‘medium’ 
infantry, capable of both skirmishing and fixed formation fighting, although they tended to fare 
poorly against heavy infantry at close-quarters.46  The Hellenistic thureos is substantially smaller 
than the Roman scutum, and Plutarch comments on how light it was.47  While several of the 
Greek states in the late third century reformed their armies away from the thureophoros towards 
the sarisa-phalanx armed in Macedonian fashion, thureophoroi as allied or mercenary troops 
remained common in Hellenistic armies.48  Such soldiers appear frequently on grave paintings in 
the Hellenistic world.49 
The equipment of these types of soldiers, who made up the ‘core’ of these Hellenistic 
armies, will be discussed in greater depth in the following section.  However, it is first necessary 
to consider the many other mercenary and ethnic special contingents found in Hellenistic armies.  
                                                 
44 Eichberg (1987), 164-6.  Stary, (1981), 286-307.   
45 Thureophoroi were the common infantry of Sparta before the reforms of Cleomenes (Plut. Cleom. 11.2 notes 
Cleomenes replacing a shield carried by a handle (the thureos) with one carried by a strap (the aspis)), in the 
Achaean league prior to the reforms of Philopoemen (Plut. Philop 9.1-3), as well as the Aetolian League.  J. K. 
Anderson, “Philopoemen’s Reform of the Achaean Army” CP 62.2. (1967): 104-106.  The Boeotians too used 
thureophoroi, but also peltophoroi, Liv. 33.14.5.  See also on this Sekunda (2013), 112.  Thureoi feature frequently 
on third century Boeotian tombstones, P. M. Fraser, T. Rönne, Boeotian and West Greek Tombstones (Lund: C. W. 
K. Gleerup, 1957), 69-70.  As light-infantry mercenaries, Everson (2004), 196. 
46 Plut. Philop. 9.1-6. 
47 Plut. Philopoemen 9.1. 
48 Military reform to the sarisa-phalanx: Sparta: Plut. Cleom 11.2; Megalopolis: Plb. 2.65.3; Achaean League: Plut: 
Philop. 9.1-3.  Thureophoroi in Antigonid armies, Sekunda (2013), 108-127. 
49 Sekunda (1994/5). 
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Often, the evidence for these contingents does not permit confident reconstruction.  However, an 
overview of these troops is sufficient to show that they were generally lighter-armed than the 
core Macedonian forces, with the exception of troops organized ‘in Macedonian fashion.’ 
 
 
Antigonids 
 The army of the Antigonids is perhaps the easiest of the three great powers to assess, 
insofar as the Antigonids had access to a relatively more limited array of non-Macedonian 
specialist troops; also as noted previously, of the three great powers, the Antigonids are the best 
documented.  Nicholas Sekunda, in attempting to discern the nature of the leukaspides (a 
question I consider below), presents a detailed breakdown of these troops as reported in the 
invasion of Laconia during the Cleomenean War (222 BCE), the review at Citium (171 BCE) 
and at Pydna (168 BCE), along with their likely battlefield role.50  Many of the mercenaries 
present in these armies would have been armed as thureophoroi.  For the Cleomenean war, the 
regular troops of the Achaeans were still armed this way and would be until Philopoemen’s 
reforms in 207 BC.51  Likewise, Livy describes Boeotians, Thessalians and Acarnanians in a 
Macedonian force defeated near Corinth in 197 as scutati omnes, suggesting they fought as 
thureophoroi at that date.52  A force of 3,000 Cretans is also reported at Citium; Cretan 
mercenaries were the mercenary archer force par excellence, in use by all of the major 
Hellenistic powers.  “Cretan” in the context of mercenary light infantry could be as much a type 
                                                 
50 Sekunda (2013), 108-127. 
51 Plut. Philop. 9.1. 
52 Livy 33.14.5.  Sekunda (2013), 112. 
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of soldier as an ethnic origin, although Perseus’ archers at Citium do appear to have been from 
Crete, given the demonyms of their commanders.53  Some Greek allies in Antigonid armies, such 
as the 1,000 Megalopolitans at Sellasia, were armed “in the Macedonian fashion” (εἰς τὸν 
Μακεδονικὸν τρόπον) meaning as sarisa-bearing phalangites, although such forces seem 
uncommon.54 
Gallic infantry appears frequently.  A significant force of Gauls also features in the army 
of Antigonus Gonatas.  There were 1,000 Gauls in 227/6, 2,000 at Citium, and a Gallic 
mercenary also appears on the Aemilius Paullus monument, attesting to the presence of Gallic 
troops at Pydna.55  Gallic military equipment is discussed in greater depth in the next chapter, but 
it is useful to note here that the average Gallic warrior, lacking metal body-armor, would have 
required far less worked metal than either a Roman legionary or a Macedonian phalangite.56  
Connolly labels Gallic mercenaries (among others) as ‘medium infantry’ in a diagram of the 
battle of Raphia, and this term is useful as a classification for troops that, although not missile 
                                                 
53 Sosos of Phalassarna and Syllos of Knossos. Liv. 42.51.7.  Sekunda (2013), 116-117 supposes these troops to 
have been supplied from the Cretan koinon.  Everson (2004), 197.  G. T. Griffith, The Mercenaries of the Hellenistic 
World (1935), 144, 241.  These archers are sometimes also noted in the sources as being ‘Neo-Cretans’ the meaning 
of which is not entirely clear, but seems to indicate newly recruited or younger Cretan archers.  On this, see N. 
Sekunda, “Neocretans” in Pratiques et identités culturelles des armées hellénistiques du monde méditerranéen eds. 
J-C. Couvenhes, S. Crouzet and S. Péré-Noguès (Bordeaux: de Boccard, 2011), 75-85. 
54 Plb. 2.65.3.  Sekunda (2013), 112.  Possibly also the Paionians at Citium (Livy 42.51.6), Sekunda (2013), 118-9. 
55 Plb. 2.65.2.  Liv. 42.51.7.  Taylor (2016), 564.  On Gauls in Antigonus Gonatas’ army, see A. N. Borel, 
“Mercenaires galates d’Antigonos Gonatas: problèmes de numismatique et de démographie” in Pratiques et 
identités culturelles des armées hellénistiques du monde méditerranéen eds. J-C. Couvenhes, S. Crouzet and S. 
Péré-Noguès (Bordeaux: de Boccard, 2011),193-202. 
56 The evidence for the military equipment of Gallic mercenaries in the Greek east specifically is discussed briefly 
by A.-M Adam and S. Fichtl, “Les Celtes dans les guerres hellénistiques: le cas de la Méditerranée orientale” in 
Pratiques et identités culturelles des armées hellénistiques du monde méditerranéen eds. J-C. Couvenhes, S. 
Crouzet and S. Péré-Noguès (Bordeaux: de Boccard, 2011), 117-128, who note the distinctive Gallic sword (and its 
equally distinctive suspension) and shield in art and funerary deposits. 
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troops, are relatively lightly armored and equipped, but are nevertheless expected to fight hand-
to-hand.57 
 At Citium the Antigonid army also had 3,000 Thracian troops fighting under their own 
commander, left unnamed by Livy; some of these Thracians are reported in the skirmish that 
begins the Battle of Pydna.58  Plutarch relates a description from Scipio Nasica that the Thracians 
were “clad in tunics which showed black beneath the white and gleaming armor of their shields 
(θυρεοί) and leg-coverings (περικνημίδες), holding their heavy iron rhomphaiai (ῥομφαῖαι 
βαρυσιδήροι) high on their right shoulders.”59  The rhomphaia was a heavy two-handed iron 
polearm which continued in use well into the Roman period.60  Aside from this weapon, 
however, the implication is that the equipment of the Thacians is fairly light.  Sekunda connects 
Plutarch’s description with a tomb-painting from Kazanluk (fig. 5.2), which serves to help 
evaluate it.61  Plutarch’s description implies a lack of any kind of body-armor, the lack of which 
is also apparent in the Kazanluk tomb.  The “white and gleaming” part of the shields must be the 
hide front-facing painted white; the thureos has the same basic construction as the Roman 
scutum.  It also seems plausible that the leg protections that Plutarch describes were textile, 
                                                 
57 Connolly (1981), 82. 
58 Liv. 42.51.7.  Sekunda (2013), 114-5, Plut. Aem. 18.1-5.  Liv. 44.40.2.  On Thracian mercenaries and ethnic 
auxiliaries in the Hellenistic world and their relative integration into Hellenistic states, note D. Dana, “Les Thraces 
dans les armées hellénistiques: essai d’histoire par le noms” in Pratiques et identités culturelles des armées 
hellénistiques du monde méditerranéen eds. J-C. Couvenhes, S. Crouzet and S. Péré-Noguès (Bordeaux: de 
Boccard, 2011), 87-115. 
59 Plut. Aem. 18.5.  λευκῷ καὶ περιλάμποντι θυρεῶν καὶ περικνημίδων ὁπλισμῷ μέλανας ὑπενδεδυμένοι χιτῶνας, 
ὀρθὰς δὲ ῥομφαίας βαρυσιδήρους ἀπὸ τῶν δεξιῶν ὤμων ἐπισείοντες.  Cf. a very similar description, Xen. Cyrop. 
6.2.10. 
60 M. Kostoglou, Iron and Steel in Ancient Greece (Oxford: John and Erica Hedges Ltd, 2008), 27-8.  Sekunda 
(2013), 120-121.  Everson (2004), 197. 
61 Sekunda (2013), 121. 
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rather than metal if they were the same color as the shield-facing; the Kazanluk tomb painting 
shows no leg protections at all.62  Thracians then, fighting in native style, can be classified as 
medium infantry comparable to Gallic warriors: close combat troops nevertheless lacking 
significant body-armor.  If the Thracians at Pydna lacked metal helmets (Plutarch does not 
describe them as having any) as do the figures in the Kazanluk tomb, they would likely be even 
more lightly armored than the average Gallic warrior. 
 Illyrians also made up a common auxiliary force in Antigonid armies.  Illyrian troops 
were present in Antigonus’ invasion of Laconia, and Livy reports a force of 2,000 Illyrians from 
Penestia as part of the garrison at Cassandrea in 168 BC.63  A complete Illyrian panoply is not 
described in the sources, but the archaeological evidence suggests the Illyrians fought as a 
‘medium’ infantry.  The distinctive Illyrian weapon was a curved sword, the sica, but Illyrian 
grave deposits also include a range of weapons including spears, battle-axes, swords, bows, and 
light shields with bronze bosses.64  In terms of armor, John Wilkes notes that breastplates and 
greaves are present in Illyrian burials, but seem to be the preserve of the elite; metal helmets are 
more common.65  The Illyrians troops at Sellasia were placed in alternating formations with the 
phalanx of the chalkaspides.  Sekunda takes this to suggest they might have been equipped as 
thureophoroi, providing a more mobile covering force for the phalanx.  However, it seems 
equally likely that the Illyrians would have fought in their native equipment and style, which 
                                                 
62 Sekunda (2013), 121. 
63 Plb. 2.65.4.; Liv. 44.11.7. 
64 J. Wilkes, The Illyrians (Malden: Blackwell, 1992), 239. 
65 Wilkes (1992), 240-1. 
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seems to have filled much the same role.66  Polybius notes that in the assault on the Spartan 
position, set on a hill and occupied by the perioeci and allied troops, it was the Illyrians who 
were decisive, being able to fight effectively in the rough terrain and constricted space at the top 
of the hill; the Spartan formation, “because of their heavy equipment and stiff formation,” was 
forced to retreat, making it clear that the Illyrians were relatively lighter-armed.67 
 
Seleucids 
 The Seleucids employed the most diverse array of special troops of any of the Hellenistic 
powers, though as Bar-Kochva notes, most of these are auxiliaries from regions under the control 
or influence of the Seleucids, rather than mercenaries in the strict sense.68  Many of the troop-
types discussed above in the Antigonid army were also put to use by the Seleucids.  Thracian 
mercenaries are attested at the battle of Raphia and the Daphne military parade; the Galatians, 
presumably armed as Gallic warriors, are present at Magnesia and at Daphne.69  At Magnesia, 
Antiochus also had Cappadocian troops that Livy reports were “similarly armed” (similiter his 
armati) to the Galatian infantry.70  Cretan archers are also present in Seleucid armies at both 
Raphia and Magnesia, though after 188 Seleucid access to these mercenaries seems to have been 
limited.71 
                                                 
66 Sekunda (2013), 113. 
67 Plb. 2.67.1-10.  τῷ βάρει τοῦ καθοπλισμοῦ καὶ τῆς συντάξεως 
68 II. Macc. 8.9; Liv. 37.40.1.  Bar-Kochva (1976), 53; Griffith (1935), 168-70. 
69 Thracians at Raphia, Plb. 5.79.6; Galatians (called gallograeci by Livy) at Magnesia Liv. 37.40.5-10.  At the 
Daphne parade, Plb. 30.25. 
70 Livy 37.40.10. 
71 Plb. 5.79.10; Liv. 37.40.8.  Griffith (1935), 165. 
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 Seleucid armies are also reported with a number of ethnic infantry contingents not seen in 
the other Hellenistic armies, nearly all of them light troops.  At Raphia, Polybius notes the 
presence of 5,000 mixed Dahae, Carmanian and Cilician light-armed troops, 2,000 Agrianian and 
Persian bowmen and slingers, 500 Lydian javelin troops (akontistai) and 1,000 Cardaces, which 
Bar-Kochva considers likely to be Kurds; that these Cardaces are also javelin troops is made 
clear when Polybius details the army’s deployment.72  Polybius also notes a mixed ethnic 
contingent of 5,000 “Medes, Cissians, Cadusians and Carmanians,” which were likely also 
archers.73  Antiochus also had 10,000 Arab troops, obtained previously in the campaign as a 
result of a series of early successes.74  Polybius does not detail their equipment, but the force is 
almost certainly of light troops; they are, in any event, routed almost immediately by Ptolemy’s 
Greek mercenaries.75  At Magnesia, Livy reports 2,500 Mysian archers, 8,000 Cyrtaean slingers 
and Elymaean archers (in two detachments), Cretan archers along with Carians and Cilicians 
armed the same way (2,500 total), 3,000 Trallian light infantry (levis armatura, per Livy). 76  
Finally 4,500 Pisidians, Pamphylians and Lycians, which Livy terms caetrati; Appian makes 
clear that these are skirmishers, not the heavier Macedonian-style peltasts.77 
 The Seleucids also deployed significant forces of mercenary and auxiliary cavalry.  
Polybius does not distinguish between the types of cavalry present at Raphia, but Livy and 
                                                 
72 Plb. 5.79.3-6, 82.11. As Bar-Kochva notes, the Carmanians are listed twice, both with the other light infantry 
(5.79.3) and with the other auxiliaries from within the empire (5.79.7), Bar Kochva (1976), 50. 
73 Plb. 5.79.7.  Cissian bowmen: Strabo 16.744.   Walbank (1957), 608-9.  M. Launey, Recherches sur les Armées 
Hellénistiques (Paris: De Boccard, 1949), 567. 
74 Plb. 5.71.1, 79.8. 
75 Plb. 5.85.4.  Walbank (1957), 609. 
76 Livy 37.40.5-14. 
77 Livy 37.40.14; App. Syr. 32. 
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Appian do so distinguish for the Seleucid army at Magnesia.  Livy notes that the army included 
2,500 Galatian cavalry.78  Appian adds that these cavalrymen were armored (κατάφρακτοι), 
which probably means mail armor as we might expect from Gallic cavalry composed of local 
elites (discussed in the next chapter), though it is possible that Appian has confused the regular 
cataphract cavalry and the Galatians set next to them; Livy makes clear that these were separate 
formations.79  The Galatian cavalry seems to have been mailed Gallic heavy cavalry.  Appian 
describes them as mailed (κατάφρακτος), like the cavalry of the agema; in contrast, he describes 
the Companion cavalry on the opposite wing as armored (κατάφρακτος), but also lightly armed 
(ὡπλισμένη κούφως).80  Livy echoes this distinction in equipment, noting that the royal cohort 
(meaning the Companions) had “lighter coverings for themselves and their horses, but not 
altogether dissimilar from the rest.”81  These descriptions would seem to suggest the Galatian 
cavalry was heavier than the Macedonian Companion cavalry, but lighter than the heavy 
Seleucid cataphracts, which in turn suggests mailed Gallic cavalry. 
 In addition to the Galatians, the Seleucids used light missile cavalry.  Livy and Appian 
both report Arab mounted camel-archers at Magnesia, though neither gives a number to this 
formation.82  Though not mentioned by Polybius, it seems fairly likely that similar Arab camel-
cavalry would have been present at Raphia, given the reported presence of a very large body of 
Arab infantry in the Seleucid formation there.  Livy also reports 200 Dahae horse archers; 
                                                 
78 Liv. 37.40.13. 
79 Livy 37.40.5-10; App. Syr. 32. 
80 App. Syr. 32.   
81 Livy 37.40.11.  regia ala levioribus tegumentis suis equorumque, alio haud dissimili habitu. 
82 Livy 37.40.11; App. Syr. 32. 
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Appian reports the formation without the ethnic signifier.  Appian also notes the presence of 
“other mounted archers from the Dahae, Mysia, and Elymais” on the left of the army; Livy does 
not mention these cavalrymen, although he does mention Elymaean and Cyrtaean infantry.83  
The Dahae horse-archers may also have been present at Raphia although they are omitted from 
Polybius’ order of battle; Dahae infantry are reported by Polybius as part of the light troops.84  
This sort of light missile cavalry would have represented a tremendous investment in human 
capital, as the skills required of mounted archers are considerable, although the equipment 
required for them, beyond the mounts themselves, would have been minimal.85 
 
Ptolemies 
 Evidence for special and ethnic units in the Ptolemaic army benefits tremendously from 
the epigraphic and papyrological evidence from Egypt, which serves to supplement Polybius’ 
otherwise somewhat brief and schematic description of the Ptolemaic army at Raphia.  He 
reports a force of 4,000 Thracians and Gauls there, some of whom were actually military settlers 
in Egypt (called katoikoi).86  Likewise, Polybius notes the presence of 3,000 Cretan archers in the 
Ptolemaic army.87  The documentary sources from Egypt tend to confirm the presence of these 
soldiers in the Ptolemaic army, but also provide evidence of other groups, particularly Jewish 
                                                 
83 Livy 37.40.13; App. Syr. 32.  ἱπποτοξόται τε ἐπὶ τοῖσδε ἕτεροι, Δᾶαι καὶ Μυσοὶ καὶ Ἐλυμαῖοι. 
84 Plb. 5.79.3. 
85 See Chapter 3 at n. 145 for a comparison of bow-cost to metal armor-cost. 
86 Plb. 5.65.8; Fischer-Bovet (2014), 176. 
87 Plb. 5.65.7.  1,000 of these are noted as being ‘Neo-Cretans.’ 
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military settlers in the Fayyum.88  Fischer-Bovet presents a study of ethnic designations; more 
than half of the men bearing the ethnic designations for Galatian, Libyan, Thracian, Thessalian, 
Macedonian, Cyrenian and Cretan were soldiers, which conforms generally to the picture 
provided by Polybius.89 
 The Ptolemaic army is unusual, however, in that some of these units were incorporated 
into the heavy infantry phalanx directly.  Polybius notes for the Battle of Raphia that not only the 
native Egyptian infantry, but also 3,000 Libyans and the Greek mercenary infantry were armed 
in the Macedonian fashion and incorporated into the phalanx.90  Equipped as phalangites, these 
units are therefore covered in my reconstruction below as part of the regular army.  The 
Ptolemaic cavalry at Raphia has already been discussed above as part of the regular army.  The 
documentary sources also preserve evidence for a number of ethnic hipparchies within the 
Ptolemaic cavalry, starting around 235 BCE.91  Hipparchies are attested for Thracians, Mysians, 
Persians, Thessalians, and Macedonians; they likely originally consisted of a core of cavalrymen 
from that ethnic designation, using equipment associated with it.92  At some point in the first half 
of the second century, these ethnic hipparchies were discontinued.  Fischer-Bovet suggests that 
by that time the ethnic designations had probably lost their connection to specific kinds of 
fighting or equipment.93 
                                                 
88 Fischer-Bovet (2014), 176. 
89 Fischer-Bovet (2014), 187. 
90 Plb. 5.64.1-3; 5.65.4-9. 
91 Fischer-Bovet (2014), 126-7. 
92 Fischer-Bovet (2014), 127. 
93 Fischer-Bovet (2014), 133. 
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 To sum up, the effect of the many special, ethnic or mercenary units in Hellenistic armies 
would have been to lower the average per-man resource intensity of the army, as these additional 
non-regular units were almost all substantially less heavily equipped than the regular army.  Such 
light troops may have been more cost-effective as garrison forces, especially in the far-flung 
Seleucid empire.94  Restricting the heavy infantry to a closed and ethnically distinct class tied 
directly to the ruler also served to maintain royal escalation dominance and thus to secure royal 
Macedonian power.95  Nevertheless this cost-economizing use of light-troops had negative 
battlefield effects, vividly illustrated by the collapse of the Seleucid light troops at both Raphia 
and Magnesia.  Moreover, when discussing the resource intensity of the regular Macedonian 
army, as I will below, it must be kept in mind that the regular Macedonian forces are by far the 
heaviest part of a Hellenistic army; the outer layer of auxiliary and mercenary troops were far 
more lightly equipped and consequently significantly less expensive. 
 
Reconstructions 
 The next step towards a reconstruction of the resource intensity of the regular 
Macedonian and Greek portions of Hellenistic armies is to outline the equipment expected of 
each type of soldier.  The following section, building off of the previous discussion of the 
Macedonian core of Hellenistic armies, outlines the equipment for the basic troop-types within 
                                                 
94 Bar-Kochva (1976), 53. 
95 ‘Escalation dominance’ here refers to the ability of the core military force to prevail in a high intensity conflict, cf. 
the same concept applied to the Roman army of the early empire, E. Luttwak, The Grand Strategy of the Roman 
Empire (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1976), 41-2. Polybius notes this interaction explicitly, Plb. 
5.107.1-3; Bar-Kochva (1976), 52-3 also notes this as an organizing principle.  Contra this view for Egypt, note 
Fischer-Bovet (2014), 86-102, who contends that the Great Revolt was more a general military coup d’état of both 
Greek and Egyptian soldiers than an ethnically Egyptian uprising. 
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that framework.  Subsequent sections next discuss the evidence for each piece of that equipment 
one by one.  A full reconstruction, paralleling the reconstruction of the Roman legion in the 
previous chapter, is then presented in the conclusion. 
The most numerous soldiers in any Hellenistic army were the regular sarisa-bearing 
infantry, the phalangites. The best evidence for their equipment comes from an Antigonid 
inscription from Amphipolis dating to the reign of Philip V, which specifies fines for the loss of 
various pieces of equipment.96  The decree lists the equipment for the regular infantry as a 
kottybos, helmet (konos), sarisa, sword (machaira), greaves (knemides) and shield (aspis); for 
the officers (hegemon), a thorax or hemithorakion is also specified.  Hegemon in this context 
signifies a file-leader, a lochagos or dilochites, who occupied the front rank in combat and was 
evidently more heavily armored than the regular phalangite.97  While most of the items listed 
here are relatively straightforward to identify, the terms for body-armor, particularly kottybos and 
hemithorakion, pose interpretative problems which will be discussed below. 
 The elite sarisa-bearing peltasts of the Antigonid and Ptolemaic armies seem to be 
somewhat lighter than the regular phalangites.   Ascelpiodotus, in describing an ideal 
Macedonian-style army, notes that the peltasts are heavier than the light troops (psiloi) but 
lighter than the phalangites.98  He notes specifically that the sarisa of the peltasts is much shorter 
than that of the main phalanx, and they use a smaller, lighter shield (pelte).  The distinction 
between the pelte and the aspis in this context is a fraught one, and will be discussed below.  
Beyond this, Asclepiodotus’ description leaves the impression (but does not specifically state) 
                                                 
96 SEG 40.524; Hatzopoulos (2001), 161-4. 
97 Sekunda (2013), 89.  Hatzopoulos (2001), 76-7, 80-1.  Connolly (1981), 76-7. 
98 Asclepiodotus 1.2. 
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that the peltasts are otherwise equipped like the phalangites, with cuirasses, greaves and helmets.  
Sekunda, however, notes that descriptions of the Antigonid peltasts in the Macedonian wars do 
not mention cuirasses, and reconstructs the peltasts as having no body-armor or greaves.99  As 
with the phalangites, this issue will be considered in the section on body armor. 
 The regular cavalry of Hellenistic armies were essentially heavy lancers: typically 
armored and using a spear as their primary weapon.100  The standard cavalry lance was the 
xyston, a cornel wood spear.101  From Arrian’s description of Aretas fighting with the broken end 
of a xyston at Granicus, it seems that the spear had a pointed metal butt; this confirms the 
impression from Polybius that Greek cavalry spears of his period (unlike earlier Roman spears) 
had that feature.102  During the third century, Hellenistic cavalry adopted shields, which they do 
not seem to have used previously, possibly from contact with Gallic cavalry.103  Representational 
evidence generally reflects Hellenistic cavalry as armored.104  This impression is reinforced by 
Livy’s comment that the Macedonian cavalry at Magnesia, although “with lighter coverings” 
(levioribus tegumentis) than the cataphracts, was otherwise similar.105  The probable distinction 
being made here would be between the textile type-IV armor of the regular Macedonian cavalry 
compared to the heavier metal armor of the cataphracts.  The Boeotian helmet seems to have 
                                                 
99 Sekunda (2012), 33-4. 
100 Hatzopoulos (2001), 49-54.  Everson (2004), 193. 
101 Hatzopoulos (2001), 51.  Sekunda (2013), 68-9.  Everson (2004), 197-8.   
102 Arr. Anab. 1.15.5-8.  Plb. 6.25.8. 
103 Hatzopoulos (2001), 53-4.  Sekunda (2013), 69.  Everson (2004), 198-9. 
104 Everson (2004), 199. 
105 Liv. 37.40.11. et tria milia cataphractorum equitum et mille alii equites, regia ala levioribus tegumentis suis 
equorumque, alio haud dissimili habitu. 
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remained popular with the cavalry, alongside the Attic and ‘Phrygian’ or ‘Thracian’ types, 
recognizable in artwork from their distinctive metal crests.106  The standard side-arm of the 
cavalry seems to have remained the machaira as advised by Xenophon.107 
 The equipment of the Seleucid cataphract cavalry is less clear.  These units appear only 
infrequently in the sources; besides the battle of Magnesia, they appear only once more in Livy 
at Aigion in 192, and twice in Polybius at Panium in 200 and at the Daphne parade in 166.108  
The state of the evidence makes it difficult to assess if Seleucid cataphracts were as heavily 
armored as later Parthian and Sassanid cataphracts, but they seem not to have been.109  Armor 
made of segmented metal plates, found at Ai Khanum in Afghanistan, is thought to have been 
armor for a cataphract (fig. 5.3), though the plates were unfortunately published without 
thickness data.110  This armor consisted of thin metal plates attached to a leather or textile 
backing, which would have covered the shoulders, arms and possibly legs of the rider; chest 
protection could have been provided by a traditional Greek cuirass.  This armor appears to match 
a set of Seleucid armor to be seen on a frieze (fig. 5.4) over the entryway to the Temple of 
Athena at Pergamum, showing the arms and armor of enemies defeated by the Attalids. 
                                                 
106 Xenophon recommends the Boeotian helmet for the cavalry, Xen. Peri Hippikes 12.3.  Everson (2004), 199-200.  
Hatzopoulos (2001), 50-51.  Sekunda (2013), 71-2. 
107 Xen. Peri Hippikes 12.11. Arr. Anab. 1.15.8.  Hatzopoulos (2001), 51.  Everson (2004), 197-8.  A. Choremis, 
“Μετάλλινος ὁπλισμὸς ἀπὸ τὸν τάφο στό Προδρόμι Θεσπρτίας,” Athens Annals of Archaeology 13 (1980): 3-21. 
108 Magnesia: Liv. 37.40.5.  Cf. App. Syr. 32 and Florus 1.24, which make no mention of cataphract cavalry.  
Aigion: Liv. 35.48.  Panium: Plb. 16.18.8.  Daphne Parade: Plb. 30.25.  Mielczarek (1993), 68. 
109 Mielczarek (1993), 70-1.  Bar-Kochva (1976), 75. 
110 P. Bernard, et al.  “Campagne de Fouille 1978, à Aï Khanoum (Afghanistan)” Bulletin de L’École Française 
D’Extrême Orient 68 (1980): 5-116. 
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The same frieze also shows horse armor in the form of a face guard (chamfron) and chest 
guard (plastron).111  A small terracotta relief dating to the fourth or third century BCE from 
southern Khwarezm (fig. 5.5), shows part of a horse armored on the front legs and chest with 
what appears to be a segmented metal plate armor, but without the full covering of later Parthian 
cataphracts.112  The armor for the horse may have been much thinner than that for the rider; one 
of the sets of plates from Ai Khanum, thought to be possibly a plastron for the horse, though 
made in iron, was thin enough to be flexible.113  A reconstruction of this armor with metal-
weights is impossible given the current state of the evidence.  Evidently, such cavalry was 
somewhat more heavily armored than normal Macedonian cavalry; Livy says as much.114  The 
conclusion to this chapter will suggest some tentative estimates to account for the Seleucid 
cataphracts, but without more evidence, any such estimate is little more than informed 
guesswork. 
 The last soldier-type to be reconstructed in detail here is the thureophoros ‘medium’ 
infantryman.  He carried the thureos for which he was named, a Hellenic and Hellenistic variant 
of the center-bossed Gallic scutum shield-type.115  Plutarch’s description of the differences 
between thureophoroi and sarisa-infantry makes clear that the former did not generally wear 
cuirasses or greaves.116  This impression is reinforced by their appearance on funerary artwork in 
                                                 
111 Everson (2001), 200-202.  Mielczarek (1993), 71-2. 
112 Sekunda (1994), figs 29-30. 
113 Bernard, et al (1980), 61.  No report is made of the thickness of the metal as an absolute measurement. 
114 Liv. 37.40.11. 
115 Eichberg (1987), 164-6.  Stary (1981). 
116 Plut.  Philop. 9.2. 
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the Hellenistic world, which frequently shows these soldiers with combat equipment: helmets, 
swords, spears and the thureos are almost always all present, but body-armor is rare and greaves 
do not appear (fig. 5.6a-b).117  Some thureophoroi were armored, but in Polybius’ narrative these 
soldiers are indicated by a different term, thorakites (θωρακίτης); the implication must be that 
such armor was unusual enough to render the man wearing it essentially a soldier of a different 
type.118  At the battle of Caphyae, the Achaean thorakites are deployed in separate formations 
from the main body of thureophoroi.119  When describing the division of lighter troops during 
Antiochus III’s eastern expeditions, Polybius explicitly separates the thorakites from the 
thureophoroi, although they are both assigned to the same commander.120  For offensive 
weapons, Plutarch makes clear that the thureophoroi generally carried the shorter thrusting spear, 
the dory; the representational evidence discussed above confirms this, but also consistently 
shows that they carried a sword, typically straight-edged rather than curved.121  Thureophoroi 
could also engage at range with javelins, though these weapons make few appearances in 
artwork.122 
 
 
 
                                                 
117 Sekunda (1995), figs 65-73. 
118 Plb. 4.12.3-7; Plb. 10.29.6. 
119 Plb. 4.12.3. 
120 Plb. 10.29.6.  τελευταίους δὲ θωρακίτας καὶ θυρεοφόρους, ὧν εἶχον τὴν ἡγεμονίαν Νικομήδης Κῷος καὶ 
Νικόλαος Αἰτωλός. 
121 Plut. Philop. 9.1. 
122 Plut. Philop. 9.1. 
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Weapons 
Sarisa123 
 The primary weapon of the main body of Macedonian infantry was, as noted, the sarisa, 
a long pike wielded in two hands.  However, nearly everything about the normal form of the 
weapon has been the subject of significant scholarly debate.  When assessing the evidence and 
arguments, it is worth keeping in mind that the sarisa certainly did work.  Any reconstruction 
must produce a functional weapon which could perform in combat in the formations described 
by the ancient sources.  Clever arguments that nevertheless result in non-functional weapons, or 
ones which cannot function in a Macedonian pike-phalanx, must be rejected. 
 Various ancient sources give figures for the length of the sarisa.  Of these, the most 
reliable are Theophrastus who states that the sarisa was 12 cubits long, and Polybius who gives 
14 cubits.124  Asclepiodotus states that the shortest sarisa was 10 cubits, while Polyaenus states 
the length of the sarisa at 16 cubits at the time of Cleonymus of Sparta; Leo VI and Aelian also 
provide lengths for the weapon, but they seem to be merely quoting Polybius on the topic.125  
Converting from Athenian cubits, the sarisa of Theophrastus would thus be 18 feet (c 5.5m), 
while Polybius’ measurement suggests one 21 feet (c. 6.4m) in length.  Polybius further specifies 
that each man in the formation occupies three feet (c. 1m) and that the grip of the sarisa occupies 
                                                 
123 Here and following, I spell the weapon sarisa after the more common Greek spelling (σάρισα), rather than the 
more common sarissa in English; both spellings, σάρισα and σάρισσα, appear in the sources. 
124 Theophrastus HP 3.12.2.  Plb. 18.29.2.  Connolly (2000a), 105. 
125 Asclepiodotus Tact. 5.1; Polyaenus Strat. 2.29.2; Leo Tact. 6.39; Aelian Tact. 14.2.  On these passages and their 
use, note J. R. Mixter, “The length of the Macedonian Sarisa during the Reigns of Philip II and Alexander the Great” 
AW 23 (1992): 21-29. 
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the rear 4 cubits (c. 1.6m), such that the sarisae of the first five ranks project beyond the first 
rank.126 
The discovery of a set of spear components from the royal tombs at Vergina (Aigai), 
believed to be elements of a sarisa, prompted a number of competing reconstructions of the 
weapon.  Manolis Andronicos published three sarisa components (cat. H7, H8, H12) in 1970, 
followed by Minor Markle’s publication in 1982 of two more spear-points (cat. H10, H11) from 
the same site (fig. 5.7).127  The weights and suggested function of these items are shown in table 
5.1.  A sarisa-butt found at Isthmia seems to be of the same size and type as cat. H8, but was 
pictured without measurements.128  The first set of reconstructions proposed for the Vergina 
finds were produced by Markle, who accepted Theophrastus’ figure for the length of the sarisa at 
18 feet, comprising two pieces of cornel wood joined by a metal sleeve at the center; he used the 
large flanged spear-butt (cat. H8) and the very large element (cat. H12) which had been 
identified by Andronicos as a spear-tip for the metal elements.129  At 14.5lbs (6.57kg), Markle’s 
reconstruction was extremely heavy.130   
 
 
 
                                                 
126 Plb. 18.29.1-5. 
127 M. Andronicos, “Sarissa” BCH 94 (1970): 91-107.  M. Markle, “Macedonian Arms and Tactics under Alexander 
the Great” in Macedonia and Greece in Late Classical and Early Hellenistic Times eds. B. Barr-Sharrar and E. N. 
Borza (Washington D.C.: National Gallery of Art, 1982), 87-112. 
128 W. Rostoker and E. R. Gebhard, “The Sanctuary of Poseidon at Isthmia: Techniques of Metal Manufacture” 
Hesperia 49.4 (1980): 347-363, pl. 108d. 
129 Markle (1977), 323-339.  Markle defends and qualifies this reconstruction in a number of subsequent 
publications, notably: M. Markle, “Use of the Sarissa by Philip and Alexander of Macedon” AJA 84.4 (1978): 483-
497; Markle (1982), 88-92. 
130 Markle (1977), 324. 
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Table 5.1: Sarisa and spear elements from Vergina/Aigai 
Cat. No. Length Width Socket 
Diameter 
Mass Function 
H7 27.3cm 3cm 1.9cm 97g Sarisa point 
H8 45cm 4cm 3.4cm 1070g Sarisa butt 
H10 47cm  2.5cm 235g Xyston/Dory 
point? 
H11 50cm  2.0cm 297g Xyston/Dory 
point? 
407 51cm 6.7cm 3.6cm 1235g Xyston butt 
 
Markle does not discuss the handling characteristics of his reconstruction of the weapon, 
apart from noting its limited utility outside of the phalanx, but they would have been very poor 
even in formation.  Handling characteristics are an often-neglected element of ancient weapons, 
but proper weight distribution is essential, especially in the case of heavier weapons.  In order to 
provide effective tip control, and to avoid fatiguing the wielder, the point of balance for the 
sarisa needs to fall either on the position of the leading hand, or between the leading hand and 
the trailing hand to provide satisfactory leverage.  Markle’s reconstruction would balance very 
near the midpoint (the shaft is not tapered, and the head and butt are near the same weight), while 
the phalangite’s leading arm would grip the weapon (as per Polybius) four cubits (c. 1.6m) from 
the rear, which in turn would place the grip more than a meter behind the point of balance.131  
With both hands behind the point of balance, the phalangite must exert torque on the weapon 
merely to keep the tip level with the ground; the effect may be compared to attempting to hold a 
long staff at the base with a single hand, compared to holding the same at the point of balance (or 
with two hands, one on each side of the point of balance).  Such a poorly balanced weapon 
would have rapidly fatigued the wielder, especially given the very heavy weight Markle 
                                                 
131 Plb. 18.29.1-4. 
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assumes.  His reconstruction must then be rejected, because it cannot function as the weapon is 
described. 
 Peter Manti attempted to correct Markle’s reconstruction by revisiting a suggestion by 
Tarn that there was a Macedonian cubit measuring three-fourths of the traditional Attic cubit, 
and that the measurements given for the sarisa used this, otherwise unattested, measurement.132  
The result would reduce Theophratus’ sarisa to 4.12m and Polybius’ to 4.8m.  Such a change 
does nothing to fix the balance problems raised by Markle’s reconstruction, save that by making 
the weapon much shorter, it also renders it lighter.  However, even small weapons need to 
balance for ease of use.  The more pressing problem is that, by sharply shortening the length of 
the sarisa, Manti’s solution renders the formation suggested by Polybius, with five sarisa-points 
projecting out from the first rank, impossible.133  The sarisa would project forward from each 
man only 3.4m (accounting for the grip), whereas the four ranks in front of the fifth would 
occupy 3.7m (145.5 inches; 12 attic feet).  Reducing the space allowed to each man in order to 
make Manti’s short sarisa function as Polybius says it should would result in too little space for 
each man.  If we account for two cubits (c. 0.8m) of projection, as Polybius says the fifth rank’s 
sarisa should project beyond the first, Manti’s reconstruction would only allow each man about 
half a meter to occupy when in combat, far too little for a workable formation.134  Manti’s 
reconstruction thus introduces more problems than it solves, and must also be rejected. 
                                                 
132 P.A. Manti, “The sarissa of the Macedonian Infantry” AW 23 (1992): 31-42.  Note also P.A. Manti, “The cavalry 
sarissa” AW 8 (1983): 73-80; P. A. Manti, “The Macedonian Sarissa Again” AW 25 (1994): 79-86.  Tarn’s original 
hypothesis, Tarn (1930), 15-6. 
133 Plb. 18.29.5.  Connolly (2000a), 105-106.   
134 Assuming a 4.8m long sarisa, 2/7ths of which, as per Polybius, is occupied by the grip and that the weapon must 
project past the first rank 2 cubits (even using Manti’s ‘short’ cubit).   
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 More recent articles by Peter Connolly and Nicholas Sekunda have suggested more 
workable reconstructions of the sarisa.  Sekunda argues persuasively that the evidence strongly 
points to the lighter ash wood, rather than the heavier cornel wood, as the material used for the 
shaft of the sarisa.  Cornel remained the material of choice for shorter spears, cavalry lances and 
javelins, but the cornelian cherry tree does not grow tall enough to provide the shaft of the sarisa 
(a point which Theophrastus makes).135  Both Sekunda and Connolly note that the resort to a 
Macedonian ‘short’ cubit is unnecessary, as pikes of comparable length to the sarisa are known 
from early modern Europe.136  Most importantly, Connolly correctly identifies what Andronicos, 
Markle and Manti thought of as a sarisa-head (cat. H12) as the butt of a cavalry lance, and three 
smaller and far lighter spear-points (cat. H7, H10 and H11) as actual sarisa-points.  With this 
configuration (without the overheavy tip), the flanged spear-butt can perform its role, in 
balancing the weight of the wooden shaft which projects beyond the leading arm of the 
phalangite.  Connolly then reproduced the proposed weapon along these lines and demonstrated 
its handling characteristics, noting that with cornel wood the point of balance was within 3cm of 
the leading hand, and that a coordinated group could wield the weapon and even charge with 
it.137  The shaft of Connolly’s sarisa tapers over the length of the weapon (as the socket of his 
tip, cat. H7 is much smaller than that of the butt, cat. H8), resulting in a much lower weight of 
only 4.05kg.138  Changing the wood of the shaft from cornel to ash, as Sekunda suggests, would 
                                                 
135 N. Sekunda, “The Sarissa” Acta Universitatis Lodziensis 23 (2001b): 13-41.  Sekunda (2013), 78-81.  Sekunda 
here revives the opinion of Lammert and Snodgrass; Lammert, “Sarissa” RE s.v. 2515-30.  Snodgrass (1967), 119. 
136 Sekunda (2001b), 40-41; Connolly (2000), 105.   
137 Connolly (2000). 
138 Connolly (2000), 109-10.  Connolly notes that a tapered shaft also clearly conforms to representational evidence 
of the weapon. 
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likely bring the point of balance back further and substantially reduce the overall weight of the 
weapon, thus further improving its handling characteristics. 
 Further complicating any reconstruction is the suggestion, first advanced by Andronicos 
and Markle, that the sarisa would normally have been made of two shorter wooden hafts joined 
together at the center by a metal connecting tube.139  A hollow metal sleeve, 17cm long, 
supposed by Andronicos to be for those purpose, was found at Vergina, but unlike the other 
sarisa pieces, no weight was published for this find.140  Notably, none of the forgoing 
reconstructions includes such a tube when calculating length or weight.  Christopher Matthew 
recently suggests a weight of roughly 200g for the sleeve and reconstructs the sarisa on this 
basis.141  However, the evidence for the normal use of such a connecting tube is practically 
nonexistent.  No ancient source mentions such a connecting tube, and it is not depicted in any 
ancient artwork of the weapon.  Most notably, none of the sarisae on the Alexander mosaic (fig. 
5.1c) show metal connecting tubes, although many of them have the mid-section of their hafts, 
where such a tube would be found, in view.  On that basis, I have assumed a single long wooden 
haft, with no metal connecting tube. 
 Matthew’s recent reconstruction of the sarisa and related formation must also be rejected.  
Matthew proposes a sarisa held two cubits from the rear, rather than four.  Matthew follows 
Asclepiodotus and Aelian rather than Polybius; it is hard to see how either of the former is more 
credible than Polybius, who would have actually had an opportunity to see the sarisa-phalanx in 
                                                 
139 Andronicos (1970), 106.  Markle (1977), 323-4.  C. A. Matthew, An Invincible Beast: Understanding the 
Hellenistic Pike-phalanx at War (Barnsley: Pen & Sword, 2016), 55-62. 
140 Andronicos (1970), 98. 
141 Matthew (2016), 91. 
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action.142  Matthew argues that Polybius’ figure of four cubits behind the leading hand is in error, 
but Polybius is quite deliberate in noting that part of the sarisa extends behind the area of the 
grip “to balance the weight in front [of the grip].”143  The two cubits behind the trailing hand in 
Polybius’ description are furthermore necessary for understanding his explanation of the 
projection of the sarisa; they cannot be a careless error.  Finally, Matthew’s argument that a 
formation holding the sarisa as Polybius describes could not function is refuted by Connolly’s 
success  in doing exactly that with a re-enactment pike group; Connolly expressly notes that, the 
extension of the rear of the pike into the next file caused no issues in the practical test. The group 
was even able to charge in the formation at a run without difficulties.144   
 Consequently, a reconstruction involving a hybrid of Connolly and Sekunda’s efforts, 
produces not only the most functional weapon, but also one most consistent with the ancient 
evidence concerning length, use and handling.  The limited nature of the evidence for this 
weapon makes reconstructing maximum and minimum cases difficult.  While actual weapons 
almost certainly varied, the published examples of these pieces provide only one reconstruction 
(combining cat. H8 and H7), for a total metal content of 1.167kg.  Connolly allows for the other 
two spear tips (cat. H10 and H11) to have been sarisa-heads, but it seems more likely, as 
discussed below, that these belong to cavalry spears, or perhaps the smaller dory.145  Smaller and 
lighter variants of the weapon may have existed, particularly for the peltasts: Asclepiodotus notes 
                                                 
142 Matthew (2016), 81-90.  It seems far more likely, on the balance, that both Ascleiodotus and Aelian have 
misunderstood their source, which may very well be Polybius. 
143 Plb. 18.29.3.  τούτων δὲ τοὺς τέτταρας ἀφαιρεῖ τὸ μεταξὺ τοῖν χεροῖν διάστημα καὶ τὸ κατόπιν σήκωμα τῆς 
προβολῆς. 
144 Connolly (2000), 111. 
145 Connolly (2000), 109-110.  Connolly notes that the heavier spear-tips caused notable degradation in the handling 
of the weapon. 
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that the peltasts use a much shorter sarisa than the phalangites.146  Another butt-spike, noted by 
Sekunda and Matthew, now in the Great North Museum in Newcastle (cat. H9), is of uncertain 
date and provenance, but has the letters “MAK” inscribed on the side.  It is 38cm long and has a 
mass of 876g.147  It is plausible, but by no means certain, that this bronze butt could have 
belonged to one of the shorter sarisae of the peltasts.  A shorter sarisa will have required a 
lighter butt-spike, because less material on the rear of the weapon will have been required in 
order to bring the point of balance back to the grip.  However, without further evidence, it is 
impossible to distinguish different lengths of sarisa for elite units with certainty; for the purpose 
of this reconstruction, I assume that all sarisa-bearing infantry use the heavier full-length sarisa, 
consistent with Polybius’ measurements.  This may mean that the resulting reconstruction 
somewhat overstates the resource intensity of the elite peltast units. 
 
Other Spears: Xyston, Dory, and the ‘cavalry sarisa’ 
 There is significant debate as to the choices of spears for Macedonian cavalry.  In 
practice, it seems likely that there was substantial variation, both between units and also 
individual variation in the size, length and weight of these spears, as the cavalryman, unlike the 
infantryman, does not need a weapon of a very specific length in order to function with the unit.  
Xenophon advised the cavalryman to carry javelins (παλτά), rather than a spear (δόρυ), but 
Macedonian cavalry in the late Classical and Hellenistic periods appear to have been primarily 
lancers.148  What lance they carried, however, has been the subject of some debate. 
                                                 
146 Asclepiodotus, Tact. 1.2. 
147 Sekunda (2001b), 35-6.  Matthew (2016), 49-51. 
148 Xen. On Horsemanship 12.12.  Sekunda (2013), 68.  Connolly (1981), 71-72.  Snodgrass (1967), 114. 
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 Parallel to the efforts to reconstruct the infantry sarisa following the discoveries from the 
royal tombs at Vergina were efforts to reconstruct Macedonian cavalry weapons, particularly the 
so-called ‘cavalry sarisa,’ assumed to be an unusually long cavalry lance likened, by Manti, to 
Cossack cavalry lances.149  Clear references to cavalry sarisophoroi are relatively scant in the 
literature.  Arrian mentions sarisophoroi at Granicus and again against the Scythians at Tanais, 
but the term appears nowhere else in his corpus; they appear to be the same unit as the 
prodromoi or scouts.150  Otherwise, the term does not appear at all save for references in 
Polyaenus’ Strategemata and a single reference in Polybius, both of which clearly relate to 
infantry armed with sarisae rather than cavalry.151  Instead, the weapon of the Macedonian 
cavalry is consistently called either a xyston or a dory.152  This leaves two possibilities: first that 
the sarisa-bearing cavalry was, as suggested by Snodgrass, a brief experiment by Alexander, 
swiftly discontinued, or second that the name sarisophoroi was merely a regimental title or a use 
of the term sarisa in a very general sense to mean simply a long spear when in fact these units 
continued to use the standard Macedonian cavalry spear.153  In both cases, as suggested by 
Sekunda, the surviving representational and archaeological material should be taken as evidence 
for the standard cavalry spear, the xyston (sometimes called by the more general term dory), 
rather than a longer specialist cavalry ‘pike.’154 
                                                 
149 E.g. Markle (1977), Markle (1978); Manti (1983). 
150 Arr. Anab. 1.13.1, 1.14.1, 4.4.6. 
151 Polyaenus, Strat. 2.29.2.  Plb. 12.20.2. 
152 Sekunda (2001b), 37-40.  Sekunda (2013), 68. 
153 Snodgrass (1967), 114. 
154 Sekunda (2013), 68.  Sekunda (2001b), 37-40. 
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 Arrian’s account of Granicus, focused on the cavalry engagement, gives important clues 
as to the design of the xyston.  He notes that the Macedonian xystoi were superior to Persian 
spears in part because they were made out of cornel-wood, and that Aretis fought on in the battle 
with the butt of his spear once the head had been broken off.155  Representational artwork 
confirms the latter point; the rider from the Kinch Tomb, generally taken to be a Macedonian 
lancer, wields a spear that has a tear-drop shaped second point on the back end (fig. 5.8); 
Sekunda notes that this style of cavalry spear also occurs in earlier Greek artwork.156  Connolly 
suggests that a grey fragment of the Alexander mosaic behind the figure of Alexander is very 
likely to be part of the iron butt of his spear.157  Both Alexander on the mosaic and the rider from 
the Kinch tomb seem to grip the spear about three-fourths of the way from the tip.   
Connolly attempted to reconstruct this weapon, but his effort was hampered by the 
assumption that the weapon in question was a cavalry sarisa, and thus by nature relatively long, 
rather than the shorter xyston.  Consequently, even though Connolly estimated, accounting for 
the scale of the image, that the weapon Alexander carries on the Alexander mosaic would have 
been around 3.5m long, he attempted to recreate a substantially longer (4.87m) one.  Ingeniously, 
Connolly also observed that the object Andronicos had mistakenly identified as a sarisa-head 
(cat. H12) was consistent with the winged butt of the lance of the Kinch tomb cavalryman, and  
that the significant weight of the piece (1.235kg) would function as the counter-balance to allow 
the spear to be gripped close to the rear, as shown in the representational evidence.  Connolly 
then combined this butt with one of the mid-sized Vergina spear tips (cat. H10), serving as the 
                                                 
155 Arr. Anab. 1.15.5-7. 
156 Sekunda (2001b), 38-39.  Connolly (2000), 105. 
157 Connolly (2000), 106. 
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head of the spear.158  The result was a functional weapon, as demonstrated in Connolly’s test by 
equestrian John Duckham although, as Connolly notes, “not entirely satisfactory.”159 
Instead it seems more reasonable to suppose, as Sekunda does, that the weapons depicted 
in the Alexander mosaic and Kinch tomb painting are xystoi.160  Many of the difficulties in 
Connolly’s reconstruction can thus be solved by abandoning the notion of a cavalry sarisa, and 
instead reconstructing the weapon as a shorter xyston of c. 3.5m consistent with the 
representational evidence.  The shorter length serves to move the point of balance back.  
Connolly reported that the center of balance on his reconstruction was about one-third of the 
length of the spear from the rear end; a shorter shaft shifts the center of balance to approximately 
a quarter of the spear’s length from the rear, where the figures on the Alexander Mosaic and the 
Kinch tomb are shown to be gripping the weapon.161  The metal-weight of this reconstruction, 
taken by combining the winged spear-butt (cat. H12, 1.235kg) and the mid-sized Vergina spear-
point (cat. H10, 0.235kg), produces a total metal-weight of 1.470kg.  As with the infantry sarisa, 
the limited number of published exemplars for the components makes it impossible to establish a 
normal range of reconstructions for these weapons, but it must be assumed that they varied 
significantly from one cavalryman to the next. 
 In addition, it is necessary to consider the shorter dory, the traditional one-handed hoplite 
spear.  Some cavalry may have opted to carry the dory, and it seems to have remained the 
primary close-combat weapon for the thureophoroi.  Several funeral stelae from Sidon pictured 
                                                 
158 Connolly (2000). 
159 Connolly (2000), 108. 
160 Sekunda (2013), 68.  Sekunda (2001b), 38-9. 
161 Point of balance calculations courtesy of Chris Crapuchettes and WASK Engineering. 
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by Sekunda show thureophoroi, many of them with the dory; he notes the similarity of this 
weapon to the Roman hasta.162  Plutarch likewise notes the shorter thrusting spear as the typical 
armament of the thureophoros.163  Unfortunately, I know of no study of Hellenistic short-spears, 
but as noted in the previous chapter, the parameters for one-handed thrusting spears are relatively 
consistent, making it useful to extrapolate from previous periods.  Jarva suggests that the 
hoplite’s dory during the Archaic or early Classical period might typically be c. 2.2m long, with 
a spear-head from 0.2 to 0.4kg, broadly consistent with Republican Roman spearheads discussed 
in the previous chapter, if somewhat heavier.164  Jarva dismisses Markle’s suggestion, based on 
the smallest of the Vergina spear-tips (cat. H7), that the tip of a spear might be less than 200g.  
However, given the comparative Roman and Gallic evidence (discussed in the previous and 
following chapters respectively), it is difficult to dismiss the possibility of such small tips.165  
Jarva suggests 0.25kg as a maximum weight for Greek spear-butts, proposing a typical example 
at c. 150g; this is again somewhat heavier than the examples for the hasta.166  A spear with a 
heavier tip would require a heavier ferrule in order to maintain the point of balance.  It would 
produce a weapon somewhat heavier than the Roman hasta, but not unreasonably heavy.  The 
metal-weight of the hasta of the previous chapter ranged from 130g to 420g; Jarva’s data for the 
dory suggests reconstructions ranging from c. 200g to c. 600g of metal-weight.  Into this range, 
                                                 
162 Sekunda (1995), 73-4, Pl. 65-69. 
163 Plut. Philop. 9.1. 
164 Jarva (1995), 137-8. 
165 Jarva (1995), 138, n. 956.  Markle (1977), 324-5. 
166 Jarva (1995), 138, n. 958. 
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we may insert a median case of c. 400g, combining a relatively typical 250g spearhead with a 
150g ferrule. 
 
Swords: Xiphos and Kopis 
 The standard sidearms in Hellenistic armies carried, by all appearances, by every kind of 
soldier, were swords of two types, the xiphos and the kopis.  The distinction between them is 
worth specifying at the outset for clarify.  What is meant by xiphos here is a strongly waisted 
double-edged straight-sword (fig. 5.9), while the kopis is a forward-curving single-edged sword 
(fig. 5.10), synonymous with the narrow meaning of the word machaira.167  Care must be used 
with the latter term, however, as it is sometimes employed as a generic word for a sword of any 
type.  Some older scholarship, perhaps overly influenced by Plutarch’s description of 
Macedonian sidearms as μικρά ἐγχειρίδια, has asserted that the phalangites had only daggers to 
defend themselves, but the evidence strongly points to swords as regular equipment.168   
As noted above, the military regulations of Amphipolis specify a machaira for the regular 
infantry.  Given the continued presence of the xiphos, the word machaira here must be taken to 
mean ‘sword’ generally, rather than a curved sword specifically; representational evidence 
continues to show both weapons.  Even when sheathed, xiphos and kopis can be told apart by 
their different hilt and pommel structure.  The kopis generally features an asymmetrical hilt 
which curves around the hand, whereas the xiphos generally features a symmetrical hilt, 
sometimes with a scalloped or lobed pommel, or alternately with a disc-pommel (fig. 5.11).  This 
difference is well illustrated by the two lunette paintings in the Tomb of Lyson and Kallikles, 
                                                 
167 Note esp. Xen. On Horsemanship 12.11 for the distinction between types. 
168 Plut. Aem.  20.10.  Scholars suggesting daggers, e.g., Markle (1977), 332. 
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both of which feature swords painted as if suspended from the ceiling; each has a pairing of a 
kopis and a xiphos (fig. 5.12).169  Miller also detects a xiphos at the side of a phalangite depicted 
at the ‘Great Tomb’ at Lefkadia.170  Again, he xiphos seems to be the dominant sword-type in the 
funeral images of thureophoroi compiled by Sekunda.171 
The xiphos-type is somewhat shorter and more strongly waisted than the Roman gladius 
hispaniensis; the type seems to have remained relatively consistent from the 5th century into the 
Hellenistic period.172  An example from Vergina (cat. H1) published by Markle was 55cm long 
with a well-preserved blade; the tang is broken off and lost, but would have added another c. 
8cm to the end of the blade making the weapon originally c. 65cm long (fig. 5.13).173  Markle 
weighed the remaining fragment at 300g; accounting for the missing tang, the intact original 
might have weighed around 400g.174  A very well-preserved example of the type from the late 
Classical period can be seen in the ‘Sword of Beroia’ (cat. H2, fig. 5.9); it is 55cm long with a 
strongly waisted blade that is 4.5cm at the thickest and 3cm at the thinnest.175  Using the same 
digital reconstruction methods as with the two Šmihel gladii in the previous chapter, I estimate 
                                                 
169 Miller (1993), 54-5. 
170 Miller (1993), 54; Pl. 8b. 
171 Sekunda, (1995), pl. 66-86.  Note esp. pl. 85, where the ‘lobed’ pommel of a xiphos can be seen on the otherwise 
heavily damaged fresco. 
172 Consistency of the type: G. Tourgatsoglou, “Το ξίφος Τῆς Βέροiας: Συμβολή Στη Μακεδονική Οπλοποιια των 
Ύστερων Κλασικών Χρόνων,” in Ancient Macedonia IV, Fourth International Symposium (Thessaloniki, Institute 
for Balkan Studies, 1986), 616-620.  A. E. Remouchamps, Griechische Dolch- und Schwertformen: Ein Beitrag zur 
Chronologie der Europäischen Bronzezeit (Leiden: Brill, 1926), 34-40.  The iron-age xiphos comprises ‘Typus 15’ 
and ‘Typus 16’ in Remouchamps’ typology. 
173 Markle (1982), 101.  P. Adam-Veleni, "Arms and Warfare Techniques of the Macedonians" in Alexander the 
Great, Treasures from an Epic Era of Hellenism ed. D. Pandermalis (New York: Onassis, 2004), 53. 
174 Assuming a tang 8cm long; 3cm wide and 0.5cm thick, as with the sword of Beroia discussed subsequently. 
175 Tourgatsoglou (1986), 611-628. 
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an original mass of c. 490g for the sword.  Another example of the type from Rhodes in the 
British Museum (cat. H3, fig. 5.14) is missing only the very tip of the tang.  It is 55cm long, with 
a maximum blade width of 4.5cm and is otherwise complete, but too badly rusted to produce a 
useful weight.176  As noted above, representational evidence confirms the use of this type in the 
Hellenistic period.  Two of the painted swords in the Tomb of Lyson and Kallikles are of this 
type and are apparently drawn very nearly to life-size: the north wall’s xiphos is 67.3cm long, 
while the south wall’s is 59.5cm.177  Miller notes that the scale and proportions of the two 
painted swords differ, but the overall scale is consistent with swords of this type being between 
c. 55cm and 65cm; the scabbards will have added some length to the painted swords. 
 The other sword-type was the kopis or machaira.  The kopis was a forward-curving 
single-edged sword, specialized for brutal cutting attacks; in form and function it has much in 
common with the Spanish falcata, discussed in the next chapter.  The type, though frequently 
mentioned and well-known, is often presented with little evidence, though it appears as early as 
the sixth century in Greece.178  Jarva offers only a single example of a long type and can only 
speculate about the existence of lighter versions; Connolly is forced to direct the reader to 
examples of Spanish falcatas for lack of Greek examples.179  Fortunately, more examples of the 
type have since come to light; it seems likely that as more of these swords (many of which 
                                                 
176 The sword is listed in the catalog with a date of 1-400 AD; Ben Harridge, Asst. Collections Manager at the 
British Museum, confirmed in correspondence that the sword was misdated and almost certainly dates to the Archaic 
or Classical period based on accompanying material.  The sword type would seem to rule out the beginning of that 
range, suggesting a Classical, late Classical or Hellenistic date to the weapon. 
177 Miller (1993), 54. 
178 Remouchamps (1926), 40-44. 
179 Jarva (1995), 138.  Connolly (1981), 77. 
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languish, unpublished, in museum collections) are identified and published, our understanding of 
the type will improve greatly. 
The kopis seems to have come in two forms, with a longer blade for use by the cavalry, 
and with a shorter one, presumably for the infantry.  One very well-preserved example of the 
longer type has been published by Angelos Choremis (cat. H4, fig. 5.15), found intact in the 
same deposit as a cavalry helm and metal cuirass, discussed below, confirming the weapon’s role 
as a cavalryman’s sword.180  Jarva notes another example of the type from Vetulonia which 
currently weighs 450g, but he estimates the original weight to have been about double, or 
900g.181  The connection of this type to cavalry contexts conforms to Xenophon’s advice that the 
cavalryman should prefer the machaira or kopis to the xiphos, because the former perform better 
than the latter in downward slashes; the greater length of these weapons may be meant to 
facilitate cutting downward from a mounted height.182 
We also see evidence for a substantially shorter kopis, probably for use on foot.183  The 
swords on the painted tomb of Lyson and Kallikles, as noted above, appear to have been painted 
roughly to life size; the two machairai there are 67cm and 58.3cm long, essentially the same size 
as the xiphoi.184  Two machairai, acquired in 2001 by the Metropolitan Museum of Art, are of 
this type, dated by the museum to the 5th or 4th century BCE (cat. H5, H6, fig. 5.10).  They are 
54.6 and 56.5cm long respectively; both feature the same flat-tang construction seen in the xiphoi 
                                                 
180 Choremis (1980), 3-21. 
181 Jarva (1995), 138. 
182 Xen. On Horsemanship 12.11. μάχαιραν μὲν μᾶλλον ἢ ξίφος ἐπαινοῦμεν: ἐφ᾽ ὑψηλοῦ γὰρ ὄντι τῷ ἱππεῖ κοπίδος 
μᾶλλον ἡ πληγὴ ἢ ξίφους ἀρκέσει. 
183 Snodgrass (1967), 97-8. 
184 Miller (1993), 54. 
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above.  Both were measured by the museum at c. 1.5lbs (c. 700g).  The analogy of the quite 
similar falcata discussed in the next chapter would suggest that swords of this type might also be 
significantly lighter than this, but it may be that the kopis was, on the whole, a heavier type of 
sword than the falcata. 
 Given the shape and function of these swords, scholars have tended to attribute the kopis 
to the cavalry and the xiphos to the infantry; as a general rule this seems correct, but significant 
latitude must be given for individual variation.  The helmets in the tomb of Lyson and Kallikles 
suggest that one of the brothers was a cavalryman and the other an infantryman, so the decision 
to show one of each type of sword there makes sense.185  The kopis was popular, however, with 
Greek hoplites of the late Classical period, and appears frequently in artistic representations of 
infantrymen from that point forward.186  The xiphos also appears in representational evidence for 
Macedonian cavalry; Alexander wears a xiphos on the Alexander mosaic from Pompeii (the 
sword can be identified from the disc-pommel, fig. 5.11).  Likewise, the Pergamum frieze, 
showing the equipment of a defeated Greek cavalryman, also shows a xiphos, rather than a kopis 
(fig. 5.4). 
 For the infantrymen (peltasts, phalangites and thureophoroi), then, we might assign as the 
maximum case the shorter kopis-type at 700g; it seems unlikely that the longer type of kopis 
would have been functional in close-order infantry formations.  The lighter xiphos from Vergina, 
may make the minimum case at 400g and the heavier reconstruction of the Sword of Beroia at c. 
490g the median case.  For the cavalry, the maximum case may be set with the long type of kopis 
at c. 900g.  The minimum case would be again the 400g xiphos; as noted, cavalrymen are 
                                                 
185 Miller (1993).  Sekunda (2012), 44 on the identification of the panoplies. 
186 Snodgrass (1967), 97-8. 
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represented as still using the weapon, despite Xenophon’s advice.  The median case may be set at 
the shorter type of kopis at c. 700g. 
 There is a notable tendency in the less recent scholarship to devalue Greek and 
Macedonian swords, particularly in light of the tremendously effective Roman gladius.187  The 
Greek xiphos of this period, however, was only slightly shorter than the Roman gladius, and 
could clearly have been a very effective weapon.  However, both Greek swords have a strong 
tendency towards the cut over the thrust, which may have proved a liability in close combat.  For 
the kopis, this function is obvious from the shape and weight of the weapon; the xiphos is more 
multi-purpose.  However, compared to the gladius, the xiphos is more strongly waisted, a design 
feature that will tend to concentrate the weight of the weapon towards to the point.  This is a 
desirable feature for delivering a powerful cut, as it focuses the weight of the weapon towards 
the center of percussion.188  However, as with any lever (and a sword is in a mechanical sense 
merely a sharpened lever) shifting the weight away from the grip limits the amount of control the 
hand can exert on the point, making precise thrusts more difficult. 
When designed with cuts in mind, the xiphos and the kopis would be more effective 
against lightly armored targets, but less so against an armored Roman soldier.  Strong cuts can 
swiftly disable an opponent without the difficulty of recovering the sword that is posed by a deep 
thrust.  At the same time, this design focus on the cut may explain in part why Hellenistic 
phalangites failed so rapidly and so consistently against Roman troops once exposed to close 
combat and unable to use their sarisae.  The cutting attacks favored by Greek swords would have 
                                                 
187 E.g. Markle (1977), 322.  Snodgrass (1967), 119.  Note also Liv. 34.33-4, which places emphasis on the terrible 
wounds the gladius inflicted compared to Greek weapons.    
188 The center of percussion is the point on a sword where an impact will not produce any oscillation in the grip and 
thus will deliver the strongest cut.  The exact position of the center of percussion will vary from sword to sword 
depending on the weight distribution. 
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been far less effective against mail armor; no amount of force will permit a sword to cut iron 
rings, and the padding worn underneath the armor will have absorbed most of the shock of a 
blow.189  Even so, the kopis and xiphos should not be dismissed.  They were formidable weapons 
for their intended purpose, but they were ill-suited to fight mail-armored Romans.  This 
shortcoming may explain why both of these sword-types vanish in the Roman period, to be 
supplanted by Roman sword-types like the gladius and spatha. 
 
Aspis and Pelte 
 Macedonian shields were constructed, like older Greek hoplite shields, with a wooden 
core, overlaid by a bronze sheet.190  The Macedonian aspis was generally smaller than the hoplite 
aspis of the Classical period, probably to facilitate carrying the greater weight of the sarisa, 
which required two hands.  The shield is described as being carried by way of a strap (ochane) 
rather than the porpax handle of the hoplite aspis; the usability of a grip system consisting of 
combining elbow and wrist straps with a shoulder strap (to allow both hands for the sarisa) has 
been demonstrated by Connolly (fig. 5.16).191  The primary metal component of these shield-
types is the bronze facing.  In contrast to the scutum, the grip of Macedonian shields was, as 
noted, provided by a series of straps, likely in leather.  A smaller version of this shield, carried by 
                                                 
189 It is possible for a very strong blow to ‘burst’ riveted rings, but even this would not deliver a fatal cut through the 
armor.  The ‘bashing’ impact of an ancient sword is minimal, which should be apparent given how light these 
weapons are. 
190 On the construction generally, see Liampi (1998), 9-12. 
191 Ochane vs. Porpax grip: Plut. Cleom 11.2.  Connolly (2000), 110-111.  Sekunda (2013), 81.  Liampi (1998), 11. 
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some elite units like the Antigonid peltastai, was called the pelte; it too seems to have been 
bronze-covered and carried by means of the same strap system.192 
 The main point of contention concerning Macedonian shields has been their size, but 
more recent finds of the bronze-plate shield covers have thrown considerable light on this 
question.  It is now fairly clear that there existed two sizes of Macedonian shield, one with a 
diameter of c. 70-75cm, generally identified as the aspis, and another smaller shield of c. 65cm 
in diameter, generally identified as the Macedonian pelte.193  For the sake of clarity and 
simplicity, I will refer to the larger of these shield types as the aspis and to the smaller as the 
pelte, though it should be noted that the identification of these types with those mentioned in the 
literary sources, while very probable, is not entirely secure.  The aspis appears in life-sized relief 
on a monument at Veria in Dion showing a series of carved shields; the best-preserved relief 
(‘block A’) shows two aspides, 76 and 73cm in diameter.194  The two shields painted on the 
walls of the tomb of Lyson and Kallikles also appear to be this size, measuring 73 and 75cm in 
diameter.195  Fragments of bronze shield covers of this size include one in the Florina Museum 
discussed by Katerini Liampi (cat. H18, 73.6cm diameter), another discussed by Demetrios 
Pantermales (74cm), and two more from Staro Boniče (74 and 72cm).196  The smaller type of 
                                                 
192 Sekunda (2013), 83. 
193 Hatzopoulos (2001), 83-4.  Sekunda (2013), 82; Sekunda (2007), 337-9.  Liampi (1998), 15-22.  Cf. Markle 
(1977), 331 and M. Markle, “A Shield Monument from Veria and the Chronology of Macedonian Shield Types” 
Hesperia 68.2 (1999), 219-254.  Markle argues for two shield types for the line infantry, a c. 65cm shield and a 
90cm shield, for the period of Alexander and the Diadochi; the larger (90cm) shield is, in fact, the hoplite aspis, and 
does not seem to have remained in use.  See Hatzopoulos (2001), 84, n. 2. 
194 Markle (1999). 
195 Miller (1993), 55. 
196 Liampi (1998), 55.  Adam-Veleni (2004), 55.  D Pantermales, “Βασιλέ[ως Δημητρ]ίου” in Myrtos: Mneme 
Ioulias Vokotopoulou (Thessaloniki: Hypourgeio Politismou - Aristoteleio Panepistemio Thessalonikes, 2000), xvii-
xxii.  Staro Boniče: P. Juhel and D. Temelkoski, “Fragments de “Boucliers macédoniens” au nom du roi Démétrios 
trouvés à Staro Bonče (République de Macédoine).  Rapport préliminaire et présentation épigraphique” ZPE 162 
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shield is also well-attested.  A very well-preserved example, 65.1 x. 66.9cm from Pergamum and 
dated to the mid-second century, is now at the Antikensammlung in Berlin (cat. H20, fig. 5.17); I 
will refer to this example as the ‘Berlin shield.’197  Relatively well preserved, it provides an 
excellent example of this smaller pelte-type. 
 An unusual example in this regard is the ‘Shield of Pharnakes” (cat. H19) now at the 
Getty Museum, which measures 79.7 x 81.4cm.  The inscription on the front (ΒΑΣΙΛΕΩΣ 
ΦΑΡΝΑΚΟΥ), which declares it to have belonged to Pharnakes of Pontus, dates the shield to the 
second quarter of the third century.  This shield, due to its remarkably good condition (fig. 5.18), 
is frequently used as the basis for reconstruction.198  To extrapolate from it is potentially difficult 
however, as it was not necessarily ever intended for battlefield use.  Notably, the tabs around the 
edge (see figure) are still straight and may never have been bent around a wooden core; one may 
contrast the Berlin shield (cat. H20, fig. 5.17), where the tabs around the edge are still clearly in 
a bent shape.  The shield is also, as noted, uncommonly large and significantly outside the range 
for other finds.  It is currently bolted into a mount which prevents measurements of the thickness 
of the metal plate except on the tabs.  The tabs themselves are uncommonly thick (ranging from 
1.0-2.47mm, see below for comparison), further suggesting that the shield was a display piece, 
rather than battlefield equipment.199  Given these measurements as well as with the royal 
                                                 
(2007): 165-180.  P. Juhel and D. Temelkoski, “Découverte de nouveaux ‘boucliers macédoniens’ en Pélagonie 
(République de Macédoine).  Aspects archéologiques et réflexions historiques” in Pratiques et identités culturelles 
des armées hellénistiques du monde méditerranéen eds. J-C. Couvenhes, S. Crouzet and S. Péré-Noguès (Bordeaux: 
do Boccard, 2011), 177-192. 
197 Uwe Peltz, "Der Makedonische Schild aus Pergamon der Antikensammlung, Berlin" Jahrbuch der Staatlichen 
Museen zu Berlin 43 (2001), 331-343. 
198 E.g. Connolly (2000), 109, though Connolly also considers the Berlin shield (cat. H20); his reconstruction is 
substantially based on the Getty shield. 
199 Measurements by Getty Museum staff. 
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inscription, it seems plausible that this shield was a display piece, oversized and not intended for 
combat use.  A further problem is that the shield as presented appears to have undergone 
significant restorative work since its acquisition by the Getty: one may contrast an older picture 
of it, which shows significant damage (fig. 5.18).  As a result, this particular exemplar should be 
treated with extreme caution. 
 No complete Macedonian shield survives; generally, finds are composed of fragments of 
the thin bronze facings, with the wooden cores having long since rotted away.200  The poor state 
of preservation often make it difficult to estimate the original dimensions of the shield; even so, 
enough of these fragments are sufficiently well enough preserved to reconstruct both types.  The 
bronze facings are generally very thin, though the thickness of these thin metal plates is difficult 
to measure and is often not recorded in publication details.  The metal sheets were likely 
produced by hammering, so the thickness is not consistent throughout.  Part of the reason why 
these shield facings continued to be produced in bronze is no doubt the difficulty of maintaining 
consistent thickness when producing hammered iron sheets.  A fragment of a Macedonian shield 
(cat. H18) discussed by Liampi has a thickness listed at only 0.3mm.201  The Berlin shield ranges 
from 0.35 to 0.5mm in thickness, and averages c. 0.4mm.  The older aspis could be somewhat 
thicker, but not much: a remarkably well preserved late 6th century hoplite aspis (cat. H21) now 
in the Boston Museum of Fine Arts averages a thickness of 0.5mm.   
Apart from thickness, the final dimension required for reconstruction is the depth of the 
dome or dish, as the bronze plate is not a perfect flat circle, but a dome.  Many shield fragments 
                                                 
200 The ‘shield of Pharnakes’ (cat. H19) noted above is a rare exception to this rule: nearly the entire facing survives.  
This is probably because the facing is unusually thick.   
201 Liampi (1998), 55. 
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are simply not large enough to provide this data, but some of the better-preserved shield covers 
can.  The aforementioned Berlin shield (cat. H20) is 11cm deep.  The ‘Shield of Pharnakes’ (cat. 
H19) is 11.8cm deep, while the Boston hoplite aspis (cat. H21) is 11.5cm deep.  The 
Macedonian aspides depicted in relief on the Veria monument are somewhat shallower; the best 
preserved of the group (‘Block A’) are 8cm and 9.5cm deep.202  Asclepiodotus, in outlining the 
ideal shield for the sarisa-phalanx, suggests a shield of eight palms (c. 66cm) that is “not too 
concave.”203  Hence, it has sometimes been assumed that the smaller pelte shield type of c. 65cm 
was flatter than the larger aspis type, but this does not seem to be the case.204  Indeed, the Berlin 
shield, despite being of the pelte-type and matching Asclepiodotus’ diameter measurements 
almost precisely, is one of the deepest shields, matching the depth of the Boston hoplite shield; 
by contrast the two shield-reliefs at Veria are much shallower, but they seem to depict that larger 
aspis.  Given the evidence, it thus seems reasonable to read Asclepiodotus’ statement as a 
preference for flatter shields rather than as a description of the characteristics of an entire type, 
and to assume that both the larger aspis and the smaller pelte probably ranged in depth from c. 
8cm to c. 12cm. 
Based on these parameters, it is possible to calculate the metal required for the bronze 
facing of both the aspis and the pelte.  Beginning with the aspis, a shield of 72cm in diameter 
with an 8cm dish might have c. 4,270cm2 of surface area.  A domed metal plate laid over this at a 
thickness of 0.3mm, would have a volume of 128cm3; in bronze this would mass 1.088kg.205  
                                                 
202 Markle (1999), 222. 
203 Asclepiodotus Tact. 5.1.  Περὶ ὅπλων ἰδέας τε καὶ συμμετρίας Τῶν δὲ φάλαγγος ἀσπίδων ἀρίστη ἡ Μακεδονικὴ 
χαλκῆ ὀκτωπάλαιστος, οὐ λίαν κοίλη. 
204 Flatter pelte: Sekunda (2013), 83. 
205 This assumes that the curvature of the dish of the shield is the cap-section of a sphere; the actual surface area is 
likely to vary slightly depending on how the dome is curved.  The Pergamum shield appears to be very close to the 
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This may serve as a minimum case for the aspis.  For a maximum case, a shield of 76cm in 
diameter and 11cm in depth would have a surface area of 4,910cm;2 assuming a quite thick metal 
plate of 0.5mm, the shield would require 2,086kg of bronze.  For the median case aspis, 
diameters close to 74cm seem the most common; a bronze plate of 0.4mm over a 74cm diameter 
shield with a depth of 9cm would mass 1.548kg, which may serve as a median case. 
The same process may be performed for the pelte.  For the minimum case, a 64cm 
diameter shield, with a depth of 8cm and a plate thickness of 0.3mm, would require c. 870g of 
bronze.  For the maximum case, a shield of 66cm diameter, with a 12cm depth and a plate 
thickness of 0.5mm, would require 1,646g of bronze.  The median case may match the Berlin 
shield exactly; a 66cm diameter shield with 11cm of depth and a 0.4mm plate would require 
1,292g of bronze. 
 
Thureos 
 The thureos, the oval-shield of the thureophoroi, is the Hellenistic variant of the Gallo-
Italian scutum-type.  It seems to have been introduced to Greece in the early third century, but 
the circumstances are not entirely clear; modern scholars have suggested both the Italian 
campaigns of Pyrrhus of Epirus’ and the arrival of the Galatians as possible vectors of 
transmission.206  Plutarch describes the thureos used by the Achaeans as light and easy to handle, 
                                                 
section of a sphere, however; note esp. Peltz (2001), 334, abb 4.  Mass estimates in bronze assume 8.5g/cm density, 
as in the previous chapter. 
206 Stary (1981).  Sekunda (2007), 339-343.  More recent scholarship has tended to favor Galatian transmission, e.g. 
J. Ma, “Fighting poleis of the Hellenistic world” in War and Violence in Ancient Greece, ed. H. van Wees (London: 
Duckworth, 2000), 354.  M. Eichberg (1987), 188-193.  Transmission via Pyrrhus: P. Coussin, Les Institutions 
Militaires et Navales (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1932), 82-3,  Q. F. Maule and H. R. W. Smith, Votive Religion at 
Caere: Prolegomena (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1959), 6, n. 48. 
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but too small to fully protect the body.207  This description seems borne out by the 
representational evidence.  Thureoi depicted on funerary stele (e.g. fig. 5.6) often extend from 
just above the shoulder to the mid-thigh; the shield is typically depicted as being a little less than 
half as wide as it is tall.208  The thureoi depicted on the Athena Propylon at Pergamum, which 
measure 85-90cm tall, may be life-sized, although they may also represent the Gallic shield 
type.209  The contrast with the scutum, which offered full-body protection, being both wider and 
taller, is marked.  The depiction of the shields in relief on funerary monuments (fig. 5.6) shows 
them to lack the pronounced curve of the scutum.210  The Kasr al-Harit shield from Egypt, 
discussed in the previous chapter, may also be a Hellenistic thureos, but it replicates the much 
larger and more deeply curved style of the Roman scutum, rather than the more common, smaller 
and flatter Hellenistic thureos. 
 The construction of the shield seems to roughly parallel the Roman and Gallic forms: a 
wooden oval core, strengthened by a wooden central spina, with a metal ‘butterfly’ boss over the 
wooden bulge at the center of the spina and possibly a metal rim.211  The shields would have 
been covered in thin hide, as with the Roman shield, and are almost universally painted white.  
Two examples from a funerary monument at Tanagra, Greece, show a flat rim, much like the one 
around the edge of a hoplite aspis; but a second funerary monument, also at Tanagra, shows no 
                                                 
207 Plut. Philop. 9.1.  ἐχρῶντο γὰρ θυρεοῖς μὲν εὐπετέσι διὰ λεπτότητα καὶ στενωτέροις τοῦ περιστέλλειν τὰ 
σώματα. 
208 Sekunda (1995), fig. 65-73.  Eichberg (1987), 164. 
209 Eichberg (1987), 263. 
210 P. M. Fraser and T. Rönne (1957), 69. 
211 Sekunda (1995) reconstructs these shields with a metal spina, but a wooden spina, consistent with the evidence 
for the Roman scutum (see previous chapter) seems more likely. 
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rim at all, neither does it show any trace of a metal butterfly boss, although this may be a result 
of wear.212  The thureoi on the Athena Propylon do show evidence of butterfly bosses; one of the 
shields, pictured by Michael Eichberg (fig. 5.19), shows a very thick rim, which seems likely to 
be leather rather than metal, given the thickness.  The Sidon stele paintings that show the thureos 
often show it with a darkened rim (e.g. fig. 5.20) which could be metal, but could also be a 
leather binding; the rim is not typically the same color as the boss, which would seem to suggest 
leather.213 
 I know of no finds of metal shield components from the Hellenistic world which can be 
clearly linked to the Hellenistic thureos, but the parameters of the shield are well enough known 
to permit an informed if speculative reconstruction, based on the Roman and Gallic evidence for 
the metal components.  As with the Roman scutum, the primary metal elements would consist of 
a metal boss and handle; some shields may also have had a metal rim.  Metal bosses depicted in 
artwork are consistent with the ‘butterfly’ boss shapes found in Roman and Gallic shields; given 
the small size of the shields and the lack of curvature, the smaller ‘Gallic-style’ handle also 
seems likely.  As just noted, evidence for metal rims on the shield is mixed; it seems likely that 
some shields had leather edgings, while others had metal rims.  Given that the thureos is taken to 
be a light shield, poorly suited for close combat, it seems likely, but by no means certain, that 
metal rims were rare.  A median case for the thureos, then, might include as metal elements only 
an average-weight c. 300g boss and c. 20g of metal for the handle, for a total of 320g of iron.  A 
minimum case might posit a lighter boss (c. 200g) and a lighter handle (c. 14g), for a total metal-
                                                 
212 Fraser and Rönne (1957), 69-70, pl. 1.1, 2.4. 
213 Sekunda (1995), photo 1-3.  Sekunda reconstructs the rims, boss and spina of these shields as being of the same 
metal; this seems unlikely given the coloration on the stelae. 
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weight of c. 214g.  For the maximum case, a metal rim may be added; assuming a rim of c. 
0.5mm thick, 2cm wide running the edge of a shield 80cm x 40cm, the rim might weight c. 
160g.214  Accounting for a relatively heavy (c. 300g) boss and a grip (c. 20g), the maximum case 
may be set at 480g of iron.  The drastic difference in metal intensity between the thureos and the 
two ‘Macedonian’ shield types makes the decision for Greek poleis to rely on thureophoroi 
understandable, even though such soldiers generally performed poorly when opposed by 
Macedonian phalangites: it must have been far less expensive to equip soldiers of this type.215 
 
Armor 
Body Armor 
 The starting point for discussing the body-armor of regular Macedonian troops is the 
inscribed military regulations from Amphipolis, which assign a kottybos to the regular soldiers 
and a thorax or hemithorakion to the officers.  However, two of these terms (kottybos and 
hemithorakion) have unclear meanings.  It further complicates matters that, although the term 
thorax is sometimes used in modern scholarship to mean a bronze breastplate specifically, in 
Greek sources a θώραξ can mean almost any kind of full chest protection, including mail, scale 
and textile armors.216  Thus, in order to avoid confusion, it seems best to first outline and 
reconstruct the various kinds of armor available to a Hellenistic army, before discussing which 
armors might correspond to which terms in the Amphipolis regulations. 
 
                                                 
214 An oval shield 80cm x 40cm should have a circumference of c. 200cm, thus the rim would consist of a metal 
band 20cm x 2cm x 0.5mm, or 20cm3; in iron, this would mass 157.2g. 
215 Plutarch implies as much, Plut. Philop. 9.3-5. 
216 Use of thorax as a general term meaning, effectively, breastplate, e.g. Hatzopoulos (2001), 81.  Fischer-Bovet 
(2014), 136.  Examples for θώραξ used for mail armor: Plb. 30.25.2; scale armor: Hdt. 9.22.; Paus. 1.21.6; textile 
armor: Homer Iliad 2.529, Xen. Cyropaedia. 6.4.2  Anab. 4.7.15-16, Dio 78.7.1-2, a list by no means exhaustive. 
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Breastplates 
 What is often translated or described as a breastplate is, in a technical sense, actually a 
plate armor cuirass, in that it includes both a front-plate (which is to say, a breastplate) and a 
back-plate.  The choice to wear only a front-plate with no matching back-plate, common in the 
medieval period, seems not to have been employed in the Hellenistic world.  Here, conforming to 
the common usage, I will use the term ‘breastplate’ to mean this armor (the problem with using 
the term thorax being detailed above), although it should be understood that in this context a 
‘breastplate’ includes both a front-plate and a back-plate.  ‘Cuirass’ generally may apply to any 
armor that protects both the front and back of the torso; the muscle cuirass and bell cuirass are 
thus both cuirasses and subtypes of breastplate.  The two plates are typically connected by straps 
or buckles over the shoulders and on the sides.217  Adding to this protection, the armor would be 
worn with a leather or textile liner, which also typically includes leather strips, called pyterges 
which hang down from beneath the breastplate to protect the groin and upper thighs. 
 The muscle cuirass subtype, which Jarva terms a ‘Type III’ cuirass, appears by the early 
fifth century, and remained in use in the Hellenistic period.218  This cuirass was typically made 
from copper-alloy, although a single example has been found in iron from the Hellenistic period, 
the Prodromi Cuirass from Thesprotia (cat. H23, fig. 5.21).219  The Prodromi Cuirass also 
exhibits one new characteristic of Hellenistic versions of this armor, which is the addition of 
shoulder-plates mimicking the construction of type IV ‘shoulder piece’ armor. 
                                                 
217 Jarva (1995), 31-2.  Pausanias describes this attachment system, Paus. 10.26.5. 
218 Jarva (1995), 31.  Everson (2001), 186-192. 
219 Choremis (1980). 
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 Although the Prodromi cuirass was unfortunately published without weight or thickness 
data, a number of other well-preserved examples of the type in copper-alloy can serve to give a 
sense of it.  A remarkably well-preserved example is in the British Museum, dated to the latter 
half of the fourth century (cat. H24, fig. 5.22).  This breastplate is in copper-alloy, with a 1,186g 
front-plate and a 1,316g back-plate (2,502g total); there are rings on the shoulders and the sides 
where straps would have connected and closed the plates.  A damaged example of the same type 
from Puglia, Italy dated to the fourth century BCE (cat. H25, fig. 5.23), also in the British 
Museum, has a listed weight of 7.25lbs (3,280g); some of the material from it is clearly missing, 
but the original mass is not likely to be more than 4kg.  Two fourth century cuirasses of this type 
from Apulia mass 3,850g (cat. H26) and 3,363g (cat. H27).220  As Jarva notes, the overall weight 
of such breastplates seems to have varied within a fairly limited range for some time; the Archaic 
bell cuirass from Argos (cat. H31) dated to the eighth century masses 3,360g despite being a 
much earlier cuirass.221  In Thrace, a local variant of the Archaic bell cuirass remained in use at 
least into the fourth century; an example of this type from Chernozem, Bulgaria, dated to the late 
fifth century, masses 3kg.222 
 Despite the relatively clear picture offered by the archaeological evidence, reconstructed 
weights for Greek breastplates have tended to skew high, at times unrealistically so.  Jarva’s 
study of the weight of hoplite arms continues to be the basis for discussion, with no systematic 
                                                 
220 Jarva (1995), 135.  D. Cahn, Waffen und Zaumzeug (Basel: Antikenmuseum Basel, 1989), 58-60, 66. 
221 Jarva (1995), 135.  P. Courbin, "Une tombe géometrique d'Argos" BCH 81 (1957), 322-386, esp. 340-350. 
222 K. Kisyov, “Le tumulus n˚ I de Chernozem-Kaloyanovo” in L’Épopée des rois thraces: des guerres médiques 
aux invasions celtes 476 – 278 av. J.-C, eds. J-L. Martinez, A. Baralis, N. Mathieux, T. Stoyanov and M. Tonkova 
(Paris: Musée du Louvre, 2015), 78-9.  It has been suggested that these later cuirasses might have been worn with an 
iron pectoral or gorget to cover the neck, as the Thracian variants lack the high collar of the Archaic bell cuirass 
type.  Everson (2001), 185-6.  L. Ognenova, “Les cuirasses de bronze trouvées en Thrace” BCH 85 (1961): 501-538. 
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effort to compile the archaeological evidence since his.223  In discussing the Argos bell-cuirass, 
Jarva notes that the maximum reported thickness is c. 2mm, and proposes to calculate an original 
of weight of 8kg on this basis; his approach has a number of problems, however.224  First, he 
assumes the rough surface area of the armor to be c. 1m2, or 10,000cm2; this is almost certainly 
too high.225  As noted below, the pattern for the detailed reconstruction of the type IV armor has 
a much lower surface area, while covering the same region of the body.  Second, Jarva appears 
not to make allowances for the wide variance of armor-thickness within cuirasses.  Instead, he 
notes that the reported average thickness of the cuirass was 2mm, and thus adjusts the ‘original’ 
mass of the breastplate from the preserved weight of 3.36kg to roughly 8kg on that basis; even 
so, the Argos cuirass which is quite well preserved (fig. 5.24), leaves little room for such 
material loss.226   
Jarva seems to assume that the original breastplate had uniform thickness and that 
variations in thickness are the result of material loss, perhaps from corrosion.  However, copper-
alloy, in contrast to iron, corrodes protectively, meaning that the initial corrosion layer protects 
the rest of the metal from further corrosion; material loss is thus typically very low, even over 
long periods.  Moreover, thickness in body-armor is often varied from section to section by 
design, or as a consequence of the working and forging process.227  Jarva himself notes that “it 
                                                 
223 Reliance on Jarva (1995), e.g. A. Schwartz Reinstating the Hoplite: Arms, Armour and the Phalanx Fighting in 
Archaic and Classical Greece (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 2009), 95-96, n. 368; Aldrete et al (2013), 147. 
224 Jarva (1995), 135.  It should be noted that Jarva seeks in his argument to stress the considerable weight of hoplite 
equipment and tends to consistently make assumptions maximizing that weight. 
225 This can be compared with the same surface area suggested for the lorica hamata of the previous chapter.  Unlike 
a breastplate, the lorica hamata extends to the knees rather than the natural waist (where a breastplate typically 
terminates) and is doubled on the shoulders. 
226 Jarva (1995), 135. 
227 As noted in chapter three, producing a sheet of metal of uniform thickness required specialized equipment 
unavailable in the classical period.  Schwartz (2009), 67, also assumes significant corrosion, despite the cuirass 
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seems that Archaic armourers were mostly satisfied with a thickness of less than 1mm.”228  The 
thickness of body-armor plates actually varies a great deal more than Jarva implies, with a range 
from fractions of 1mm to 3.5mm being reported in the British Museum’s fragments of bronze 
body-armor plates when measured.229  A fragment of a breastplate from Metapontum (cat. H28) 
ranges from 1mm to nearly 2mm, within a single sheet of bronze.  Finally, Jarva then suggests 
weights of 4-8kg for armors ranging from 1mm to 2mm, despite having just noted that he places 
a normal range at or below 1mm, and that none of his cited archaeological exemplars fits within 
this range.230  The results of these computations have been repeated in subsequent works, despite 
the glaring flaws.231  Far more reasonable is Connolly’s computation of c. 6kg for the entirety of 
a hoplite’s body protection, including not only the metal elements of the breastplate, but also the 
lining and leather pyterges.232  It should be noted that Connolly’s reconstruction included c. 3kg 
of non-metal material, which matches well with the preserved archaeological examples. 
 Jarva’s high estimates are partly the result of  a desire to harmonize the archaeological 
evidence with a report from Plutarch that Demetrius Poliorcetes received as a gift from Cyprus 
two breastplates in iron weighing 40 minas (c. 13.5 – 17.5kg) each, which were supposedly proof 
                                                 
being in copper-alloy; Schwartz attributes Connolly’s suggestion of 6kg for the Argos cuirass to accounting for 
corrosion.  However, Connolly (1981), 58 makes it clear that the extra weight is to account for a textile lining or 
undergarment beneath the armor. 
228 Jarva (1995), 135. 
229 Pers. Correspondence with Ben Harridge, Assistant Collections Manager at the British Museum.  The examined 
pieces were British Museum inv. 1772,0303.140a-b, 1865,0722.3, 1865,0722,4 and 1842,0728.712; max thicknesses 
ranged from c. 2mm to c. 3.5mm, but varied greatly within individual fragments. 
230 Jarva’s heaviest example is 3.85kg.  Jarva (1995), 135. 
231 E.g. Schwartz (2009), 95-6.  Aldrete et al. (2013), 147. 
232 Connolly (1981), 58. 
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against a catapult shot at close range.233  Plutarch adds that a man to whom one of these 
breastplates was given, Alkimos of Epirus, wore an entire panoply that weighed two talents (c. 
52kg), and that it was twice the standard weight of equipment.234  But this claim is poor ground 
on which to base a reconstruction.  We are explicitly told that Alkimos was an unusual warrior, 
that the armor he was given was unusual in both material and weight, and moreover that it was 
an extravagant gift for a king.  In addition, Plutarch’s reliability here is suspect.  Writing 
centuries later, he can hardly have been familiar with these armors and their weights, and he does 
not supply his own source for the information, in contrast to his account of Pydna, where he 
makes his reliance on the testimony of Scipio Nasica clear.  Consequently, this anecdote should 
not be accorded greater credence than the archaeological evidence. 
 One standout example from the royal tombs at Aigai, the Vergina cuirass (cat. H30), 
needs to be discussed.   Although the cuirass was first partially published in 1977 and has often 
been pictured and discussed (fig. 5.25), it has never been fully published with measurements.235  
Its main material is iron, but with gold detailing; the iron elements were covered with white 
linen, and the pyterges, which do not survive, were covered with gold strips.  No other armor, 
complete or fragmentary, of this type and style from any period has been found, making the lack 
of published details particularly unfortunate.  Along with the Prodromi cuirass previously 
discussed, the Vergina cuirass marks the only example of Hellenistic cuirasses yet discovered in 
                                                 
233 Plut.  Demetrius 21.3-4. 
234 Plut. Demetrius 21.4 
235 Initial publication:  M. Andronikos, "Vergina: The Royal Graves in the Great Tumulus" AAA 10 (1977), 1-72.  
Subsequent discussion: M. Andronikos, "The Royal Tombs at Aigai (Vergina)" in Philip of Macedon eds. 
Hatzopoulos and Loukopoulos (Athens: Ekdotike Athenon S.A. 1980), 188-231; Connolly (1981), 58-9; M. 
Andronikos, Vergina: The Royal Tombs and the Ancient City (Athens: Ekdotike Athenon S.A., 1984), 140-144; 
Everson (2004), 192-3; Aldrete et al. (2013), 69-70. 
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iron.236  It is remarkably thick at 5mm, and while no weight has been published, it is almost 
certainly uncommonly heavy at that weight, even before the gold detailing and trim on the 
pyterges are considered.  While it has been suggested that this cuirass represents an alternative 
interpretation for the type IV ‘shoulder piece’ armor discussed below, it is far more likely that it 
represents a one-off piece of armor for a king, rather than a typical example of a more 
widespread type.237  Like the two cuirasses mentioned by Plutarch, it is hard to see how this 
piece could have been anything but an exceptional one-off.238 
 Thus the range of weights for Hellenistic breastplates remains unclear.  I have aimed, 
wherever possible, to let the archaeological exemplars speak for themselves.  The minimum case 
may thus be set at the lightest exemplar reviewed (cat. R73), with c. 2.5kg in copper-alloy.  The 
grouping of exemplars around 3.5kg (cat. H25, H31, etc) suggests a median case in that range.  
More speculatively, we might set a maximum case around 5kg, to allow room for exceptionally 
thick examples.  None of the exemplars are nearly this heavy, but it seems prudent to allow for 
the possibility of heavier breastplates, particularly as prestige armors. 
 
 
Type IV ‘Shoulder Piece’ Armor and the Linothorax 
 The other major option for armor is what Jarva terms the ‘Type IV’ armor, sometimes 
also called the ‘shoulder piece’ or ‘tube and yoke’ armor and identified with the ancient term 
                                                 
236 Noted by Everson (2004), 186-7. 
237 In this, I follow the judgment of Aldrete et al. (2013), 69-70.  N. Sekunda, Greek Hoplite 480 – 323 BC (Oxford: 
Osprey 2000), 11, attempts to argue that cuirasses of this type were not only common, but in fact comprise the 
majority or even the whole of Type IV armor; it is hard to see how this view can be supported. Cf. Everson (2004), 
192-3, who notes that backdating this sort of armor to the fifth century is very unlikely.  
238 It should be noted that muscle-cuirass wearing Roman generals are likewise excluded from the reconstruction of 
the Roman legion, and for the same reason, the object being to assess the arms and armor of the average soldier, not 
of elite aristocratic generals and kings. 
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linothorax.239  This armor-type has recently been the subject of an extensive study by Gregory 
Aldrete, Scott Bartell and Alicia Aldrete, which has done much to elucidate its nature; the 
conclusions of that study are largely accepted here.240  Type-IV armor consisted of a tube of 
material covering the chest, tied together on the left side of the body, with thick bands of 
material bent over the shoulders and tied down on the front of the armor (fig. 5.26).  In order to 
provide mobility, the main tube of the armor generally terminates at the natural waist (as with a 
metal breastplate), but with pteryges, sometimes in one row, sometimes two, covering the groin 
and upper-thighs.241  This armor begins to appear in representational artwork as early as c. 600 
B.C.E. and continues to appear into the first century C.E..242 
 The typical material for this type of armor was probably a thick laminated linen.  Modern 
scholars have often doubted that the Type IV armor, called a linothorax in our sources, was, in 
fact, made of linen, and they have instead posited leather as the primary material.  Aldrete et al. 
demonstrate that the available evidence nevertheless argues heavily for linen as the most 
common material, while noting that in all likelihood at least some Type IV armors were made 
out of leather.243  Aldrete et al. have demonstrated this proposed linen reconstruction by 
producing several full cuirasses and testing the resulting armor.244  The layers of linen were 
                                                 
239 On the scholarship of this armor generally, see Aldrete et al. (2013), 2-4. 
240 Aldrete et al. (2013). 
241 Alderete et al. (2013), 31-36. 
242 Aldrete et al. (2013), 26. 
243 Leather proposed as a material, Jarva (1995), 36-7.  J. K. Anderson Military Theory and Practice in the Age of 
Xenophon (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1970).  Linen construction: Aldrete et al. (2013), 57-72.  Note 
also Snodgrass (1967), 90-1, who notes the long history of textile armor and finds the idea of linen armor very 
plausible. 
244 The construction of the armor described here follows Aldrete et al. (2013); the methods are speculative to a 
degree, but the high correlation between the end product and the ancient evidence argues strongly for their validity.  
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probably laminated together with glue, a solution argued for by the clear rigidness of the armor 
when portrayed in artwork.  Multiple layers of linen, as many as 17, are saturated with glue and 
allowed to dry in contact in order to bond into a rigid and quite strong material.  Aldrete et al. 
subsequently tested their armor and showed it to be able to defeat a range of melee and missile 
weapons while weighing only 3.5 – 4.0kg, making it highly effective for the weight. 
  In terms of resource intensity, the primary driver of cost for this armor was the linen 
used in construction.  Aldrete et al. estimate some 650 hours of production time to produce the 
fabric necessary for the armor, representing more than 91% of the total production time.245  
Producing the armor in leather rather than linen would have likely resulted in broadly similar 
costs; in both cases the armor was likely to be far less expensive than the contemporary muscle 
cuirass.246  Metal elements in the construction of the most basic linothorax are limited to rings 
and attachment points for the straps which tie down the shoulder-pieces (fig. 5.27).  Some of the 
representational evidence shows more complex attachment systems, including wheel-like central 
attachment points for the two shoulder straps; the evidence does not always permit their 
reconstruction.  In artwork many examples of the armor show only rings, or even no metal 
elements at all, used in the attachment points for the shoulders.247  Type IV armor was often 
supplemented with additional metal protective elements like metal plates and scales; these are 
discussed below.  A plausible median case for these metal elements might then amount to c. 
100g of rings and attachments.  The minimum case is quite clearly no metal at all.  For the 
                                                 
245 Aldrete et al. (2013), 152-3. 
246 Aldrete et al. (2013), 156-8. 
247 Aldrete et al. (2013), 32-35. 
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maximum case, we might set a metal-weight of c. 500g, accounting for some of the more 
complex attachment systems. 
 
Reinforced Type IV Armors 
 However, type IV armors often appear to have been reinforced with additional metal 
elements, including metal plates and scales.  Aldrete et al. note that in the 913 instances of Type 
IV armor they catalog, 201 of them, or 22%, show an additional layer of protection, typically 
scales.248  Given the tendency (previously noted), for ancient artwork to overrepresent high-
status equipment, the relatively low appearance rate of metal reinforced type IV armors strongly 
suggests that this was a minority armor type.   As a result, it seems best to treat this armor 
separately from the more standard fully textile type IV armor, rather than as a variation within 
the type, in order to avoid skewing the figures for the more common basic type IV armor. 
While scales sometimes covered the entire armor, it was more typical that they covered 
only a region, most often as a band of scales extending over the lower section of the torso.249  
Alexander’s armor on the Alexander mosaic shows a number of possible reinforcements.  
Alexander clearly has a copper-alloy scale belly-guard of a type common on type IV armor and 
also what may be a copper-alloy plate with a gorgoneion over the center of the rib-cage (fig. 
5.1b).  Connolly suggests that Alexander’s shoulder-pieces are reinforced with iron plates, while 
Aldrete et al. read the coloration as reddish-brown or perhaps purple, and thus simple textile; 
damage to the mosaic prevents certainty.250  Less expensive composite cuirasses – Alexander is a 
                                                 
248 Aldrete et al. (2013), 68-9. 
249 Aldrete et al. (2013), 68. 
250 Conolly (1981), 72.  Aldrete et al. (2013), 50. 
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king, after all – might incorporate one or more of these sorts of reinforcements.  As some are 
fairly common, it is worth assessing possible weights for them. 
To reconstruct the metal requirements of these sorts of reinforcements is very difficult, 
however.  Not only do the potential levels of armor reinforcement vary widely, but also the 
absence of clear recovered archaeological exemplars makes fully secure reconstruction 
impossible.  Jarva notes a class of metal belly-guards in the archaeological record; these were 
metal reinforcements covering the lower torso and sometimes groin area.251  He notes that the 
thickest of them seem to weigh less than 0.4kg and the lightest examples around 0.15g, being 
both quite small and relatively thin (typically less than 1mm thick).  The chest plate Alexander 
wears on the Alexander mosaic is difficult to estimate; it only covers the front of his body and 
only the upper torso.  We might suggest a plate c. 30cm wide and c. 16cm tall; if made in bronze 
at 1mm thickness, such a plate might weigh c. 400g.  Alexander’s shoulder-plates, which may be 
made in iron, are also difficult to estimate; if metal, they are clearly placed over a textile base 
and leave some of the textile uncovered around the edges.  Going by Aldrete et al.’s 
measurements for the reconstruction type IV armor, we might expect an iron plate 8cm wide and 
perhaps 40cm long.252  At c.1mm thickness, such a plate would weigh c. 250g; two (one for each 
shoulder) would then add some 500g of metal to the armor. 
The most common type of reinforcement, as noted, was metal scales.  These most 
commonly cover the belly, but scale reinforcement to the sides and chest also appear.  Jarva 
suggests that 3,500 scales found in the Crimea might belong to a scale-reinforced cuirass of this 
                                                 
251 Jarva (1995), 136. 
252 Aldrete et al. (2013), 74.  This assumes that approximately 2cm of fabric are showing around the edges of the 
plate. 
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type; the scales are 2.5 x 4.2cm and c. 0.5mm thick.253  Jarva further estimates that the scales 
might have covered a surface of roughly 8,000cm2, which he figures to be about the surface of a 
type IV armor; he suggests that this could mean all of the scales belong to a single armor which 
he supposes might have weighed 16kg, an extraordinarily heavy armor.254  Judging by Aldrete et 
al.’s measurements for the reconstruction type IV armor, the total surface area to be covered with 
scales is likely to be significantly less than 8000cm2.  Basic calculations working from their 
measurements suggest a surface area to be armored around c. 6,000-6,500cm2, depending on 
how areas of overlap are armored.255  Moreover, Jarva’s suggestion that each of the Crimea 
scales, at 10.2cm2 surface area each, would have covered only “a little more than 2cm2” calls for 
a very high rate of overlap, far higher than comparable scale armors from, for instance, the 
Roman imperial period.256  
                                                 
253 Jarva (1995), 136. 
 
254 Jarva (1995), 136.  For comparison, Claude Blaire gives 41lbs, 13.5 ounces (19kg) for the full weight of an entire 
German plate field armor, offering full body plate protection, dating to c. 1525.  Blaire (1958), 192.  The armor in 
question is at the Wallace collection, inv. A24. 
255 Aldrete et al. (2013), 74.  Using the measurements provided, I estimated that the ‘tube’ part of the armor would 
have a rough surface area of c. 4,350cm2, while the shoulder elements would add roughly 2,000cm2 additional area; 
this almost certainly overstates the area to be armored, as section where the shoulder-pieces and the torso armor 
overlap are counted twice. 
256 Jarva (1995), 136.  Cf. Sim and Kaminski (2012), 98-100.  Note also the spacing of attachment holes on Roman 
scales showing that most of any given scale was exposed, Bishop and Coulston (2006), 97, fig 54.  Groller 
calculated the ‘lost area’ created by scale overlap in the Carnuntum scales at 33-40%; Jarva’s suggestion would 
create a ‘lost area’ of 80%; M. von Groller, “Römische Waffen” Der römische limes in Österreich 2 (1900), 85-132. 
This strikes me as an unreasonably tight distribution of scales, but serves as an upper-bound.  Medieval scale armors 
also appear to have been nowhere near this densely crowded, e.g. C. Blaire, (1958), 228-9. 
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Fully scale-covered armor outside of Etruria is rare, however.257  Far more common are 
scale-armored belly-guards of the type Alexander has attached to his armor on the Alexander 
mosaic.  The scales cover the lower quarter or so of the armor; if they ran entirely around the 
back, the total area covered might be 1,100cm2 (c. 110cm x c. 10cm).258  Scale armor entails a 
degree of overlap between the scales in order to provide full protection, and individual scales 
from different armors may vary significantly in size; representational artwork often simplifies 
these patterns and is a poor guide for scale size.  Working from Roman exemplars of imperial 
period lorica squamata, Sim and Kaminski noted that in a typical pattern of Roman armor scales, 
68% of the covered area would have two overlapping scales, 21% four overlapping scales, and 
only 11% would be covered by just a single scale.259  Using that level of overlap as a rule of 
thumb and the thickness of the Crimea scales as a general guide, we might expect the belly-guard 
in the Alexander mosaic to require c. 1kg of bronze.260  Acceptance of Jarva’s much denser scale 
placement would suggest that the belly-guard might require c. 2,100g of bronze.261 
 This exercise should give some sense of the wide range of possible reinforcements; 
however, it is worth reiterating that the vast majority (78%) of representations of type-IV armors 
compiled by Aldrete et al. show no reinforcements at all.  If Etruria is excluded from the sample, 
                                                 
257 Aldrete et al. (2013), 52.  Nearly 40% (79 of 201) of all examples of scales on type IV armor noted by Aldrete et 
al. comes from Etruria, despite Etruria providing only a quarter of the total corpus of examples.   
258 As before, figures for the overall surface size of the armor follow Aldrete et al. (2013), 74. 
259 Sim and Kaminski (2012), 98-100. 
260 Of the 1,100cm2, (with 0.5mm thick scales), 748cm2 would be covered by 2 scales (1mm total thickness), 
121cm2 by 1 scale (0.5mm thickness) and 231cm3 by 4 scales (2mm thickness). 
261 Jarva (1995), 136.  As noted above, it seems likely that Jarva significantly overstates the density and thus weight 
of typical examples of this kind of armor, but such estimates still serve as upper-bounds. 
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the percentage of unreinforced armors rises to 82%.262  At the upper-end of these reinforcements, 
a cuirass like Alexander’s from the Alexander Mosaic might include c. 2,500g of additional 
metal components, approaching the metal requirements of a lighter muscle cuirass.  More 
commonly, cuirasses featuring one of these protective elements might range in metal-weight 
from c. 500g to c. 1,500g; it seems likely that most reinforced cuirasses would have fit into this 
range.  We might set a minimum case for reinforced armors of this type at c. 500g; if any less 
than this, we might consider the armor to be merely a typical linothorax.  For a median case, we 
may posit the most common reinforcement, the belly-guard of scales, at c. 1.5kg, splitting the 
difference between my estimates and Jarva’s for likely typical scale weight.  For a maximum 
case, the full range of reinforcements for Alexander’s cuirass on the Alexander Mosaic seems a 
reasonable choice, at perhaps c. 2.5kg. 
 
Other armor types 
 A number of other types of armor were available and likely present to some degree or 
another in the regular armies of the major Hellenistic states.  Quilted armor, made of multiple 
layers of textile stitched together with additional loose fabric in the pockets between layers, has 
been suggested for Greek armies, notably by Snodgrass.263  This type of armor was extremely 
common in Europe during the Middle Ages under a number of different names (e.g. aketon, 
gambeson, pourpoint, arming jack), but appears only very rarely in sources for the ancient 
world.264  The one clear reference to armor of this type in a Hellenistic army is to 100 
                                                 
262 Aldrete et al. (2013), 52. 
263 Snodgrass (1967), 90. 
264 Blaire (1958), 32-34. 
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cavalrymen in the army of Ptolemy II, equipped with Kushite-style quilted armor.265  Plate 
defenses like the muscle cuirass and helmets were worn with liners, which may have often been 
quilted in much the same way; being textile (or possibly leather), these do not survive.266  
However, as a primary armor material, quilted textiles do not seem to have been a major armor 
type for Hellenistic armies.267  The other major potential armor was mail, transmitted to the 
Greek world by way of the Romans and Gauls.  Polybius reports 5,000 Seleucid soldiers 
organized as a Roman legion and armored in mail at the parade at Daphne in 166, and a mail-
clad warrior appears on a grave stele from Sidon which, Sekunda argues, ought to be dated c. 
154-147 BCE.268  However, as noted in the introduction, the focus of this chapter is on the 
Hellenistic armies that Rome faced in battle.  By 166, the Third Macedonian War was over and 
Gaius Popillius Laenas armed only with a senatus consultum had already stopped a Seleucid 
army; Rome’s victory over the great states of the Greek East was a fait accompli.269  Without 
evidence to show the adoption of mail armor earlier than this, it seems more sensible to exclude 
it from the reconstruction. 
 
Types and Prevalence 
 As with the Romans of the previous chapter, to determine the prevalence of these armor 
types is made complicated by scarce evidence.   As noted, the Amphipolis military regulations 
                                                 
265 Fischer-Bovet (2014), 131. 
266 Connolly (1981), 58.  Jarva (1995), 135.  
267 Aldrete et al. (2013), 64-67, consider the evidence for quilted construction for type IV and related armors; the 
evidence strongly argues for laminated construction, as they note. 
268 Plb. 30.25.3.  Sekunda (1995), 23.  Date of the stele: Sekunda (2001a), 68, 135-149. 
269 Liv. 45.12; Plb. 29.27. 
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specify the wearing of a kottybos for the regular infantry.  The meaning of this term is unclear, 
though it may equate to the kossumbe or kossumbos (κοσύμβη or κόσσυμβος), a shepherd’s coat, 
which may suggest a textile or leather object of some kind.270  Recent interpretations have tended 
to see the kottybos, then, as equivalent to the Type-IV shoulder-piece cuirass, that is, the 
linothorax.271  Following that assumption, the hemithorakion is sometimes identified with 
reinforced type-IV shoulder-piece cuirasses; the thorax of the inscription, then, must clearly mean 
a full muscle-cuirass; these armors were only required of the hegemones, meaning the first rank of 
the phalanx, consisting of the lochagoi and higher officers.272 
 The evidence for the widespread use of the linothorax and its role as the distinctive armor 
of the Macedonian phalanx is quite strong.273  Alexander the Great, after receiving reinforcements 
and 25,000 sets of armor while on campaign in India, ordered the old armor burned; in order to be 
burned, such armor must have been textile or leather, while the quantity of armors replaced 
strongly indicates that the new sets armors were for the common soldiers.274  Likewise, Caracalla, 
seeking to re-create Alexander’s phalanx, arms his men in “breastplates of three-plied linen” 
according to Dio, indicating that this armor was seen as characteristic of the Macedonian 
phalanx.275  Representational evidence reinforces this claim.276  The Alexander sarcophagus shows 
                                                 
270 Everson (2004), 194. 
271 E.g. Hatzopoulos (2001), 80-81.  Everson (2004), 194. Connolly (1981), 80. 
272 Sekunda (2013), 89.  Hatzopulos (2001), 80-1.  Connolly (1981), 76. 
273 Aldrete et al. (2013), 14-17. 
274 Curtius 9.3.21. Diodorus 17.95.4.  Aldrete et al.(2013), 14. 
275 Dio 78.7.1-2: Θώραξ λινοῡς τρίμιτος.  Aldrete et al. (2013), 15. 
276 The examples in this paragraph are only the most notable in a huge corpus of representational evidence for the 
type-IV armor.  The most exhaustive catalog of examples is to be found in Aldrete, et al. (2013). 
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an infantryman, probably a hypaspist to judge by his helmet (fig. 5.28), wearing a type-IV 
cuirass.277  Alexander, as noted, wears a reinforced type-IV cuirass in the Alexander mosaic.278  
Tomb paintings at both the ‘Bella Tumulus’ at Vergina and the ‘Great Tomb’ at Lefkadia depict 
infantrymen carrying what appear to be sarisae, wearing white-colored type-IV armor, almost 
certainly linothorakes.279  Likewise, the two armors painted in the tomb of Lyson and Kallikles 
(fig. 5.12, top) are type-IV cuirasses, apparently in white linen.280 
 Recently, Sekunda has attempted to revive the older position that the Macedonian 
infantry, especially the elite infantry peltastai, were in fact far more lightly armored.281  He 
suggests that the Amphipolis decree should be read to mean that “only those in the front rank 
(i.e. the lochagoi) were equipped with body armour.”282  Such a reconstruction would mean a 
radical reduction in weight of the phalanx; not only would it deprive the rearmost fifteen ranks of 
any body armor but, given the aforementioned evidence for the ubiquity of textile armor, it 
would also fall to reason that very few of the lochagoi would have worn any metal body armor, 
                                                 
277 Pictured in Connolly (1981), 71, and listed as S-23 in Aldrete et al. (2013), 197. 
278 Connolly (1981), 72.  Listed as P-10 in Aldrete et al. (2013), 206. 
279 Vergina: M. Andronikos (1984), 37. Lefkandia: Miller (1993), pl. 8b.  Aldrete et al. (2013), 206 lists the Vergina 
painting as P-7 and the Lefkadia painting as P-8. 
280 Miller (1993), 52-53.  Aldrete et al. (2013), 206 lists this instance as P-9.  Sekunda (2012), 44, pl. G, reconstructs 
these armors as made in bronze, presumably from the slight yellow tint of the armor.  Note also Sekunda (2013), 13, 
where the parts of the armor are described as ‘plates.’ This reconstruction is extremely unlikely; the pyterges are 
clearly made of the same material as the chest and shoulder straps and would need to bend in order to accommodate 
movement.  Notably the two bronze helmets painted immediately above the cuirasses are set off in a clearly different 
color (as are the bronze greaves in the opposing lunette). 
281 Sekunda (2012), 33, 42-3.  Sekunda (2013), 83, 89.  This position in older scholarship: Launey (1949), 359; G. T. 
Griffith, “ΜΑΚΕΔΟΝΙΚΑ: Notes on the Macedonians of Philip and Alexander” Proceedings of the Cambridge 
Philological Society 4 (1956/7), 3-10; Snodgrass (1967), 117-8; Markle (1977), 327-8; E. Borza, In the Shadow of 
Olympus: The Emergence of Macedon (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), 204-5, 298-9.  Connolly 
(1981), 79-80, suggests something of a compromise position, that the very back ranks may have worn little armor; 
nevertheless, his visual reconstructions show all Macedonian soldiers wearing linothorakes or heavier armor. 
282 Sekunda (2013), 89. 
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as opposed to the linothorax.  This reconstruction does have the advantage of a clean reading of 
the Amphipolis inscription: it does not require any meaning to be read into the uncertain word 
kottybos; as noted above, thorax can certainly be taken to include textile armors like the type-IV 
armor.  Moreover, the inscription seems to imply that whatever the kottybos is, it is required of 
both regular soldiers and hegemones; this cannot mean, as Tim Everson suggests, that this is a 
type-IV cuirass worn underneath a breastplate.283  Inflexible, thick and quite heavy, a type-IV 
cuirass could not have been worn this way.  Instead, the kottybos in this reading might mean a 
military cloak, consistent with its derivation from the kossimbos. 
The balance of the evidence, however, seems to argue against Sekunda’s position.  The 
number of replacement armors said to have been delivered to Alexander’s army, 25,000, alone 
suggests that they could not have been merely for the lochagoi.284  As noted above, Macedonian 
soldiers, when not heroically nude, are represented typically in type-IV armor.  Against this 
evidence, Sekunda places a fresco from the North wall of Ala 4 in the House of Menander in 
Pompeii, which (he contends) shows Ajax equipped as a Macedonian peltast without armor; the 
fresco forms the basis of an artistic reconstruction of peltast equipment.285  Sekunda’s 
assumption that this mythical scene is accurate in terms of equipment is dubious, not least 
because, as Sekunda himself notes, the artist has chosen to dramatically shorten Ajax’s sarisa, if 
in fact it is a sarisa at all.286  Later writers of military manuals must be read carefully, but they 
too seem to reinforce the idea that the sarisa-phalanx is assumed to be armored.  Asclepiodotus 
                                                 
283 Everson (2004), 194. 
284 Curtius 9.3.21.  Diodorus 17.95.4. 
285 Sekunda (2013), 40.  Sekunda (2012), 43-44, pl F. 
286 Sekunda (2012), 44. 
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says this directly, noting that the men with Macedonian spears (meaning sarisa) are to be 
protected by thorakes; Arrian notes this as well.287  Plutarch, in his description of Achaeans’ 
transition from thureophoroi to phalangite troops, is also quite clear that the change required 
donning heavier body-armor.288  It is hard to imagine that the body-armor of the phalangists 
would have been considered such a defining part of the panoply if only the front-rank, one out of 
every sixteen men, wore significant body-armor. 
Bar-Kochva, reacting against the older assumption that Macedonian phalangites were 
generally unarmored, goes in the opposite direction, suggesting that Seleucid phalangites might 
have all worn breastplates.289  In so doing, he does not distinguish between textile type-IV armor 
(which was not well understood when he wrote) and metal body protection, but opts instead to 
use the blanket term ‘breastplate.’  However he clearly has the muscle-cuirass in mind.  His 
suggestion seems unlikely; his assumption that a breastplate was necessary to defend against 
arrows is flawed.  Aldete et al. have shown that the textile type-IV provides excellent protection 
against missile weapons.290  Bar-Kochva himself notes that “in this case there is no direct 
evidence,” and he presents only general considerations suggesting that Seleucid phalangites were 
at least somewhat armored.291  As noted in the previous paragraph, the balance of the evidence 
strongly suggests that all of the regular phalangites were at least somewhat armored; without 
specific evidence, there is no reason to suspect the Seleucids were any different in this respect. 
                                                 
287 Asclepiodotus 1.2.  Arr. Tact. 3.1-2. 
288 Plut. Philop. 9.2. 
289 Bar-Kochva (1976), 55-6. 
290 Bar-Kochva (1976), 55.  Aldrete et al (2013), 101-128. 
291 Bar-Kochva (1976), 55. 
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A related issue is the question of the armor of elite troops like the Antigonid and 
Ptolemaic peltasts.  Asclepiodotus places Macedonian peltasts between the main phalanx and the 
light infantry (psiloi) in weight, but attributes this placement to a shorter sarisa and a smaller 
shield (the pelte); he makes no mention of a reduction in body-armor.292  Plutarch describes the 
Antigonid peltasts as having “gilded equipment (ὅπλα) and new red cloaks (φοινικίδες)” at 
Pydna; it seems likely that what is gilt here is body-armor.293  Sekunda emphasizes the lack of 
cuirasses reported in the looted equipment of the peltasts of Flamininus’ triumph after 
Cynoscephalae; that the lighter peltasts would be unarmored fits with his view of an overall very 
lightly armored phalanx.294  Hatzopoulos suggests that body-armor may have been normal for the 
peltasts, arguing from a funeral stele showing a Macedonian peltast in armor.295  Based on the 
evidence, the armor of the peltasts was unlikely to be any heavier than that of the regular 
phalangites, but it is not necessarily clear that it would have been as much lighter, as Sekunda 
supposes.  My reconstruction assumes that peltast units wear the same body armor as the regular 
troops, but it should be noted that this assumption is, at best, conjectural.  Alternative 
reconstructions, however, would almost certainly have the peltasts more lightly armored, rather 
than more heavily so; thus objections on this point can only serve to lower the total resource 
intensity of the unit, rather than raise them. 
                                                 
292 Asclepiodotus Tact. 1.2. 
293 Plut. Aem. 18.7.  ἄγημα τρίτον οἱ λογάδες, αὐτῶν Μακεδόνων ἀρετῇ καὶ ἡλικίᾳ τὸ καθαρώτατον, ἀστράπτοντες 
ἐπιχρύσοις ὅπλοις καὶ νεουργοῖς φοινικίσιν.  Φοινικίδες, literally a red cloth of any kind, here should be understood 
as cloaks, not tunics (as the Thracians are reported wearing just before this passage); this is the Macedonian red 
military cloak. 
294 Plut. Flam.14.1.  Sekunda (2012), 33. 
295 Hatzopoulos (2001), 71.  Sekunda (2013), 119 agrees with the identification of this figure as a peltast, but 
assumes that the figure is a hegemon based on the body-armor he wears, as a consequence of Sekunda’s assumption 
that only the hegemones wore body armor. 
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On the whole it seems most prudent to accept the current prevailing consensus, that the 
common Macedonian soldier, be he Antigonid, Seleucid or Ptolemaic, wore the textile type-IV, 
and that the lochagoi of the front ranks, corresponding to the hegemones of the Amphipolis 
inscription, wore heavier armor, meaning reinforced type-IV armor and full muscle-cuirasses.  It 
is possible that some of the regular soldiers in the rear ranks wore less armor or lower-quality 
textile armor, but the lack of evidence makes quantification impossible; my reconstruction treats 
all of the back ranks as homogenously equipped in type-IV textile armor.296  I include both 
soldiers armed with the larger aspis shield and elite units armed with the smaller pelte.  Such a 
reading is not without problems, as noted, but it seems to conform best to the available evidence.  
It should be noted that the alternative is to posit a far more lightly armored formation, as 
Sekunda does.  The full unit reconstruction presented below will also assume that the officers 
split evenly between reinforced Type-IV cuirasses and muscle-cuirasses; given the dominance of 
the Type-IV in the representational evidence, such a split probably errs on the side of giving too 
much weight to the muscle-cuirass rather than too little.  Consequently, it seems very unlikely 
that the above assumptions significantly understate the total armor of the formation. 
 
Helmets 
 In contrast to the near ubiquity of the second century Roman Montefortino-type helmet, a 
wide variety of helmets continued in use in Hellenistic armies.  It is worth noting at the outset 
that the detailed typological and developmental studies of these helmets, notably those by Petros 
Dintsis and Götz Waurick, often rely on representation evidence, especially on coins, on account 
                                                 
296 This is the position held by Hatzopoulos (2001), Connolly (1981), and more recently by D. Lush, “Body armour 
in the phalanx of Alexander’s army” AW 38.1 (2007), 15-37.  Both Connolly and Lush allow for a fairly wide range 
in quality and availability of textile body-armor for the back ranks of the phalanx, while Hatzopoulos merely 
suggests a non-metallic body-defense without further specification. 
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of the often-limited archaeological record.297  Neither of the studies named considers the weights 
of the helmets, and many examples are not fully published, or they reside in museum collections 
which were not willing or able to weigh them.  In addition, both studies also rely heavily on 
helmets recovered from Italic contexts; the Southern Italian variants of these helmets tend to be 
more common in the archaeological record than recovered examples from the Greek East, where 
the latter exist at all.  Some of the remaining examples have been restored, rendering their 
current weights, at best, only approximations of the original weight.  As a result, it must be 
stressed that this discussion of the weights of helmets is rather more tentative than the rest of this 
chapter. 
 The standard helmet of the Macedonian infantry was known as the konos (κῶνος).  It is 
heavily featured on Hellenistic bronze coinage, especially the shield/helmet bronze coinage type, 
and these representational depictions have been connected with a class of archaeologically 
recovered helmets, allowing for the identification of the konos-type with archaeological 
exemplars.298  The konos was, in fact, a Macedonian descendant and variant of the successful 
Lacedaemonian pilos type; modern works sometimes refer to the entire type-group as either pilos 
or konos; intermediate forms are sometimes termed ‘pilos/konos’ types.299  Pierre Juhel 
persuasively argues that this helmet should be understood as the standard one of the regular 
infantry, with the ‘Phrygian’ type (discussed below) being the mark of elite units like the 
                                                 
297 G. Waurick, “Helme der hellenistchen Zeit und ihre Vorläufer” in Antike Helme (Mainz: Verlag des Römisch-
Germanischen Zentralmuseums, 1988), 151-180.  P. Dintsis (1986). 
298 P. Juhel, “The Regulation Helmet of the Phalanx and the Introduction of the Concept of Uniform in the 
Macedonian Army at the End of the Reign of Alexander the Great” Klio 91 (2009): 342-355. Dintsis (1986), 57-87.  
Waurick (1988), 156. 
299 Dintsis (1986), for instance reserves the term ‘konos’ to only the late forms of the helmet and classes.  Waurick 
(1988), 161-158 refers to the entire joint pilos-konos type together as the pilos.   On the derivation of the knonos 
type from the pilos,see Dintsis (1986), 71-73, Waurick (1988), 151-162. 
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hypaspists.300  A plumed example of the second century konos type is painted on the walls of the 
Tomb of Lyson and Kallikles (fig. 5.12, bottom, right), possibly connected to the infantry 
equipment shown in the opposite lunette.301 
 Within this basic type there is considerable variation.  Regional variants were developed 
in Southern Italy (e.g. cat. H34), and the long-lasting use of this helmet results in considerable 
variations over time as well (fig. 5.29).302  Some variants have attachments for cheekguards 
while others do not, and there is wide variance in the height of the helmet bowl, from relatively 
low types (e.g. cat. H37) which come close in form to late Boeotian-type helmets (discussed 
below), to very high vertical helmets (e.g. cat. H32).  Reconstruction is further complicated by a 
relative lack of well-preserved exemplars.   
To reconstruct all the variants of this type is beyond the scope of this work; the following 
reconstructions instead focus on examples of types of pilos/konos helmet that remained common 
in the second century.303  Waurick divides the main group of the pilos-type initially into Italic 
and Greek (geographic, rather than cultural) variants, along with early shape variants (with 
different neck protection) that do not persist into the second century.304  A decorated example of 
the Italic type from the British Museum (cat. H33, fig. 5.30), dated between 325 and 275 by the 
Museum, masses 920g; the fairly simple high bowl shape distinguishes the Italic types.  A 
                                                 
300 Juhel (2009). 
301 Miller (1993), 53.  Sekunda (2012), 44-5, suggests that the helmet may be taken along with the shield in same 
lunette, to identify this helmet as possibly belonging to Lyson, and suggesting that he was a heavy cavalryman.  
Miller (1993), 49, n. 79 expresses reservations concerning this identification. 
302 See esp. Dintsis (1986), bailage 3-5, for charts showing the development of the relatively wide range of sub-
forms. 
303 Following, in particular, G. Waurick’s dating and identification of charts, G. Waurick (1988), Beilage 1.  On the 
type in general, note Feugere (1994b), 27-29, Dintsis (1986), 57-86, Waurick (1988), 151-158. 
304 Waurick (1988), 151-158. 
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simpler, probably contemporary example from the Antikensammlung in Berlin (cat. H34), 
masses 720g.  Neither example will have had cheek-guards. Another example at the 
Antikensammlung (cat. H32, fig. 5.31), found in Upper Egypt and dated to the fifth century by 
the museum, represents an early Greek type, with the upper part of the helmet projecting out 
slightly from the rim and an overall lower bowl; it masses 725g, though it is partially restored.  
Waurick also identifies late types, which seem to be borrowing design elements from 
contemporary Boeotian and Attic helmet types, including a lower bowl and a rim.  An example 
of this type from the Ashmolean (cat. H37, fig. 5.32), dated to the second century, masses 826g.  
Many of these later types did have cheek-flaps, as with the painted example from the Tomb of 
Lyson and Kallikles; so the mass of these later examples could be somewhat higher.   
 The other type of helmet generally associated with the infantry is the ‘Thracian’ or 
‘Phrygian’ type, distinguished by a larger, forward sloping decorative knob (typically hollow) on 
the crest.305  This type is frequently depicted in artwork, such as on the infantryman on the 
Alexander sarcophagus (e.g. fig. 5.28), but archaeological finds seem less common.  Juhel argues 
that this helmet was likely the mark of the elite hypaspists.  That could explain both the 
prominence of this elite helmet in artwork, which tends to bias towards elite units, as well as its 
relative scarcity in the archaeological record.306  An example of this type, dated to the middle of 
the fourth century from the British Museum (cat. H39; miscategorized in the museum catalog as 
an Attic-type helmet, fig. 5.33), has a shallow knob almost completely submerged in the body of 
the helmet and masses only 529g, but is somewhat damaged.  Even so, it is substantially more 
                                                 
305 Dintsis (1986), 50-53 refers to this helmet as the ‘tiara-shaped’ helmet ‘tiaraartiger helm’, but notes the use of 
Thracian and Phrygian to describe the helmet.  Waurick (1988) and Juhel (2009) opt to use ‘Phrygian’ and I have 
followed this usage. 
306 Juhel (2009), 354.  In artwork, cf. Waurick (1988), 166, abb. 40-45. 
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than 50% complete, so we may suppose that it never weighed more than 1kg, perhaps closer to 
700g in its original form.307  Another Phrygian helmet (cat. H40, fig. 5.34), from Southern Italy 
has a more typical and pronounced knob and is well preserved, although no weight for this piece 
is published.308  The metal used in these helmets does seem to be significantly thicker than in the 
pilos/konos types; the previous example has a reported metal thickness of up to 6mm in places.  
Another badly damaged example (cat. H41) from Italy dated to the late third or early second 
centuries ranges from 2.3 to 6.9mm in thickness; as it is gilded, it is clearly an elite product, but 
it shows that this type can be quite substantial. 
 Next is the ‘Attic’ type, a continuation of a classical design, marked by a relatively low 
bowl, an extension to protect the back of the neck, and a thin decorative central ridge over the 
back of the crest (fig. 5.35).309  This type appears in artwork associated with both the infantry 
and the cavalry.  A figure on the Aemilius Paullus monument (fig. 5.36), clearly an infantryman 
by his shield, wears such a helmet.310  A grave stele for a Nikanor, son of Herakleides, shows a 
Macedonian cavalryman also wearing an Attic helmet.311 
 Both in artwork and archaeological examples, Attic and Phrygian helmets seem easy to 
confuse, perhaps suggesting that the two types were converging.  Sekunda first identified the 
second helmet in the Tomb of Lyson and Kallikles (fig. 5.12, lower left) as a Phrygian/Thracian 
                                                 
307 For identification of this type as Phrygian, rather than attic, note Dintsis (1986), esp. his cat. 99 and 100, which 
also feature very shallow crest-knobs.  Likewise Waurick (1988), 166, abb 45. 
308 Carratelli (1996), 652. 
309 Feugere (1994b), 31-34.  Waurick (1988), 169-174.  Dintsis (1986), 105-112. 
310 Sekunda (2012), 23.  Taylor (2016), 562. 
311 Sekunda (2012), 11.  The gravestone is Kilkis Archaeological Museum inv. No. 2315. 
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type, but subsequently he identifies nearly identical helmets as of the Attic type.312  Likewise the 
museum entry for cat. H42 lists it as a Phrygian helmet, though by Dintsis or Waurick’s typology 
it is far closer to an Attic type with the thin ‘comb’ crest, even though it does lack the brow-
guard common in Attic helmets.  The museum identification for cat. H39 has this problem 
reversed, identified as an Attic-type helm, but with the thicker top-knob and higher helmet bowl 
it is more likely a Phrygian type.  This is not to call out failures in identifying the previous 
examples, but merely to note that the two helmet types, though clearly distinct at the ends of the 
spectrum, can blend in to each other. 
 The weights for Attic helmets vary considerably.  At the high end, one from the early 
third century BCE found in Albania and now at the Antikensammlung in Berlin (cat. H43, fig. 
5.37) masses 1010g.  This helmet is well preserved and retains one cheek-guard; the original 
weight is likely to be somewhat higher (to account for the missing cheek-guard), perhaps c. 
1,100g.  Another, undated example from Pergamon, now at the Antikensammlung, is unrestored 
at 995g, but lacks both normal cheekguards (but there are signs of an attachment point).  Finally, 
a third helmet at the Antikensammlung from Melos masses only 470g (cat. H44); both cheek-
pieces are missing and the helmet has had some restoration work, but it seems unlikely that it 
ever weighed more than c. 700g.  The helmet is decorated and clearly made of fine workmanship 
(fig. 5.38); relatively light helmets were not merely restricted to low-quality examples.  Another 
example of the type in the British Museum (cat. H42), originally found in Lake Copais, Boeotia 
and dated to the fifth century, masses 898g, but also lacks cheek-guards. 
                                                 
312 Sekunda (2006), 60.  Cf. Sekunda (2012), 23  Sekunda avoids typing the helmets in Sekunda (2013), 10-11, 
despite discussing them in detail. 
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 What seems to be the last common type of helmet in Hellenistic armies of this period was 
the Boeotian helmet, which is typically only seen in cavalry contexts.313  The distinct feature of 
this helmet was its wide brim, which often has grooves in it that make it look almost ‘crumpled.’  
The rider behind Alexander on the Alexander Mosaic wears such a helmet (fig. 5.39), as do the 
two cavalryman with him on the Alexander sarcophagus (fig. 5.40).314  Xenophon advises the 
use of a Boeotian helmet for fighting on horseback, which seems to confirm the specialized 
nature of this type of headgear.315  Unlike most geographic signifiers for helmet types (i.e. 
‘Thracian’ ‘Phrygian’ or ‘Attic’), the Boeotian helmet type can actually be associated with 
Boeotia, and does thus appear to be the helmet advised by Xenophon.316  One fairly well 
preserved example of this type of helmet is the Ashmolean Boeotian helmet, found originally on 
the Tigris river and thought to be associated with Alexander’s campaigns (cat. H46).  The helmet 
has some moderate damage on the crown, but is overall fairly intact and masses 1,005g. 
 Summing up, the wide range of helmet types available to Hellenistic soldiers makes 
confident reconstruction difficult.  This challenge is compounded by the much more limited 
archaeological record for the Greek East.  Nevertheless, some conclusions may be ventured.  The 
well-recognized trend in Greek helmets towards lighter and thinner types has left the typical 
Hellenistic types substantially less massive than their Roman counterparts.317  Few Hellenistic 
helmets mass a kilogram, and I found no examples with published masses significantly above 
                                                 
313 Feugere (1994b), 29-30.  Dintsis (1986), 1-22, Waurick (1988), 159-163. 
314 Additional artistic representations, see Waurick (1988), 159-161; Dintsis (1986), 1-11, taf. 1.4 - 4.1. 
315 Xen. On Horsemanship 12.3. 
316 The helmet, for instance, is a strong Boeotian funerary motif, see P. M. Fraser, T. Rönne, (1957).  Waurick 
(1988), 159. 
317 Trend towards lightening Greek helmets beginning in the Archaic, note Jarva (1995), 134. 
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that figure, though it does seem likely that some of the heavily decorated Phrygian helmet types, 
worn by elite soldiers, would have exceeded it.  The lighter helmets make a great deal of sense 
within the Macedonian fighting system.  The primary threats to a Macedonian phalangite, armed 
with a long sarisa, were other sarisae and missile weapons rather than heavy downward cuts.  
Hellenistic helmet forms evidently did respond to changing threats; the encounter with Gallic 
armies in the third century seems to result in the addition of reinforced brow-ridges to many 
helmet types as a response to the threat posed by Gallic swords.318  Equally, part of the 
explanation for the greater robustness of Italian helmets compared to their Greek counterparts 
may be due to the longer duration and greater intensity of the Gallic threat in Italy. 
 In terms of the metal-weights of these helmets, for the regular infantry, both the 
phalangites and the regular peltasts (that is, the peltasts not in the agema) as well as 
thureophoroi, we may reconstruct a minimum case at 720g, matching the simpler pilos/konos 
types (e.g. cat. H34, H32).  For a median case, the second century Ashmolean konos (cat. H37) at 
826g seems typical; we may add 100g to account for the missing cheek-flaps, bringing the 
median case to c. 926g.  For a maximum case, a relatively heavy Attic type helmet, such as cat. 
H43 at 1,010g (perhaps 1,100g at most to account for the missing cheek-guard) seems 
reasonable.  For elite units, like the Antigonid infantry agema and the Seleucid argyraspides, the 
maximum case ought to be set significantly higher, perhaps around 1,250g to account for the 
heavier and thicker variants of the prestigious Phrygian helmet-type, though it must be recalled 
that not all such helmets were so heavy (e.g. cat. H39).  For the cavalry, both the Attic and 
Boeotian helmet types were common.  We might set the minimum case at an Attic helmet of 
700g (e.g. cat. H44), a median case c. 926g, and a maximum case of c. 1,100g (e.g. cat. H43, 
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H42, H46), accounting for both heavier Attic-type helmets and helmets in the style of the 
Ashmolean Boeotian helmet. 
 
Greaves 
 As noted, the Amphipolis regulations also specify the wearing of greaves for the regular 
infantry.  The Tomb of Lyson and Kallikles features a pair of painted greaves (fig. 5.12), which 
may be part of the infantry panoply; Miller suggests that these are made of leather, but copper-
alloy seems more plausible.  Notably the greaves are a different color than type-IV armor in the 
opposite lunette, and appear to match the color of the helmets, especially the Attic-type helmet, 
fairly closely.319  The greaves are of the anatomical type which emerged in the Late Archaic and 
continued into the Classical period.  The hypaspist on the Alexander sarcophagus (fig. 5.28) does 
wear greaves, again of the anatomical type, but none of the riders on the sarcophagus do so.  
That said, the wearing of greaves, even by the infantry, does not seem to have been universal.  
The Macedonian warrior, apparently an infantryman, painted in the façade of the ‘Great Tomb’ 
at Lefkadia (fig. 5.41) does not wear greaves.320  The previously mentioned relief of a 
Macedonian sculpture on the funeral stele of Idomenes shows a Macedonian peltast with no 
greaves.321  Damage makes it is difficult to tell for certain, but none of the Macedonians on the 
Aemilius Paullus monument appears to be wearing greaves; one may note especially figure 8 (by 
Taylor’s numbering), who is clearly a Macedonian infantryman by his shield and has an intact 
                                                 
319 Miller (1993), 51-52.  Miller’s reasoning for supposing the greaves are leather is based on the fact that the 
greaves clearly wrap tightly around the leg, but as will soon be apparent, this is a standard feature of copper-alloy 
Greek greaves.  Note Jarva (1995), 96-100. 
320 Miller (1993), pl 8b. 
321 Hatzopoulos (2001), pl. VI.  Sekunda (2013), 119. 
 385 
leg, but does not appear to be wearing greaves.322  Macedonian cavalrymen are typically shown 
without greaves in all contexts, and do not appear to have worn them.323  Thus it seems that 
greaves were uncommon among the cavalry and common, but far from universal, among the 
infantry. 
 The archaeological record for Greek greaves is surprisingly robust; along with helmets 
and shields, they seem to have been a preferred equipment type for inclusion in ritual deposits in 
sanctuaries and burials.324  As a result, the basic structure of this armor is fairly well understood.  
Greaves typically fit snugly to the leg, with a textile liner between the metal plate and the leg 
itself.  Earlier greaves attached this liner through perforations on the edges of the greaves, 
whereas later examples lack these perforations and use liners that may have been tied in the 
back.  The metal plate of the greaves during the late archaic period becomes increasingly thin 
and flexible to allow for the greave to be ‘snapped’ on and held to the leg by tension.  After the 
end of the Archaic period, the metal plates of Greek greaves were not generally tied off at the 
back or attached to a foundation garment in the way that medieval greaves are.325 
As noted, although there are a significant number of preserved greaves, the published 
evidence tends to skew heavily in favor of examples from Greek settlements in Southern Italy 
and towards earlier periods, with the major exception being from the sanctuary at Olympia.326  
                                                 
322 Taylor (2016), 562. 
323 Note esp. Hatzopoulos (2001), pl. 1-4; Sekunda (2012), 11.  Everson (2004), 195 notes this.  Xenophon advises 
cavalrymen to wear leather boots rather than greaves, Xen. On Horsemanship, 12.10; the Macedonians seem to have 
followed this practice. 
324 Jarva (1995), 111.  Jarva reads this as suggesting variable panoplies, but it is hard to imagine the hoplite who 
acquires greaves but not body armor; it seems more likely that certain items are more commonly given as votives 
than others. 
325 Jarva (1995), 99-100. 
326 Jarva (1995), 84-100. 
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Jarva does present a table with a number of weighed examples from his typological groupings.   
These are included in the table below (under Jarva’s catalog numbers noted by the B-prefix), 
alongside Southern Italian examples from my catalog:327 
Greaves tended to grow thinner and lighter over the Archaic period; Jarva notes an 
average weight close to 0.8kg per greave, but that the last group in his typology, the Anatomy 
group which he dates to the fifth century, tends to mass around 0.6kg per greave.328  This 
                                                 
327 Jarva (1995), 136-7. 
328 Jarva (1995), 136-7. 
Table 5.2: Greaves, Weight and Thickness, by date 
Cat. No. Date Region Length Mass Thickness Notes 
B2593 650-550 Olympia  850g   
B2660 650-550 Olympia  930g   
B2784 650-550 Olympia  1,000g   
B2659 650-550 Olympia  740g   
B2682 650-550 Olympia  450g   
B2780 650-550 Olympia  1,100g   
H49a 550-500 Ruvo 43cm 580g 1.6-2.5mm Pair w/ H49b 
H49b 550-500 Ruvo 42cm 623g 2.1-3mm Pair w/ H49a 
B4864 c. 550 Olympia  1,100g   
B309 c. 525 Olympia  850g   
H48a 6-5th cent. Tarquinia  46.9cm  1.9mm Not part of a pair 
H48b 6-5th cent. Tarquinia 46.2cm  2.5-4mm Not part of a pair 
H47a 6th-5th 
cent. 
Apulia 41.5cm 609g 0.7-1.4mm Pair with H47b 
H47b 6th-5th 
cent. 
Apulia 43.8cm 677.7 0.7-1.4mm Pair with H47a 
H50 500-450 Unknown 
(S. Italy?) 
45.72cm 759g 2.2mm Pair with H51 
H51 500-450 Unknown 
(S. Italy) 
45.72cm 773g 2.4-4mm Pair with H50 
B7175 5th century Olympia  560g   
B5752 5th century Olympia  680g   
H52a c. 330 Apulia 41.5cm 909g  Pair with H52b 
H52b c. 330 Apulia 41.2cm 738g  Pair with H52a 
H53a c. 330 Apulia 39cm  0.8-1.1mm Pair with H53b 
H53b c. 330 Apulia 40cm  0.8-1.1mm Pair with H53a 
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reduction in weight is mirrored in the Italian examples, but not as strongly; as with other armor 
types, the Western Greeks seem to have held on to heavier defensive equipment longer.  The 
diminishing record for greaves in later periods compared the Archaic period is generally 
attributed to decreasing prevalence; that is, fewer greaves occur in the archaeological record 
because the equipment itself was becoming less common, a trend which seems to have continued 
in the Hellenistic period, despite the mention of greaves on the Amphipolis inscription.329 
A median case, then, for a pair of greaves may be set around 1.5kg of copper-alloy, 
similar to cat. H50-H51.  A minimum case can then be set around 1.2kg, matching the later 
examples from Jarva as well as cat. H47a-b, while a maximum case might be set at 1.65kg, 
roughly matching cat. H52a-b.  The second question is prevalence: as noted, it is clear both that 
some Hellenistic infantrymen did wear greaves, but also that many did not.  Overall, the majority 
of the representational evidence for Hellenistic infantrymen appears not to show greaves, as 
noted above.  The evidence does not permit confidence as to how common greaves were in this 
period.  Everson supposes that they might have been worn only by officers (hegemones) in most 
Hellenistic armies, but he notes that this claim runs afoul of the testimony of the Amphipolis 
inscription; perhaps the Antigonid army was different in this respect.330  My reconstruction 
below of the metal-weight of units assumes that all of the hegemones wore full sets of greaves, 
but that perhaps only half of the regular infantry did, and that the lighter peltasts probably did 
not. 
 
 
                                                 
329 Everson (2004), 159-160, 195.  Connolly (1981), 60.  Snodgrass (1967), 110.   
330 Everson (2004), 195. 
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Quantitative Analysis 
Metal-Weights for Hellenistic Infantry 
 Table 5.3 presents the estimated metal-weights for each piece of infantry equipment, both 
for sarisa infantry (regular phalangite and peltast units) as well as thureophoroi.  As noted, for 
equipment types where the limited archaeological evidence does not allow for a range of 
reconstructions, only a median case is presented; this should not be taken to mean that this 
reconstruction is precise (quite the opposite), but rather that the range of error is uncertain.  
Taking these factors into account, Table 5.4 then presents the resulting metal-weights for 
Hellenistic infantry in minimum, median, and maximum cases. 
 As with the previous chapter, it is necessary to aggregate these figures in order to 
represent the larger units in which they fought; this aggregation is even more important in the 
case of Hellenistic armies because of the large gap between the equipment of the front rank of 
hegemones and that of the rest of the army.  The basic unit for Hellenistic armies seems to have 
been the syntagma of 256 soldiers (16x16 square); the Antigonid equivalent was called a speira 
and seems to have been the same size.331  The arrangement of this system is described by 
Asclepiodotus, whose account is no doubt simplified and essentialized, but nevertheless provides 
a basis for working out an average metal-weight per-man.332  A syntagma of sarisa-infantry 
would contain 16 hegemones (deployed in the front rank) and 240 regular soldiers. As noted in 
the previous section, I have assumed that while all of the hegemones wear greaves, only half of 
the regular infantry do, and none of the regular peltast infantry do.  Based on these assumptions, 
                                                 
331 Sekunda (2013), 90.  Hatzopoulos (2001), 77.  Connolly (1981), 76. 
332 Ascleipdotus, Tact. 2.7-9.  The syntagma also had five supernumeraries, a herald, signalman, musician, an aide 
and a file-closer, who were not in the regular battle order and are not counted here. 
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the average metal-weight per-man of the heavy infantry is presented in table 5.5.  As the 
thureophoroi do not have sub-types, the figure for these soldiers is simply carried forward.  
Included in table 5.5 for comparison are the metal-weight averages for the Roman heavy infantry 
(assuming 40% of the troops wore mail) from the previous chapter. 
Table 5.3: Reconstructed metal-weights for Hellenistic infantry equipment by type 
 Minimum Median Maximum Used by 
Sarisa  1,167g  Phalangites, Peltasts 
Dory 200g 400g 700g Thureophoroi 
Sword (Xiphos/Machaira) 400g 490g 700g All Infantry 
Aspis 1,088g 1,548g 2,086g Regular phalangites 
Pelte 870g 1,292g 1,646g Peltasts 
Thureos 214g 320g 480g Thureophoroi 
Muscle Cuirass 2,500g 3,500g 5,000g Hegemones (Phalangites, 
Peltasts) 
Reinforced Type-IV 
Cuirass 
500g 1,500g 2,500g Hegemones (Phalangites, 
Peltasts) 
Textile Type-IV Cuirass 
(Linothorax) 
0 100g 500g Phalangites, Peltasts 
Helmets 720g 926g 1,100g All Infantry 
Greaves 1,200g 1,500g 1,650g Hegemones, some 
phalangites 
 
  
Table 5.4: Reconstructed Metal-weights for Hellenistic infantry by soldier type: 
 Minimum Median Maximum 
Phalangite (no greaves) 3,375g 4,231g 5,553g 
Phalangite (with greaves) 4,575g 5,731g 7,203g 
Phalangite Hegemon, Muscle Cuirass 7,075g 9,131g 11,703g 
Phalangite, Hegemon, Type IV 5,075g 7,131g 9,203g 
Peltast 3,157g 3,975g 5,113g 
Peltast Hegemon, Muscle Cuirass 6,857g 8,878g 11,263g 
Peltast Hegemon, Type IV 4,857g 6,878g 8,763g 
Thureophoros 1,534g 2,136g 2,980g 
 
  
Table 5.5: Reconstructed Average Per-Soldier Metal-Weights for Hellenistic Heavy Infantry 
 Minimum Median Maximum 
Phalangites 4,106g 5,177g 6,632g 
Peltasts 3,326g 4,219g 5,419g 
Thureophoroi 1,534g 2,136g 2,980g 
Roman Heavy Infantry (40% loricatus) 4,279g 6,810g 9,732g 
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Non-Metal Equipment Requirements – Wood and Textiles 
 As with the Roman army, although worked metal will have represented the most 
expensive element of the heavy infantry panoply, wooden and textile elements make up a 
significant portion of the weight.  This intensity in wood and textiles is at its greatest for the 
regular phalangite troops wearing the textile type-IV linothorax.  For such a soldier, the raw 
weight of wooden and textile equipment significantly exceeds that of the metal elements.  
Connolly’s reconstruction of the sarisa and aspis suggest total weights of 4.05kg and 8.60kg 
respectively; subtracting out the weight of the metal elements suggests 2.88kg of wood for the 
sarisa and 7kg for the aspis.333  Aldrete et al. suggest that a normal weight for the all-textile 
type-IV linothorax would be between 3.5kg and 4kg.334  Accounting for a helmet liner, shield-
straps and other textile or leather elements of the panoply, we might then suppose that the 
average phalangite carried around 9.9kg of wood and perhaps 4.5kg of leather and textile into 
battle. 
 
Heavy Cavalry and Cataphracts 
 Likewise, combining the reconstructions of the previous section suggests a reconstruction 
for the regular Hellenistic heavy cavalry as presented in table 5.6; it is clear that both the textile 
Type-IV armor and the muscle-cuirass were worn by Hellenistic cavalry, but not in what ratios, 
so panoplies with all three types of armor are represented here.335  On the other hand, as noted 
                                                 
333 Connolly (2000), 109.  This assumes the median-case thickness of the metal facing on the shield, as Connolly 
does not indicate how thick he made his shield-facing.  For the sarisa, if ash wood rather than cornel wood is used, 
the weight would be a bit less, Sekunda (2001b). 
334 Aldrete et al. (2013), 146. 
335 Hellenistic representations of cavalrymen show type-IV cuirasses, note Hatozpoulos, pl. 3a, IV.  Likewise, one of 
the brothers commemorated by the Tomb of Lyson and Kallikles seems to have been a cavalryman, but the tomb 
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previously, evidence for the Seleucid ultra-heavy cataphract cavalry is insufficient to allow for 
reconstruction.  Bar-Kochva supposes it unlikely that Seleucid cataphracts were as heavily 
armored as later Parthian and Sassanid cataphracts.336  Working from the very limited 
representational evidence, Mariusz Mielczarek suggests that Seleucid cataphracts may have only 
featured segmented armor for the horse’s head and breast (a chamfron and plastron), a claim 
which seems consistent with the segmented armor found at Ai Khanum and the spoils of armor 
displayed on the Pergamum frieze.337  Notably, the iron construction of the segmented plates 
from Ai Khanum was very thin; although no absolute thickness measurements are given, the 
plastron is noted to be thin enough to be substantially flexible.338  For the rider, Mielczarek 
suggests segmented arm defenses and greaves, as seen on an equestrian figurine from Syria 
depicting what is probably a cataphract, who interestingly is depicted wearing a type-IV textile 
armor, rather than a muscle cuirass.339  A precise estimate based on this information is not 
possible, but a very rough order-of-magnitude estimate may be ventured.  Taking the median 
muscle-cuirass wearing heavy cavalryman as a baseline, I have estimated another 5kg of iron for 
the armor of the horse and 1kg for the additional segmented arm protection, bringing the total 
metal-weight to 12,916g (as shown in Table 5.6), very roughly double the required metal for a 
median regular heavy cavalryman.  The metal-weights for Roman equites from the previous 
chapter are also listed for comparison. 
                                                 
shows two type-IV cuirasses, Sekunda (2012), 44-5, Miller (1993), 52.  Alternately, muscle cuirasses designed for 
wear on horseback have been found, e.g. Choremis (1980b).  Everson (2001), 189. 
336 Bar-Kochva (1976), 75. 
337 Mielczarek (1993), 71-2. 
338 P. Bernard et al. (1980). 
339 Mielczarek (1993), 71.  Note also that cataphracts do not appear to have used shields. 
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Table 5.6: Reconstructed metal-weights for Hellenistic cavalry by type: 
 Minimum Median Maximum 
Cavalryman, Type-IV textile cuirass 2,784g 3,516g 4,450g 
Cavalryman, Reinforced type-IV cuirass 3,284g 4,916g 6,450g 
Cavalryman, muscle cuirass 5,284g 6,916g 8,950g 
Seleucid Cataphract (rough estimate) 12,916g 
Roman Equites 5,620g 8,190g 10,980g 
 
 
Comparisons and Conclusions 
 Comparing these results to those of the previous chapter offers useful insights, both on a 
per-man basis, as well as for entire armies or deployments.  On the individual level, this 
comparison suggests that Roman soldiers were markedly better equipped than their Hellenistic 
opponents.  The median case figures (from the previous chapter, table 4.9) for the metal-weight 
requirements of Roman heavy infantry range from 6.59kg to 7.67kg, compared to only 5.18kg 
for the heavier phalangite units (like the Antigonid or Seleucid chalkaspides or regular Ptolemaic 
sarisa-infantry) and 4.22kg for the lighter Antigonid and Ptolemaic peltast units.  Even in the 
median case, Roman soldiers wearing only the lighter pectoral defense, the worst equipped 
heavy infantry in a Roman legion, carry slightly more worked metal (5.6kg for the hastati and 
principes, 5.23kg for the triarii) than the average Hellenistic soldier.  As shown in table 5.5, we 
might expect the average Roman soldier to have carried around 1.6kg more worked metal into 
battle than his Hellenistic heavy-infantry counterpart; the difference amounts to just over 30% of 
the Hellenistic phalangite’s metal-weight.  The same is true for the comparison of Hellenistic 
cavalry with Roman equites, with the difference in metal-weight largely a consequence of the 
high metal-intensity of mail armor. 
 Put another way, the average Roman heavy infantryman traded around 2kg of textile 
equipment for an additional 1.6kg of metal and 2kg of wood compared to the equipment of a 
Hellenistic phalangite; as discussed in the previous two chapters, such a trade almost certainly 
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involved a large increase in cost.  Most of this additional material expenditure was in defensive 
equipment, with the larger Roman scutum driving the increased wood requirements, and heavier 
Roman body-armor and helmets driving the increased metal requirements.  Against lighter 
Hellenistic troops, like sarisa-peltasts and thureophoroi, the Roman advantage in defensive 
equipment becomes even more pronounced.   
This advantage in defensive equipment may go some way to explaining the surprisingly 
low reported Roman casualties in major battles against Hellenistic armies.  Polybius reports only 
700 Roman losses at Cynoscephalae compared to 8,000 Macedonians killed and 5,000 
captured.340  Livy reports only 300 Roman dead at Magnesia, but notes that many more were 
wounded, which seems a testament to the effectiveness of Roman armor at preventing lethal 
damage.341  In contrast, he reports some 53,000 Seleucid dead and 1,400 captured.342  At Pydna, 
Plutarch reports 25,000 Macedonian losses, but gives the Roman losses at 100 (after 
Poseidonius) or 80 (after Nasica).343  Livy, for the same battle, notes “not more than 100” Roman 
losses, 20,000 Macedonians killed and 11,000 captured; as with Magnesia he notes many more 
Romans were wounded than killed.344  This is significant particularly because the Macedonian 
phalanx at Pydna was successful in its initial attack and apparently inflicted many wounds, yet 
few of them were fatal.345  While we must be wary of exaggeration in these reports, the 
                                                 
340 Plb. 18.27.6. 
341 Livy 37.44.2. 
342 Livy 37.44.1.  Appian echoes these figures, App.  Syr. 36, but this may not represent independent confirmation if 
Appian is working from the same source as Livy (likely Polybius). 
343 Plut.  Aem. 21.7. 
344 Liv. 44.42. 
345 Initially successful Antigonid assault, Plut. Aem. 20.1-6. 
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remarkable consistency of low Roman casualties in major engagements with Hellenistic armies 
suggests some truth behind these reports.  Given heavier Roman armor and larger Roman 
shields, it seems reasonable to suggest that the greater amount of resources that the Romans 
dedicated to defensive armaments may have significantly contributed to their low casualty rate 
and consequently to ultimate victory.  Moreover Hellenistic weapons, particularly swords, were 
ill-suited to fight against mailed opponents, though this observation should not be taken too far: 
the sarisa was perfectly capable of defeating mail, as Plutarch notes.346 
 Sekunda attributes Rome’s victory to “its ability to conscript horde after uncomplaining 
horde of Italian peasant manpower,” and that “lack of manpower, rather than inferiority in 
military technique, sealed Macedon’s fate.”   Though the current consensus embodied in the 
‘demographic approach’ discussed in the first chapter is rarely stated so boldly, Sekunda’s 
formulation provides an effective summation of its conclusion that the Hellenistic world could 
not hope to compete against Rome’s endless supply of mere warm bodies for the legions.   Given 
the forgoing analysis, this claim cannot be sustained.  Rome’s soldiers were not only more 
numerous, but they were also better and more expensively equipped.  Yet, as noted in the first 
chapter, the major states of the Hellenistic world were about as large, as resource rich and as 
populous as the Roman Republic.  Indeed, in some instances, they were dramatically more so.  
Why, then, were the Hellenistic great powers not able to mobilize resources on the same scale as 
the Roman Republic?  We will return to this question in the conclusion, but first it is important to 
look too at the often neglected armies of the pre-state peoples who also opposed Rome in the 
third and second centuries.  
                                                 
346 Plut. Aem. 20.4. 
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Figure 5.1a-c: The Alexander Mosaic 
a: Mosaic Overview 
 
b: Alexander in detail 
 
c: Sarisae in detail 
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Figure 5.2: Thracian Warriors from Kazanluk Tomb Painting.347 
 
  
                                                 
347 Image from Sekunda (2013), 121. 
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Figure 5.3: Segmented metal plates, possibly Seleucid Cataphract armor, from Ai Khanum.348 
 
  
                                                 
348 P. Bernard et al. (1980),  
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Figure 5.4: Detail from the Temple of Athena at Pergamum showing spoils of war 
Equipment Shown: 
Top Left: Pilos/Konos Type helmet. Top Right: Xiphos in sheath. 
Bottom, Left to Right: Type-IV Textile cuirass, horse face-guard (chamfron), masked helmet and 
possibly segmented arm-guards.
 
 
Figure 5.5: Terracotta relief fragment showing a cataphract from Khwarezm.349
 
 
                                                 
349 Sekunda (1994), 76, fig. 29-30. 
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Figure 5.6: Funeral Stele with thureophoroi 
Left: 5a, Detail from the Stele of Dioskourides of Balboura, from Sidon.350 
Right: 5b, Detail from Stele of Hekatiaos, from Sidon351 
 
  
                                                 
350 Sekunda (1995),72, color plate 3.  
351 Sekunda (1995), 73, fig. 66. 
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Figure 5.7: Scale drawing of sarisa and spear elements from Vergina/Aigai.352 
From Left to Right, drawings correspond to my catalog: H12, H7, H8, metal sleeve 
(unnumbered), H10, H11. 
 
  
                                                 
352 Connolly (2000), 104. 
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Figure 5.8: Macedonian lancer from the Kinch Tomb at Noussa353
  
Figure 5.9: Sword of Beroia (cat. H2) 
 
  
                                                 
353 Connolly (2000), 105. 
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Figure 5.10: Iron machairae from the MET 
Top: Cat. H5.  Bottom: Cat. H6. 
 
 
Figure 5.11: Pommel Types on the xiphos 
Leftmost: Detail of disc-pommel from the Alexander Mosaic 
Center and Right: Scalloped or lobed pommels from the Tomb of Lyson and Kallikles:354 
 
  
                                                 
354 Details from Miller (1993), pl 3. 
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Figure 5.12: Paintings of equipment from the Tomb of Lyson and Kallikles:355 
Top: South Lunette 
Bottom: North Lunette 
 
                                                 
355 Miller (1993), pl 3. 
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Figure 5.13: Macedonian Xiphos from Vergina/Aigai (cat. H1) 
 
 
Figure 5.14: Xiphos from the British Museum (cat. H3) 
 
Figure 5.15: Long bladed kopis from Thesprotia. 
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Figure 5.16: Reconstructed Macedonian aspis with grip-system demonstrated by Connolly.356 
 
  
                                                 
356 Connolly (2000), 110. 
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Figure 5.17: Macedonian shield from the Antikensammlung in Berlin.  Front (top) and back 
(bottom) view.  Note the serrated flanges for securing the cover to the wooden core of the 
shield.357 
 
Figure 5.18: Shield of Pharnakes (Getty Museum), Original (left), current state showing 
extensive restoration (right).358 
 
                                                 
357 Peltz (2001), 332-3. 
358 Left image, Peltz (2001), 336.  Right image, J. Paul Getty Museum.  
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Figure 5.19: Shield in Relief from the Temple of Athena in Pergamum.359 
 
  
                                                 
359 Eichberg (1987), 263, taf 21b. 
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Figure 5.20: Thureophoros Thorakitai with thureos, on  the Stele of Salamis, from Sidon.  Note 
that the coloring of the edge of the shield does not match the (faint) coloring of the boss.360 
 
Figure 5.21: Prodromi Cuirass (cat. H23) from Thesprotia361 
 
 
                                                 
360 Sekunda (1995), 71, color plate 2.  
361 Choremis (1980), 10, fig 4. 
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Figure 5.22: Muscle cuirass in the British Museum (cat. R73) 
 
 
Figure 5.23: Damaged muscle cuirass in the British Museum (cat. H25) 
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Figure 5.24: Archaic Bell Cuirass from Argos with helmet (cat. H31).362 
 
Figure 5.25: Iron Cuirass from Vergina/Aigai 
                                                 
362 Courbin (1957), fig. 19. 
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Figure 5.26: Arming scenes featuring type-IV textile body armor.  Note the ‘tube-and-yoke’ 
construction and the rigidity of the shoulder-flaps, which stand upright when not tied down.363 
 
 
 
                                                 
363 Aldrete et al. (2013), 23. 
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Figure 5:27: Reconstructed type-IV textile body armor, demonstrated by Aldrete.364 
 
  
                                                 
364 Aldrete et al (2013), pl. 6. 
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Figure 5.28: Detail from the Alexander Sarcaphagus showing a hypaspist wearing type-IV 
cuirass 
 
 
Figure 5.29: Variations of the Pilos/Konos helmet-type.365
 
  
                                                 
365 Juhel (2009), fig b.  Dintsis (1986), beil. 3.  I have shown Juhel’s simplification of Dintsis’ much larger diagram 
here for clarity’s sake. 
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Figure 5.30: Southern Italian Pilos/Konos type helm with decorations (cat. H33). 
 
 
Figure 5.31: Pilos/Konos type in the Antikensammlung, Berlin, found in upper Egypt (cat. H32). 
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Figure 5.32: Pilos/Konos helmet-type in the Ashmolean Museum (cat. H37).
 
 
Figure 5.33: Thraco-Phrygian Helmet type in the British Museum (cat. H39). 
 
 
Figure 5.34: Decorated Thraco-Phrygian Helmet from S. Italy (cat. H40).366 
 
  
                                                 
366 Carratelli (1996), 652. 
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Figure 5.35: Attic helmet from Boeotia, now in British Museum (cat. H42). 
 
Figure 5.36: Detail from the Aemilius Paullus Monument showing an Infantryman wearing an 
Attic-type helmet.367 
  
                                                 
367 Detail from Taylor (2016), 562, fig 1. 
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Figure 5.37: Attic-Type Helmet in the Antikensammlung, Berlin (cat. H43). 
 
Figure 5.38: Attic-Type helmet in the Antikensammlung, Berling (cat. H44) 
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Figure 5.39: Insert from the Alexander Mosaic showing Boeotian Helmet on Rider 
 
 
Figure 5.40: Riders on the Alexander Sarcophagus with Boeotian helmets (figures on extreme 
right and extreme left)
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Figure 5.41: Phalangite from the ‘Great Tomb’ at Lefkadia.368  Note that the figure carries an 
aspis and what appears to be a sarisa, but wears boots without greaves. 
 
 
                                                 
368 Miller (1993), pl. 8. 
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CHAPTER SIX: PRE-STATE PEOPLES 
 
 While the previous two chapters have dealt with Rome and the other great states of the 
Mediterranean, it is also important that this analysis include the equipment and military systems 
of the many pre-state peoples that Rome came into conflict with in the third and second 
centuries.  Pre-state peoples are often neglected in treatments of Roman expansion and 
imperialism, but it is important to keep in mind that eventual consolidation of Roman control, 
and the establishment of a state apparatus over these pre-state peoples, was by no means a 
forgone conclusion.1  Pre-state armies could and did deeply disrupt the Mediterranean state 
system, and on occasion (such as with the Galatian invasions or the wars of the Cimbri and 
Teutones) seriously imperil or even destroy well-established states.  And though it would take 
centuries, Rome’s imperium did eventually collapse into a situation where the majority of its 
territory would once again be pre-state (or rather, post-state).  Moreover, in addition to pre-state 
societies being formidable adversaries in their own right, pre-state warriors often feature in the 
ranks of the armies of the major powers of the Mediterranean, either as mercenaries or as 
dependent peoples.  The military landscape of the third and second century Mediterranean is thus 
one in which the many pre-state peoples are not to be ignored. 
                                                 
1 Much of the scholarship on Roman imperialism discussed in the first chapter is focused heavily on state-to-state 
interaction.  Particularly notable is Eckstein’s approach, in both Eckstein (2006) and Eckstein (2008), definitionally 
focused on a condition of ‘interstate anarchy,’ which then naturally excludes pre-state peoples.  Likewise, though to 
a lesser extent, Harris (1979) remains far more focused on Rome’s interactions with other state-peoples in the 
Mediterranean. 
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 This chapter focuses on the resource intensity of the military equipment of pre-state 
peoples primarily in the western Mediterranean, particularly the peoples of Gaul and Spain.  
These were certainly not the only militarily significant pre-state peoples in the Mediterranean 
world, but they were the ones with which Rome had the most interaction in this period and who 
were the most militarily relevant to Roman activities.  Moreover, as will become apparent, the 
archaeology on the military equipment from pre-Roman Gaul and Spain has reached a point that 
makes the approach employed in the previous chapters tenable here too; the same cannot be said 
of the homelands of the many other pre-state peoples of the eastern Mediterranean.2  This 
chapter, then, will begin by defining the peoples and material cultures to be examined, before 
advancing the evidence for reconstructions of the metal-intensity of the military equipment from 
the third and second centuries found in Gaul and Spain.  The chronological limit here is 
important to note, as both Gallic and Spanish military equipment evolved continuously.  Some 
particularly notable equipment types are effectively excluded by a focus on the third and second 
centuries.  However, such a focus is necessary to render this analysis comparable with the 
previous chapters.  In addition to analyzing the resource-intensity of pre-state militaries, this 
chapter will revisit the question of the resource intensity of Carthaginian land armies in the 
Second Punic War.  While this may seem a strange place to return to them, those armies 
operating in Spain and Italy, particularly Hannibal’s own army, were primarily made up of 
Spanish and Gallic mercenaries fighting in their own distinctive style.  As a result, the military 
equipment of late third century Spain and Gaul also formed a very large component of the 
military equipment of soldiers fighting for Carthage in the Second Punic War. 
                                                 
2 The sharp limits on our understanding, in particular, of the military equipment of Thrace and Illyria were touched 
on in the previous chapter. 
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The Pre-State Peoples of the Western Mediterranean 
By definition, the divisions between and among pre-state peoples lack the clarity and 
precision of those between states.  As a result, it is necessary at the outset to clarify what peoples 
here are being discussed and how certain common terms for them are being used.  The Romans 
termed the people living immediately north of Italy as Galli, while the Greeks called them 
galatai or keltoi; as a result, Gaul and Celt are the two most common terms of reference for these 
peoples.  English and German language scholarship in particular has tended to prefer the term 
‘Celt’ and ‘Celtic’ (or kelten and keltische) to describe these peoples and their culture.  However, 
this usage is not without difficulties.  As frequently applied, ‘Celtic peoples’ is taken to 
encompass not only the Gauls, narrowly understood, but also many of the peoples of pre-Roman 
Britain and those of north-western Spain (the Celtiberians and Lusitanians, among others).  
When referring primarily to a family of related languages, this grouping has linguistic merit, but 
it is impossible to speak of a single material culture across this wide of a space, especially if it is 
taken to include the peoples of Scotland or Ireland.3  Moreover, this usage of the term often 
comes with the unhelpful assumption that these people are ‘Celtic’ in not only a linguistic or 
material culture sense, but also in an ethnic or hereditary sense, an assumption that the 
archaeology often does not, or indeed cannot, support.  Moreover, the conception of a ‘Celtic 
world’ as a cultural or ethnic unity runs afoul of the considerable evidence for deep and 
meaningful divisions between a diverse host of different ‘Celtic’ peoples. 
                                                 
3 On these problems and the troubled history of the term ‘Celt,’ note especially S. James, The Atlantic Celts: Ancient 
People or Modern Invention (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1999).  Note also, largely contra James, D. 
W. Harding and W. Gillies, “Introduction: Archaeology and Celticity” in Celtic Connections, vol 2, eds. W. Gillies 
and D. W. Harding (Edinburgh, University of Edinburgh: 2005), 1-14. 
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Because this study is focused on material culture and military systems, it is possible to 
avoid these pitfalls.  I therefore propose to use the terms Gallic and La Tène culture in a 
substantially more limited sense than the common usage of ‘Celt’ and ‘Celtic,’ which will 
otherwise be avoided except when referring to Celtic languages, in particular the Celtic-
language-speakers of the Spanish Meseta, discussed later in this section.  In this study, ‘Gallic’ 
should be understood to signify a specific material culture connection.  That is to say that I term 
those peoples, regions or objects ‘Gallic’ which are connected to observable La Tène material 
culture, in particular elements of weapons and armor associated with that material culture.  As 
will soon become apparent, Gallic military material culture is consistent enough, even over a 
large geographic area, to speak of a Gallic military system, at least inasmuch as weapons, armor 
and their employment in battle are concerned.  This assertion, that there is a conceptual unity in 
Gallic warfare, even as there is great diversity in Gallic peoples, is echoed in the sources, which 
will be discussed in the subsequent section.  At the same time, assignment of any given artefact 
or site to a ‘Gallic’ context should not be taken necessarily to mean that individuals once 
connected to it would have seen themselves as part of a broader cultural community.  Instead, the 
investigation of ‘Gallic warriors’ should be understood, effectively, as investigation of warriors 
who fought in Gallic fashion, regardless of culture, tribe or allegiance. 
It is also necessary in this context to discuss the periodization of La Tène artifacts.  A 
number of different periodization systems exist for La Tène material culture (fig. 6.1).  Because 
this study is focused on Roman military activity in the third and second centuries, its key period 
of interest is the period variably referred to as the ‘Middle’ La Tène or La Tène II, corresponding 
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broadly to c. 300 to c. 100.4  As a result, Late La Tène (post-100) sites, most notably Alesia, are 
somewhat less useful, although material from both the Early and Late periods are occasionally of 
use in understanding the development or use of Gallic military material culture.5 
 The complications involved in discussing military material culture in the Iberian 
Peninsula are effectively the opposite of those in Gaul.  Rather than dealing with a fairly 
consistent material culture in the context of political and tribal fragmentation, as in Gaul, Spain 
plays host not only to a remarkable array of peoples, but also to multiple clearly distinguishable 
material cultures.6  In particular a sharp divide in material culture developed, distinguishing the 
peoples of the North and West of the country, particularly in the highland Meseta from the 
peoples living along the Mediterranean coast, which is to say the regions of (moving from the 
south to the north) Andalusia, the Levante and Catalonia.   
In particular, the Iberian Peninsula was host to a number of Celtic-language speaking 
groups, concentrated predominately in the Meseta and the west of the peninsula.7  The initial 
explanation for the presence of Celtic-language speakers in Spain, championed by Pere Bosch 
Gimpera, was a sequence of waves of ‘Celtic’ immigration beginning in the sixth century.  
However, the archaeological evidence has not tended to support this explanation, and the means 
                                                 
4 In this, I am following the chronological framework of J. Déchelette, Manuel d’archéologie préhistorique celtique 
et gallo-romaine; vol. 4: Second âge du fer ou époque de La Tène, 2nd ed. (Paris: Picard, 1927). 
5 M. Redde, L’Armée Romaine en Gaule (Paris: Editions Errance, 1996). 
6 Spain, here and following, should be understood to refer to what the Romans would have called Hispania, that is 
the entire Iberian Peninsula, including both modern Spain and Portugal.  On the differences between the peoples of 
the Meseta and the coastal region, note J.S. Richardson, Hispaniae: Spain and the Development of Roman 
imperialism, 218-82 BC (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 16-7.  J. S. Richardson, The Romans in 
Spain (Malden: Blackwell, 1996), 9-16.  S. J. Keay, Roman Spain (London: British Museum Publications, 1988), 8-
24.  L. A. Curchin, Roman Spain: Conquest and Assimilation (London: Routledge, 1991), 15-23. 
7 R. J. Harrison, Spain at the Dawn of History: Iberians, Phoenicians and Greeks (London: Thames and Hudson, 
1988), 140-2.  M. C. F. Castro, Iberia in Prehistory (Cambridge: Blackwell, 1995), 349-67. 
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by which the linguistic and material-culture geography of the Iberian Peninsula as subsequently 
observed by Greek and Roman writers developed is not fully understood.8  Among the groups 
here were the Celtiberians and the Lusitanians; in the scholarship, the term Celtiberian has come 
to be used as short-hand for all of the Celtic language speaking peoples in the Meseta; I follow 
this usage here.9  The coastal region, often classified as Iberian in contrast to the Celtiberian 
Meseta, was more heavily urbanized, and included Greek and Phoenician colonies alongside 
native inhabitants.10  In contrast, although there were a number of fortified hilltop sites in the 
Meseta, these were small compared to the towns of the coast; within the Meseta itself, most of 
the larger of such settlements are concentrated in the north east, in the area inhabited by the 
Celtiberians proper.   
The result, insofar as this study is focused, is the existence of at least two (and potentially 
more) different military material cultures.  In practice, as Fernando Quesada Sanz has argued, the 
situation is more complex, with significant movement of military equipment and technology 
between the coastal and Meseta regions and local variation within those regions, much of which 
is likely not yet apparent due to the still somewhat limited state of the archaeological evidence.11  
In particular, while the military equipment of the peninsula had been converging during the sixth 
and fifth centuries, it substantially diverged during the fourth century, with a Celtiberian panoply 
centered on short antennae swords while the Iberian panoply increasingly used the curved 
                                                 
8 A. J. Lorrio, G. R. Zapatero, “Celtiberians: Archaeology of Celts in Iberia” in Celtic Connections, vol 2, eds. W. 
Gillies and D. W. Harding (Edinburgh, University of Edinburgh: 2005), 33-55.  Cf. also A. Arribas, The Iberians 
(London: Thames and Hudson, 1964), 24-9. 
9 On the difficulties in the term, note Castro (1995), 350-1. 
10 Harrison (1988); Castro (1995). 
11 F. Quesada Sanz, “Patterns of interaction: ‘Celtic’ and ‘Iberian’ weapons in Iron Age Spain” in Celtic 
Connections, vol 2, eds. W. Gillies and D. W. Harding (Edinburgh, University of Edinburgh: 2005), 56-78. 
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falcata.  This divergence widens further during the third century with the appearance of 
equipment associated with both Gallic and Italic origins.  In North-Eastern Spain, weapons 
associated with La Tène culture, particularly local variants thereof, become more common, while 
in the coastal region, Italic military equipment, particularly the scutum (or possibly Gallic oval 
shield) and Montefortino-style helmets become more common.  These developments further 
deepened the distinctiveness of the regions, in part because these new equipment types largely 
fail to penetrate into the interior and thus are far less prevalent in the Celtiberian panoply of the 
Meseta.12 
Based on this division, this study will thus suggest reconstructions for the late third and 
second century panoplies of both the Celtiberians of the Meseta (understood here in the broad 
sense to include the bulk of the Celtic language speakers) and of the Iberians of the coastal zone.  
It should be stressed that neither of these two groups, the Celtiberians or the Iberians, were 
politically united in anything like their own state; Strabo’s description makes clear that both 
groups remained fragmented into distinct, smaller entities (fig. 6.2).13  Prior to Rome’s arrival, 
Carthage’s control of the coastal zone may have imposed a degree of political unity among some 
of the Iberians, but the course of operations in Spain during the Second Punic War and the 
frequency with which Iberian communities defected, switched sides or otherwise acted 
independently, suggest that Carthaginian control was never so complete.14 
 
 
                                                 
12 Quesada Sanz (2005), 63. 
13 Our best information on these divisions comes from Strabo 3.4.1-14. 
14 For an overview of the volatility of the situation, see J. F. Lazenby, Hannibal’s War: A military history of the 
Second Punic War (Warminster: Aris & Philips Ltd, 1978), 125-156.  Harrison (1988), 80-92. 
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Warriors and Equipment 
Gallic Warriors 
 Before embarking on a description of a typical Gallic warrior, it is necessary to note the 
artificiality of this nevertheless essential discussion.  As noted, the Gallic cultural sphere was 
never politically united, and it does not seem that Gallic peoples or Celtic language speakers ever 
saw themselves as part of a single cohesive cultural unit.15  As a result, a discussion of a Gallic 
military system is a necessary simplification.  As will become increasingly clear, while there are 
broad commonalities in the material culture of warfare between Gallic peoples, there are also 
notable regional and ethnic variations preserved in both the archaeological record and the literary 
evidence.  It is further safe to assume that some greater amount of variety is rendered invisible to 
us by the limited nature of the evidence.  Nevertheless, despite this diversity, it is possible to 
speak of a Gallic ‘military system,’ in the limited sense of the interplay of a set of common 
weapons and their battlefield implementation. 
 Because this system of weapons and tactics was relatively alien to the Greek and Roman 
writers of the period, it is frequently described by them.  The distinctive Gallic weapon was a 
relatively long, straight-edged one-handed cutting sword, well attested in the literary sources and 
archaeological evidence.16  Spears are less frequently noted by the sources, possibly because the 
Gallic thrusting spear was not very different from Roman or Greek spears of the same size.  
                                                 
15 A fact that was recognized by the more nuanced ancient sources, e.g. Caesar, B. G. 1.1; Plb. 2.17.8, 22.1, 23.1-3; 
Strabo 4.1.1. 
16 Plb. 2.30.8; Liv 7.10.8-10, 22.46.5-6, 38.21.4; Diodorus 5.30.3; Dionysius 14.9; Tac. Agricola 36; App. Gal. 6.  
Plut. Cam. 40.  . J.-L Brunaux and B. Lambot, Armement et Guerre chez les Gaulois (Paris: Editions Errance, 1987), 
85-90.  A. Deyber, Les Gaulois en Guerre: Stratégies, tactiques et techniques. Essai d’histoire militaire (IIe/Ier 
siècles av. J.-C.) (Paris: Editions Errance, 2009), 297-302.  R. Pleiner, The Celtic Sword (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1993). 
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Polybius omits any mention of spears in his accounts of the array of the Boii, Gaesatae, and 
Insubres at the battle of Telamon (225) and at Cluius River (223).17  Livy follows suit, describing 
the Tolostobogii, a Galatian people, at Olympus Mons (189), as explicitly carrying only swords, 
and he omits any mention of spears from the equipment of Gallic mercenaries in Hannibal’s 
army in his account of Cannae (216).18  Likewise, the Gallic champion defeated by Manlius 
Torquatus is described as armed with a sword, but no spear is mentioned.19  On the other hand, 
Dionysius, giving a full account of the Gallic panoply, includes spears (but omits javelins).20  
Diodorus also notes spears as part of Gallic arms and offers a description, “they brandish spears, 
which they call lanciae; these have iron heads a cubit in length or more and a little less than two 
palms broad.”21  This reference to the native name of the weapon as a lancia (λαγκία, equivalent 
to the Latin lancea), is itself intriguing, suggesting that the term in Latin and Greek might be a 
loan-word for this specific form of spear.22 
 The archaeological evidence suggests very strongly that spears were a normal part of 
Gallic battlefield equipment.  Radomír Pleiner assembles studies of some 1,616 La Tène culture 
flat cemetery graves; in total his figures reveals that, while 213 (or 13.2%) of the graves 
                                                 
17 Plb. 2.28.3-8; 33.5. 
18 Olympus Mons: Liv. 38.21.4.  Cannae: Liv 22.46.5.  At Olympus Mons, Livy is stressing the Gallic lack of 
missile weapons to respond to the attack of Roman and allied skirmishers; it seems plausible that he has merely 
elided out the presence of spears, but it may well be that some Gallic peoples tended not to carry them.  At Cannae, 
Livy makes no effort to describe the entire Gallic panoply, but merely contrasts Gallic and Spanish swords. 
19 Liv. 7.10.8-10. 
20 Dionysius 14.9.2.  Cf. also App. Gal. 11. 
21 Diodorus 5.30.4.  προβάλλονται δὲ λόγχας, ἃς ἐκεῖνοι λαγκίας καλοῦσι, πηχυαῖα τῷ μήκει τοῦ σιδήρου καὶ ἔτι 
μείζω τὰ ἐπιθήματα ἐχούσας, πλάτει δὲ βραχὺ λείποντα διπαλαίστων. 
22 Pleiner (1993), 27.  J-.L Burnaux, A. Rapin, Gournay II: Boucliers et Lances Dépôts et Trophées (Paris, Editions 
Errance: 1988), 88. 
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contained at least one sword, 236 (14.6%) contained at least one spearhead.23  The same analysis 
reveals considerable regional variation; in 13 of the 24 sites noted by Pleiner, burials with spears 
outnumbered those with swords.  In Moravia, sword burials outnumbered spear burials 51 to 31, 
whereas around the Marne and the Seine, the situation was reversed, with spears outnumbering 
swords 18 to 7.  Although it should be noted that burials with weapons in general comprised a 
minority (9.4%) of the sample, burials with both a spear and a sword were more common than 
with either weapon alone, suggesting quite clearly that the sword and spear were (as in Greek 
armies) complements to each other, rather than replacements.  In a separate table, Pleiner 
assembles 34 La Tène culture graves containing helmets.  Of these, 32 (94%) contained at least 
one sword, one contained two swords; 30 (88%) contained at least one spearhead, of which 13 
(38%) contained more than one; the total number of spearheads found in the selection 
outnumbered the swords 44 to 33.24  Ritual deposits also show significant concentrations of 
spearheads; the excavation of the sanctuary at Gournay-sur-Aronde has yielded at least 72 
spearheads and 53 spear-butts.25  Thus while not necessarily emphasized by the sources, it is 
clear that a one-handed thrusting spear was as much a standard weapon of Gallic warriors as the 
sword, though we should be alert to the potential for regional or ethnic variation between Gallic 
groups. 
The evidence for the widespread use of javelins is more ambiguous.  As noted, Livy 
stresses that the Tolostobogii at Olympus Mons lack any sort of ranged weapon to retaliate 
                                                 
23 Pleiner (1993), 40-41.  The studies Pleiner cites are broken down by region: Marne, Seine-Marne, Ardennes, 
Switzerland, N. Italy, Bavaria, Bohemia, Moravia, Slovakia, Hungary, Yugoslavia and Romania. 
24 Pleiner (1993), 46-7.  It is unfortunate that Pleiner remains throughout his study distinctly uninterested in the 
presence of these spearheads. 
25 Brunaux and Rapin (1988). 
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against Roman and allied missile troops.26  Polybius notes a similar inability to counter ranged 
skirmish tactics at Telamon.27  Diodorus, however, reports javelins as part of the Gallic panoply, 
and Caesar reports their use by Gallic armies during his campaigns in Gaul.28  A number of 
javelin-heads have been recovered from the sanctuary at Gournay-sur-Aronde, as well as from 
the site of La Tène itself, though they do seem to be less common overall.29  It is possible that the 
popularity of the javelin was subject to regional or ethnic variation; Alain Deyber notes that the 
gaesum, a Gallic word for a type of javelin, seems to have given the name to the Gaesatae, so it 
is possible that the weapon was a local specialty.30  
Both sword and spear were used in conjunction with a large, center-grip oval shield from 
the same family of shields as the Roman scutum and the Hellenistic thureos.31  Like the sword, 
the Gallic shield is nearly always present in literary descriptions of Gallic weapons.32  Livy notes 
of the shield that it was long like the scutum, but not as wide, and lacked the scutum’s 
characteristic curve, being instead flat-faced.33  This description is confirmed by the wooden 
remains of three shields dredged from the lake at La Tène; such a shield is also shown on the 
                                                 
26 Liv. 38.21.4. 
27 Plb. 1.30.1-4. 
28 Diodorus 5.30.4.  Caes. B.G. 1.26, 5.34.  Diodorus also reports that Gallic chariotry threw javelins from the 
chariot before dismounting to fight with swords, Diodorus 5.29.1. 
29 Brunaux and Lambot (1987), 94-5.  Deyber (2009), 306-308.  Gournay: Brunaux and Rapin (1988), 88.  La Tène: 
Lejars (2013), 155-156. 
30 Deyber (2009), 306-7.  This notion seems at odds with Polybius, who notes the Gaesatae at Telamon were badly 
prepared to retaliate against missile fire, Plb. 2.30.1-4. 
31 As noted in the previous chapter, Gallic incursions are a likely cause for the introduction of the thureos to the 
Hellenistic world.  Brunaux and Lambot (1987), 97-101.  Deyber (2009), 287-296.  On the broader origins of this 
kind of shield, note Stary (1981), Eichberg (1987), 166. 
32 Plb. 2.30.3. Liv 7.10.9, 10.29.11, 22.46.5.  Dionysius 14.9.2.  Diodorus 5.30.2.  Caesar, B.G. 1.25. 
33 Liv. 38.21.4.  Note also Plb. 2.30.3. 
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statue of the Mondragon Warrior (fig. 6.3).34  Shield-fittings, particularly the iron bosses and 
handles of shields, are well established in the archaeological record.35 
 The amount of armor worn by Gallic warriors varied a great deal.  Diodorus spells this 
out explicitly, noting that “some have iron cuirasses of chains, but others are satisfied with the 
armor nature has given them and go into battle naked.”36  Polybius notes that at Telamon, the 
warriors wearing cloaks (σάγοι) and trousers (ἀναξυρίδες) were protected against the attacks of 
Roman javelin troops, suggesting that these garments might have had some significant defensive 
value.37  Diodorus also notes the use of decorated bronze helmets.38  In fact, the Gauls by this 
period made helmets in both copper-alloy and iron, in at least two different styles.39  Gallic 
armor thus ran the range from a complete absence of body protection to elite Gauls with metal 
helmets and mail armor; the former would be one of the least protected warriors on an ancient 
battlefield, while the latter, well protected indeed, one of the heaviest armored.  The varied and 
complex evidence for armor among Gallic warriors deserves more in-depth treatment and will be 
returned to later in the present chapter. 
                                                 
34 Connolly (1981), 118-9. Brunaux and Lambot (1987), 97.  Deyber (2009), 293. 
35 Ritual deposits: E.g. Gournay-sur-Aronde, Brunaux and Rapin (1988).  Shields also figure in warrior burials, 
Pleiner (1993), 39, 59-60.   
36 Diodorus 5.30.3.  θώρακας δ᾽ ἔχουσιν οἱ μὲν σιδηροῦς ἁλυσιδωτούς, οἱ δὲ τοῖς ὑπὸ τῆς φύσεως δεδομένοις 
ἀρκοῦνται, γυμνοὶ μαχόμενοι. 
37 Plb. 2.30.1. 
38 Diodorus 5.30.2. 
39 U. Schaaff, “Keltische Helme” in Antike Helme (Mainz: Verlag des Römisch-Germanischen Zentralmuseums, 
1988), 293-317.  M. Feugere, Les Casques Antiques: Visages de la guerre de Mycenes à l’Antiquité tardive (Paris: 
Editions Errance, 1994), 51-76.  Deyber (2009), 287.  Brunaux and Lambot, (1987), 102-107.  Dionysius 14.9.2 
implies that naked Gallic warriors also lacked helmets, placing this description in the mouth of the Roman dictator 
Camillus; it is unclear how far this report should be credited. 
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 Apart from horse fittings, the equipment of Gallic cavalry is not always readily 
distinguishable from infantry equipment.40  The Gundestrup Cauldron, of uncertain date, shows a 
procession of four horsemen (fig. 6.4), apparently mailed, helmeted and armored with spears but 
without shields, while a votive plaque from Baratella shows Gallic cavalry, again with spears, 
but also with oblong shields apparently of the type common to Gallic infantry.41  Again it is 
necessary to be aware of the possibility of significant regional or chronological variation, but it 
seems likely that, on the whole, Gallic cavalry carried the same sort of equipment as the infantry: 
sword, spear, javelins, helmets, armor and sometimes shields.42  That said, this equipment was 
likely to be of generally higher quality, as Gallic cavalry seems to have been drawn largely from 
aristocrats and their retinues.  Consequently, I assume that mail armor was normal for mounted 
warriors.43  Gallic cavalry had a reputation for effectiveness, to the point that Caesar seems to 
have used Gallic cavalry to the exclusion of Roman cavalry.44  Gallic peoples were also some of 
the last to use the chariot in battle.  However, the last reported use of Gallic chariotry was at the 
Battle of Telamon (225), although the chariot remained in use in Britain until Caesar’s time.45  
Given that the chariot had been abandoned as a weapon of war on the mainland of Europe for the 
majority of the period under consideration, it seems sensible to exclude it from this 
reconstruction, as it did not play a role in most of the Gallic armies that Rome faced.46 
                                                 
40 On horse fittings: Deyber (2009), 328-9. 
41 Deyber (2009), 292-3. 
42 Deyber (2009), 292-3, 326-35.  Connolly (1981), 126. 
43 J.-L Brunaux, Guerre et Religion en Gaule, Essai D’Anthropologie Celtique (Paris: Editions Errance, 2004), 57-9.   
44 On the reputation of Gallic cavalry, note Plut. Marc. 6.4.  Caesar’s cavalry: Keppie (1984), 100. 
45 Plb. 2.28.5.  Caesar, B.G. 4.33.  Connolly (1981), 126. 
46 On Gallic chariots, including some efforts at reconstruction, note Deyber (2009), 322-326. 
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Gallic Spears 
 The typical Gallic spear was a one-handed thrusting spear similar to the Greek dory or 
the Roman hasta.  Assessing the overall length of the spear is difficult, since the wooden haft is 
typically lost.  Iconographic depictions are often of somewhat limited use, as the figures and 
their weapons may not be drawn to scale, but tend to suggest a weapon only slightly larger than 
the bearer.47  Burial deposits offer more information; spears frequently had to be broken in half 
in order to be included with the deceased in a grave, which allows a maximum length of the 
wooden haft to be calculated based on the relative position of the surviving metal spear point and 
butt.  Jean-Louis Brunaux and André Rapin, while stressing the uncertain nature of such 
estimations, note that they seem to indicate lengths between 2.4 and 3m.  Moreover, a single 
complex spear recovered from La Tène, with the haft still intact, measures 2.55m.48  Taken 
together, then, the evidence indicates a one-handed spear, with a length typically around two to 
three meters, which is to say roughly the same size as the hasta or the dory.  In terms of the 
diameter of the shaft, Brunaux and Rapin note that the majority of spearheads found at the 
sanctuary at Gournay-sur-Aronde have socket diameters between 2 and 2.2cm, suggesting a 
normal thickness in that range.49 
 There is far more evidence for variation in the shape and weight of spearheads; both 
spearheads and spear-butts seem to be made exclusively in iron in this period.  Brunaux and 
Lambot note particularly that the Middle La Tène period shows the greatest range and variety of 
                                                 
47 Brunaux and Rapin (1988), 90-92. 
48 Brunaux and Rapin (1988), 93-5. 
49 Brunaux and Rapin (1988), 97. 
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spearhead types.50  Examining a sample of more than 70 spearheads, Brunaux and Rapin advance 
a typology in five main groups (fig. 6.5).51  Each of these groups in turn has sub-groupings 
denoted by letter.  Examining 53 spear and javelin points from La Tène in the Schwab 
Collection, Thierry Lejars expands this typology to seven groups, adding typological groups for 
javelin points (Group VI) and for spearheads with octagonal, rather than round, sockets (Group 
VII, fig. 6.6).52  Nearly all of these spearheads have pronounced central ridges down the center of 
the blade of the spearhead up to the point, and all but one example have circular sockets, affixed 
to the haft by either rivets or nails driven through holes at the base.  Middle La Tène spearheads 
were made exclusively in iron. 
Group I, termed the ‘classic form,’ is the most common in both of the sample sets from 
the Schwab Collection and at Gournay; Brunaux and Rapin note that this type has the most stable 
shape and remains in use throughout the period.53  This form is tear-drop shaped, with a round 
base and a smooth arc to a triangular point.  In Group II, the ‘convex form,’ the blades of the 
spearhead form more of an oval than teardrop shape, without a strongly defined point distinct 
with the body of the spearhead.54  This type, though not as common as Group I, is still well 
represented in both sample sets.  Brunaux and Rapin’s dating would suggest, however, that apart 
from the IIc variant, Group II spearheads generally date to the mid-third century, rather than the 
second.  Group III, the ‘wide form,’ are relatively wider for their length; the type is rare and 
                                                 
50 Brunaux and Lambot (1987), 95. 
51 Brunaux and Rapin (1988), 133-134. 
52 Lejars (2013), 149-158. 
53 Brunaux and Rapin (1988), 133.  Lejars (2013), 149-51. 
54 Brunaux and Rapin (1988), 133.  Lejars (2013), 151-2. 
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Brunaux and Rapin date it early, with only the last sub-type, IIIc having much presence in the 
second century.55   
Group IV is a distinctive group, which Brunaux and Rapin refer to as the ‘bayonet type;’ 
these spearheads extend the mid-ridge into a long, thin point with a rectangular or rhombic 
section.56  Brunaux and Rapin date this type to the early second century, making it a relatively 
late emergence.  One can see that the earlier Type IIa and IIIc spearheads seem to be moving 
developmentally in this direction, experimenting with extended tips.  The purpose of these 
spearheads would seem to be defeating armor.  The extended point would function much the 
same way at splitting open mail armor as the square-sectioned Roman ‘bodkin’ spearheads 
discussed in chapter four.  Nevertheless, this type is both late chronologically and relatively rare, 
presumably because the rarity of body-armor in Gallic armies made armor-piercing weapons 
unnecessary most of the time.  Finally, Group V, which emerges at the end of the second 
century, is an elaboration on the ‘classic form’ but with the addition of a secondary bulge in the 
blade of the spear towards the base.57  Brunaux and Rapin term this type ‘biconvex.’  This type 
seems more common than III or IV, but less than I or II. 
While the Gournay-sur-Aronde spearheads were published with only length 
measurements, the spearheads and javelin-tips from La Tène published with the Schwab 
Collection were published with complete measurements and weights, which are shown, 
organized by type group, in Table 6.1 below.  It should be noted that while all of the major type 
groupings, denoted by a Roman numeral, are represented in this sample, some of the minor 
                                                 
55 Brunaux and Rapin (1988), 133-4.  Lejars (2013), 153-4. 
56 Brunaux and Rapin (1988), 134.  Lejars (2013), 154-5. 
57 Brunaux and Rapin (1988), 134.  Lejars (2013), 155-6. 
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types, denoted by a lowercase letter, are not.  Type VI, which covers javelin-heads, is discussed 
in a later section and included in a separate table there. An additional pair of well-preserved La 
Tène type spearpoints from the British Museum’s collection are appended to the end of the table; 
the type classification for these spearpoints is mine. 
Table 6.1: La Tène Spearpoints from the site of La Tène, by type 
Cat. 
No. 
Type Length 
(cm) 
Blade 
Length 
(cm) 
Blade 
Width 
(cm) 
Socket 
Length 
(cm) 
Weight 
(g) 
Notes 
G69 Ia 17.2 9.9 4.0 7.3 121  
G55 Ia 21.2 16.2 3.6 5.0 132  
G56 Ia 24.7 20.2 3.1 4.5 122  
G63 Ia 25.4 19.0 5.3 6.4 125  
G64 Ia 24.6 19.8 4.5 4.8 103  
G65 Ia 22.2 15.2 3.4 7.0 91  
G66 Ia 26.3 14.9 3.8 11.4 151  
G70 Ia? 28.3 22.4  5.9 112.7 Incomplete 
G57 Id 38.8 32.8 7.4 6.0 224  
G58 Id 46.3 40.8 7.5 5.5 259  
G60 Id 34.2 29.5 7.2 4.7 211  
G61 Id 34.3 28.8 6.2 5.5 188  
G62 Id 31.6 26.0 6.2 5.6 162  
G54 IIb 22.5 17.5 7.9 5.0 151  
G59 IIb 28.6 23.2 7.4 5.4 174  
G45 IIc 54.6 30.0 4.2 24.6 296 Incomplete 
G46 IIc 34.4 20.5 4.3 13.9 200  
G47 IIc 35.5 25.0 3.4 10.5 147  
G48 IIc 30.9 19.5 3.3 11.4 142  
G49 IIc 28.6 19.0 3.4 9.6 128  
G71 IIc 39.2 25.0 4.8 14.2 162  
G50 IIc 30.5 17.5 2.8 13.0 160  
G72 IIc 40.1 24.5 3.7 15.6 201 Incomplete 
G52 IIIc 24.3 39.1 7.5 4.5 115  
G73 IV 27.7 21.3 3.3 6.4 115  
G74 IV 19.0 10.2 3.0 8.8 75  
G53 Vc 45.0 39.1 8.9 5.9 295  
G67 Vc 40.3 35.0 6.5 5.3 173  
G68 Vc 39.3 34.0 7.7 5.3 198  
G46 VII 17.2 10.0 1.5 7.2 102  
G76 Ib 30.2  7.13  146 BM; Findspot: River Thames 
G75 Ib 38.7  3.2  138 BM; Findspot: Unknown 
(France) 
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 The base of a La Tène spear was typically fitted with an iron spear-butt; these come in 
two main styles, which occur at roughly the same rate (fig. 6.7).  The first type is a simple 
socketed, conical spear-butt.  This type consists of a hollow cone, affixed by a pair of rivets or 
nails, much like the spear-butts of the Roman hasta.58  These socketed butts are almost always 
conical and rounded, although square-sectioned butts do appear rarely at both La Tène and 
Gournay-sur-Aronde.59  The second type is what Brunaux and Rapin refer to as the talon a ̀ soie, 
which consists of an iron cone affixed to a long, thin steel nail which is driven up into the base of 
the spear to attach the spear-butt.60  The spear-butt itself was manufactured by winding layers of 
metal around the central shank, creating a spiral pattern which can be observed with a 
metallographic cross-section (fig. 6.8).61  Variants of this type with square or octagonal cross-
sections are more common, but still seem to be a minority.62  A more significant variation in this 
style is the presence of an additional metal sleeve or ferule either as a separate metal ring placed 
above the spearbutt or incorporated directly into the spear-butt itself (fig. 6.9).  This extra metal 
ring, either attached or independent, would have the added benefit of preventing the wood of the 
base of the haft from splintering when the spear-butt was inserted.63  Table 6.2 below lists 
measurements for the spear-butts from the Schwab Collection; 53 spear-butts were also found at 
                                                 
58 Brunaux and Rapin (1988), 104-5.  Lejars (2013), 158-9. 
59 Brunaux and Rapin (1988), 181, 236. 
60 Brunaux and Rapin (1988), 105-107.  Lejars (2013), 158-9. 
61 Brunaux and Rapin (1988), 104. 
62 Brunaux and Rapin (1988), 106. 
63 Brunaux and Rapin (1988), 106. 
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Gournay-sur-Aronde, but these were published without measurements and as such are 
substantially less useful and thus not listed in the table. 
Table 6.2: La Tène Spear-butts from the site of La Tène, by mass 
Cat. No. Type Cross-Section 
Shape 
Length 
(cm) 
Max 
Diameter 
(cm) 
Mass 
(g) 
Notes 
G77 Socket Square 7.8 1.0 17.9 Circular socket 
section 
G78 Socket Circle 5.5 1.8 21 Incomplete 
G79 Socket Circle 6.7 2.0 22 Damaged 
G80 Socket Circle 4.9 1.8 40 Flat base 
G81 Nail Circle/Hexagonal 7.6 2.0 45 Hexagonal base 
Circular top 
G82 Nail Circle 7.2 2.1 46  
G83 Nail Circle 6.9 2.1 47  
G84 Nail Circle 7.8 2.2 47  
G85 Nail Circle 9.1 2.1 55  
G86 Socket Circle 7.6 2.4 72  
G87 Nail w/ 
ferrule 
Circle 10.2 2.5 82  
G88 Nail w/ 
ferrule 
Octagonal 10.1 2.4 91  
383.2 Socket Circle/Rectangular 17.2 1.9 102 Square base 
Circular socket 
383.17 Nail w/ 
ferrule 
Octagonal 11.3 2.8 123  
383.7 Nail w/ 
ferrule 
Octagonal 15.0 2.6 135  
383.9 Nail w/ 
ferrule 
Octagonal 17.1 2.7 153  
383.8 Nail w/ 
ferrule 
Circle 15.6 2.8 154  
 
 As is apparent from the last two tables, there is considerable range in the metal-weight for 
spears of this type.  For spear-butts, the socketed types tend to be substantially lighter than the 
nail-attachment types; the exception to this rule (cat. G89) has an extended square spike base in 
the manner of a Greek sauroter and seems to be an atypical example.  Moreover, not all spears 
may have been fitted with a metal spear-butt, if the rate of preservation at ritual sites is indicative 
of the relative frequency of spearheads and butts.  Lejars notes in a series of graphs that from La 
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Tène some 269 spearheads were recovered compared to 52 butts; at Gournay-sur-Aronde the 
figure is 69 spearheads for 53 butts.  Only the site of Ribemont-sur-Ancre showed the 
preservation of butts at a greater rate than spearheads.64  It is important not to overread this 
evidence, however. Lejars proposes a number of potential causes for differences in the 
preservation and recovery of spearheads and butts.  Of particular note is his suggestion that the 
spears in ritual sites, many of which may have been combat spoils, may have been broken and 
deposited without butts.65  In reconstructing metal-weights for spears, I have assumed that all 
spears had metal butts of one type or another.  Javelins, discussed in the next section, which gain 
little from a metal spear-butt, are assumed not to have any. 
While there is considerable range for the metal-weights of both spearheads and butts, it is 
worth noting that preserved examples of both tend to cluster towards the middle and lower ends 
of that range; most of the heaviest examples seem to be relative outliers.  As a result, the median 
case is likely to be a fair bit closer to the minimum case than the maximum case.  The minimum 
case for a complete spear may thus be set at 125g, representing one of the lighter circular-socket 
spear-butts combined with a relatively light spearhead.  For a median case, iron elements close to 
the average of the sample in tables above would be around 230g; a 160g spearhead combined 
with a 70g spear-butt.  For the maximum case, a relatively heavy spearhead of the II or V types 
combined with a nail-and-ferrule spear-butt could be as heavy as 450g. 
 
 
 
                                                 
64 Lejars (2013), 159-60. 
65 Lejars (2013), 160. 
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Gallic Javelins 
 The other key hafted weapon in the Gallic panoply was the javelin.  As noted previously, 
the literary evidence for the use of javelins by Gallic armies is mixed; sometimes javelins are 
mentioned, but in several cases Gallic armies are said to be without any significant number of 
ranged weapons.66  Chronological distinctions may play a role alongside regional ones.  Brunaux 
and Rapin note of the javelin-heads found at Gournay-sur-Aronde that they were substantially 
more common in Early La Tène, with very few finds in the Middle period.67  The use of the 
javelin seems to revive in Late La Tène, possibly motivated by increasing exposure to the Roman 
army; the Roman pilum also begins appearing in Gallic sites in this period.68  Thus in the period 
comprising the core of this study, the javelin was a less common weapon, although by no means 
entirely absent.  Javelins could be thrown by hand, but also by way of a throwing strap, in Latin 
known as an amentum; a javelin thrown this way was a tragula.69 
The only metal element for a Gallic javelin appears to have been the tip.  Lejars appends 
javelin tips to Brunaux and Rapin’s typology as Group VI, and assigns 12 complete specimens 
from La Tène to this type; these are shown in Table 6.3 (for typology, note fig. 6.6).  The 
subtype VIb is distinguished from VIa by the much longer socket resulting in a generally greater 
overall length and weight.  Lejars notes that type VI is more common in the Early La Tène 
period, while VIb occurs mostly at the end of the Middle La Tène and in the Late La Tène 
                                                 
66 Javelins as part of the panoply: Diodorus 5.30.4.  Caes. B.G. 1.26; 5.34.  Gallic armies unable to retaliate against 
missile troops, Plb. 2.30.1-4; Liv. 38.21.4. 
67 Brunaux and Rapin (1988), 128.  Brunaux and Lambot (1987), 94-5.  Lejars (2013), 155-6. 
68 Brunaux and Rapin (1988), 128.  Connolly (1981), 118-9. 
69 Caesar B.G. 5.35; 5.48. 
 441 
periods.70  Following this data, a minimum case may be set at 44g (corresponding to cat. G33).  
The median case ought to reflect the greater weight of the later type VIb javelin tips, suggesting 
a median case at c. 200g; this is towards the higher end of the spectrum of weights, but should be 
taken to reflect more on the javelins of the Late period after the weapon re-emerged into 
prominence.  For a maximum case, the heaviest exemplar (cat. G42) at 269g will serve.  
Table 6.3: Javelins from the site of La Tène by Subtype 
Cat. No. Type Length (cm) Blade 
Width 
Socket 
Length (cm) 
Mass (g) 
G30 VIa 16.8 3.2 7.3 121 
G31 VIa 14.0 2.7 6.0 94 
G32 VIa 12.0 2.3 5.0 68 
G33 VIa 12.5 2.2 5.0 44 
G34 VIa 16.4 2.2 8.4 110 
G36 VIa 23.7 2.5 13.7 158 
G37 VIa 25.5 3.0 8.0 128 
G38 VIa 24.0 3.0 8.0 105 
G39 VIa 17.3 2.3 10.8 119 
G40 VIb 31.5 3.2 20.0 203 
G41 VIb 34.8 2.2 22.8 174 
G42 VIb 41.1 4.5 20.1 269 
 
  
 
The La Tène Sword - Terminology 
 Unlike most of the swords in this study, no ancient technical term for the Gallic sword 
comes down to us.  Polybius distinguishes the weapons ethnically, merely calling it a “Gallic 
sword” (ἡ Γαλατικὴ μάχαιρα).  The use of the word machaira over xiphos may be to stress that 
these swords are cutting rather than thrusting weapons, as Polybius himself is quick to note; he 
                                                 
70 Lejars (2013), 156. 
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quite clearly cannot mean that it was curved.71  Livy follows this usage in Latin, referring to 
Gallic swords as gladii or arma with an added ethnic signifier when necessary.72   
Likewise, the modern scholarship has settled on no specific term for this sword.  English 
language scholars sometimes refer to the weapons as ‘longswords,’ but this usage is deceptive 
and unhelpful, as it implies an analogy between two very different weapons.  The term 
‘longsword’ as a typological distinction typically refers to a Late Medieval two-handed sword 
emerging in Europe c. 1350 (sometimes also called a ‘bastard sword’).73  This later medieval 
sword, however, is very different from a Gallic sword; the former is a dedicated two-handed 
sword with a blade typically around 100cm in length, while the latter is a one-handed sword with 
a substantially shorter blade.74  The French-language scholarship more often avoids attaching a 
technical term to these weapons.75  In German, Peter Stary refers to Gallic swords as die 
Latèneschwerter.76  I follow this German usage in English, referring to this weapon-type as ‘La 
Tène swords,’ which has the advantage of specificity without the unhelpful imprecision of the 
                                                 
71 Plb. 2.30.8, 3.114.1-3. 
72 Liv. 7.10.8-10; 22.46.5. 
73 Middle and Late La Tène swords referred to as longswords, e.g. R. Pleiner, The Celtic Sword (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1993).  I. M. Stead, British Iron Age Swords and Scabbards (London: British Museum Press, 2006), 9.  The 
‘longsword’ commonly understood corresponds to Oakeshott types XIIa, XIIIa, XVa, XVIa, XVII, XVIIIb and 
XVIIIc.  E. Oakeshott, The Sword in the Age of Chivalry (London: Lutterworth Press, 1964); E. Oakeshott, The 
Archaeology of Weapons: Arms and Armour from Prehistory to the Age of Chivalry (Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 
1960). 
74 The one-handed nature of the La Tène sword is exemplified by the short length of the sword’s tang, which tends 
to be c. 15cm, providing a grip long enough to be held by just one hand.  Two-handed swords typically feature much 
longer hilts. 
75 E.g. Brunaux and Lambot, (1987), 85.  T. Lejars, La Tène: La collection Schwab (Bienne, Suisse).  La Tène, un 
site, un mythe 3. (Lausanne: Cahiers d’archéologie romande, 2013), 91-2.  Both use the non-technical l’épée to 
denote a sword of no particular type. 
76 P. F. Stary, Zur eisenzeitlichen Bewaffnung und Kampfesweise auf der Iberischen Halbinsel (Berlin: Walter de 
Gruyter, 1994), 122-6. 
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term ‘longsword.’ Where relevant, the term may be modified by a period-marker, e.g. ‘Middle 
La Tène sword’ to denote a sword of the style of the Middle La Tène period. 
 
The La Tène Sword – Typology and Reconstruction 
 The La Tène swords of the third and second centuries evolved out of the early La Tène 
sword types.  Swords of the early period (c. 500-300) tend to be significantly shorter, with a 
stronger taper and sharper thrusting points.77  During the Middle La Tène period (c. 300-125), 
swords tended to become longer, with a less pronounced taper eventually giving way to parallel 
edges and an increasingly rounded tip.  In the Late La Tène period (c. 125-1), these trends are 
accentuated, particular with the increasing absence of a pointed tip on the swords (fig. 6.10).78  
Of these groups, it is the Middle La Tène period, covering the third and second centuries, that is 
most relevant to the present study.  The loss of taper, increase in length and eventual loss of the 
tip all suggest a steady shift from an emphasis on the thrust towards an emphasis on the cut; 
Middle and Late La Tène swords had a shape extremely well adapted for powerful cutting 
strokes, but increasingly poorly suited to the thrust.  La Tène swords were made exclusively in 
iron and steel; indeed, the greater strength of iron was required to enable the longer, cut-oriented 
design. 
 The structure of a Middle La Tène sword was relatively simple (fig. 6.11).  The sword 
typically had a long blade (60-75cm), with parallel edges that tapered to a point only towards the 
tip.  A small metal guard (or croisière) divides the blade from the hilt.  This guard hugs the 
                                                 
77 A sword ‘taper’ is the degree to which it narrows to a point over the blade.  A sword with a strong taper has a 
blade that is essentially an elongated triangle, while a sword with little taper will have the edges of the blade running 
nearly parallel to each other.  A tapered blade is thus the opposite of a parallel-edged one. 
78 Brunaux and Lambot (1987), 120.  Pleiner (1993), 4-5.  de Navarro, (1972), 17-33.  Note also Stead (2006)1-2, 9, 
on the chronology of these sword-types in Britain.  Stead’s chronology largely mirrors the pattern on the continent. 
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shoulders of the blade; they in turn shape to the wooden guard which would have protected the 
hand (fig. 6.12).  The tang itself is typically square in section and ends with a disc-button which 
serves to fix the hilt to the sword.  While the point of the La Tène sword is beginning to fade in 
the Middle La Tène period, most swords at this time still retained a point and were thus capable 
of thrusting.79 
 The comparatively numerous preserved examples also makes it relatively straight-
forward to estimate the normal metal-weight of these sword-types.  Table 6.4 shows 
measurements, including masses, for 29 examples of this type.  The masses for these swords tend 
to cluster between 500 and 650g, with just a handful of outliers.  It should be noted that some of 
the heaviest examples (cat. G3, G18, G9, G8, G10), were measured with their sheaths; some are 
so badly rusted that the sheaths cannot be removed.  Lejars notes the average mass of the sheaths 
in the Bienne collection as 267g, with the heaviest example at 526g; so the sheaths included in 
these measurements may add considerable mass, although in several cases the sheath is  
                                                 
79 Pleiner (1993), 62-3. 
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Table 6.4: Middle La Tène Swords, by preserved length (r. = reconstructed) 
Cat. No. Total 
Length 
(cm) 
Blade 
Length (cm) 
Max 
Blade 
Width 
(cm) 
Mass 
(g) 
Notes 
I26 70.2  4.2 410 Iberian; find location: Cerro 
de las Cabezas 
G19 73.9 59.2 4.45 448 British; find location: River 
Thames 
G18 75.4 61.2 6.1 1225 Massed with sheath, ring 
suspension 
G16 77.7  3.65 410  
G3 78.2 63.8 4.1 695 Rusted into sheath 
G12 79.2 (r. 
82.6) 
64.0 4.7 642  
G19 79.5 72.6 3.7 480  
G21 79.5 64.2 4.1 437.6 Blade is in two fragments.  
Possibly pattern-welded. 
G23 79.5 65.5 5.1 574  
G2 79.7 63.6 4.1 490 Point lost 
G5 79.9 65.1 3.95 472  
G22 80.5 64.9 4.0 497  
G9 81.0 64.3 3.7 840 Rusted into sheath 
G4 81.6 66.5 4.57 594  
G24 81.6 64.9 4.7 575  
G15 81.9 65.6 5.02 607.5  
G28 82.5 65.2 4.8 643.1  
G13 83.2 66.8 4.6 636  
G29 83.4 67.7 3.9 549  
G27 84.3 66.4 4.4 662.3  
G14 85.0 67.9 4.9 661 Possibly pattern-welded 
G7 85.8 68.9 4.11 500 Possibly pattern-welded 
G8 85.8 69.3 3.7 813 Rusted into sheath 
G6 86.4 71.3 4.05 577  
G10 86.5 (r. 
87.0) 
69.8 4.3 1003 Massed with sheath, 
Possibly pattern-welded 
G11 87.8 72.2 3.88 578 Possibly pattern-welded 
G26 88.2 72.8 4.2 578.3  
G20 89 72.9 3.8 530 Tip missing (c. 1cm) 
G25 90.7 75.1 4.0 531  
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incompletely preserved.80 That said, the data in the table suggests a maximum case metal-weight 
of roughly 700g, a median case of 610g (representing the largest cluster of masses), and a 
minimum case of roughly 425g.  
 
The La Tène Sword: Battlefield Characteristics 
 The Greek historical tradition preserves an impression of the poor quality of La Tène 
swords, that does not entirely accord with the archaeological evidence.81  This poor reputation 
first appears in Polybius, who notes in the context of the Battle of Telamon that Gallic swords 
would bend after the first stroke and need to be bent back into shape.82  The same report is 
repeated subsequently by Plutarch and Polyaenus, with Polybius as their likely inspiration.83  
Subsequent metallographic examinations of La Tène swords has produced a more complex 
picture.  Radomír Pleiner, combining his own metallographic examinations with the broader 
literature, assembled a sample base of 122 swords.84  Quality within this sample varied widely; 
36% of the examined swords consisted entirely of softer iron, and Pleiner suggests that around 
40% of the sample were of inferior quality generally.  However, 40.3% of swords examined in 
full cross-section had steel edges, and a smaller subset of these weapons show more complex 
                                                 
80 Lejars (2013), 113. 
81 On this generally, see Pleiner (1993), 157-164. 
82 Plb. 2.33.3. 
83 Plut. Cam. 41.4.  Polyaenus, Strat. 8.72. 
84 Pleiner (1993).  Note also J. M. de Navarro, The Finds from the Site of La Tène: Volume I, Scabbards and the 
Swords Found in Them (London: Oxford University Press, 1972). 
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pattern-welding.85  Pattern-welding can leave a ‘streaky’ or ‘fibrous’ appearance on a blade when 
it is polished; this can offer a hint to the metallurgical quality of blades which have not been 
metallographically examined; I have noted in Table 6.4 instances where blades in the sample are 
reported to have streaky or fibrous appearance.  However, it must be noted that it is possible to 
produce this appearance on a blade during manufacture without true pattern-welding, so that an 
inferior blade might appear as a high-quality pattern-welded one.86 
 Any attempt to extrapolate from Pleiner’s data to a ratio of superior to inferior swords in 
Gallic armies is not without problems.  Most notably, there is no reason to suppose that the 
preserved archaeological sample is representative.  Given that the majority of recovered La Tène 
swords come from either burial or ritual deposit contexts, it falls to reason that preservation may 
disproportionately favor high quality weapons.  In that case, we might expect the prevalence of 
inferior weapons among poorer Gallic warriors to be potentially quite high, though impossible to 
estimate with precision.  Nevertheless, as Pleiner notes, Polybius’ characterization of Gallic 
swords as being of poor metallurgical quality and of dubious usefulness as cutting weapons on 
the battlefield must be rejected as an over-dramatization.87  It is possible that Polybius’ anecdote 
about swords bent so badly that they needed to be straightened mid-combat may owe something 
to a misinterpretation of the tendency, observed in the archaeological evidence, for swords to be 
heavily bent prior to ritual deposit; this practice appears to be unrelated to battle damage.88 
                                                 
85 Pleiner (1993), 79-167.  Pleiner notes regional variations as well; the highest quality swords in the sample came 
from Northern Italy and Southern Germany.  A set of swords from sites in the Czech Republic and Slovakia showed 
the odd regional variation of having only one steel edge, with the other made of soft iron. 
86 de Navarro (1972), vii. 
87 Pleiner (1993), 168. 
88 Plb. 2.33.3.  Pleiner (1993), 158.  S. Reinach, “L’épée den Brennus,” L’Anthropologie 17 (1906): 343-356.  
Contra Reinach, Walbank (1957), 209, who considers Polybius’ story a soldier’s fabrication told to and then 
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 The shape and function of La Tène swords may have proved more of a liability than their 
metal composition.  Ancient descriptions of these swords, most notably by Polybius and Livy, 
stress their utility at cutting but relative inability to thrust effectively.89  It is possible to overstate 
this point; most Middle La Tène swords, properly sharpened, would have been able to thrust into 
an unarmored opponent.  While swords of this period increasingly feature a rounded tip (e.g. cat. 
G25, G26, fig. 6.13), these tips seem to have been sharp (that is, the edge was ground to 
sharpness, rather than that the tip was drawn to a point), rather than blunt.90  Such a point would, 
however, have been far less effective at thrusting through armor, particularly mail.  As discussed 
with ‘bodkin’ style spearpoints in both Roman and Gallic contexts, the key to defeating mail is in 
concentrating force on the inside of a single ring in order to burst it open.  This a rounded point 
cannot do.  A mailed warrior, either a Roman soldier or a Gallic elite, would have been very well 
protected from a La Tène sword, which could neither cut through his mail nor thrust through it.  
In assessing this apparent design failure, it is important to remember that weapons evolve based 
on the pressure exerted by long-term security threats.  The primary threat to a Gallic warrior was, 
most of the time, another Gallic warrior; as noted above, both were likely to be unarmored or 
lightly armored.  In that context, a rounded point, which allowed for more mass to be focused at 
the point of percussion and thus favored the cut, makes battlefield sense.  Against a Roman army 
of increasingly mail-armored soldiers, however, this feature became a critical design flaw; most 
Gallic warriors carried a sword which would have likely struggled to defeat Roman mail armor. 
 
                                                 
repeated by the historian.  On ritual deposits of military equipment, often intentionally damaged, bent or destroyed, 
see Brunaux and Lambot (1987), 41; Brunaux and Rapin (1988), 47-54.   
89 E.g. Plb. 2.30.8, 33.5.  Liv. 7.10.9-10.  Plut. Cam. 40.3.  Dion. 14.9.13. 
90 Pleiner (1993), 62-3. 
 449 
Gallic Oval Shield 
 The typical Gallic oval shield was closely related to the Roman scutum and may have 
been the direct predecessor of the Greek thureos; as such, it shares most of the basic design 
elements of these shields (fig. 6.14).  The basic structure of the shield consists of an oval-shaped 
flat wooden core with a gap in the center for the hand.  Over this gap was laid the spina, a 
wooden ridge down the center of the front the shield, with a bulge to cover the grip gap.  This 
construction was covered with a thin layer of hide or parchment to protect the wooden core.  It 
was then held together by the attachment of a metal boss, and possibly metal rims on the top and 
bottom of the shield, as well as a leather binding around the entire rim of the shield.  The boss, 
which covers the front-face of the central bulge of the spina, is riveted through the shield to 
connect with the maniple, the metal bar that anchors the handgrip, on the opposite side.  The 
boss, by pressing the core, grip and spina together tightly, adds strength to the structure of the 
shield.91 
 Polybius and Livy report that the Gallic shield was not large enough to cover the entire 
body.92  Diodorus seems to contradict this claim, reporting that Gallic shields were as tall as a 
man.93  The archaeological and representational evidence confirms the former report; several 
shields recovered from La Tène seem to be somewhat smaller than the Roman scutum, though 
larger than a Greek thureos.94  The most intact shield recovered from La Tène (cat. G114) 
measured 110cm long, and 50.7cm wide; the original width is estimated to have been between 52 
                                                 
91 Structure of the Gallic shield: Brunaux and Rapin (1988), 13-27.  Brunaux and Lambot (1987), 97-101.  Lejars 
(2013), 162-165.  Deyber (2009), 287-296.  Connolly (1981), 119-120. 
92 Plb. 2.30.3.  Liv. 38.21.4. 
93 Diodorus 5.30.2. 
94 Connolly (1981), 119.   
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and 54cm.95  This conforms well with the representational evidence, such as the size of the shield 
of the Mondragon warrior, which rests on the ground and comes up to the figure’s chest (fig. 
6.3).96  Analysis of the wood remains of the recovered La Tène shield (cat. G114) by Patrick 
Gassmann suggests that it was constructed out of a pair of flat wooden planks, rather than the 
multi-layered ‘plywood’ construction of the Roman scutum.97  The Gallic shield, as Polybius and 
Livy note, provides less protection, especially from missile weapons, than the Roman scutum, as 
the lack of a curve to the shield means that the bearer cannot put his entire body into the dish of 
the shield.98  However, it would have been lighter and easier to handle; Connolly estimated 6-
7kg of mass for the entire Gallic shield (including wooden and leather elements), compared to 
10kg for the scutum.99 
 The primary metal component of the shield is the boss, which consists of a curved metal 
hull spanning the ridge of the spina and a pair of ‘wings’ into which the rivets binding the shield 
together are driven.  Working from the large number of preserved bosses at the sanctuary at 
Gournay-sur-Aronde, Brunaux and Rapin have established a morphological chronology for the 
                                                 
95 Lejars (2013), 163.  P. Gassmann, “Nouvelle approche concernant les datations dendrochonologiques du site 
éponyme de La Tène (Marin-Epagnier, Suisse)” Annual Review of Swiss Archaeology 90 (2007): 75-88. 
96 Lejars (2013), 163.  For a more extensive discussion of the representational evidence, see Brunaux and Rapin 
(1988), 16-27; Connolly (1981), 118-120. 
97 Gassmann (2007), 80-82.  Cf. the construction of the scutum described by Polybius, Plb. 6.23.3, where ἐκ διπλοῦ 
σανιδώματος ταυροκόλλῃ πεπηγώς should be taken to read “[it is made] from two layers of wood laminated together 
with bull’s hide glue” rather than, as in Paton’s translation, “made of two planks glued together.” Bishop and 
Coulston (2006), 61-62. 
98 Plb. 2.30.3.  Liv. 38.21.4. 
99 Connolly (1981), 119. 
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boss (fig. 6.15), defined primarily from the shape of its ‘wings’ or flanges.100  The most 
consistent shape, in use across nearly the entire period, is the rectangular-winged boss (type I).  
A set of smaller boss-types (types II, III and IV) emerges in the fourth century, but largely 
disappears by the mid-second century; these types generally shorten the wings or round-off the 
corners, making them rather smaller.  Finally, a number of larger boss-types (V, VI and VII) 
come into use in the second century; the last of these types eventually seems to evolve into the 
round Gallic bosses found at mid-first century sites like Alesia.101   
 While the bosses from Gournay-sur-Aronde were published without weights, the bosses 
from La Tène in the Schwab Collection have been weighed and published, as have a pair of 
intact bosses from the British Museum.  These are listed below in Table 6.5, sorted by type 
according to the Brunaux and Rapin typology.  More detailed measurements of these bosses, 
such as the height or length of the wings, are listed in the catalog.  Many of the bosses from La 
Tène were poorly preserved.  Where the original size of the boss can be reasonably ascertained, I 
have given my estimate for the original dimensions, as well as an estimate of the original mass 
based on the mass of the preserved elements.  The maniple (the hand-bar) is not included in these 
figures unless noted. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
100 Brunaux and Rapin (1988), 79-84.  Lejars (2013), 165-168, offers an alternate typology in only two groups based 
on whether the boss has rectangular or trapezoidal wings; I have opted to use Brunaux and Rapin’s more detailed 
typology. 
101 Bosses at Alesia, note Redde, (1996), 70. 
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Table 6.5: Gallic Shield Bosses by Type.   
Cat. 
No. 
Type Length 
(cm) 
 
Hull 
height 
(cm) 
Mass (g) Damage? 
G100 I 22.5  335 Juncture between wing and hull 
restored with plaster 
G105 I (II?) 35.1 10.0 217 Complete, with two rivets. 
G99 II 20.3 12.2 298 Fragments, restored with plaster 
G101 V 27.4(p) 
c. 32(r) 
11.0 174 (p) 
c. 300 (r) 
One wing and hull missing; maniple 
still attached by a rivet.  Maniple 
included in measurements 
G102 V 26.4 10.8 195.6 Complete, with two rivets. 
G103 V 29.0 8.2 197 Complete, with two rivets 
G104 V 20.8 (p) 
c. 30 (r) 
10.3 180 (p) 
c. 225 (r) 
One wing missing, large crack on the 
hull, one rivet preserved. 
G106 ? 11.7 (p) 10.2 167 (p) Only the hull remains, both wings lost 
Note: p indicates preserved measurements; r indicates reconstructed estimates. 
 In accounting for Gallic shield boss types, some allowance must also be made for the 
smallest and largest types (III/IV and VI), which are not represented in this sample.  As noted, 
type III and IV bosses can be significantly smaller than the examples listed in the table.  One of 
the smallest finds, a type IIIa boss from Gournay-sur-Aronde (cat. G95), is only 4.2cm high and 
c. 15.25cm long; accounting for the curve of the hull, the original unbent iron band, if flattened 
out, would have been c. 18cm.102  At an average thickness of 1mm, the mass of a flat iron plate 
of that size would be only c. 70g.103  On the other hand, the type VI boss is defined by having 
wings that stretch nearly the entire width of the shield; at Gournay, these were recovered only in 
fragments.104  One such example (cat. G96) is listed with a hull height of 13.8cm; one wing is 
                                                 
102 Brunaux and Rapin (1988), 174, cat. n˚ 755.  Brunaux and Rapin only list a single measurement, either the height 
of the hull or the length, for each boss; the remaining measurements for the Gournay bosses I have taken from the 
scale drawing and are marked with a ‘c.’ to indicate they are only approximations. 
103 This and subsequent estimates of the mass of Gournay-sur-Aronde bosses are only approximations; absent 
detailed measurements, full reconstruction can only give a false impression of certainty. 
104 Brunaux and Rapin (1988), 81-2, cat. n˚ 2706-7, 3242.   
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broken off and the hull has a large hole in the center.  However, judging by the intact wing, the 
original boss would have been perhaps c. 47.5cm long and might have massed c. 550-600g.105 
 The boss was riveted through to a maniple, the bar that provided the structural strength to 
the grip of the shield and served to bind it together.106  This component, consisting of a metal bar 
(the ‘stem’) with disc-shaped extensions (the ‘flanges’) at either end for the rivets, is generally 
quite light, as can be seen on Table 6.6; all of these maniples are from the site of La Tène.107  
The flanges of these maniples range from fairly simple disc or hemisphere shapes (e.g. cat. 
G108, G109), to more complex or decorative shapes (e.g. G111, G112). 
Table 6.6: Gallic Shield Maniples from the site of La Tène by mass 
Cat. 
No. 
Length 
(cm) 
Stem 
Length 
(cm) 
Stem width 
(cm) 
Flange 
Width (cm) 
Mass 
(g) 
Notes 
G109 12.5 9.1 0.6 3.2/3.3 6.3 Minor damage to 
flanges. 
G112 12.8 (p) 
13.0 (r) 
9.6 0.9 5.6 8.16 Incomplete, roughly 
half of one flange is 
missing 
G107 15.2 10.4 0.8 3.7/3.8 10.9 Complete. 
G108 13.9 10.5 0.5 5.2/5.7 14.1 Complete. 
G110 14.3 10.2 0.5 7.0/7.5 15.9 Minor damage to 
flanges 
G111 15.2 10.4 0.8 3.7/3.8 18.9 Complete 
G113 16.3 11.5 0.9 2.7/3.0 24.5g Complete 
Note: p indicates preserved measurements; r indicates reconstructed estimates. 
                                                 
105 Calculating both wings as flat metal sheets (18.5cm x 13.8cm x 1mm) in iron gives a mass of c. 400g; the hull 
might add another 150-200g, cf. cat. G106 on Table 6.5.  It is possible that such a large boss would be made thinner 
in the wings to avoid excessive weight; Brunaux and Rapin (1988) provide no thickness measurements for any 
individual boss, so this must remain speculation. 
106 In the case of a plywood shield (like the Roman scutum), the riveted construction serves to press the plywood 
layers together.  For plank construction (like the La Tène shields), the same construction serves to press the wood-
joins together. 
107 Lejars (2013). 
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 The final metal element attributed to the Gallic shield is a metal rim, covering the top and 
bottom curve of the shield.108  Unlike for the Roman scutum, however, ancient sources 
describing the Gallic shield do not explicitly mention an iron rim.  This may simply be a 
consequence of the level of detail in the sources; no description of the Gallic shield is as 
thorough as Polybius’ description of the scutum, so it is possible that the fairly minor point of 
metal rims simply escaped notice.109  No metal rim survives on the dredged shield from La Tène, 
nor any trace of rivet holes, although this may simply be because those parts of the wooden 
planking are not preserved.110  I am not aware of any finds of metal strips that have been 
identified as Gallic shield rims.111   
The representational evidence also seems to offer little help.  The Mondragon Warrior’s 
shield (fig. 6.3) shows no trace of a rim at all, while many depictions of Gallic shields such as 
those on the Gundestrup Cauldron (fig. 6.4), or the Pergamum frieze (shown in the previous 
chapter, fig. 5.19), show a wide rim along the entire curve of the shield; this should be 
understood as a leather binding, rather than a metal one.112  As a result, there is no clear evidence 
for metal rims on any Gallic shield, apart from the assumption that, being very similar to the 
Roman scutum, it would have this structural element too.  However, it is important to point out 
that one of the key functions of the metal rim, preventing the delamination of the shield, would 
                                                 
108 This rim is routinely included in artistic reconstructions of the shield, such as Brunaux and Rapin (1988), 12-13. 
109 Cf. Polybius on the scutum, Plb. 6.23.2-5, with sources for the Gallic shield, e.g. Diodorus 5.30.2; Plb. 2.30.3-8, 
3.114.1; Liv. 7.10.8-11; 22.46.5; 38.21.4.  However, it is worth noting that adding metal rims to Roman shields is 
presented as an innovation, rather than an adaptation, Plut. Cam. 40.4. 
110 Gassmann (2007), 80. 
111 Note that this is true also for Roman scuta from the Republic; metal reinforced shield rims from the imperial 
period are known however, see ch. 4. 
112 The wide binding strip around the edge of the shield is a common appearance, see Brunaux and Rapin (1988), 25; 
Brunaux and Rapin also consider this to be likely a leather binding strip, rather than metal. 
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potentially not be as necessary in a shield constructed from a pair of metal planks joined 
together, as was the method used on the recovered La Tène shield.  Comparatively speaking, late 
Anglo-Saxon and Viking shields, which also used plank construction, albeit with a larger number 
of smaller parallel planks, do not generally have metal rims either.113  It seems prudent to 
exclude a metal rim from the minimum and median case for these shields, as it does not seem to 
have been a common structural element.  For the maximum case, a metal rim over the top and 
bottom will be included, because some Gallic elites may have at least thought to copy it from the 
Romans, assuming the idea had not existed indigenously. 
 The minimum case for the metal-weight of the Gallic shield may then be set as low as c. 
85g, representing a smaller, type III boss and a similarly minimal maniple, with no rim.  The 
median case is significantly more substantial at c. 220g, representing a heavier type I or V boss 
at c. 200g and a more complex maniple at c. 20g.  Finally, the maximum case is metal heavy 
indeed at perhaps 700g, representing a shield with metal rims on the top and bottom and a larger 
type VI metal boss (which in turn requires a longer maniple).114  As with offensive Gallic 
weapons, there is a tremendous range between the most and least resource-intensive variants, a 
trend which proves to be even more pronounced with armor. 
 
 
                                                 
113 T. Dickinson and H. Härke, Early Anglo-Saxon Shields (London: Society of Antiquaries of London, 1992), 29-
30, 52.  Perhaps the most famous such shield, the Sutton Hoo shield, was found with copper-alloy bands which may 
have been a shield rim, but this is exceptional; the majority of such shields show no signs of having this sort of 
reinforcement. 
114 550g for the boss; 120g for two rims (on this calculation, see ch 4), and 30g for the maniple (roughly double the 
mass of cat. G108 and  G110). 
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Gallic Armor 
Prevalence 
 The limited use of armor by the Gauls at first seems paradoxical; the heaviest Roman 
defensive wear of this period derives from Gallic armor and helmet types, yet Gallic peoples 
themselves often fought unarmored and occasionally nude.  Varro notes that the Roman mail 
armor, the lorica hamata, was of Gallic origin, and the archaeological evidence seems to confirm 
this.115  Mail finds are rare, both because such armor seems to have been the preserve of the elite, 
but also because mail, by its nature, tends to be preserved at lower rates.  In particular, mail 
armor is readily repairable, with broken rings merely needing to be replaced or repaired.  Mail is 
also readily transferable or inheritable, as it does not need to be, and indeed should not be, close 
fitting to the body.116  Finally the thin rings of mail armor, produced in iron, are very vulnerable 
to rust; mail is often found in ‘concretions’ of rings rusted together.117  Nevertheless, mail finds 
do occur in Gallic contexts from an early date.  Notably, the Ciumești warrior-burial, has been 
dated by the other materials in the deposit to Late La Tène I (c. 300).118  Remarkably, mail armor 
even reached Britain at a fairly early date; a nearly full shirt of abutted mail armor was found in 
Kirkburn dated to late in the La Tène I period.119 In contrast, as discussed in chapter four, the 
earliest clear representational evidence or archaeological evidence for Roman mail armor (the 
                                                 
115 Varro, De Ling. Lat. 5.116. 
116 Note, for instance, the ease with which Hannibal’s troops repaired and reused Roman mail, Plb. 3.114.1. 
117 See Chapter 4 for a discussion of Roman mail finds in concretions. 
118 M. Rusu, "Das Keltische Fürstengrab von Ciumes̡ti in Rumänien" Bericht der Römisch-Germanischen 
Kommission, 50 (1969): 267-297. 
119 I. M. Stead, Iron Age Cemeteries in East Yorkshire: Excavations at Burton Fleming, Rudston, Garton-on-the-
Wolds and Kirkburn (London: English Heritage, 1991), 55-6. 
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Pydna monument and the ring finds at Numantia, respectively) come from the second century.   
Literary sources place the presence of the armor somewhat earlier, perhaps in the late third 
century, but still far later than the evidence for the armor in the Gallic world.  Likewise, the 
Roman copper-alloy Montefortino helmet was itself an Italian variation on, and development 
from, the Gallic iron Montefortino-type.120 
  Despite this array of advanced defensive options, the average Gallic warrior appears to 
have had very limited protection beyond his shield.  References to effective Gallic defensive 
wear in the sources are very few.  Plutarch notes that the Gallic king slain by Marcellus at 
Clastidium (222) wore a brilliant set of armor (πανοπλία) of an undisclosed type.121  Lucian the 
Sophist has Antiochus relate a battle-order in which the Galatian front-rank (supposedly out of 
24 ranks) was bronze-armored; little credibility can be placed in such a report, save that it was a 
commonplace that most Galatians fought unarmored.122  Diodorus mentions mail armor in his 
description of the Gallic panoply, but contrasts it with Gallic warriors fighting nude.123 At 
Telamon (225), Polybius notes that the bulk of the Gallic force is protected only by cloaks 
(σάγοι) and trousers (ἀναξυρίδες); that these garments reportedly provided meaningful protection 
from javelins may suggest an intentional textile defense, but this is still far short of the protection 
offered by mail.124 
                                                 
120 U. Schaaff, “Keltische Eisenhelme aus vorrömischer Zeit” Jahrbuch des Römisch-Germanischen 
Zentralmuseums 21 (1974): 149-204.  Feugere (1994), 37.  
121 Plut. Marcellus 8. 
122 Lucian Zeux. 8. 
123 Diodorus 5.30.3. 
124 Plb. 2.30.1. 
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 Nevertheless, the great preponderance of the evidence suggests that the average Gallic 
warrior was quite lightly armored.125  The comparison of more heavily armored and thus 
‘rational’ Romans with the less heavily armored, ‘irrational’ Gauls was itself a literary 
commonplace.126  Moreover, as noted previously, the battle narratives surviving in the literary 
evidence often either explicitly or implicitly note the lightly armored nature of most Gallic 
infantry.127  The repeated motif of the upward Roman thrust into the belly of a Gallic foe itself 
assumes a lack of protection on a part of the body that, for a Greek or Roman soldier, would 
likely have been armored.128  The evidence from burial deposits follows this implication; even 
among burials already including weapons, helmet finds are uncommon and mail cuirass finds are 
exceedingly rare.129  Leather and textile protections, particularly for the head, have been 
suggested to fill this apparent gap in preservation; such head coverings would not be preserved 
archaeologically.130  The helmets of the infantry on the Gundestrup cauldron feature a similar 
pattern to their body-wear, perhaps suggesting a non-metal head protection; the metal helmets of 
the cavalry above them are clearly of a different material.131  On the other hand, the otherwise 
                                                 
125 Connolly (1981), 125-6.  Brunaux and Lambot (1987), 106-8.  Brunaux (2004), 56-7.  Deyber (2009), 282-7. 
126 E.g. Dionysius 14.9-10; Liv. 7.10.7-10, 10.29.2; App. Gal. 6. 
127 Plb. 2.30.8.  Liv. 10.29.6-7, 22.46.5, 38.21.4.  
128 E.g. Dionysius 14.10.  Liv 7.10.10. 
129 Pleiner (1993), 46-58.  Compared to a sample of 297 weapon burials, Pleiner presents only 33 burials with 
helmets (all of which contained at least one spear or sword), only one of which (the Ciumești burial already 
mentioned) contained a cuirass.  Indeed, of the 105 burials presented in detail by Pleiner, the Ciumești burial 
remains the only burial containing a cuirass of any kind, in this case of mail. 
130 Brunaux and Lambot (1987), 106-7.  Deyber (2009), 285-6.   
131 Cf. the find of a decorated metal helmet at Ciumești, Rusu (1969), which is nearly a perfect match for the helmet 
of the lead cavalryman. 
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naked warrior on the Braganza Brooch (British Museum 2001,0501.1, fig. 6.16) wears a 
Montefortino style helmet, albeit apparently without cheek-guards.132 
 Despite the prominence of naked Gallic warriors in the literary evidence, this seems to 
have been a relatively unusual fighting style, even for the Gauls.  Diodorus notes that some 
Gauls fought nude while others fought armored; later in the same passage on military equipment 
he notes that some Gauls “gather up their shirts with belts plated with gold or silver,” suggesting 
that the Gauls also fought clothed but unarmored.133  Dionysius has Camillus describe Gallic 
warriors as entirely nude without exception, but this description, placed in context of a distant 
and highly mythologized event, can hardly be considered reliable save that it was well known 
that some Gauls fought nude.134  Reports of nude warriors in specific battles are exceedingly 
few.  Of the four Gallic peoples at Telamon, only the Gaesatae are reported as having fought 
nude.135  Polybius also reports that the Gauls in Hannibal’s army at Cannae were naked (γυμνός), 
but Livy adjusts this report, while clearly relying on Polybius, to say merely that the Gauls were 
naked (nudus) from the navel up (super umbilicum); in either case, they are clearly unarmored, 
as are the Spanish mercenaries they are deployed with.136  Caesar’s remark that the German 
Suebi trained to withstand a cold climate nude, sometimes presented as more evidence for nude 
Gallic warfare, should be taken as the opposite; Caesar specifies clearly that the Suebi are 
                                                 
132 The brooch: British Museum 2001,0501.1.  F. Quesada Sanz, “The Braganza Brooch warrior and his weapons: 
the Peninsular context” in La Fíbula Braganza, ed. A. Perea (Madrid: Ediciones Polifemo, 2011), 137-156.  Note 
that the warrior here is probably best understood as Celt-Iberian, rather than Gallic, as discussed below. 
133 Diodorus 5.29.2, 5.30.3.  τινὲς δὲ τοὺς χιτῶνας ἐπιχρύσοις ἢ καταργύροις ζωστῆρσι συνέζωνται. 
134 Dionysius 14.9.2. 
135 Plb. 2.28.4-8.  The other tribes present were the Insubres, Boii and Taurisci. 
136 Plb. 3.114.4.  Liv. 22.46.6. 
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Germans rather than Gauls.  Moreover, the training described is in peacetime, rather than a 
description of battlefield dress.137  Caesar presents this activity as unique to the Suebi, part of 
what makes them “the most warlike” (bellicosissima) of the Germans.  If this were common 
practice in Gaul, it would hardly be worth comment in this context. 
 Representational evidence from the Greek and Roman world favors depicting the Gallic 
warrior as nude, particularly in the context of the ‘dying Gaul’ motif, but in assessing actual 
practice among Gallic peoples, these depictions are less useful.  Depictions of nude warriors in 
Gallic artwork are uncommon, but not entirely unheard of.  A fifth century Hallstatt scabbard 
depicting a military procession (fig. 6.17) shows three infantrymen with oval shields.  The 
shields obscure most of the body, but the apparently uncovered chests of two warriors can be 
seen above the rim of their shields; in contrast, the mounted warriors in the procession are clearly 
shown as armored, with what may be a quilted textile armor.138  The Braganza Brooch (fig. 6.16) 
has also been taken to be a depiction of a naked warrior with La Tène material culture weapons.  
However, the brooch itself is a mix of La Tène, Iberian and Greek stylistic elements.139  
Moreover, Quesada Sanz argues that the warrior in question is more likely Iberian or Celtiberian 
than Gallic.140  However, the vertical alignment of the sword and lack of a baldric, along with the 
presence of a belt, suggest the more complex suspension system of a Gallic, rather than Iberian, 
sword scabbard.  Even if the warrior carrying those weapons and fighting in the nude is 
                                                 
137 Caesar B.G. 4.1. 
138 J.-L. Brunaux, Les Gaulois: Sanctuaires et rites, (Paris: Editions Errance, 1986), 107. 
139 D. Williams, “The Braganza Gold Brooch: its maker, iconography and use” in La fibula Braganza, ed. Alicia 
Perea (Madrid: Ediciones Polifemo, 2011), 127-135. 
140 F. Quesada Sanz, “The Braganza Brooch Warrior and his Weapons” in La fibula Braganza, ed. Alicia Perea 
(Madrid: Ediciones Polifemo, 2011), 137-156. 
 461 
ostensibly Spanish, he is still depicted fighting as a nude Gallic warrior, providing additional 
confirmation that such warriors did exist.  Nevertheless, as Dyfri Williams notes, the depiction of 
a warrior in the nude like this is unusual for artwork from Spain or Gaul.141  Nude Gallic 
warriors, while existing in Gallic art, are thus distinctly uncommon, which may suggest that the 
prevalence of this type of war-dress (or lack thereof) may have been overemphasized by Greek 
and Roman sources.  
 In order to account for this vast range in armor-use, I propose three scenarios for 
calculating reconstructed metal weights.  The first, a mailed warrior with a helmet, corresponds 
to the best equipped Gallic warriors and should be taken as perhaps typical for the upper-end of 
the Gallic elite.  The next scenario, a warrior wearing no mail, but with a metal helmet, 
corresponding to most reconstructions for common Gallic warriors, but in practice most 
applicable to the well-to-do Gallic warrior, given how rare helmets seem to be in the La Tène 
archaeological record.  The final scenario is a warrior with neither armor nor helmet, 
corresponding to the poorest Gauls.  In each instance the warriors carry the same weapons, a 
shield, a sword and either a thrusting spear or javelins.  
Mail Armor 
 The basic form of mail armor has been discussed in chapter four; because the Romans 
imported Gallic mail armor as the basis for the lorica hamata, the form remains essentially the 
same.  Some of the representational evidence for this armor in Gallic contexts, such as the 
Vacheres warrior (fig. 4.28), have already been discussed as well.  Gallic mail armor consisted of 
a tunic of mail, stretching to the knees, typically with an additional layer of mail shoulder-
doubling to provide extra protection to the shoulders from downward cuts. 
                                                 
141 Williams (2011), 127. 
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 Recovered Gallic mail does seem to show a greater diversity in design and construction 
than Roman mail.  While nearly all European mail armor in any period, including all recovered 
Roman mail armor fragments, follows the four-in-one link pattern (in which each ring is linked 
to four others), a fragment of Gallic mail recovered from Tiefenau (cat. G117) has the rings 
joined in a six-in-one pattern.142 While the majority of mail armor alternates riveted and solid 
rings, both the Ciumești armor rings (cat. G115) and the Yorkshire mail coat (cat. G116) have 
rings which are end-abutted.143  This construction would allow for much faster assembly of the 
armor, but significantly reduce the protective value because a thrust could more easily split the 
rings to penetrate through.  The Yorkshire coat is also unusual in the overall style.  As noted in 
chapter four, the normal configuration of mail armor in this period, both Gallic and Roman, was 
to add an additional layer of protection over the shoulders.  Instead, Ian Stead notes that the 
shoulders of the Yorkshire coat hold up the armor and that the coat otherwise lacks sleeves, 
which is to say that it is constructed in a similar style to the tube-and-yoke construction of the 
Greek linothorax.144 
 Likewise, the size of the rings in Gallic armor is also substantially more variable than 
comparable Roman examples from the Republic or the early Empire.  The Ciumești rings (cat. 
G115) came in two fragments, the first of which had a wire thickness ranging from 0.8 to 1.8mm 
and a ring diameter between 8.5mm and 9.2mm.  The second fragment, apparently part of the 
same armor, was significantly finer, with a wire-thickness of 1.2-1.4mm and ring diameter 
                                                 
142 F. Müller, “Das Fragment eines keltischen Kettenpanzers von Tiefenau bei Bern” Archäologie der Schweiz, 9 
(1986), 116-123.  Müller, unfortunately, does not provide a diagram of the link-pattern beyond this description and it 
is difficult to see the exact link pattern from the images he does include. 
143M. Rusu, "Das Keltische Fürstengrab von Ciumes̡ti in Rumänien," Bericht der Römisch-Germanischen 
Kommission, 50 (1969): 267-297.  Stead, (1991), 54-7.   
144 Stead (1991), 54-7. 
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between 7.2 and 7.5mm.145  The wire thickness of the Yorkshire mail coat (cat. G116) ranges 
from 1.5 to 1.9mm, and ring diameter from 8.2 to 9.2mm.146  The published information about 
the Tiefenau armor rings (cat. G117) does not include the range of ring-size, but does note that 
the rings generally were c. 1.3cm in diameter with wire roughly 1mm.147  Felix Müller, in 
discussing the Tiefenau armor rings, also notes an as-yet unrestored concretion of rings from 
Lausanne with ring diameters of between 5mm and 6mm.148  While the latter two examples are 
hard to assess, the overall impression is of a significantly greater range of variation within a 
single armor, or even a single fragment of mail, than is present in Roman mail, which may speak 
to a lower degree of precision in the manufacture of the armor rings. 
 Given the limited sample size for both Republican Roman and Gallic mail, it is 
impossible to make any comparisons with a great deal of certainty, but some hypotheses may be 
advanced.  Both the Ciumești and Yorkshire mail coats were likely produced well before the 
widespread adoption of mail by the Romans; the unusual design elements in Gallic mail may be 
the result of an early period of experimentation.  Alternately, what appears to us as standard 
design elements for the armor, such as shoulder-doubling, the four-in-one pattern, and riveted 
ring construction, may merely seem so because they were the model on which the Romans 
homogenized the armor for their use and thus spread through conquest, replacing other local 
varieties.  Finally, the apparent wider variation in ring-size introduces the tempting hypothesis 
that Roman mail, at least by the early imperial period, was produced to a higher quality standard 
                                                 
145 Rusu (1969), 277-8. 
146 Stead (1991), 56. 
147 Müller (1986), 120-1. 
148 Müller (1986), 121. 
 464 
than Gallic mail of the previous period had been.  This hypothesis would be reinforced by the 
common presence of end-abutted ring construction which is, as noted, an inferior form in terms 
of the protection offered. While it may well have been the case that Gallic mail was overall lower 
in quality, it must be stressed that the sample size for Gallic armor rings remains very small.  So 
it is possible that this appearance is simply the result of accidents of preservation rather than a 
reflection of real difference.  
 Because Gallic mail armor and the lorica hamata used the same materials and the same 
basic form, the metal-weight reconstructions of the two armors may be regarded as identical, 
with the same maximum, median and minimum cases (5.95kg, 4.8kg and 3.8kg respectively), 
with some necessary caveats.  A minority of early Imperial Roman mail finds show much 
smaller ring-sizes (and thus much higher ring-counts for a complete armor, e.g. cat. R62, R64, 
R68 and R70) than have been observed in the Gallic finds discussed here.  Moreover, as noted, 
Roman mail uses the more time intensive riveted-ring construction, whereas Gallic mail is 
frequently end-abutted.149  At the same time, it is equally likely that mail armor of the Roman 
Republic did not attain the quality of the early Imperial samples.  It seems more likely than not 
that Roman mail was of generally higher quality by the end of the second century BCE; it was 
certainly more common.  But quantifying this difference in quality is not possible with the 
current limited evidence. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
149 The additional mass of the rivets in the rings is also likely to add a small but significant amount of mass to the 
lorica hamata when compared with end-abutted mail, but the exact amount is very difficult to calculate in the 
absence of the recovery of complete and intact armors. 
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Helmets 
 La Tène culture helmets of the third and second century were made in both copper-alloy 
and iron.  However, despite the differences in materials, iron and copper-alloy Gallic helmets 
follow the same general patterns of morphology (fig. 6.18).  The basic form of helmet consists of 
a hemispherical bowl, frequently stretched vertically, with a thickened or cabled lower rim.  
Most helmets also feature some extension of the helmet at the rear base to protect the back of the 
neck, either by drawing out the helmet bowl or with an attached metal neck-guard.  Metal cheek-
guards, as with the Roman Montefortino-type helmets, are a standard element, although these are 
often not preserved archaeologically with the helmet; their presence can frequently be inferred 
through the presence of attachment holes.  Finally, some helmets have an additional knob at the 
crest of the helmet (fig. 6.19). 
 English language scholarship has tended to further divide these helmet types between 
Montefortino-type helmets, defined as having a knob mounted on the crest, and Coolus helmet 
types, which lack a knob.150  Both types occur in both iron and copper-alloy.  This typology, 
which is better suited to the Roman variants of these La Tène culture types, is not entirely 
satisfactory.  Unlike the Roman Montefortino-type helmets (produced in copper-alloy 
exclusively), the crest-knob of the La Tène culture helmet is typically a separate metal element, 
secured through a punch-hole in the top of the helmet (fig. 6.20).151  Moreover, Roman helmets 
of the Middle Republic do not generally show the same elongated neck-guards as contemporary 
La Tène culture helmets.  Finally, some helmets, like the Ciumești helmet (fig. 6.21), defy both 
                                                 
150 E.g. Paddock (1993), Connolly (1981), 120-122; Robinson (1975), 13-41.  This typology is not used in non-
English language scholarship, such as Schaaff (1988), 293-326; Bernaux and Lambot (1987), 102-106; Lejars 
(1996), 96; Feugere (1994), 57-65. 
151 Schaaff (1988), 295-6, 300. 
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type-groups.152  Thus, a typology that generalizes from the Roman forms of helmets, which were 
imitations, rather than adoptions, of the form, is apt to be misleading. Ulrich Schaaff instead 
divides the iron helmet types based on decorative elements and on whether the neck guard is a 
supplementary attached element or of one piece with the helmet.  Such a typology, focused 
primarily on decorative rather than structural elements, while valid generally, is of limited use 
for the present study.153  A more comprehensive type-study of La Tène culture helmets of this 
period would clearly be valuable.  For the present study I have opted to use the 
Montefortino/Coolus terminology, because of the clarity it offers, despite the problems it also 
poses.  It must be stressed, however, that the use of these terms should not be taken to mean that 
the La Tène culture types are identical to their Roman counterparts. 
 Regardless of type, even a limited sample of La Tène culture helmets demonstrates the 
considerable range in quality, decoration and metal-weight.  A pair of copper-alloy ‘Coolus’ type 
helmets in the British Museum (cat. G122 and G120) mass 514g and 598g respectively; both are 
complete save for the cheek-guards, which are missing; Paddock suggests that the latter helmet 
may never have had cheek-guards, the visible holes on either side being for securing a chin-
strap.154  The latter of these helmets had a thickness over the bowl between 0.5 and 1mm.155  
Another helmet of this type (cat. G121) found in the Po River has a bowl thickness of 0.8-1mm 
(no weight is given); Paddock suggests that it ought to be understood as a Gallic helmet and thus 
                                                 
152 Rusu (1969), 272-5. 
153 Schaaff (1988), 297. 
154 Paddock (1993), 675. 
155 Paddock (1993), 675. 
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dated to pre-200 BCE.156  Overall, the Coolus type helmets appear to be generally more humble, 
less decorated affairs than the Montefortino types; they seem thus generally to have also been 
somewhat lighter, although it is difficult to extrapolate from the current small sample-size.157 
In contrast to these simpler examples, an early and heavily decorated iron helmet (cat. 
G118, fig. 6.21) was found with the mail fragments in the Ciumești warrior burial; the helmet is 
badly damaged, making a weight less useful, but the average thickness over the bowl is around 
1.5mm, suggesting an original mass (without the decorative bird-crest) perhaps around 1.5kg (cf. 
for instance cat. R83 or R86).158  The helmet, which is made in iron, has a copper-alloy 
decorative bird secured to the crest, using the same attachment manner typical of La Tène culture 
style knobs; both the decorative bird and the attachment-protrusion for the crest are hollow.  This 
assembly follows the typical method for attaching a crest-knob for La Tène culture helmets, 
where the knob is inserted first through a rounded hollow cone of metal which sits against the 
crown of the helmet; the base of the knob is then flattened against the inside of the helmet bowl, 
securing the entire assembly in much the same way as the tang of a sword might be hammered 
flat against the base of the pommel (fig. 6.20).  This sort of construction allows for larger 
decorative knobs without excessive weight.  Another example of this type is a partially restored 
helmet now at the Antikensammlung in Berlin (cat. G119, fig. 6.22).159  This helmet is made in 
iron, but features copper-alloy decorations applied to the exterior.  The helmet as it is now, with 
restoration work, masses 725g. 
                                                 
156 Paddock (1993), 680.   
157 One may note however that the ‘Coolus’ types rarely have additional decoration, whereas the Montefortino types 
frequently do, note esp. Connolly (1981), 121, fig. 1-18 and Schaaff (1988). 
158 Rusu (1969). 
159 Schaaff (1988), 514-5, K103. 
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Assessing the normal weight of these helmets for the purpose of reconstruction is 
difficult, as it is clear that there was a significantly wider range of cost, quality and decoration in 
La Tène culture helmets in than their Roman counterparts.  Few, if any, Roman Montefortino 
helmets were as decorated as either the Ciumești or Berlin helmets (cat. G118 and G119).  At the 
same time, no Roman helmet in my sample is as light as either of the British Museum Coolus 
helmets.  Indeed, the lightest Roman Montefortino in my sample (cat. R88, Table 4.5) massed 
680g without cheek-guards, and perhaps c. 900g if those cheek-guards were restored, making it 
around a third heavier than the Coolus-type examples above.  Likewise, no Roman Montefortino 
was measured with a thickness of less than 1mm, compared to minimum thicknesses of 0.5 (cat. 
G120) and 0.8 (cat. G121) in some La Tène culture helmets.  Compared to Roman helmets, then, 
the minimum case must be significantly lower, as low as 500g to account for the very light 
Coolus type helmets.  The maximum case, on the other hand, is not likely to be much higher than 
the Roman Montefortino, simply due to wearability issues; 2kg, somewhat heavier than my 
estimate for the Ciumești example (to account, in part, for the large crest-decoration), seems 
reasonable.  For the median case, a tentative figure around c. 725g, as with the Berlin helmet, 
seems reasonable, though it is difficult to assess what is a typical or average example without 
more comprehensive typological studies. 
In addition, it must be noted that, unlike in the Greek and Roman world, metal helmets 
were not universal standard equipment among Gallic peoples, especially in the Middle La Tène 
period.  As Lejars notes, “De façon générale, en Gaule du Nord comme dans la plus grande 
partie du monde celtique l’usage du casque reste exceptionnel.  Il faut attendre La Tène finale 
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pour en trouver une trace significative.”160  Representational evidence from the Gallic world 
often shows warriors either without helmets or with non-metal head-coverings.  The apparently 
textile helmets of the infantry on the Gundestrup cauldron have already been noted above.  A 
procession on a fifth century Hallstatt-culture scabbard shows warriors in procession with long 
oval shields and spears, but without helmets (fig. 6.17).161  In contrast, a similar procession of 
warriors on the situla Arnoaldi shows each with a helmet, most including the distinctive knob of 
the Montefortino-type.162  As noted, this varied picture fits in with the evidence from warrior 
burials, in which helmet deposits are substantially less common than weapon deposits, 
suggesting that perhaps many such warriors either did not possess a helmet, or that a helmet was 
simply too valuable to be deposited permanently; of course, ritual reasons for differences in 
burial and in ritual deposits cannot be ruled out, but the concordance between the burial evidence 
and the representational evidence is suggestive.163  The potential presence of warriors lacking 
helmets in Gallic armies further underscores the considerable variability in Gallic panoplies, 
between the elite who owned a high-quality bronze-decorated iron helmet like the Ciumești 
helmet, and a non-elite who may have gone to war with either only a leather or textile head 
protection, or even no head protection at all. 
 
 
 
                                                 
160 T. Lejars, “L’armement des Celtes en Gaule du Nord à la fin de l’époque gauloise” Revue archéologique de 
Picardie (1996), 96.   
161 Brunaux and Rapin (1988), 14. 
162 Brunaux and Lambot (1987), 51. 
163 Pleiner (1993), 46-58.   
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Iberian Panoplies 
 It is better to talk of Iberian panoplies rather than a single set of equipment for the Iberian 
Peninsula.  After the sixth century, the military material culture of the peninsula becomes 
markedly complex, on account of the interaction of two parallel, yet interrelated material 
cultures, Iberian and Celtiberian.  Moreover, not only are some distinctive equipment types 
associated with La Tène or Roman material culture adopted, but distinctive location variations 
based on these types also emerge, creating a military material culture that is a mix of imported, 
indigenous and adapted designs.  As a result, the military equipment of the region is complex. 
Differences between the military equipment of the Celtiberians (the term here being used to 
mean not only the people so named in the ancient sources, but also many of their neighbors who 
seem to share much of the same military material culture), associated with the Meseta region, 
and of the Iberian population, concentrated in the Levante and Andalusia, are marked.  At the 
same time some equipment is shared between the two groups, and Quesada Sanz notes that there 
is significant exchange between the two regions, particularly for equipment from the coastal 
Iberian region moving inland into the Meseta.164 
 Two brief descriptive panoplies for the region survive in the textual evidence, but both 
conform only partially to the archaeological evidence. Diodorus describes the Celtiberians as 
carrying either a Gallic style shield or else a round wicker shield about the size of a Greek aspis 
and an iron, two-edged sword.165  For armor, Diodorus notes that the Celtiberians have bronze 
helmets and greaves made of hair (τρίχινος), which might mean a leather or rawhide covering.166  
                                                 
164 Quesada Sanz (2005). 
165 Diodorus 5.33.3. 
166 Diodorus 5.33.3. 
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Diodorus reports a second panoply for the Lusitani, neighbors of the Celtiberians to the west and 
also evidently Celtic-language speakers.167  This panoply consists of a durable small round shield 
“woven with sinew” (διαπεπλεγμένη νεύροις), possibly a misunderstanding of the leather or hide 
surface of a wooden shield, a javelin made entirely of iron (ὁλοσίδηρος), and swords and helmets 
“about the same as the Celtiberians.”168  Diodorus’ description seems to completely neglect body 
armor, but it is unclear if this is an intentional indication that it was uncommon, or simply an 
omission.  Moreover, some of Diodorus’ attributions do not seem to be supported by the 
archaeological evidence.  His attribution of the all-iron javelin, known generally by the Latin 
term soliferreum, only to the Lusitani seems to be an error; the soliferreum appears 
archaeologically not only in the entirety of the Meseta, but also in the Iberian coastal zone.169  
Diodorus’ placement of shields in the Gallic style in Celtiberia seems to be another error; the 
remains of such shields tend to be concentrated in Catalonia and along the coast, rather than 
penetrating inland.170  In short, Diodorus, in presenting this panoply, appears to have conflated 
military equipment common in the Meseta and on the coast. 
 Strabo also provides a description of the arms of the Lusitani.171  He describes the round 
shield as about two feet in diameter, but reports that it lacks a handle, and is instead carried by a 
shoulder-strap.  This last point is only partially accurate, as many of the handles of the Iberian 
round-shield, known in Latin as the caetra, survive and often have fittings for a leather strap for 
                                                 
167 Diodorus 5.34.4.  τῶν δ᾽ Ἰβήρων ἀλκιμώτατοι μέν εἰσιν οἱ καλούμενοι Λυσιτανοί. 
168 Diodorus 5.34.4-5.  φοροῦσι δὲ κράνη καὶ ξίφη παραπλήσια Κελτίβηρσιν. 
169 F. Quesada Sanz, El Armamento Ibérico. Estudio tipológico, geográfico, functional, social y simbólico de las 
armas en la Cultura ibérica (siglos VI-I a.C.) (Montagnac, Spain: Editions Monique Mergoil, 1997b), 317-22. 
170 Quesada Sanz (1997b), 539, 544-5. 
171 Strabo 3.3.6. 
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carrying, but also a handle for use in combat.  Strabo further reports that the common soldiers 
wear textile body-armor (λινοθώρακες) and leather helmets, but that a few wear mail armor and 
metal helmets.  It is worth noting that, apart from this statement, there is no evidence for the use 
of mail armor in Spain in the pre-Roman period.172  For offensive weaponry, Strabo reports that 
they use the kopis, along with spears and javelins.  The description of the native sword as the 
kopis might be intended by Strabo to mean the well-attested Spanish falcata.  If this is the case, 
he has erred in conflating the sword of the Lusitani with the falcata; the latter seems to have been 
far more common in the coastal Levante.  Of Iberian warfare generally, Strabo reports that “the 
Iberians all began, it is said, as peltasts, and were light-armored, on account of brigandry, as I 
said of the Lusitani, using javelin, sling and cutting-sword [μάχαιρα].”173   
 Given the limitations of these descriptions, it seems more prudent to proceed from the 
archaeological evidence primarily, while keeping the literary evidence in mind.  Thus, this 
section will discuss Iberian equipment piece by piece, presenting the evidence for both resource 
intensity and geographic range of use.  It will then be possible to suggest complete panoplies at 
the end.  As noted previously, by the third century the military equipment of the Celtiberian 
Meseta had diverged significantly from that of the Iberian coastal region.  Based on the 
geographic and chronological distribution of recovered examples, Quesada Sanz has proposed a 
set of panoplies, divided by both region and period (fig. 6.23).174  My reconstructions will 
primarily follow this schema, divided into two panoplies, one Celtiberian and one Iberian.  A 
third panoply, corresponding more roughly to the equipment of a fifth century Celtiberian elite, 
                                                 
172 Quesada Sanz (1997b), 577-8. 
173 Strabo 3.4.15.  πελτασταὶ δ᾽ ἅπαντες, ὡς εἰπεῖν, ὑπῆρξαν οἱ Ἴβηρες καὶ κοῦφοι κατὰ τὸν ὁπλισμὸν διὰ τὰς 
λῃστείας, οἵους ἔφαμεν τοὺς Λυσιτανούς, ἀκοντίῳ καὶ σφενδόνῃ καὶ μαχαίρᾳ χρώμενοι. 
174 Quesada Sanz (1997b), 615-619.  See also Quesada Sanz (2005).  
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will also be computed, to give a sense of the absolute upper-bounds of metal-intensity for 
Spanish military equipment in the pre-Roman period. 
 
Swords – La Tène, Antenna, Falcata 
 The falcata was a forward-curving single-edged sword similar to the Greek kopis 
common in the coastal regions of Spain beginning in the fifth century (fig. 6.24).  
Representational and archaeological evidence for the weapon are strongly concentrated in the 
Levante region (although the occasional example does appear in the Celtiberian Meseta), 
suggesting that this was a distinctively Iberian, rather than Celtiberian, weapon.175  The origin of 
the falcata has been a subject of significant debate, with arguments advanced for an indigenous 
origin, or development from Hallstatt or La Tène precedents, or development from either the 
Greek kopis or from that sword’s Near-Eastern predecessors.176  Quesada Sanz plausibly 
suggests derivation from the Greek kopis, but by way of sixth century versions of that weapon 
introduced into Italy, arriving in Spain in the mid-fifth century.177  Regardless of the origin, the 
falcata’s forward-curved construction enabled it to deliver powerful cutting blows which would 
have been highly effective in a military environment where armored opponents were extremely 
rare. 
 Fortunately, the falcata is a well-attested type in the archaeological record, allowing for 
fairly confident reconstruction.  Moreover, the type is fairly consistent in dimensions; out of a 
sample of 189 falcatas included in Quesada Sanz’s study, the smallest was 41cm long and the 
                                                 
175 Find distribution: Quesada Sanz (1997), 67-78.  P. F. Stary, Zur Eisenzeitlichen Bewaffnung und Kampfesweise 
auf der Iberischen Halbinsel (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1994), 119-20. 
176 For an overview of this debate, see Quesada Sanz (1997), 126-33. 
177 Quesada Sanz (1997), 133-61.  Stary, likewise, favors Greek introduction, Stary (1994), 120-2. 
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largest 71.5cm, with the vast majority of the samples clustered in the center of that range.178  
Unfortunately, Quesada Sanz’s data on these falcatas did not include weight.  However, it was 
possible for me to have five of the most complete examples of the sword-type at the Museo 
Arqueológico Nacional (MAN) in Madrid weighed; the results are shown in Table 6.7.  Although 
this sample is small, the relative consistency of the mass of the swords is significant, if not 
surprising.  One of the design features common on the falcata is complex grooves, called fullers, 
on the thick back end of the blade.179  These fullers allow the smith to finely control the weight 
of the weapon without compromising the point of balance or the structural stability, as would be 
the case if the blade was either shortened or had its width reduced.  Of the swords in the sample, 
all five have fullers running the length of the back of the blade. 
Table 6.7: Iberian Falcatas by Length 
Cat. no. Total Length 
(cm) 
Handle 
Length (cm) 
Max Blade 
Width (cm) 
Mass (g) 
I10 52.5 11.3 5.7 530 
I9 52.8 10 5.7 390 
I6 53.1 11.5 5.8 510 
I5 53.2 10.0 6.7 473 
I7 58 11 6.5 740 
I8 60 12.5 6.4 530 
 
 The Iberian Peninsula also was host to several straight, double-edged swords.  Some of 
these, such as the Frontón sword-type, distinguished by a round pommel and triangular shape, 
fall outside the chronological range of this study.180  Two key types, however, remain common 
enough to merit further discussion: the indigenous style of Antenna sword, and locally adapted 
versions of the La Tène sword-types (particularly from La Tène I and II).   
                                                 
178 Quesada Sanz (1997), 85-6.  Stary (1994), 119 gives a similar size range: 47-70cm, most between 53 and 65cm. 
179 Quesada Sanz (1997), 92-5. 
180 On this type, see Quesada Sanz (1997), 173-87. 
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Spanish Antenna swords are distinguished by the shape of the pommel.  As the form 
emerges in the fifth century, these pommels tend to have two widely spread antennae at the base 
of the grip; by the late fourth century, the two antennae have drawn progressively close together 
and, in some cases, effectively merged, creating a double-lobed style pommel (e.g. cat. I4, fig. 
6.25).181  Quesada Sanz sets out a typology for these swords in six groupings; of these, only the 
last two (groups V, and VI) enter the chronological reach of this study.182  Geographically, finds 
for the V and VI types are densely clustered in the Soria-Guadalajara region; they are thus 
clustered around the ancient site of Numantia.183  Altogether, the Antenna sword, including these 
two most relevant latest types, has a strong association with the Celtiberian material culture; 
Quesada Sanz notes that the Antenna sword is commonly seen as the Celtiberian equivalent for 
the Iberian falcata; the geographical distribution seems to reinforce this impression.184 
All of the Antenna sword-types are extremely short.  Quesada Sanz notes that the average 
blade-length for the chronologically latest group, VI, is only 34.4cm, around half the length of a 
Roman gladius hispaniensis; the preceding type V is only slightly longer, with an average length 
of 40.6cm in Quesada Sanz’s study.185  As a result, swords of this type tend to be quite light.  
Three examples of the type VI at the MAN Madrid are shown with measurements in Table 6.8 
below.  As smaller swords, these Antenna swords are fairly light, although not as dramatically 
                                                 
181 The early types are types A and B in Bosch Gimpera’s typology and associated with the fifth and early fourth 
century, whereas types C and D are associated with the fourth century and after.  P. Bosch Gimpera, “Los celtas y la 
civilización céltica de la Península Ibérica” Boletín de la Real Sociedad Española de Excursiones 19: 248-301.  
Quesada Sanz (1997), 190-1.   
182 Quesada Sanz (1997), 205-27. 
183 Quesada Sanz (1997), 221-6. 
184 Quesada Sanz (1997), 188, 211-26.  Stary (1994), 127-8. 
185 Quesada Sanz (1997b), 221-24.  Quesada Sanz, “Gladius Hispaniensis: an archaeological view from Iberia” 
JRMES (1997a), 262. 
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light as their size might suggest, partly as a consequence of the construction of the grip.  On 
these types of swords, the iron tang in fact serves as the entire grip (fig. 6.25); it thus survives, in 
contrast to other Mediterranean swords where the tang is a relatively thin strip of metal encased 
in an organic (wood or leather) grip. 
Table 6.8: Type VI Antenna Swords from MAN Madrid by Length 
Cat. No. Length (cm) Blade Length 
(cm) 
Max Blade 
Width (cm) 
Mass (g) Date 
I4 41 30.5 3.9 430 400-200 
I3 44  6 410 300-200 
I2 49.8 40.5 4.0 350 400-200 
 
 The other potential sword-choice in the period under consideration was swords derived 
from late La Tène I type swords, but locally produced.   As Quesada Sanz notes, very few of 
these swords are well preserved, hence a complete and systematic study of the type is currently 
impossible.186  Nevertheless, it is possible to outline the basic specifications of the type.  The 
Iberian (here a geographic, not cultural, signifier) variants of the La Tène type derived from the 
late La Tène I swords, rather than from the substantially longer La Tène II types discussed in the 
previous section.   
The La Tène I design is, however, taken over by local smiths and altered.  Notably the 
suspension and scabbard system progressively changes from the Gallic suspension-loop with 
iron-plate scabbard to an organic scabbard with a ring suspension typical in Spain in the 
period.187  By the end of this evolution, the sword has also settled to a blade-length of c.60cm 
(see fig. 4.8); it is this form of the sword which is most likely the immediate predecessor of the 
Roman gladius hispaniensis.188  As Quesada Sanz notes, while few of these swords are well-
                                                 
186 Quesada Sanz (1997b), 250. 
187 Quesada Sanz (1997b), 250-55; Quesada Sanz (1997a), 263-5. 
188 Quesada Sanz (1997a), 256, 265-6. 
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preserved, making weighting difficult, one example of a La Tène -type sword in an Iberian 
context from MAN Madrid (cat. I1) is largely intact.  Its total length of 70.2cm is consistent with 
the lengths suggested for this type, and it has a preserved mass of 410g.  Further evidence is 
provided by the Roman variant of this weapon; as Quesada Sanz notes, the third century locally 
manufactured ‘La Tène’ Spanish sword type was “virtually identical” to the Republican swords 
now generally accepted to represent the gladius hispaniensis type and discussed in the previous 
chapter.189 
 Geographically, the distribution of the local La Tène I variants swords is wider than the 
other two types.  It is important to distinguish swords of the La Tène II type (already discussed in 
form in the previous section) which are also found occasionally in Spain, particularly in 
Catalonia; Quesada Sanz associates their appearance with the period of the Second Punic War.190  
These imported swords, Quesada Sanz notes, are almost always found associated with other 
markers of La Tène culture military equipment and with their distinctive suspension and 
scabbard system; they never become as common in Spain as the local variant of the La Tène I 
sword.191  Of these Spanish variants, while the largest cluster of finds is centered on the eastern 
Meseta near Numantia (as with the Antenna swords), a second significant cluster of finds 
occurred in Catalonia, and further small finds occur somewhat infrequently in Andalucia.192  
Thus this type of sword, while more common in the Celtiberian cultural zone, was apparently 
                                                 
189 Quesada Sanz (1997a), 268. 
190 Quesada Sanz (1997b), 259. 
191 Quesada Sanz (1997a), 262. 
192 Quesada Sanz (1997b), 255-7. 
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available in both Iberian and Celtiberian military material cultures, and so would have provided a 
potential alternative to both the Celtiberian antenna sword and the Iberian falcata. 
 Keeping in mind the geographical distribution of each of these types, it is possible to 
propose maximum, minimum and median cases for the swords carried by Spanish warriors.  For 
the Iberian warrior, the minimum case may be set at c. 400g, corresponding to the lightest 
preserved falcatas (cat. I9), as well as to the lighter examples of the locally produced variant of 
the La Tène I sword (cat. I1).  For the median case, the cluster of falcatas around 530g suggests a 
median in this range.  Finally, for a maximum case, the very heavy falcata (cat. I7) at 740g 
suggests this upper bound.  For the Celtiberian warrior, a minimum case of 350g corresponds 
well with the lighter Antenna swords (e.g. cat. I2), while a median case ought to be set at perhaps 
c. 410g to represent the cluster of Antenna swords at that weight, as well as the local variant La 
Tène swords.  For the maximum case, it is necessary to consider a mass of at least c. 700g, 
corresponding to the rough median case for the gladius hispaniensis, following the reasoning that 
the Roman sword-type itself was an adaption of Iberian or Celtiberian La Tène sword variants. 
 
Shields – Caetra, Oval shields 
The common shield of the Iberian Peninsula was the center-bossed round shield known 
by its Latin name, the caetra.  The basic construction of the shield is a flat wooden disc, 50-
70cm wide, with a round gap in the center for the grip.  This gap is covered by a round, domed 
iron boss which is riveted through to an iron maniple on the rear face of the shield, much as with 
the scutum (fig. 6.26).193  The styles for the metal elements of this shield – the boss and handle – 
vary considerably both chronologically and geographically.  Unlike the Gallic oval shield and the 
                                                 
193 Quesada Sanz (1997b), 489-93. 
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Roman scutum, which generally feature larger bosses and small maniples, the caetra can have 
maniples with wings that run nearly the entire diameter of the shield, although smaller, simpler 
handlebars are also common.194 
The maniples of the caetra range from simple small bands, akin to the maniples of the 
scutum or Gallic oval shields, to much larger hand-holds with broad wings reinforcing the back 
of the shield (fig. 6.27).  Quesada Sanz has divided these into a typology in seven groups.  Of 
these typological groupings, archaeological examples of group II (maniples with small curved 
wings) and group III (maniples with triangular fins) are by far the most common, outnumbering 
all of the remaining groups together.195  As such, this reconstruction will focus on these types.  
Although Quesada Sanz does not present weights for the examples in his catalog, I was able to 
have several examples in the collection at MAN Madrid weighed (cat. I18-I23).  None of these 
examples are complete, but they may give a sense for the rough range of metal requirements.   
At the smallest, many of smaller Group I and II maniples are no larger than the maniples 
on Gallic shields; Quesada Sanz notes that the normal length of subgroup IIA1 varies between 
21-23cm in length.196  In contrast, the subgroup IIA2 tends to be larger and, Quesada Sanz notes, 
is substantially more frequent; these tend to have lengths between 20.5 and 35cm.  An example 
of this type (cat. I18) consists only of the handle and a single wing, and is 16.4cm long and 
31.29g.  Accounting for the missing bit of handle and a matching wing, the maniple when 
originally made was likely c. 23-24cm long and probably massed no more than c. 55g. 
                                                 
194 It seems worth noting that this same style of construction, with a long handle-bar providing strength to the shield, 
along with a smaller hemispherical boss, is also typical of Early medieval Anglo-Saxon shields; this is not a case of 
influence, but merely of two geographically and chronologically separated cultures apparently coming to similar 
solutions for similar problems.  Dickinson and Härke (1992). 
195 Quesada Sanz (1997b), 499-508. 
196 Quesada Sanz (1997b), 502. 
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Maniples from Group III can be substantially larger.  Subtype IIIA has an average length 
of 37.2cm, while IIIB has an average length of 61.5cm but is far less frequent than the former.197  
An example of this type (cat. I19) consists of only one wing and part of a handle, and is 20cm 
long and 37.7g.  Accounting for the missing wing and part of the handle, the maniple was likely 
originally c. 35cm long and probably massed c. 65g.  Considerably larger examples do exist; 
Subtype IIIA has an average length of 37.2cm, while IIIB has an average length of 61.5cm, 
although it is far less frequent than the former.  A quite large example is listed by Quesada Sanz 
as being 71cm long with a 10cm wide handle.198  Such a maniple, if constructed to the same 
thickness as the MAN examples, might mass c. 167g.199 
 The circular bosses used on the caetra also ranged considerably in size, although by the 
end of the third century some of the larger types of boss are increasingly rare.  The largest boss-
type, which Quesada Sanz classes as type I, ranges between 30 and 40cm and is manufactured in 
copper-alloy.200  The boss consists of a central hemispherical dome with a large flat extension at 
the base covering a significant portion of the shield.  Bosses of these types occur in both the 
coastal region and the Meseta, but finds of this type fade out by the third century.201  If this type 
of boss was in use at all by the period of Roman involvement in Spain, it was likely exclusively 
                                                 
197 Quesada Sanz (1997b), 504.  Two more subtypes, IIIC and IIID exist, but both have only a single exemplar, and 
must be thus judged extremely rare. 
198 Quesada Sanz (1997b), 500, 928, cat. 859. 
199 Proceeding from the listed measurements and a scale drawing, I estimated a surface area of approximately 
200cm2 per wing and 30cm2 (somewhat wider than the previous example) for the handle.  This suggested a total 
combined surface area of 430cm2, which at an average thickness of 0.5mm, in turn suggests a volume of 43cm3, for 
a mass in iron of 167g.  The average thickness estimate of half a millimeter was in turn derived from the measured 
masses of the MAN examples (cat. I18-I23). 
200 Quesada Sanz (1997b), 508-11. 
201 Quesada Sanz (1997b), 508. 
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an elite product.  One well preserved example of this type at MAN Madrid (cat. I15, fig. 6.28) is 
33.5cm in diameter; the reported thickness of the metal plate is 2mm.  However this 
measurement, like those for cat. I16 and I17 (see below) seems to be a maximum, rather than 
average, figure.  Removing the boss from the wooden mounting board for weighing or 
remeasurement was not possible, but assuming that the thickness reported is a maximum figure 
and the average thickness is c. 1.5mm, the original mass of the boss might be estimated at c. 
1,224g.202  A second early boss-type, classed by Quesada Sanz as type II, consists of a central 
hemispherical home with a number of radial projections; like the type I bosses, this type does not 
appear to have been used after the third century.  An example of this type (cat. I17, fig. 6.29) 
from MAN Madrid weighs 193.67g and is very nearly complete, with only two of the radial 
flanges broken off.  As noted, such bosses disappear from the archaeological and 
representational record, replaced in the Meseta by much smaller iron bosses and in the coastal 
zone increasingly by oval shields. 
 In the Meseta, a smaller, iron boss type appears during the fourth century.  Classed by 
Quesada Sanz as Type III, it consists of only a hemispherical iron dome with a small flat 
concentric extension around the base, covering the gap in the shield created by the hand-hold 
(cat. I16).  Rivets driven through the base hold the boss to the shield, but do not necessarily 
intersect with the grip in the manner of a La Tène or Roman shield.203  This simple boss type is 
typically quite small, with diameters between 10-15cm, and with the dome typically 8-10cm 
                                                 
202 From the museum’s scale image, the central dome of the boss appears to be roughly 12cm wide, and perhaps c. 
5cm tall, suggesting a total surface area of the central dome around 191cm2.  With a total diameter for the boss of 
33.5cm, this would leave the flat part of the boss at a surface area of 768cm2 (a circle with a diameter of 33.5, with a 
circular gap in the center c. 12cm in diameter), suggesting a total surface area for the boss of 959cm2; if the metal of 
the boss varied between 1-2mm (average c.1.5mm), this would give a total volume of 144cm3, for a mass in copper-
alloy of c. 1,224g. 
203 Quesada Sanz (1997b), 514-5. 
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across at the base and between 3-5cm tall.  Somewhat larger types, with dome heights up to 
7.6cm and diameters of c. 20cm exist, but are quite rare.204  One such iron boss at MAN Madrid 
(cat. I16, fig. 6.30), has a maximum diameter of 16.2cm and a dome 3.5cm tall; the boss masses 
127.05g.  The boss has a reported thickness of 2mm, which in turn must be an average figure; at 
uniform 2mm thickness, the boss would have been nearly three times as heavy.205  These smaller 
iron bosses seem to have been generally confined to the Meseta region, suggesting use by 
Celtiberian, but not Iberian, peoples.206 
 The other shield-type available in Spain was oval shields of the Gallic type.  As Quesada 
Sanz notes, these were late arrival to the peninsula, their introduction dating no earlier than the 
middle of the fourth century and perhaps as late as the third.207  However, by the late third 
century, shields of this type had become common in the coastal zone, particularly in Catalonia; 
in most areas they appear to have coexisted with the older, indigenous caetra.208  Stary has 
suggested that the expansion of the oval shield in Spain corresponds to a spread in Gallic 
armaments more generally, a thesis that Quesada Sanz persuasively refuted.209  Instead, the oval-
                                                 
204 Quesada Sanz (1997b), 514-5. 
205 Calculated from the surface area implied by the museum measurements.  The dome should have a surface area of 
c. 151cm2 (assuming a dome 3.5cm high and c. 6cm in radius at the base), while the surface area of the flat base 
would be c. 93cm2 (the area of a circle with a diameter of 16.2cm, with a circular gap in the center of a diameter of c. 
10cm), suggesting a total surface area of c.244cm2, at 2mm in thickness, this produces a total volume of 48.8cm3, 
suggesting the total mass in iron of 382.5g, which three times the actual mass of the boss.  Even accounting for 
damage to the surface of the boss, it seems certain that the actual average thickness of the metal plate is less than 
1mm.  
206 Quesada Sanz (1997b), 514-5.   
207 Quesada Sanz (2010), 145.  Quesada Sanz (1997b), 544-5. 
208 Quesada Sanz (1997b), 544-5, 619. 
209 P. F. Stary, “Keltische Waffen auf der Iberischen Halbinsel” Madrider Mitteilungen 23 (1982): 114-144.  Stary 
(1993), 115-119.  Quesada Sanz (1997b), 545.  F. Quesada Sanz, “Montefortino-type and related helmets in the 
Iberian Peninsula: a study in archaeological context” JRMES 8 (1997c): 151-166. 
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shield appears to have been integrated into the pre-existing Spanish systems of warfare alongside 
more long-standing equipment. 
 Without a broader range of weighed examples of each of these types, it is not feasible to 
establish a range of cases.  Hence, I propose only median cases for each type; this is not an 
expression of confidence but rather of uncertainty, in that the full range of possible metal-
weights for these shields is unclear.  As noted, by the third century, the oval shield of the Gallic 
type had become increasingly common in the coastal zone; for this a median case of c. 220g, 
following on the reconstruction in the preceding section, seems reasonable.  On the Meseta, 
pairing a typical type III iron boss (such as cat. I16) with a relatively average-sized maniple 
(such as cat. I19) suggests a median case for the Meseta caetra of c. 200g.210  The equipment of 
local elites could be considerably heavier; adding a large winged maniple to the previous caetra 
produces an estimated metal-weight of c. 300g.  And, as noted, the very large copper-alloy 
bosses in use by elites in the coastal region in the fourth century, and possibly later, can mass 
more than 1kg; combined with a large maniple, such an early elite caetra might have massed c. 
1.4kg.  Nevertheless, by the third century, the most common types by far, in both the 
representational and archaeological evidence, are the humbler former examples.211 
 
Javelins – the Soliferreum 
 Javelins of several common types have already been discussed in this and previous 
chapters.  Of these, the Roman-style pilum makes fairly frequent appearance in the 
                                                 
210 Roughly 135g for the small iron boss (following cat. I16) and roughly 65g for a mid-sized handle (following cat. 
I19). 
211 Quesada Sanz (1997b), 619. 
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archaeological evidence outside of the context of Roman military operations in Spain, suggesting 
that it may have been adopted as a consequence of contact with the Romans well before they 
established complete control of the peninsula.212  But the distinctive Spanish javelin, in use over 
much of the peninsula, was the soliferreum.  As the Latin term implies, this javelin was made 
entirely in iron, with no wooden haft. It is thus quite unlike missile weapons seen elsewhere in 
the Mediterranean world, and our Greek and Roman sources were quite intrigued by it.213  It 
consists of a metal haft, typically with a thickened center for a grip.214  The haft is typically quite 
long; Quesada Sanz notes that 66% of complete soliferrea have lengths between 180 and 205cm, 
with the average length of complete examples being 193.5cm.215  The form of the tip varies 
considerably (fig. 6.31): the most common type (3 in fig. 6.31) is an arrow-head shape with a 
pronounced mid-ridge and relatively wide wings.  However, square-sectioned bodkin points, and 
even round-sectioned needle-points, are known.216 
 To reconstruct the original mass of these weapons is difficult, given the remaining 
evidence.  Recovered soliferrea are frequently folded over multiple times and occasionally 
broken into multiple pieces, especially in burial deposits, most likely for ritual reasons.217  
Moreover, the nature of a long, relatively thin iron rod makes deposited soliferrea more 
vulnerable to corrosion or damage than many other types of military equipment.  One complete, 
                                                 
212 Quesada Sanz (1997b), 325-43. 
213 Liv 34.14.11.  Diodorus 5.34.  The common usage is to refer to this weapon with the Latin term soliferreum; any 
indigenous name for the weapon is lost.  Diodorus, writing in Greek, calls the weapon a σαυνίον ὀλοσίδηρος, an 
“all-iron javelin.” 
214 Quesada Sanz (1997b), 308-10, fig. 178. 
215 Quesada Sanz (1997b), 310-1. 
216 Quesada Sanz (1997b), 311-2. 
217 Quesada Sanz (1997b), 325. 
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but heavily bent, example of a soliferreum from MAN Madrid (cat. I14) masses 600g.  It has a 
recorded length of 63cm, but this is clearly a measurement of the current folded configuration 
(fig. 6.32); the original length is likely more than 190cm.  Another example (cat. I13), masses 
400g, split into two fragments; like the previous example, the recorded length appears to be only 
a measurement of the longest fragment.  The preserved elements (fig. 6.33) measure perhaps 
160cm long and appear to be still missing the tip of the weapon; assuming it was of a fairly 
standard length of c. 195cm, we might expect the original to have massed c. 550g.  Quesada 
Sanz notes that eight well-preserved examples in the Museum of Cordoba had an average mass 
of 683g, with a maximum of 800grams and a minimum of 620grams; two more examples from 
the Peyros necropolis massed 650g and 750g.218  The relatively low metal-weight for a two-
meter long iron weapon is explained by the thin shaft; the shafts of the two above examples from 
MAN Madrid have maximum thicknesses in the shaft of only 1 and 1.2cm respectively. 
 The origin of the soliferreum in Spain remains unclear.219  It was, however, already 
common by the Second Punic War and remained so considerably after.220  As late as 38, Appian 
reports that one of Sextus Pompey’s commanders, Menecrates, was wounded when struck by a 
soliferreum, which Appian explicitly describes as Iberian and with a barbed tip.221  
Geographically, the soliferreum occurs frequently in both the coastal Iberian zone and the 
Meseta Celtiberian zone, suggesting that it was a key part of both styles of warfare.222  For most 
                                                 
218 Quesada Sanz (1997b), 311.  Y. Solier, G. Rancoule, M. Passelac, “La nécropole de ‘Les Peyros’ (VI siècle av 
JC) à Couffoulens (Aude)” Revue Archéologique de Narbonnaise Suppl. 6 (1976), 72. 
219 Quesada Sanz (1997b), 317-22.  Quesada Sanz favors introduction from Languedoc/Aquitania. 
220 Quesada Sanz (1997b), 315-7.   
221 App. Bel Civ. 5.82.  This battle occurred in the context of Octavian’s failed invasion of Sicily in 38 BCE. 
222 Quesada Sanz (1997b), 317-22. 
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of the period under consideration, a Roman-style pilum seems to have been an alternative to the 
soliferreum; pila occur frequently in the archaeological record both in the Meseta and the 
Levante.223  Notably, adapted Spanish pila tend to be of the lighter, socketed type (which would 
have been most similar to the soliferreum in terms of weight and flight characteristics), rather 
than of the heavier, tanged variety; typically they have broad-bladed tips, rather than the 
narrower tips of many Roman pila.224 
 Quesada Sanz suggests that in combat the soliferreum might have performed much like 
the pilum in terms of range and penetration.225  While reconstruction and testing would be 
needed to determine this with certainty, it seems unlikely that the two weapons would have had 
similar characteristics.  The greatest difference is weight: while a soliferreum might include as 
much as 800g of iron (compared to c. 300g in most types of pila), the soliferreum lacks the 
heavy wood haft of the pilum.  In particular, the heavy socketed pila, ranging in reconstructions 
from 1.1 to 1.7kg in total weight, could have been twice as heavy as a soliferreum.  Even the 
lightest pila reconstructions, such as Connolly’s reconstruction of the socketed pilum discussed 
in chapter 4, put the weapon’s total weight at nearly 1kg, roughly 20% heavier than a 
soliferreum.  This difference would impact not only range, but also penetrative power; as noted 
in chapter four, the apparent purpose of the heavy wooden haft on the pilum was to provide mass 
behind the point to drive it through shields and armor.  The soliferreum, lacking any such 
backloaded mass, would presumably not perform the same.  Moreover, while the tips of Roman 
pila tend to be narrow and quite sharp, in order to punch through a resistive surface like a shield, 
                                                 
223 Quesada Sanz (1997b), 325-43. 
224 Quesada Sanz (1997b), 326-30. 
225 Quesada Sanz (1997b), 324. 
 487 
the heads of soliferrea are generally (though not always) wide-bladed spear-shapes.  The purpose 
of the wings in such shapes is to deliver a wider, more disabling wound.  Even so, they severely 
impair any armor-penetrating ability of a weapon, as the wide surface means that the momentum 
of the weapon has to push aside more of the armor in order to penetrate.226  In essence, while the 
Roman pilum seems to have been adapted to defeat shields and armor at close range, both the 
Spanish soliferreum and the Spanish varieties of the pilum seem to have been more designed for 
lightly armored or unarmored targets.  This was a sensible adaptation given that, apart from the 
Romans themselves, nearly all warriors in Spain were lightly armored. 
 While Roman soldiers generally carried pila in pairs, Quesada Sanz notes that the burial 
evidence argues against this practice in Spain; soliferrea and pila are never found in pairs, but 
are often associated with thrusting spears in assemblages of grave-goods.227  Thus in estimating 
the metal-weight added by the weapon, a maximum case may be set at a single relatively heavy 
soliferreum of c. 800g.  The median case, at c. 700g, corresponds to a more average soliferreum, 
while the minimum case at c. 300g represents a warrior carrying a single pilum, as discussed in 
chapter four.  Given the wide geographic distribution of both the soliferreum and the pilum in 
Spain, it seems prudent to assign the weapon to both Iberian and Celtiberian panoplies. 
 
Spears 
 Both the Iberians and Celtiberians also made use of a one-handed thrusting spear as a 
regular part of the panoply.  As with the soliferreum, there is rather less variation between the 
spears common in the Iberian and Celtiberian zones, with most types crossing over from the 
                                                 
226 Quesada Sanz (1997b), 310.  Connolly (2000). 
227 Quesada Sanz (1997b), 325. 
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coastal region into the Meseta or vice-versa.228  The most common types of spearheads by far 
were oval, arrow or ‘tear-drop’ shaped spearheads with strong central ridges, very much like 
Gallic or Greek spearheads of the same period.  The notable regional variation peculiar to Spain 
is a group of very large spearheads of over 30cm and sometimes as much as 70cm in length; in 
Quesada Sanz’s typology of spearheads from Spain, these are type 1 and 2.229  However, 
chronologically, these types belong to the earlier period; type 1 is already rare by c. 450 and has 
vanished by 400, while type 2 is rare by 350 and has vanished by 300.230  Both thus fall outside 
of the chronological scope of this study.  Without these unusually large variants, Spanish 
spearheads fall into the same general size range as Gallic or Greek spearheads and share many of 
the same basic forms.231  Consequently, although Quesada Sanz’s typology does not include 
typical weights, it seems reasonable to suppose that the spears in the Iberian Peninsula had 
roughly the same metal requirements as similar spears in the Gallic and Greek worlds. 
 
Helmets and Armor 
 Compared to Italy, Greece or even Gaul, the armor used in Spain was generally light and 
made much greater use of organic materials (leather, textile) over metal.  Beginning with 
helmets, Quesada Sanz notes that during the fourth century and most of the third, metal helmets 
do not appear to be part of any Spanish panoply, failing to appear in either the archaeological or 
                                                 
228 Quesada Sanz (1997b), 359-98.  Stary (1993), 141-2. 
229 Quesada Sanz (1997b), 399.  These two large groupings in turn represent a number of smaller subtypes.  Type 1 
includes Quesada Sanz’s types IA, IB, IIA and IIB, while type 2 covers Va VIA, VIIA, IIIA and IIIB. 
230 Quesada Sanz (1997b), 404, fig. 247.   
231 Quesada Sanz (1997b), 399-404.  The same seems to have been broadly true of spear butts, Quesada Sanz 
(1997b), 427-31.  It should be stressed, this is a comparison of one-handed thrusting spears and not the sarisa. 
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representational evidence.232  Metal helmets had been part of the panoplies of local elites from 
the seventh to the fourth centuries, but these helmet styles disappear from the archaeological 
record and tend to be quite rare in any case.233  Instead, there is significant representational 
evidence suggesting that head protection for common soldiers, beginning in the fifth century, 
was made of organic material, perhaps of hardened leather.234  Quesada Sanz notes from the 
literary and representational evidence that even after the introduction and spread of metal helmet 
types in the third century, organic material helmets likely remained more common than metal 
ones in most of the peninsula, although such organic material helmets are not preserved 
archaeologically.235 
Metal head protection was introduced (or more correctly, reintroduced) towards the end 
of the third century, particularly in the form of Roman-style copper-alloy Montefortino helmets. 
Although some Gallic helmet types do occur, particularly in Catalonia, they remain rare and are 
frequently associated with other Gallic artefacts, rather than Iberian ones.236  Iberian artisans 
appear to have begun manufacturing copies of the Roman Montefortino-type domestically.  
Quesada Sanz notes that these helmets begin appearing in the Iberian coastal zone during the 
third century in Iberian, rather than Roman, contexts.237  Paddock classifies these local versions 
of the Montefortino as Type V, dating them to the third and second centuries, noting that their 
                                                 
232 Quesada Sanz (1997b), 570. 
233 Quesada Sanz (1997b), 570. 
234 Quesada Sanz (1997b), 570. 
235 Quesada Sanz (1997b), 570.  Note also Strabo 3.4.15, whose description of organic helmets and body-armor 
conforms to the representational evidence. 
236 Quesada Sanz (1997b), 570-1. 
237 Quesada Sanz (1997b), 571.  
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shape, finish and quality are sufficient to suggest they are not of Italian manufacture, but rather 
local imitations; moreover, he notes, they are frequently found in Spanish or Gallic grave 
deposits.238  Paddock assumes that, although none of these Spanish Montefortino helmets have 
been found with cheek-guards, they may have had them.  However, Quesada Sanz, examining 
the burial evidence, finds that the cheek-guards are systematically omitted from Iberian 
manufactured Montefortino type helmets; he attributes the omission to the well-established habit 
of Iberian artisans for adapting foreign weapons and armor to local needs and styles.239 
 To account for this range of possible head-protection in the reconstruction, it seems 
reasonable to set the minimum case for the metal-weight of an Iberian warrior at zero; the 
median case can match a relatively light Roman Montefortino type (see chapter four), but 
without the cheek-guards, suggesting a metal-weight of c. 700g.  For the maximum case, c. 
1,200g corresponds to a higher quality Montefortino, but again without cheek-guards, as the 
Iberian variants appear not to have them.  For the Celtiberians, metal helmets arrive later and 
appear far less frequently, so it seems prudent to assign a helmet only to the maximum case; 
thus, c. 1,200g, corresponding, as with the previous example, to a higher quality Montefortino 
type helmet, seems reasonable. 
In terms of body armor, a similar situation holds.  Evidence for elite metal body-armor 
first appears in the sixth century, including rare finds of metal breastplates in the North of 
Spain.240  More notably in this period, both in the Levante and the eastern Meseta, both 
representational and archaeological evidence emerges for an armor made of copper-alloy discs 
                                                 
238 Paddock (1993), 513-5.  In particular, Paddock describes these local variants as being of inferior quality. 
239 Quesada Sanz (1997b), 571. 
240 Quesada Sanz (1997b), 577, 583. 
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(fig, cat. I28).241  These discs were suspended in a harness of metal chains or leather strips, 
typically with front and back plates, along with smaller discs protecting the shoulders and upper-
thighs (discs: cat. I25-I27; complete harness I28).  A complete harness of this sort could be a 
considerable investment; a pair of circular front and back plates at MAN Madrid (cat. I25 and 
I26) mass 470g a piece, while a single smaller disc, possibly a shoulder- or thigh-guard (cat. I27) 
masses 140g.  A complete harness might then require c. 2.2kg of copper-alloy.242  However, 
along with the early experiments in metal helmets, evidence for such disc-harness armors 
disappears by the third century, with the possible exception of the circular disc pectoral found at 
Numantia (cat. I24), which could potentially be of either Iberian or Italian origin.243  Instead, the 
representational evidence suggests that body-armor in Spain at the beginning of Roman military 
activity there consisted primarily of textile or other organic material; the exact nature of these 
organic material armors is unclear as they are not preserved archaeologically.244  Strabo, 
however, seems to confirm the representational evidence, as he notes that the most common 
armor among the Lusitani was a linothorax, presumably meaning not the Greek model of textile 
armor (which does not appear in the representational evidence), but instead indicating the use of 
textile or organic-material armor more generally.245 
 
                                                 
241 Quesada Sanz (1997b), 572-7.  Quesada Sanz (2000), 159-165. 
242 This assumes front and back discs at c. 500g, and 6 secondary discs, each at c. 200g. 
243 Notably, both the Italic and Spanish traditions of disc-pectorals worn in harnesses would have disappeared 
centuries prior to the apparent context of the Numantia pectoral.   Given the style of decoration on the Numantia 
pectoral which consists of circular designs oriented around a central knob (a known motif for the Spanish disc-
harness but not for the Italian pectorals) Spanish origin seems more likely despite the Roman find-context. 
244 Quesada Sanz (1997b), 578-83. 
245 Strabo 3.4.15. 
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Quantitative Analysis I: Pre-State Panoplies 
 Table 6.9 shows the totals for the metal-requirements of each panoply; Roman and 
Macedonian figures are included for reference.246  Although most of the categories used here 
have already been discussed, it is worth noting again that the Celtiberian aristocrat’s panoply -  
included both for completeness and to provide a sense of the absolute upper-limits on the 
military equipment available in Spain - is fundamentally anachronistic to this study, as it 
includes elements (the disc-harness and a large type I copper-alloy shield boss) which had passed 
out of use by the end of the third century when Rome become involved militarily in the region.  
Two observations can immediately be made: first, that the gap between the best equipped and 
worst equipped warriors among pre-state armies is uncommonly large; and second that, overall, 
the armies of the great Mediterranean states were far more expensively equipped on average than 
those of pre-state people, Romans being the most expensively equipped of all. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
246 Equipment included in each reconstruction:  Gallic aristocrat: Spear, two javelins, La Tène sword, oval shield, 
mail armor, helmet.  Gallic warrior (helmet): Spear, two javelins, La Tène sword, oval shield, helmet.  Gallic warrior 
(no helmet): Spear, two javelins, La Tène sword, oval shield.  Celtiberian aristocrat: Spear, soliferreum or pilum, 
sword (Antenna or La Tène), caetra with type I boss, helmet, disc-harness cuirass.  Celtiberian warrior: Spear, 
soliferreum or pilum, sword (antenna or La Tène), caetra with small iron boss, helmet (maximum case only).  
Iberian warrior: Spear, soliferreum or pilum, sword (falcata or La Tène), oval shield, helmet (median and maximum 
case) 
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Table 6.9: Reconstructed metal-weights for Pre-State warriors by type: 
 Minimum 
Case 
Median Case Maximum 
Case 
Gallic aristocrat (helmet, mail armor) 5,023g 6,985g 10,320g 
Gallic warrior (helmet) 1,223g 2,185g 4,370g 
Gallic warrior (no helmet) 723g 1,460g 2,370g 
Celtiberian aristocrat (helmet, disc-harness) 4,875g 5,662g 7,550g 
Celtiberian warrior 975g 1,540g 3,420g 
Iberian warrior 1,045g 2,380g 3,410g 
Roman Heavy Infantry (average, 40% 
loricatus) 
4,279g 6,810g 9,732g 
Macedonian Phalangite 4,106g 5,177g 6,632g 
 
 But it is also important to note the key way in which these two observations are 
intertwined: the difference in overall resource intensity is itself the consequence of the large gap 
between the equipment of the elite and that of the common warrior.  Unlike with the Romans or 
Macedonians, the evidence simply does not allow for confident estimates of how many Gauls 
might be equipped like the aristocrat in the above reconstruction, except that it was clearly very 
few.247   As already noted, military equipment that might server as a marker of elite status, 
particularly mail armor, helmets and pattern-welded swords, is very rare, despite the reasonable 
expectation that elite military equipment tends to be preserved at higher rates.  This observation 
accords with the literary and representational evidence already discussed, which clearly suggests 
that the vast majority of pre-state warriors in Gaul and Spain had very limited armor. 
 This military environment had an important secondary impact, namely that the weaponry 
in both Spain and Gaul seems to have developed primarily to counter lightly armored opponents.  
Both the Iberian and Gallic panoplies strongly favor cutting swords; a strong cut has the 
advantage of rapidly disabling an unarmored opponent (whereas even a lethal wound from a 
thrust may take some time to kill or disable).  To disable an opponent swiftly in this manner is all 
                                                 
247 N. Roymans, Tribal Societies in Northern Gaul: an anthropological perspective (Amsterdam: Universiteit van 
Amsterdam, 1990), 17-45. 
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the more important to a soldier who is himself lightly armored.  But, as noted in the previous 
chapter with reference to the Greek kopis, cutting attacks are far more easily repelled by armor 
than thrusts are.  Thus, most of the pre-state sidearms specialize in a style of strike that is optimal 
against an unarmored foe, but woefully inadequate against an armored one; the primary 
exception, the versatile cut-and-thrust swords of the Meseta, were, of course, the weapons 
swiftly adopted by the Romans.248 
 The same tendency is visible in hafted weapons as well.  The comparison between pre-
state weapons and their counterparts in Italy is instructive.  As discussed in chapter four, 
Roman/Italian hafted weapons had developed variants that seem to have been specialized against 
armor, particularly the long ‘stiletto’ or ‘bodkin’ (type-C) point spearheads and pila with narrow, 
square-pyramidal shaped points.  The pilum itself likely represents an example of an armor- or 
shield-piercing missile weapon, as the weight of the heavy wood haft seems designed to push the 
narrow point and long iron shank through any defensive material.249  In contrast, by far the most 
common shape of tip for both javelins and thrusting spears in both Spain and Gaul is a strong 
mid-ridge with wings in either ‘tear-drop’ shape or a simple oval. 
Of particular note is that Spanish artisans appear to have applied this type of tip to 
adaptations of the Roman pilum, despite this tip being foreign to the Roman weapon being 
imitated.250  The wings of the spear-tip are not structurally critical.  Rather, the weight of the tip 
and the force of impact are carried by the mid-ridge, which is itself structurally an extension of 
the socket and transfers the energy of impact into the haft. Instead, the function of the wings of 
                                                 
248 Quesada Sanz (1997a). 
249 Connolly, “Reconstruction” (2000), 45-6.  
250 Quesada Sanz (1997b),  
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the tip is to deliver a wider wound by broadening the area of impact, thus permitting the target to 
be more rapidly disabled.  However, against an armored target, this shape requires the weapon to 
push aside more of the material of the armor in order to strike the person behind it.  As with 
swords focused on cutting, the very features that make these weapons effective against 
unarmored targets - an ability to inflict broad, rapidly disabling wounds - make them less 
effective against armor. 
 The ancient literary sources treat this design tendency as an inherent flaw (particularly in 
the context of the La Tène sword).  However, it is more appropriate to understand the 
development of pre-state weapons, not as inferior, but as a response to the security environment 
which prevailed in their homelands.251  Although we lack the sources to construct a history of 
these regions in any detail prior to Roman involvement, it is abundantly clear that the pre-state 
peoples of Gaul and Spain were already heavily militarized and politically fragmented and that 
local warfare was endemic.252  As a result, the threat from peers - that is, other lightly armored, 
pre-state peoples - was both high and continual.  In contrast, the threat of Roman intervention 
was effectively a ‘black swan’ threat: highly improbable on any given day, but massive, indeed 
existential, in its potential negative implications.253  Given the continuous military pressure from 
other pre-state neighbors, it would have been an extremely risky move for any one group of 
Gauls, Iberians or Celtiberians, to recalibrate their military material culture in order to meet the 
different sort of threat that armored Roman heavy infantry posed. 
                                                 
251 Plb. 2.30.7-8; Plb. 3.114.1; Liv. 22.46.5; Dionysius 14.10; Tac. Agricola 36. 
252 Brunaux (2004), 37-47; Roymans (1990); Arribas, (1963), 73-87; Castro (1995), 251-276.; Quesada Sanz (2000), 
26-28. 
253 The term ‘black swan’ used this way derives from N. N. Taleb, The Black Swan: the impact of the highly 
improbable (New York: Random House, 2007). 
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 This tendency to design for warfare against local peers is compounded by the nature of 
military material culture itself, both in how it is developed and how it is produced.  In all of these 
societies, the Romans included, weapons are not so much designed as they are adapted and 
experimented with.  This approach is, in no small part, a result of the sort of craft-knowledge 
required; a smith able to produce one sort of sword may lack the experience and knowledge of 
the methods to produce another.  This limitation is most clearly attested for the Roman gladius 
where as noted in the Suda, the Romans were able to copy the shape of the sword, but not its 
method of manufacture.254  The same may be true of the efforts in Spain to copy the Roman 
pilum; as noted above, Spanish-produced pila adopt the socketed joining system and wider, oval-
winged tips common in the hafted weapons that already existed in the Iberian Peninsula.  Such a 
design, a compromise of Roman and Iberian elements, may simply be a consequence of Spanish 
smiths copying the Roman designs as best they could with the skills and techniques they already 
had.  That is not to rule out efforts to develop weapons which would be more effective against 
armor.  The Group IV ‘bayonet type’ Gallic spear-tip discussed above is almost certainly an 
effort to do just this, albeit a clearly transitional form that seems never to have reached final 
expression.   
Even if new weapons could be adapted for use against more heavily armored opponents, 
the decentralized nature of pre-state organization, combined with the expense of producing new 
weapons, made rapid widespread adoption of new weapons extremely difficult.  As a result, the 
development and evolution of weapons among nearly all pre-modern people, with or without the 
state, was typically an evolutionary process that might take centuries to adequately evolve to 
counter new or sudden threats.  Pre-state peoples who suddenly found themselves bordering 
                                                 
254 Suda: μ 302, machaira, which is a fragment of Polybius, see chapter four, n. 42. 
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Roman territory did not have centuries to adapt; in some cases, they did not even have decades.  
The battlefield impact of that sudden shock will be discussed in the following chapter.  For now, 
it is sufficient merely to stress that weapons technology among the pre-state peoples of the 
western Mediterranean was not inferior.  Rather, it had simply adapted to face a specific, local 
kind of threat: other relatively lightly armored pre-state peoples. 
 
 
Quantitative Analysis II: Carthaginian Armies and Pre-State Peoples 
 Because Carthage’s armies were often composite forces, drawn from of many different 
sources of manpower fighting in native style, it is only now that we may return to a discussion of 
the material intensity of Carthaginian armies, this time focusing on the land armies of the Second 
Punic War.  By the fourth century, Carthage’s armies, especially those deployed overseas, were 
predominantly composed of mercenaries.255  These mercenaries seem to have continued to fight 
in their own style and with their own equipment, even when fighting for Carthage.  In Taylor’s 
view, the Montefortino-type helmets found among the Egadi wrecks along with North African 
ballast and amphorae suggest that the Carthaginians were making use of Italian mercenaries at 
this point, with those mercenaries being responsible for bringing the distinctively Italic helmet 
design.256  Livy and Polybius are both explicit that the Spanish and Gallic mercenaries in 
Hannibal’s army on the eve of the Battle of Cannae fought in their own style and with their own 
equipment.257  Iberians, drawn largely from the Carthaginian controlled coastal region, made up 
                                                 
255 On this topic generally, note M. J. Taylor, “Finance, Manpower and the Rise of Rome” (Ph.D. Dissertation, 
University of California, Berkeley, 2015), 40-50. 
256 Taylor (2015), 45-6.  Tusa & Royal (2012).  Burns (2003), 73-5. 
257 Plb. 3.114; Liv. 22.46.2-6. 
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the single largest source of soldiers for the Carthaginian effort in the Second Punic War; Taylor 
estimates that the peak mobilization of Iberians was roughly 75,000, roughly half of the 
Carthaginian army at the height of the war.258 
 Hannibal’s army in Italy provides a useful case-study.  Polybius reports that after 
crossing the Alps, it  numbered 12,000 African infantry, 8,000 Iberian infantry, and 6,000 
cavalry (undifferentiated by type or origin); from here on, the losses to the  African corps were 
made up, at least initially, by Gallic mercenaries from the Po River Valley.259  By the battle of 
the Trebia, Hannibal’s army had absorbed, following Polybius’ numbers, some 14,000 Gallic 
warriors: 9,000 infantry, and 5,000 cavalry.260  At Trasimene, Hannibal’s losses are accounted by 
Polybius at around 1,500, notably most of them Gallic, rather than Iberian or African.261  
Polybius notes that at Cannae Hannibal’s infantry line was about 40,000 strong, but he does not 
break down this figure beyond noting that it includes Iberians, Africans and Gauls. Lazenby 
supposes that by this point there might have been “something like 10,000 Africans and 6,000 
Spaniards left,” which would leave some 24,000 Gauls.262  Thus, to suggest a comparative 
figure, Hannibal’s forces in Italy over the first three years of his campaign in Italy conceivably 
totaled 12,000 Africans, 8,000 Iberians and perhaps 25,000 Gallic infantry, along with around 
11,000 cavalry, roughly half of it Gallic. 
                                                 
258 Taylor (2015), 46-7.  W. Ameling, Karthago: Studien zu Militär, Staat und Gesellschaft (Munich: C. H. 
Beck’sche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1993), 212-3. 
259 Plb. 3.56.4. 
260 Plb. 3.72.2, cf. Plb. 3.56.4.  J. F. Lazenby, Hannibal’s War (Warminster: Aris & Phillips, 1978), 56. 
261 Plb. 3.85.5. 
262 Plb. 3.114.5.  Lazenby (1978), 81. 
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 Using the estimates in this chapter and previous ones, it is possible to reckon the total 
metal intensity of this force.  Both Polybius and Livy note that by the Battle of Cannae Hannibal 
had re-equipped his entire African force (but not the Iberian or Gallic troops) with captured 
Roman arms; thus by Cannae there should be little difference in the resource intensity of the 
Roman and African infantry.263  Carthage’s African troops, like its citizen forces, seem to have 
fought in a phalanx much like hoplites; it is thus a remarkable tribute that by Cannae, Roman 
equipment was deemed sufficiently superior to warrant almost completely replacing the 
Africans’ original arms and armor.264  Notably, the Iberian and Gallic warriors were not similarly 
re-equipped.265  If we assume, then, that Hannibal’s African infantry will have thus matched the 
average metal intensity of the Roman heavy infantry, the median case estimate for the entire 
infantry force Hannibal fielded after crossing the Alps comes to 143,742kg, or roughly 3,190g 
per soldier on average.266  For comparison, the average median figure for the Roman heavy 
infantry at the lowest prevalence for the lorica hamata (one-third) is 6,595g; for a Roman legion, 
including the velites, the average figure would be 4,456g.  The inclusion of Hannibal’s cavalry 
would no doubt raise his per capita metal intensity figure, but not enough to match the Roman 
figures.  Even if all of Hannibal’s African cavalry, including the Numidians, were as heavily 
armed at their Roman counterparts, and his Gallic cavalry contingent were all equipped in mail 
armor, the per capita figure would rise only to 4kg.  In fact the ‘true’ figure must be significantly 
                                                 
263 Plb. 3.114.1.  Liv. 22.46.4. 
264 Plut. Tim. 28.1.  Taylor (2015), 41-5. 
265 Plb. 3.114; Liv. 22.46.2-6. 
266 The Carthaginian African troops are assessed at 6,595g per soldier (the median case for Roman forces one-third 
loricatus); the Iberians at 2,380g (as per the above section) and the Gallic troops split evenly between 2,185g and 
1460g (as per the above section). 
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lower, as we know that the Numidian cavalry at Cannae still fought as light cavalry against the 
Romans.267   
Meanwhile, Hannibal’s army was almost certainly far heavier than the Carthaginian 
armies operating in Spain, which were forced to rely far more on Iberian mercenaries and had 
little opportunity to armor themselves at the Romans’ expense.268  As Taylor has recently argued, 
Carthage’s outlays in the Second Punic War, simply in manpower terms, were a match for Rome 
until the loss of the recruiting grounds in Spain began to drain away Carthage’s own mercenary 
manpower reserves.269  But that wide net in turn diluted the heavy infantry core of the 
Carthaginian army.  In the hands of a military master like Hannibal, this weakness mattered little.  
Indeed, at Cannae the inability of Hannibal’s Gallic and Iberian forces to hold back a Roman 
advance was even incorporated into the battle-plan.270  Everywhere else, however, the Romans 
met with substantially more success than failure, and the Roman qualitative advantage seemed 
quite apparent.  Carthage was the only state to match Rome’s commitment in manpower, but it 
could not do so without sacrificing the quality. 
  
  
                                                 
267 The Numidians at least were almost certainly more lightly equipped, as they fought as lighter skirmish cavalry, 
e.g. Plb. 3.72.9.  Note that this figure also does not account for Hannibal’s light troops, so this total must be 
somewhat inflated on that count as well.  Numidian light cavalry at Cannae: Plb. 3.116. 
268 Taylor (2015), 46-7. 
269 Taylor (2015), 36-50. 
270 Plb. 3.114-5. 
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Figure 6.1: La Tène periodization271 
 
  
                                                 
271 Brunaux and Lambot (1987), 6. 
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Figure 6.2: Peoples of pre-Roman Spain272 
 
  
                                                 
272 Richardson (1996), 11. 
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Figure 6.3: Mondragon Warrior273 
 
 
Figure 6.4: Procession of Warriors from the Gundestrup Cauldron
 
                                                 
273 Brunaux and Lambot (1987), 97. 
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Figure 6.5: La Tène Spear Morphology and Chronology274
 
  
                                                 
274 Brunaux and Rapin (1988), 132. 
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Figure 6.6: Extended La Tène Spearhead Morphology275 
 
                                                 
275 Lejars (2013), 151. 
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Figure 6.7: La Tène Spear-Butts276  Figure 6.8: La Tène  
Spear-Butt Construction277 
 
 
  
                                                 
276 Lejars (2013), 151, fig. 132. 
277 Brunaux and Rapin (1988), 104.  
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Figure 6.9: La Tène Spear-butts, showing ferules (top and lower right)278 
 
  
                                                 
278 Brunaux and Rapin (1988), 106. 
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Figure 6.10: Development of La Tène Swords.  Swords are presented in rough chronological 
order.  Brunaux and Lambot assign swords 1-5 to Early La Tène, 6-9 to Middle La Tène and 10-
12 to Late La Tène.279
 
  
                                                 
279 Brunaux and Lambot (1987), 120-1. 
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Figure 6.11: Structure of a Middle La Tène Sword, along with reference for measurements280
 
                                                 
280 Lejars (2013), 114. 
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Figure 6.12: Blade-Shouldering and Pommel Structure in La Tène Swords281
 
  
                                                 
281 Pleiner (1993), 62-3. 
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Figure 6.13: Scale drawing of cat. G25, G26.282 
 
  
                                                 
282 Lejars (2013), 230. 
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Figure 6.14: Structure of the Gallic oval shield (note also the inclusion of a spearhead and 
butts)283 
 
  
                                                 
283 Brunaux and Rapin (1988), 12. 
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Figure 6.15: Gallic oval shield boss morphology.284
 
  
                                                 
284 Brunaux and Rapin (1988), 78. 
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Figure 6.16: Detail from the Braganza Brooch (British Museum 2001,0501.1)
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Figure 6.17: Military procession from a Fifth Century Scabbard from Hallstatt285
 
  
                                                 
285 Brunaux (1988), 106. 
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Figure 6.18: Chronology and Morphology of La Tène helmets, in iron (top) and bronze 
(bottom).286 
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
286 Schaaff (1988), 294, 316. 
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Figure 6.19: Examples of La Tène helmet forms287
 
 
Figure 6.20: La Tène  helmet construction288 
 
                                                 
287 Connolly (1981), 121. 
288 Schaaff (1988), 300. 
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Figure 6.21: Decorated helmet from Ciumești289
 
  
                                                 
289 Rusu (1969), 269.  
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Figure 6.22: ‘Montefortino’-type La Tène  helmet, cat. G119 
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Figure 6.23: Iberian Panoplies by geographic area and chronological period.290 
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Figure 6.24: Iberian Falcatas from MAN Madrid, from top to bottom, cat. I6, I7, and I9. 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
290 Quesada Sanz (1997b), 619. 
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Figure 6.25: Antenna Sword, cat. I4. 
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Figure 6.26: Structure of the Spanish caetra291 
 
  
                                                 
291 Quesada Sanz (1997b), 490. 
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Figure 6.27: Typology of maniples for the caetra.292 
 
  
                                                 
292 Quesada Sanz (1997b), 498. 
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Figure 6.28: Type IA large Caetra boss (cat. I15.) 
 
Figure 6.29: Type IIA Caetra boss with radial projections (cat. I17) 
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Figure 6.30: Type IIIA small circular iron caetra boss (cat. I16) 
 
 
Figure 6.31: Typology of tips and grips for the soliferreum293 
 
                                                 
293 Quesada Sanz (1997b), 310. 
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Figure 6.32: Folded soliferreum, current configuration (cat. I14) 
 
Figure 6.33: Folded and broken soliferreum, current configuration (cat. I13) 
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CHAPTER SEVEN: MOBILIZATION 
 
 The previous four chapters have laid out a series of reconstructions for the resource 
intensity, measured in metal-weight, of the equipment of many of the soldiers and warriors of the 
third and second century Mediterranean world.  This final chapter makes use of these results in 
two parts.  The first part considers the results of these studies together, engaging in a 
comparative analysis, addressing not only the individual resource intensity implied by the 
preceding reconstructions, but also the implications for armies and maximum deployments.  My 
conclusion is that the Roman Republic comprehensively out-mobilized its rivals, deploying not 
only more men, but also more economic resources in the form of equipment.  Combined with the 
analysis of other sources of cost such as logistics (see chapter three) it appears quite clearly that 
the Romans were able, and in fact did, dedicate far more resources to warfare during this period 
than any rival. 
 The second part of this chapter seeks to explain Roman success by analyzing the basic 
principles underlying the mobilization systems employed by the great powers and pre-state 
peoples of the Mediterranean.  The two predominant systems of mobilization employed by 
Rome’s rivals were either an ‘extract and pay’ system, in which revenues extracted from subject 
peoples were used to pay the armies subjugating them, or narrow, ethnically restricted 
entitlement-based systems of recruitment.  The former system could be expanded to cover large 
territories of diverse peoples, but was brittle and suffered both from high administrative overhead 
and the resistance of subject peoples.  The latter system, while very intensive, proved extremely 
difficult to expand to include new peoples or territories.   Finally, the Roman system is 
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considered.  At its core, this was an entitlement-based system, but by utilizing the cultural 
institutions of Italy, it was able to scale massively by incorporating communities as allies.  Such 
a system allowed Rome to mobilize a large area with little administrative overhead, thereby 
creating a substantial and indeed decisive advantage. 
 
Comparative Analysis 
 It is worth gathering and summarizing the preceding reconstructions before embarking on 
a comparative analysis.  A selection of the reconstructed metal-weights for infantry panoplies is 
presented in Table 7.1, ordered from lightest to heaviest in the median case.  It should be noted 
that, of the examples shown below, the Roman veles is the only dedicated light missile 
infantryman.  The sources do not allow for any confident reconstruction of other types of 
skirmish infantry, although as discussed in previous chapters, the limited evidence suggests that 
they would be just as light, if not lighter, than the velites.  The more heavily equipped 
Macedonian hegemones of the front line are included in the figures for the peltasts and 
phalangites, since the armored front-line hegemones were an organic part of the speira or 
syntagma, the basic tactical unit of organization.1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 Sekunda (2013), 90-1.  Hatzopoulos (2001), 76-80. 
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 It is further illuminating to break down these figures between offensive and defensive 
equipment; this is done for the median cases of the previous table in Table 7.2.  Defensive 
equipment in this case includes not only armor but also shields. This exercise reveals that the 
increase in metal-weight from one panoply to the next is primarily motivated by increases in 
defensive, rather than offensive, equipment.  Indeed, offensive equipment varies within a 
relatively narrow range; with only one outlier, each panoply carried between 1.2 and 1.7kg of 
offensive armaments.  The most metal-intensive weapons belong to the Macedonian sarisa-
infantry, on account of the substantial weight of the butt-spike required to balance the great 
length of the sarisa.  But this difference is dwarfed by the variation in defensive equipment, 
ranging from only a few hundred grams of metal in some cases up to nearly 7.5kg.  Put another 
way, the most metal-intensive offensive equipment set is a little less than twice as metal 
intensive as the least, whereas for defensive equipment, the most metal intensive is a little more 
than 45 times more metal intensive than the least. 
 
 
 
 
Table 7.1: Comparison of Metal Intensity of Select Types of Infantry by Median Weight 
 Minimum  Median  Maximum  
Gallic Warrior (no helmet) 723g 1,460g 2,370g 
Veles 1,320g 1,470g 1,790g 
Celtiberian Warrior 975g 1,540g 3,420g 
Thureophoros 1,534g 2,136g 2,980g 
Gallic warrior (helmet) 1,223g 2,185g 4,370g 
Iberian warrior 1,045g 2,380g 3,410g 
Peltast (average, inc. hegemones) 3,326g 4,219g 5,419g 
Phalangite (average, inc. hegemones) 4,106g 5,177g 6,632g 
Hastatus/Princeps 3,090g 5,595g 8,485g 
Gallic aristocrat 5,023g 6,985g 10,320g 
Hastatus/Princeps, loricatus 6,240g 8,815g 11,885g 
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Table 7.2: Breakdown by Equipment Type in the Median Case 
 Total Offensive Defensive 
Gallic Warrior (no helmet) 1,460g 1,240g 85% 220g 15% 
Veles 1,470g 1,310g 89% 160g 11% 
Celtiberian Warrior 1,540g 1,340g 87% 200g 13% 
Thureophoros 2,136g 890g 42% 1,246g 58% 
Gallic warrior (helmet) 2,185g 1,240g 57% 945g 43% 
Iberian warrior 2,380g 1,460g 61% 920g 49% 
Peltast (average, incl. hegemones) 4,219g 1,657g 39% 2,562g 61% 
Phalangite (average, incl. hegemones) 5,177g 1,657g 32% 3,520g 68% 
Hastatus/Princeps 5,595g 1,345g 24% 4,250g 76% 
Gallic aristocrat 6,985g 1,240g 18% 5,745g 82% 
Hastatus/Princeps, loricatus 8,815g 1,345g 15% 7,470g 85% 
 
 
The Roman superiority in metal-intensity principally provides substantially greater 
protection.  Rome’s propensity toward heavier armor fits well within the pre-Roman tradition in 
Italy of favoring heavier protection.  As Snodgrass notes, heavier forms of armor persisted 
among the Greeks of Southern Italy long after they became rare in Greece proper.2  Likewise, 
iconographic evidence suggests that when the linothorax was adopted in Italy, particularly in 
Etruria, it was often substantially reinforced by metal scales and plates.  Aldrete notes that metal 
scale reinforcement is roughly twice as common on Etruscan representations as on Greek and 
Hellenistic ones, and also that it often covered far more of the armor as well.3  Italian helmets, as 
already discussed, also remained thicker and heavier; the trend towards lightness visible in Greek 
helmets beginning as early as the sixth century does not take hold of the Roman Montefortino 
helmet until the end of the second.4  The Roman predilection for greater amounts of protection 
thus seems to be a continuation of the Italian military tradition of the previous centuries.  More 
                                                 
2 Snodgrass (1967), 128-9.  Everson (2004), 112, 144. 
3 Aldrete et al. (2013), 51-5. 
4 Jarva (1993), 134.  Paddock (1993), 66, 801-2. 
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broadly, one might suppose that the Roman citizen-soldier, responsible for providing his own 
equipment, might have placed a higher value on his own survival than the value placed by a 
Hellenistic king on the life of one of his phalangites.  For both reasons, Rome was uniquely well-
placed to take advantage of new armor technology, such as mail. 
 Given then that Roman soldiers were altogether more heavily and expensively equipped 
than their contemporaries, we might expect Rome to have fielded fewer of them, but the opposite 
is the case.  Taylor, in a recent study of military manpower in the third and second centuries, 
estimates peak Antigonid mobilization at c. 45,000 troops, including garrison troops.5  The size 
of the Seleucid army is harder to guess, but Taylor figures c. 90,000 troops, with roughly 20,000 
of them garrison troops.6  The Ptolemaic army, judging from the deployment at Raphia, appears 
to have been roughly the same size as the Seleucid, though also heavily tied down by the need to 
garrison Egypt itself against native unrest.7  Fischer-Bovet suggests that maximum-effort land 
forces of the Ptolemies might total at most some 90-95,000 compared to 90-110,000 for the 
Seleucids, with roughly 20,000 of each figure tied up in garrisons; in peacetime, the figures drop 
to c. 50-55,000 and c. 70-75,000 respectively.8  In contrast, Brunt estimates that between 200 and 
168, Rome’s lowest mobilization was 82,900 soldiers and the highest a staggering 182,400.9  
Taylor’s figures for the same are somewhat more conservative, ranging from 70,000 to 
                                                 
5 Taylor (2015), 53-4.  See also Hatzopoulos (2001), 36-8, 68-9, 75; Sekunda (2013), 114-9. 
6 Taylor (2015), 83-4.  See also Bar-Kochva (1976), 168-9. 
7 Taylor (2015), 66-77.  Plb. 5.65, 79-87. 
8 Fischer-Bovet (2014), 76.  Fischer-Bovet also includes figures for the crew of Ptolemaic and Seleucid fleets, which 
I have excluded here to provide comparable numbers.  The maximum figures for both fleets are soundly dwarfed by 
the size of Roman and Carthaginian navies, see chapter 2. 
9 Brunt (1971), 424. 
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175,000.10  Indeed, between 200 and 168, Taylor’s figures produce an average annual Roman 
mobilization of 110,000, higher than the peak mobilization of any of the Hellenistic states.11  As 
Taylor argues, the only ancient state able to match such figures was third century Carthage, but, 
as noted in chapter six, Carthage was forced to compromise heavily on quality in order to do 
so.12 
 It is worth also putting these figures into perspective by discussing the mobilization of 
equipment in individual years or for individual deployments.  Hannibal’s infantry force for the 
first three years in Italy, it may be recalled from chapter six, had an estimated metal requirement 
of 143,742kg; accounting for his cavalry yields an upper-bound figure of c.224,000kg (roughly 
246 tons).13  In contrast, the metal intensity of the massive Roman army at Cannae alone was on 
the order of c. 320,000kg (353 tons) of worked metal.14  Even allowing for the forces Hannibal 
lost crossing the Alps, it is unlikely that the total worked metal carried by his force approached 
this Roman figure, much less a figure which includes all of the Roman forces he faced during 
those initial three years.15 
                                                 
10 Taylor (2015), 18-9. 
11 If Taylor’s figures to 218 are included, the average mobilization rises to 116,000. 
12 Taylor (2015), 36-50. 
13 As noted in chapter six, this figure, which assumes c. 4kg of worked metal per soldier, is an upper-bound figure, 
as it assumes that all of Hannibal’s cavalry was mailed heavy cavalry; the Numidians at the very least were not (Plb. 
3.72.9, 3.116), but Polybius’ account does not allow for a detailed breakdown of Hannibal’s cavalry by type. 
14 Following Polybius 3.107.9-14.  Liv. 22.36.1-5 suggests the army might have been smaller, with just two 
additional legions, rather than four.  The metal-weight estimate here assumes only 33% of Romans wore the lorica 
hamata, rather than 40% as in the other examples, to account for this battle being chronologically earlier, at a time 
when the lorica hamata was likely not as widespread.  The precise calculation results in a figure of 320,796.8kg, but 
I have opted in this case to round heavily to avoid the misleading appearance of excess certainty. 
15 Estimating the metal-requirements of Hannibal’s army prior to crossing the Alps is complicated by the lack of 
information as to the nature and extent of the equipment typically carried by his African troops.  We may safely 
assume it was rather less than what the Romans were equipped with, as Hannibal made a point of re-equipping his 
Africans in Roman fashion, Plb. 3.114; Liv. 22.46.4.  Polybius does report that Hannibal started from the Rhone 
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The same exercise can be equally illuminating when applied to the peak mobilizations of 
the Hellenistic great powers.  Following the metal-weight estimates in chapter four, the metal 
requirements of the peak Antigonid mobilization at Citium in 197 can be estimated around 
174,009kg (192 tons) of worked metal.16  For Rome, 197 was one of the least mobilized years in 
decades, with only six legions deployed; nevertheless the metal requirements of those six legions 
and associated socii might conservatively total some 246,780kg (272 tons).17  The massive 
Seleucid army at Magnesia, which likely represented more than three-quarters of the total 
Seleucid strength, required an even more formidable total of some 248,905kg of worked metal 
(274 tons).18  For comparison, the Romans had an astonishing 13 legions active in 190, with 
consular armies in Greece and Italy and separate commands in Liguria (to be moved to Apulia 
and Bruttium), Aetolia, Sicily, Tuscany, Spain and Sardinia.19  The total metal requirements of 
these legions and their associated allied forces amount to 534,690kg of worked metal; if Rome’s 
non-Italian allies at Magnesia are included, the total increases to 579,827kg (639 tons).20  In 
                                                 
with 38,000 infantry and 8,000 cavalry, and arrived in Italy with 12,000 African infantry, 8,000 Iberian infantry and 
6,000 cavalry; he does not specify how many of those lost in the passes were Iberian or African.  Plb. 3.56.4, 60.1-5. 
16 For an army consisting of 21,000 phalangites, 5,000 peltasts, 4,000 Hellenistic cavalry, 3,000 Thracians (assessed 
as thureophoroi, but with an additional 1kg of worked metal to account for the rhomphaia), 2,000 Odrysian and 
Greek thureophoroi, 2,000 Gallic warriors and 3,000 light troops, for a total force of 40,000.  Liv. 45.51; Sekunda 
(2013), 114-9. 
17 This assumes that the legions were only 40% loricatus and had a matching allied force of the same size.  In fact, 
both Taylor and Brunt assume a significantly larger allied force in that year, so this figure is almost certainly an 
undercount.  Taylor (2015), 18.  Brunt (1971), 424.   
18 Following Bar-Kochva (1976), 168-9, I have assumed 16,000 regular phalangites, 10,000 argyraspides (also 
phalangites), 2,000 Hellenistic cavalry, 6,000 cataphracts, 5,000 Gallic infantry and 2,500 mailed Gallic cavalry; the 
remainder of the infantry seems to have been very light skirmishing troops.  Liv. 37.40; App. Syr. 32. 
19 Liv. 37.2.1-10. Brunt (1971), 424.  Taylor (2015), 18.  Rome and the Seleucids also had active fleets in that year, 
with the Roman fleet, supplemented by allied forces, being larger. 
20 Assuming the legions were only 40% loricatus and that allied forces, again, were only matching in size.  Brunt 
(1971), 424 suggests 110,900 allies for only 71,500 legion troops; for Taylor (2015), 18, the figures are 71,500 and 
105,000 respectively. 
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short, the Romans mobilized vastly more worked metal equipment than their rivals, to the point 
of more than doubling the metal requirements of the peak mobilization of the largest Hellenistic 
state, the Seleucids. 
 The Roman advantage in worked metal could be offset, to a degree, by the willingness of 
Hellenistic kings to concentrate nearly all of their field forces for a single battle.  The Roman 
forces at Pydna would have required only 102,825kg of worked metal, while the Roman and 
allied force at Magnesia might only have brought 127,396kg; those totals are lower than those 
for the armies they were directly facing.21  Nevertheless, it is worth remembering that smaller 
Roman forces were victorious in most of the major engagements against Hellenistic armies, 
while still being a relatively small fraction of total Roman forces.  Indeed, at Magnesia the 
Seleucid effort to field a very large army, at the cost of the average quality of forces deployed, 
seems to have been one of the major factors contributing to defeat, as the light troops on the 
Seleucid left collapsed at the outset of the battle and exposed the phalanx to envelopment.22  
Such concentrations also carried another danger: with nearly the entire field army in one place, a 
disaster such as Cynoscephalae, Magnesia or Pydna was nearly impossible to recover from in the 
short term, because a defeated Hellenistic king lacked sufficient forces to fall back on.  Yet 
against Roman armies, Hellenistic kings had little choice but to concentrate nearly all of their 
forces and hope for the best. 
 It is necessary to reiterate that this Roman advantage in matériel did not mean that 
Roman armies would win every battle or that Roman victory was preordained.  As Cannae 
                                                 
21 Pydna: Liv. 44.21.2; Brunt (1971), 424.  Magnesia: Liv 37.39.7-12.  The Roman force at Magnesia consisted of 
two over-strength legions and matching numbers of socii, along with 3,000 allied peltasts from Eumenes and the 
Achaeans, along with 800 Greek cavalry and roughly 2,300 Roman cavalry, 2,200 deployed with the Greek cavalry 
on the right as well as 4 turmae (roughly 120 horse) on the left. 
22 Liv. 37.42.  App. Syr. 34. 
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confirms quite clearly, better equipment in itself gave no certainty of victory in battle.  However, 
as the previous chapters have endeavored to show, Rome’s matériel preponderance did produce 
significant battlefield advantages.  Of particular note is the edge supplied by Rome’s increasingly 
widespread use of mail armor. It made all the more impact because Rome’s armies were the first 
to deploy such armor on a large scale.  As a result, Rome’s adversaries generally did not yet use 
many weapons which could effectively defeat mail.  Likewise, as discussed, the pilum, a metal-
intensive, disposable and armor-piercing throwing weapon, was quite successful, judging by 
efforts to adopt it in both Gaul and Spain.  Nevertheless, Rome’s most decisive edge over the 
other peoples and states of the Mediterranean was not individual well-equipped armies, but the 
strategic depth provided by the ability to field a multitude of such armies without compromising 
their quality.  It has long been observed that Rome could field more soldiers; the clearest 
conclusion from the preceding chapters is that these soldiers were also more expensively 
equipped.  This observation leads in turn to an inescapable conclusion: Rome comprehensively 
out-mobilized the other states and peoples of the Mediterranean, not only in manpower, but also 
in economic resources. 
 This conclusion returns us to the question of the source of the exceptional Roman 
mobilizations which in turn enabled Roman 
success in this period.  My analysis so far has 
been focused on the steady elimination of 
possibilities. My first chapter laid out some of 
the key ways in which Rome was not 
exceptional: Rome was not exceptionally 
aggressive or bellicose, nor exceptionally large 
Table 7.3: Estimated annual revenues for 
the Mediterranean Great Powers in 
millions of Attic drachmai in the Early 
Second Century (Taylor 2015) 
 Peak 
Revenues 
Trough 
Revenues 
Ptolemaic 
Kingdom 
72 35 
Seleucid 
Kingdom 
60 40 
Carthage 12 9 
Rome 13 3-4 
Antigonid 
Macedon 
12 8 
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or populous.  To these limitations we may now add that Rome was not exceptionally rich, 
especially at the level of state finance.  In a comparative study of the admittedly limited evidence 
for the finances of the great states of the Mediterranean in this period, Taylor notes that Rome’s 
own state finance apparatus was rather weak, on a par with Antigonid Macedon, and woefully 
outmatched by the Seleucid and Ptolemaic kingdoms (see table 7.3).23   Moreover, the returns 
from Rome’s campaigns were insufficient in the short term to repay the tremendous cost of 
Rome’s military activities in the third and second centuries; Rome’s wars outside of Italy did not, 
in fact, feed themselves.24 
 The reconstructions of chapters four, five and six have endeavored to show also that this 
Roman mobilization advantage cannot simply be attributed, as Sekunda has suggested, to the 
Roman “ability to conscript horde after uncomplaining horde of Italian peasant manpower.”25  
As discussed in chapter three, the production of staggeringly vast quantities of worked metal 
equipment required a society to dedicate significant raw material resources, along with skilled 
labor.  Legions of peasants were necessary, but not sufficient.  Legions of smiths, miners, 
foresters, smelters and other craftsmen, as well as their equipment and the agricultural surplus to 
provision them, were also necessary.  Rather than being cheap and uncomplaining, Roman 
soldiers were expensive to equip and to supply; they also had substantial latitude for complaining 
(see below).  Roman armies were thus not easier to field in quantity, but in fact harder; and yet 
Rome did field them in quantity.  The mere existence of the Italian peasantry is thus insufficient 
to explain Rome’s tremendous advantage in mobilized resources.  Instead, the answer to this 
                                                 
23 Taylor, (2015), 107-187. 
24 M. J. Taylor, “State Finance in the Middle Roman Republic: A Reevaluation” AJP 138.1 (2017): 143-180. 
25 N. Sekunda, “Hellenistic Warfare” in Warfare in the Ancient World, ed. J. Hackett (London: Sidgwick & Jackson 
Ltd., 1989), 133. 
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quandary must be found in the mobilization systems themselves of the great states and pre-state 
peoples of the Mediterranean. 
 
Mobilization Systems 
 As discussed in the first chapter, the problem of mobilization was to extract the necessary 
resources from the (primarily agricultural) underlying economy in order to produce military 
force.  Resources in this case can mean both manpower, which must be removed from the 
economy through recruitment, as well as supplies and equipment, which must be produced by the 
underlying economy.  The systems for extracting and directing this agricultural surplus could 
also themselves impose additional costs, such as the cost of maintaining administrators and tax 
collectors, as well as the cost of managing resistance to resource extraction.  It is not my intent 
here to give a complete reckoning of all the complexities of the mobilization systems of 
Mediterranean states, but rather to describe their primary operating principles in order to provide 
a contrast with the Roman system. 
 
Engines of Force – Revenue Extraction and Professional Armies 
 One option for resource mobilization was an ‘extract and pay’ system, where the state 
uses military force to extract revenue which is in turn used to maintain and expand that military 
force.  For example, Aperghis describes the chief function of the Seleucid state: “an army was 
maintained in order to exact tribute and fed off the process of this tribute.”26  Carlos Noreña, 
                                                 
26 Aperghis (2004), 189.  Note also Eckstein (2006), 82-90 and Billows (1995), 20-3 on the essentially military 
nature of Hellenistic monarchy. 
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speaking of the Roman Empire, describes this relationship as a “military-tributary complex.”27  
The two tasks, the extraction of revenue and the raising of armies, were deeply interconnected 
because these states relied on armies of soldiers serving under the vocation principle, that is, 
primarily for pay or land grants, in order to extract further revenue and maintain state control.28  
The separation of the state apparatus that extracted and spent surplus from the population that 
generated it was in turn made all the more pronounced by a strong ethnic distinction between the 
two.29  This interaction seems to have defined the mobilization systems of the Seleucid, 
Ptolemaic states, and formed part of a ‘hybrid’ system employed by Carthage and, to a lesser 
extent, Antigonid Macedon.30 
 Paying for military force in this manner was expensive.  The going rate for service in the 
eastern Mediterranean in the time of Antiochos III seems to have been around 1 drachma per 
day; an ostracon from third-century Babylon seem to confirm this figure as a good rough 
approximation of the pay of Seleucid soldiers.31  Such a figure likely did not include a normal 
daily ration allowance of roughly 2 obols, making the gross pay of a Seleucid soldier c. 8 obols 
(1 drachma, 2 obols).  The pay rate in Ptolemaic Egypt seems to have been roughly the same 
when differences in the weight of currency are accounted for (a standard rate around 9 Ptolemaic 
                                                 
27 C. Noreña, “Urban Systems in the Han and Roman Empires” in State Power in Ancient China and Rome, ed. W. 
Scheidel (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 201. 
28 On the ‘vocational principle,’ see Landers (2003), 285-7. 
29 The ‘Macedonian’ character of Seleucid and Ptolemaic armies has been discussed in more detail in chapter five. 
30 For this characterization of the Carthaginian system as a hybrid one: on the primacy of mercenaries note Plb. 1.71-
2, 6.52.4.  Ameling (1993), 183-223.  Carthage did maintain some citizen forces, Hoyos (2010), 153-5, 189-92.  
Some of Carthage’s forces were also recruited through horizonal ties among elites, note esp. Plb. 1.78.1-9, where 
Hamilcar’s personal relationship with Naravas, a leading Numidian, nets him 2,000 cavalry.  Likewise, note the 
marriage alliance between Hasdrubal Gisgo and Syphax, Liv. 29.23. 
31 Aperghis (2004), 200-3.  Taylor (2015), 177-8. 
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obols being roughly equal to one Attic drachma), with food supplied directly from royal 
reserves.32  In comparison, Polybius places the pay of Roman soldiers at only 2 obols per day, 
out of which their food was deducted.33  In a very real sense, the Roman soldier was also paid in 
non-monetary goods: status and a voice in the running of the Republic, along with a package of 
socially underwritten rights.34   
 As a result of the high cost of maintaining soldiers on the vocation principle, the state-
military revenue extraction apparatus was extremely expensive, to the point that it consumed a 
significant part of that revenue as a form of overhead.  The Seleucid system makes an effective 
example.  The Seleucid army may have cost somewhere between 40 and 70 million drachmae 
annually, depending on the level of military activity, against a state revenue of perhaps only 60 
million drachmae at the highest (see table 7.3).35  In addition, the administration necessary to 
collect the taxes themselves incurred additional expenses.  Aperghis estimates the cost of satrapal 
administration roughly between 2,000 and 3,000 talents (12 million to 18 million drachmae) 
                                                 
32 Taylor (2015), 169-70.  Fischer-Bovet (2014), 73-5.  W. Clarysse and E. Lanciers, “Currency and the Dating of 
Demotic and Greek Papyri from the Ptolemaic Period,” Ancient Society 20 (1989): 117-132. 
33 Plb. 6.39.12.  Polybius has, of course, converted from Roman currency units.  The actual pay was probably 3 or 
3.5 asses.  M. H. Crawford, Coinage and Money under the Roman Republic: Italy and the Mediterranean Economy 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), 146-51. Note also Plaut. Mostellaria 357, where the pay of Roman 
soldiers is said to be tres nummi and Plut. Tiberius Gracchus 13. 
34 Landers (2003), 285, refers to this sort of system as recruitment based on ‘entitlement’ in contrast to the 
‘vocational principle’ of professional, paid soldiers. 
35 Aperghis (2004), 205; Taylor (2013), 175-9.  Aperghis suggests that the Seleucid military (including the navy) 
might cost between 7,000 and 10,000 silver talents (42 and 60 million drachmae) per year.  Taylor argues that 
Aperghis has overestimated Seleucid revenues and estimates, that during periods of peak deployment, the cost of the 
Seleucid military might amount to 70 million drachmae, compared to only 60 million in revenue, with years of high 
military intensity made up for by surplus revenue in years of peace. 
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annually.36  Thus even in peacetime, the apparatus for the extraction of tribute could be said to 
cost more than 50 million drachmae.  The cost of revenue extraction consumed the great 
majority of all the revenue so extracted, providing little room for military expansion or rapid 
recovery without spending down treasury reserves.  Ptolemaic revenues were greater, but so 
were the costs of the Ptolemaic army.  Moreover, the Ptolemaic administration was, if anything, 
larger and more complex than the Seleucid, with fewer functions devolved on to local 
communities.37 
 The advantage of such a system is that it can be readily expanded through military 
conquest, by imposing new tribute obligations on conquered peoples to support continued 
military activity.  But, as noted, as the state expands, the military and administrative overhead of 
the system increasingly consumes the additional revenue, resulting in an overall loss of 
efficiency.  Moreover, the system is fundamentally brittle.  The state was reliant on force, rather 
than some form of domestic legitimacy with which to motivate collective action (what we might 
term ‘power’ in contrast to force) in order to raise force or to extract revenue.  Hence, the loss or 
demobilization of the army could produce a spiral of instability and fragmentation.38  Likewise, 
expanding the military’s resource base to include subject peoples weakens the control of the 
                                                 
36 Aperghis (2004), 205-6; Aperghis’ figure excludes the pay of the garrisons themselves, which are included under 
the rubric of army costs.  Note also Sherwin-White and Kuhrt (1993), 48-51. 
37 On the cost of the Ptolemaic military, see Fischer-Bovet (2013), 73-4.  Taylor (2015), 163-74.  Fischer-Bovet 
estimates the Egyptian military expenses as 10,200 to 13,400 talents during wartime and around half that figure 
during peacetime, while Taylor estimates that military expenditures during wartime might be around 90 million 
drachmae (15,000 talents) and 40 million (c. 6,660 talents). 
38 The steady disintegration of the Seleucid empire, albeit under Parthian and Roman pressure, seems to follow this 
pattern.  Sherwin-White and Kuhrt (1993), 217-28.  In presenting power and violence (or ‘force’) as opposed 
principles, I follow H. Arendt, On Violence (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1969).  In using the term ‘force’ 
over the more specific ‘violence,’ I am following Wayne Lee, pers. correspondence.    
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state, and can result in the same instability.39  In both cases, military and financial weakness 
creates further weakness, because it disrupts the fundamental engine of state power whereby 
military force is used to raise revenue to fund further military force. 
 
Problems of Scale – The Antigonids and Pre-State Peoples 
 Antigonid Macedon’s mobilization system was effectively a hybrid, but with the largest 
share of the state’s resources arising out of the Macedonian core, rather than the subject 
periphery.  As noted in chapter five, the largest part of the Antigonid as were the Macedonians 
themselves, who served as part-time, rather than professional, soldiers.40  Soldiers were levied by 
conscription from their local communities and assigned to units based on wealth classifications.41  
Although far from being civic participants like Roman citizen-soldiers, the Macedonian soldiers 
were more integrated into the Antigonid political system than the Seleucid or Ptolemaic ones.42  
Macedonians in the Antigonid army were paid, but the evidence suggests a wage of 4 obols per 
                                                 
39 The example of this par excellence is the instability suffered by the Ptolemaic state after Raphia, Plb. 5.107.1-3.  
Fischer-Bovet (2013), 88-98 seeks instead to classify the Great Revolt more as an example of instability as a result 
of demobilization and fiscal failure.  In either case, the fundamental brittleness of the system’s reliance on military 
power is clear.  There is also debate as to the degree to which the core Seleucid territories were demilitarized for this 
reason.  Cf. Bar-Kochva (1976), 20-48; Sherwin-White and Kuhrt (1993), 53-6; Aperghis (2004), 193-7.  In my 
view, the treatment of the core of the Seleucid army as fundamentally Greek and Macedonian in the sources 
(particularly by Polybius, Livy and, to an extent, Appian) is too strong to ignore. 
40 Thus, the dismissal of troops for the winter, e.g. Plb. 4.87.13.   
41 Sekunda (2013), 102-5. 
42 Taylor (2015), 58-9.  Right to petition the king: Plb. 5.27.5-6.  On soldiers’ assemblies and their limited role in the 
acclamation of new kings, note E. M. Anson, “Macedonia’s Alleged Constitutionalism” CJ 80.4 (1985): 303-316; E. 
M. Anson, “The Evolution of the Macedonian Army Assembly (330-315 B.C.)” Historia 40.2 (1991): 230-247.  
Anson contends, convincingly, that the influence of the soldiers’ assemblies was a product of Alexander’s 
campaigns, and that this influence peaked in the immediate aftermath of his death and the early wars of the 
diadochoi, only to fade again, remaining most potent in the Antigonid state.  For examples of the system under 
Alexander, note esp. Arr. Anabasis 5.25.-29, 7.8.1-7.11.9. 
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day, somewhat below the ‘going rate’ for mercenaries.43  This lower pay may have been due to 
the relative poverty of the Antigonid state, but it may also have represented a benefit of the rather 
closer relationship between the king and the army.  The bulk of the phalanx thus appears to have 
been closer to an ethnic or ‘national’ militia than a professional force. 
Onto this ethnically Macedonian core were grafted considerable numbers of mercenaries, 
as discussed in chapter five, who needed to be paid.  The Antigonids seem to have raised some 
revenue by direct taxation of their Macedonian subjects, along the lines of Roman tributum; Livy 
even calls it such.44  Further revenue was generated from mining, timber and royal estates, 
although it is difficult to put a precise figure on how much.45  But to increase revenue further was 
difficult.  Superficially, Antigonid-controlled Greece resembled Roman-dominated Italy, but in 
practice the structures of Antigonid control and Greek culture made few opportunities for 
developing that control into a source of resources for further warfare.  Extracting any revenue or 
resources from the Greek poleis to the south required expensive continual garrisons, the ‘fetters 
of Greece.’46  Further resources were drained away by active and often violent Greek resistance 
to Antigonid control, which in turn required repeated military interventions.  At the same time, 
the poleis of Greece proper were often able to use the system of honors and euergetism to limit 
the degree to which resources could be extracted from them, essentially trading honors for a 
degree of autonomy and royal benefaction.47  The problem thus faced by the Antigonid kingdom 
                                                 
43 Sekunda (2013), 106-7. 
44 Plut. Aem. 28.6.  Liv. 45.18.7. 
45 Diodorus. 16.8.6 reports the income to Philip II from the mines to have been 1,000 talents; it is by no means clear 
how reliable this figure is. 
46 Plb. 18.45.5-6. 
47 Billows (1995), 70-80. 
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was not necessarily a lack of military resources – unsupported Greek efforts to expel Antigonid 
influence generally failed – but the lack of a viable social script whereby Antigonid domination 
could allow for the extraction of military resources.  Without the ability to meaningfully scale up 
the resource base to cover Greece, Antigonid Macedon simply lacked the resources to compete 
with the other great powers, much less Rome. 
Problems of scale also limited the ability of pre-state peoples to compete, although the 
intensive nature of entitlement-based recruitment frequently allowed such peoples to threaten 
larger, more established neighbors.  Gallic organization provides a good, brief case-study to 
illustrate the major mechanisms, as we are rather better informed about the Gauls than most other 
pre-state peoples of the period.48  Gallic military organization seems largely to have followed the 
broader social organization.  The ties that bound individuals to serve militarily were largely 
personal, rather than institutional, which is to say that warriors fought because their family, clan, 
village or patron fought.49  Direct personal ties seem to have been particularly important, both 
the vertical ties between poorer members of the community and the aristocracy, and horizontal 
ties between aristocrats.50  Such a system was based on personal ties and legitimacy, on power 
rather than force.  As a result, this system could potentially mobilize resources much more 
                                                 
48 On the systems of pre-state peoples generally, note Gat (2006), 210-4. 
49 N. Roymans, Tribal Societies in Northern Gaul: An Anthropological Perspective (Amsterdam: Universiteit van 
Amsterdam, 1990), 17-48; Brunaux (2004), 40-7; Brunaux (1986), 107-8. These ties occur frequently in Caesar, e.g. 
Caesar B.G.  2.14.2, 4.3.4, 6.10.1, 6.13.1-3, 6.15.1-2, 8.23.5, typically using the equivalent Roman terminology (e.g. 
cliens, familia, etc)  
50 E.g. Polybius and Caesar on the importance of personal retinues: Plb. 2.17.12; Caesar B.G.6.15.1-2.  Patronage 
networks among elites, Caesar, B.G.1.4, 6.12.  Note also Roymans (1990), 39-40. 
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intensively, with very limited administrative overhead; the problem was that the power in 
question was personal, and thus both transitory and difficult to scale upwards. 
Moreover, the very nature of pre-state peoples imposed sharp limits on their ability to 
mobilize resources.  Lower rates of urbanism and population density significantly limited the 
economic base available for mobilization.  Moreover, as noted in the previous chapter, the pre-
state peoples of the Mediterranean were politically fragmented almost by definition and certainly 
in fact.51  In the absence of stable institutions, power within tribal groups was often in flux 
between groups of notables and individuals aspiring to (or seeking to maintain) kingship.52  Such 
tensions encouraged further fragmentation in an already fragmented political environment.  In 
the short-term, pre-state peoples could be considerable threats, as individually effective leaders 
could potentially create large networks of clientage and dependence, which would allow them to 
mobilize resources very intensively from a larger (as compared to other pre-state peoples) 
economic base.  However, in the long term, with the already relatively small economic base (as 
compared to the larger Mediterranean states) available to pre-state peoples, the tendency towards 
political fragmentation meant that no individual leader or tribal group had the resources to resist 
the great states of the Mediterranean in the long term.   
 
The Roman Mobilization System 
 In contrast to the ‘extract and pay’ systems, the Roman system of mobilization was based 
on the ‘entitlement principle’ where a state raises military force in exchange for a socially-
                                                 
51 See chapter seven, n. 6, 15. 
52 Roymans (1990), 37-8.  Cf. the fate of Orgetorix, a would-be king of the Helvetii, Caesar B.G. 1.4. 
 546 
underwritten package of rights.53  Rather than being built on the forced extraction of taxes to 
fund the creation of further force, the Roman system was more like the mobilization systems of 
pre-state peoples, relying on the active, willing compliance of the citizenry.54  But unlike the 
mobilization system of pre-state peoples, the Roman system was institutional, rather than  
personal, vested in the Republic and the duties of a citizen rather than in direct vertical or 
horizontal ties to powerful leaders.  And, critically, unlike both the Antigonid system and the 
pre-state systems, the Roman system had access to, and utilized, a package of pan-Italian social 
scripts that allowed it to be scaled up by incorporating the socii in Italy, while retaining the low 
administrative overhead of an entitlement principle system. 
 
Willing Compliance 
 As an entitlement-based system, the Roman Republic relied on the active, willing 
compliance of the citizenry, rather than force or compulsion.  This point requires some 
elaboration since the Roman system, notionally based on conscription, superficially resembles a 
compulsion-principle system.  However, in considering the Roman system of mobilization it is 
important to resist the tendency, all too present in the literary sources, to elide out the agency of 
the individual Romans and socii who were conscripted each year.  The levying of troops, the 
dilectus, is generally treated as an almost automatic process by the literary sources, which are far 
more focused on the decisions and actions of the Senate, consuls and dictators than on individual 
soldiers.  Where the sources are interested in the mechanics of the dilectus, it is generally 
because of some disruption, such as popular resistance; but such disruptions were not the norm.  
                                                 
53 On entitlement-based recruitment more generally, Landers (2003), 285-6. 
54 This view of the concept of of power: Arendt (1969),40-4.  
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As Brunt notes, the normal formula in Latin sources is simply to indicate that a magistrate or the 
Senate acts to, “milites (legiones, exercitum) conscribere (scribere)” or “legiones supplere,” with 
no further elaboration on the process generally being required.55  And certainly, the system 
seems to have functioned very well most of the time.  But we should not forget that it relied 
heavily on the willingness of most of the participants to play their roles and that the coercive 
power of the state, while considerable, was far from limitless.  Thus, rather than taking for 
granted that the Roman dilectus worked, it is worthwhile to examine how it worked. 
Our best description comes from Polybius although, as Walbank notes, his is at points 
“over-schematic,” and on the whole the evidence for the details of the practice of Roman 
mobilization is relatively poor.56  Polybius describes a system where the consuls announce, each 
year, the day on which all male citizens liable for service based on property and age must 
assemble on the Capitoline.  Once assembled, the military tribunes select soldiers in batches of 
four from each tribe, apportioning each one to a legion until the customary four legions for the 
year are filled out.57  Then the military oath is taken, and the newly enrolled soldiers are told 
where and on what day they are to arrive to be apportioned into units.58  On that occasion they 
                                                 
55 Brunt, (1971), 635. E.g. Liv. 22.11 “decretum ut ab Cn. Servilio consule exercitum acciperet; scriberet praeterea 
ex civibus sociique…” or Liv. 37.4.1., “L Cornelius…pro contione edixit, ut milites quos ipse in supplementum 
scripsisset…” 
56 Walbank (1957), 699.  Likewise, Brunt (1971), 526-627, objects that the number of iuniores would be far too 
large to assemble on the Capitoline or even in the Campus Martius as suggested by Polybius; Brunt’s solution is to 
suggest that what Polybius describes is not the enlistment of soldiers but merely their apportioning into legions, and 
that the recruitment in the municipia outside of Rome was handled by local magistrates.  The first part of the 
solution, while plausible, runs directly counter to Polybius’ text, which is quite clear about the stages of the 
conscription process.  Note also Walbank, (1957), 698-9. 
57 Plb. 6.19-20. 
58 Plb. 6.21.6. 
 548 
are next then divided into constituent battlefield units by the military tribunes.59  The men then 
reassemble, again, at a time appointed by the consuls, in this instance bearing the arms required 
of their assigned battlefield roles; then finally the army is deployed.60  The Roman troops are 
joined at this last stage by the allies, who have previously been given instructions about how 
many soldiers to supply.61 
The purpose of this outline is not mere antiquarian completeness, but rather to stress the 
vast latitude a Roman citizen soldier had for avoiding or evading the dilectus, and thus the 
considerable degree to which the system required the great majority of Romans to comply 
voluntarily.  It was possible to resist the dilectus on the spot, although only rarely with success.62  
Unwilling soldiers could refuse to answer to their names when called, or seek exemptions from 
the process, or appeal to magistrates, such as the tribunes of the plebs.63  In many cases, the 
Senate was forced to rely on popular commanders to resolve the situation, as in 151, when not 
only the common soldiers but also even the potential officers did not report for the dilectus, a 
situation eventually salvaged by Scipio Aemilianus.64 
In addition to these more direct efforts to resist the dilectus, Romans could rely on 
indirect or passive resistance at almost every stage of military mobilization, beginning with the 
                                                 
59 Plb. 6.22-26. 
60 Plb. 6.26.1-5. 
61 Plb. 6.26.5-9. 
62 In general, on resistance to the dilectus, both active and passive, in the second century, see Y. Shochat, 
Recruitment and the Programme of Tiberius Gracchus (Brussels: Latomus, 1980), 55-65, and J. K. Evans, 
“Resistance at Home: The Evasion of Military Service in Italy during the Second Century B.C.” in Forms of Control 
and Subordination in Antiquity eds. T. Yuge and M. Doi (Leiden: Brill, 1988), 121-140. 
63 Refusal to answer when called: in 494, Liv. 2.28.6-7, 2.29.2.  In 275, Val Max. 4.3.4, Liv. Per, 14.  In 169, Liv. 
43.14.  Exemptions: Liv. 34.56.9-12, Liv. 36.3.3-5.  
64 Plb. 35.4.  App. Spanish Wars, 49.  Liv. Per 48.15-18. 
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census.  As Rosenstein notes, “The Roman census depended in the last analysis on the voluntary 
compliance of citizens.”65  Rosenstein further suggests that under-registration rates may have 
been wildly variable depending on popular attitudes towards the dilectus, and extreme enough 
potentially to lead in part to the appearance and apprehension of depopulation during the second 
century without any actual depopulation.66  Likewise, soldiers could simply fail to purchase, on 
their own, the equipment required of their position.  Polybius notes that in that case the quaestor 
would deduct the price of any additional equipment from the soldier’s pay, but this would be a 
weak provision against mass failure or refusal to self-equip.67  To combat this sort of passive 
resistance, the Senate might dispatch conquisitores to seek out recruits in the countryside, but 
this seems to have been done only rarely.  The only reports during this period are in 213 and in 
212, during the Second Punic War.68  In practice, the Roman Republic simply lacked the 
complex administrative apparatus to coerce mass compliance, a situation underscored by the 
repeated need to resort to popular commanders in order to raise public enthusiasm for military 
operations in the late second century.  Instead, in a system where soldiers were expected to 
furnish their own equipment and to travel on their own initiative to the army, Rome relied not 
merely on passive obedience, but also on active and willing compliance in order to field citizen 
armies. 
The system for raising troops from the socii was no less reliant on this form of active 
compliance.  Polybius relates that the consuls, at the same time as the general levy was held, sent 
                                                 
65 Rosenstein (2004), 157.  On the penalties for failure to register or show up at a levy, Brunt, (1971), 391-2.  On the 
evasion of the census, note Evans, (1988), 128-129. 
66 Rosenstein (2004), 157-8. 
67 Plb. 6.39.14. 
68 Liv. 23.32.19.  25.5.5-9.  Rich, (1983), 289. 
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orders to the socii stating the number of troops they must supply and the time and place of the 
muster.69  Livy’s account of the muster of 193 suggests that the process of summoning the socii 
would have involved the consuls meeting representatives of the allied communities on the 
Capitoline.70  In both accounts the process is treated as practically automatic, but with no real 
functional oversight; the only real recourse the Roman state had against resistance to recruitment 
by the socii was to declare the entire community in rebellion and to wage war on it.  The limits 
of enforcement are perhaps most clearly demonstrated in 209, when twelve of the thirty Latin 
colonies simply defaulted on their requirement to furnish troops and money, claiming exhaustion 
from the long war against Hannibal.71  The consuls and the Senate attempted persuasion, and 
lionized the remaining eighteen colonies that continued to contribute, but in the end, “of the 
other twelve colonies, which refused to obey orders, the senators forbade any mention to be 
made,” and then merely moved on.72  Livy offers that “this silent rebuke seemed most consistent 
with the dignity of the Roman people,” but this seems merely patriotic cover.73  In essence, the 
Senate was forced to concede, if grudgingly, and to give the defaulting colonies their way, 
because the system had no other measures short of war to compel compliance.  If the socii did 
not actively comply, the Senate could in principle direct the consuls to move to declare war 
against them, but it could not impress or dragoon them. 
                                                 
69 Plb. 6.21.4 
70 Liv. 34.36.5.  Brunt, (1971), 626. 
71 Liv. 27.9-10. 
72 Liv 27.10.10.  duodecim aliarum coloniarum quae detractaverunt imperium mentionem fieri patres vetuerunt, 
neque illos dimitti neque retineri neque appellari a consulibus; ea tacita castigatio maxime ex dignitate populi 
Romani visa est. 
73 Liv. 27.10.10. 
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To be sure, in other circumstances Rome was more than willing to use war as a means to 
compel allied communities to remain subservient.74  This expedient, however, might not result in 
the troops Rome actually desired.  For example, even after they were subdued, many of the 
Italian rebels of the Second Punic War had to be debarred from military service for a time, 
presumably over concerns about loyalty.75  War against the socii in any period would necessarily 
entail destroying a portion of the very resources and manpower that the Romans wished to 
mobilize.  This weakness of the system was further complicated by the fact that citizen Roman 
troops do not seem to have made up a majority of soldiers in the Roman army for most of this 
period, nor do the Romans appear to have possessed any significant qualitative superiority over 
their allies.76  The Roman state quite literally could not afford to coerce all of the socii.  This is 
not to say that the system was ineffective; it was evidently tremendously effective.  Rather, the 
point is that the system relied on widespread active compliance in the absence, in any given year 
or at any given dilectus, of direct means of coercion.  Intentionally or not, the system required 
compliance from large numbers of both citizens and allies in order to function.   
In the absence of strong coercive systems, the immediate problem of any entitlement-
based system, such as Rome’s, is to achieve the necessary legitimacy to obtain willing 
compliance.  For the Roman citizen body, the mechanics of the system were broadly similar to 
                                                 
74 War, of course, was a method of compliance that the Romans were more than willing to use when it was practical.  
On its repeated use before the Punic Wars, see P. Kent, “Reconsidering socii in Roman armies before the Punic 
Wars” in Processes of Integration and Identity Formation in the Roman Republic, ed. S. T. Roselaar (Leiden: Brill, 
2012a), 71-84.  During the Second Punic War, note especially M. P. Fronda, Between Rome and Carthage: Southern 
Italy during the Second Punic War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010). 
75 Brunt, (1971), 278-284, 680. 
76 On the ratio of allied to Roman soldiers in the army, see Brunt, (1971), 677-686.  Rich, (1983), 321-323.  Contrast 
the need for the Seleucids and the Ptolemies to maintain ‘escalation dominance’ over their subject peoples.  
Seleucids: Bar-Kochva (1976), 52-3.   Ptolemies: Plb. 5.107.1-3. On ‘escalation dominance’ used in this sense for 
the ancient world, see E. Luttwak, The Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire (Baltimore: John Hopkins University 
Press, 1976), 42. 
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those of a Greek polis or the entitlement systems already discussed above.77  Military service 
explicitly underpinned citizenship and civic participation in the Middle Republic.78  Kurt 
Raaflaub notes that it was military service which had changed the plebeians “from nobodies to 
somebodies” who would have a voice in the Republic.79  The point is underscored neatly by the 
tendency of those plebeians to press their position by refusing conscription, such as in 495 and 
403.80  Moreover, as has often been noted, this civic requirement for military participation was 
underscored by a strong martial ethos, which encouraged military service as the most important 
endeavor in which a citizen male might demonstrate his quality, embodied by the concept of 
virtus.81 
The entitlement principle was, however, hardly exclusive to Rome, and the dedication of 
the Roman citizen body is not enough to explain Rome’s comprehensive advantage in 
mobilization.82  It was, as noted in the first chapter, the primary recruitment principle behind the 
polis armies.  Aristotle directly connects political participation and military service.  More 
generally, the strong connections tying together military service and political participation in the 
                                                 
77 On the continued militarism of the Hellenistic Greek polis, note Ma (2000), 337-376. 
78 Military service requirements to hold office, Plb. 6.19.3.  Walbank (1957), 698.  Note also the structure of the 
comitia centuriata and the concentration of voting power into the centuries of the heavy infantry, Dionysius RA 
4.16.2; Liv. 1.43.1.  Lintott (1999), 55-61. 
79 Raaflaub (2005), 197.  Cf. also Cicero’s statement on military service in Cicero, Caec. 99, that a man who fails to 
risk his life for freedom is not deprived of it, but never truly had it in the first place. 
80 Liv. 2.24.5-8.  6.27.8.  Cf. also 3.57.9-10. 
81 The literature on this point is voluminous, but note especially: Lendon (2005), 172-178.  J. E. Lendon, “The 
Rhetoric of Combat: Greek Military Theory and Roman Culture in Julius Caesar’s Battle Descriptions,” CA 18.2 
(1999), 273-329; McCall, (2002), 83-99; C. Barton, Roman Honor: The Fire in the Bones (Berkeley, University of 
California Press, 2001), 13, 42-58, 114-5.  Harris (1979), 17-30.  Harris confines his treatment to aristocratic virtus, 
but as Barton notes, it applied to the lower classes as well, Barton (2001), 75. 
82 See Landers (2003), 285, for examples of this principle outside of the ancient world. 
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Greek world, as well as military virtue and public standing, are well established in the 
scholarship.83  Likewise, service in the Macedonian army seems to have given Macedonian 
soldiers under Philip II and Alexander the expectation of a degree of access to their king and a 
reciprocal responsibility on the part of their king over them.84  There was nothing unique about 
the Romans were highly motivated to fight for their own Republic.  Alcmena’s declaration in 
Plautus’ Amphitryon, that “if the only reward given to me is that my husband is hailed a 
conqueror in war, I say it is enough for me,” and that “virtus surely surpasses all things: liberty, 
safety, life, property, parents, country and children” are comparable to the Spartan mother’s 
order to her son to return “either with it [his shield] or on it.”85  Rather, what is exceptional about 
Rome’s mobilizations is their extension to all of Italy.  To explain this feat, it is necessary to turn 
again to the allies. 
 
Clientela and the Allies 
  The decisive strength of the Roman system lay in the ability to mobilize the socii 
through the same entitlement-principle, thus permitting extensive mobilization with very low 
administrative overhead.  The fundamental problem is that the entitlement system Rome utilized, 
as noted above, offered relatively little latitude for the use of coercive force except in extremis.  
As a consequence, the system had to provide for the ‘buy-in’ necessary to achieve willing 
                                                 
83 See above Ch. 1, n. 150.  On Greek ideas of military virtue, note especially Lendon, (2005), 15-162. 
84 Arr. Anabasis 5.25.-29, 7.8.1-7.11.9.  Cf. also the rebuke of Hermolaus in Curtius Rufus, 8.7.1. 
85 id modo si mercedis / datur mi, ut meus victor vir belli clueat/ satis mi esse ducam. virtus praemium est optimum / 
virtus omnibus rebus anteit profecto / libertas salus vita res et parentes, patria et prognati…  Plaut. Amph 646-650. 
‘ἢ τὰν ἢ ἐπὶ τᾶς.’ Plut. Moralia 241.16.   
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compliance, even for communities who were not Roman, and who did not necessarily see their 
fates as inextricably bound to Roman fortunes.   
 It could not simply be assumed that the socii would devote their resources to Rome out of 
a devotion to a common cause or background.  Michael Fronda notes that particularly during and 
following the Pyrrhic War the Romans do seem to have seen Italy as a coherent entity which 
they controlled, but this belief does not seem to have yet spread to the allies by the Second Punic 
War, and would not do so until far later.86  Instead, the communities of the socii continued to 
make decisions in terms of their own interest; apart from the Latin colonies, they showed 
relatively little emotional attachment to Rome.87  Being bound to Rome more by self-interest 
than a sense of cultural or ethnic kinship, the socii would be continually reevaluating the degree 
to which both passive submission and active participation in Rome’s wars served their interest.  
The loyalty of the socii could not simply be taken for granted, as the defections to Hannibal and 
the Social War demonstrated in vivid fashion. 
 A further obstacle to scaling up an entitlement-based system within a hierarchy of 
communities was what we might call the ‘apprehension of slavery.’  The inherent tension 
between the demands of honor due to free men, and the subordination required for such a system, 
are often remarked upon in the sources.88  Livy has the Samnites declare to the Etruscans that 
                                                 
86 Fronda (2010), 23-29.  Salmon’s view is similar, that “the Roman system in Italy was divisive, not federative,” 
Salmon, (1982), 71.  Keaveny sees any process of ‘Romanization’ as still fundamentally incomplete even at the 
beginning of the first century, A. Keaveney, Rome and the Unification of Italy, 2nd ed. (Exeter: Bristol Phoenix 
Press, 2005), 33-5.  Contra these is David, who argues that Italy was transformed into a unified state in the third 
century by a shared Hellenization, J.-M. David, La Romanisation de l’Italie (Paris: Aubier, 1994).  David’s 
argument hardly seems compelling.  Note also Plb. 2.23.11-12, where Polybius notes it is only with the threat of a 
Gallic invasion that the socii considered Rome’s wars to concern them directly. 
87 Fronda (2010), 28-34. 
88 On the negative impact of this tension on ancient diplomacy, note Eckstein, (2006), 60-2. 
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“they had taken to war again [against Rome] because a peace which reduced them to slavery was 
heavier to bear than a war in which they could fight as free men.”89  Slavery and servility of any 
kind were inherently incompatible with the honor of free men; given a choice between servility 
and death, the honorable man was to choose death.90  Cicero sums up the viewpoint in the Tenth 
Philippic, “However, for liberty one must contend at the peril of one’s life.  Surely life is not in 
the breath, for there is no life at all in the slave.”91  The requirement, then, that free men need 
always reject anything that resembled servility created an unavoidable entropic force within any 
alliance system; the stronger the leading state grew, the more the system might resemble 
servitude, and the stronger the pressing demand of honor to break free would become.  Even if 
this tension could never be entirely removed, as the words of the Samnite delegation above 
implies it could not be, reducing this tension as much as possible was a prerequisite for stable 
Roman control over the allies and access to their vast reserves of manpower and resources. 
 The key to reducing this tension of injured honor was in recasting the alliance system 
from a system of domination to a system of reciprocal, if unequal, bilateral relationships.  
Fortunately for the Romans, they had a script for just such a form of relationship: clientela, or 
patronage.  Clientela provided a rubric for a reciprocal, but unequal relationship that, when 
handled tactfully, did not damage the honor of free men.  Ernst Badian gives as a definition for 
clientela, “an inferior entrusted, by custom or by himself, to the protection of a stranger more 
                                                 
89 Liv. 10.16.5. petisse pacem a populo Romano, cum bellum tolerare non possent; rebellasse, quod pax servientibus 
gravior quam liberis bellum esset.  Cf. Thuc. 1.122.2, 1.124.3, where the Corinthian delegation explicitly refers to 
the members of the Delian league as “the Hellenes who are not enslaved” τοὺς νῦν δεδουλωμένους Ἕλληνας. 
90 Barton (2001), 11-14, 115-6, 126-7. 
91 Cic. Phil 10.10.20.  tamen pro libertate vitae periculo decertandum est. non enim in spiritu vita est, sed ea nulla est 
omnino servienti.  Cf. here also Cic. Caec. 99. 
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powerful than he, and rendering certain services and observances in return for this protection.”92  
Importantly, performance of these services and observances was not seen as servile or 
dishonorable, but rather a positive source of honor.  Pliny notes of the town of Tifernum, of 
which he was the municipal patron, that “to be outdone in affection is disgraceful.”93  The same 
sentiment is recorded in Dionysius’ idealizing picture of patronage under Romulus where clients 
and patrons, “each strove not to be outdone by the other in kindness.”94  Such relationships had 
to be handled tactfully, often with the subordinating elements politely obscured by presenting 
them as amicitia rather than clientele; in so doing, the danger to the junior partner’s honor could 
be minimized, in order to make the relationship more stable.95 
 The relationship between Rome and the communities of the socii were handled, at least in 
an idealized form, in much the same way.  Cicero presents the analogy quite directly in his De 
Officiis, noting that the Romans, “must show consideration for those whom we have subdued by 
force but also those who, laying down their arms, fled to the fides of our generals…such that 
those who in war receive into their fides defeated nations are by the mos maiorum, patrons of 
                                                 
92 E. Badian, Foreign Clientelae (264-70 B.C.) (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1958), 1.  Note also Saller’s definition, 
R.P. Saller, Personal Patronage Under the Early Empire (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 1, where 
clientela is a personal relationship involving a reciprocal exchange of goods and services between two individuals of 
unequal status. 
93 nam vinci in amore turpissimum est.  Plin. Ep. 4.1.5. 
94 …ὅ τε ἀγὼν ὑπὲρ τῆς εὐνοίας ὑπὲρ τοῦ μὴ λειφθῆναι τῆς ἀλλήλων χάριτος ἔκτοπος ἡλίκος… Dionysius RA 
2.10.4. 
95 E.g. Pliny’s relationship with Q. Corellius Rufus, Plin Ep. 4.17.4, or Cicero’s criticism of men who were 
unwilling to be seen as the clients of others, Cic. De Off. 2.69.  On obscuring the subordinating nature of clientela by 
presenting it as amicitia, see Saller (1982), 11-21.  The blurry distinction between amicitia and clientela has given 
rise to some scholarship questioning whether Roman foreign relations should be understood more as amicitia or as 
clientela, for instance, P. J. Burton, “Clientela or Amicitia? Modeling Roman International Behavior in the Middle 
Republic (264-146 BC)” Klio 85 (2003): 333-369; and M Snowdon, “Beyond Clientela: The Instrumentality of 
Amicitia in the Greek East” in Foreign clientelae in the Roman Empire: A Reconsideration, eds. M. Jehne and F. P. 
Polo (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 2015), 209-224.  In practice, the line between amicitia and clientela seems 
sufficiently blurry so as to make this distinction less meaningful.  Cf. Cic. De Amicitia 19.69 and Seneca. Ep. Ad. 
Luc. 94.14 on amicitia between individuals of very different status. 
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those people.”96  The first century CE jurist Proculus draws the same analogy, noting “likewise a 
people is allied (foederatus) either if by an equal treaty or by a treaty such that they are to 
obligingly maintain the maiestas of another people…it is understood that though the second 
people is superior, but not that the first is not free: indeed for as we understand our clientes to be 
free, even though they are not equal to us in auctoritas or dignitas or vires, thus we understand 
these to be free, who kindly agree to maintain our maeistas.”97  This observation, that clientela 
formed the basis for how Roman elites constructed their relationships with Rome’s subordinate 
allies, forms the core of the argument in Badian’s Foreign Clientelae, which remains an 
influential reading of Roman foreign policy.98  As Badian argues, “this pattern of mos maiorum 
[meaning clientela] could not but be reproduced when Roman statesmen, moving in – and owing 
their position to – this intricate network of relationships, came to deal, on behalf of their city, 
with her inferiors abroad.”99  This is not to say that the Roman alliance system was itself a form 
or subset of clientela, but rather that it was analogous to, and modelled on, the practice.  That 
analogy, however, provided the grounds for the Romans to construct relationships between 
Rome and the communities of the socii that minimized one of the strongest entropic impulses 
                                                 
96 Cicero, de off. 1.35. consulendum est, tum ii, qui armis positis ad imperatorum fidem confugient, quamvis murum 
aries percusserit, recipiendi. In quo tantopere apud nostros iustitia culta est, ut ii, qui civitates aut nationes devictas 
bello in fidem recepissent, earum patroni essent more maiorum.  While Cicero may be taken here to speak of 
individual patrons of communities in the Late Republic, this passage comes in the context of the treatment of foreign 
states and the acceptance of defeated peoples into the citizenship; Cicero may thus as well be talking about how the 
populus Romanus ought to treat communities that submit themselves to Roman fides. 
97 Dig. 49.15.7.1  sive is foederatus est item, sive aequo foedere in amicitiam venit sive foedere comprehensum est, 
ut is populus alterius populi maiestatem comiter conservaret. hoc enim adicitur, ut intellegatur alterum populum 
superiorem esse, non ut intellegatur alterum non esse liberum: et quemadmodum clientes nostros intellegimus 
liberos esse, etiamsi neque auctoritate neque dignitate neque viri boni nobis praesunt, sic eos, qui maiestatem 
nostram comiter conservare debent, liberos esse intellegendum est. 
98 Badian, (1958). 
99 Badian, (1958), 285. 
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present in such systems of subordination: the pressing insult to honor implied by dishonorable 
servitude.  
 This relationship, however, did require reciprocity.100   Rome’s relationship with the socii 
has tended to be viewed quite cynically by modern scholars, understood more as a tool of Roman 
power than a relationship between communities.101  The implied reciprocity of the exchange, 
however, was not merely an empty promise.  The very nature of the network consisting of a large 
number of bilateral relationships required that Rome’s promise of protection and military support 
be credible.  The system was, in essence, underwritten by Roman fides.102  As Eckstein notes, 
ancient states were forced to operate with extremely limited information about each other; as a 
result, concepts of honor or trust became crucial tools for guiding decision-making.103  In the 
absence of information about a community’s intentions, a reputation for ‘toughness’ was one of 
the only tools for deterring enemies, while a reputation for steadfastness was one of the few tools 
for reassuring allies.  Thus, in order to maintain Rome’s system of alliances, the Romans had to 
                                                 
100 There is some debate as to the nature of the formal structures of this system.  For the orthodox view, which tends 
to assume a system of written treaties formally spelling out obligations, see E. S. Staveley, “Rome and Italy in the 
Early Third Century” in CAH2 vol 7.2 (1989): 420-455.  Rich has argued recently that some allies may not have been 
bound by formal treaty; this remains an interesting if unorthodox position.  J.W. Rich “Treaties, allies and the 
Roman Conquest of Italy” in War and Peace in Ancient and Medieval History eds. P. de Souza, J. France 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 51-75.  See also M. Fronda, (2010), 23, n. 51; Kent (2012b), 56-
77.  The latter view, where the obligations are the implied consequences of unwritten agreements, seems more in 
keeping with the forms of clientela. 
101 Roman alliances primarily as a tool of Roman power: Badian, (1958), 15-32.  J. W. Rich, (2008), 51-52.  
Staveley, (1989), 426.  Salmon, (1982), 70-72, 92.  Keaveney (1987), 3-44.  David (1994). E. Gabba, “Rome and 
Italy in the second century BC,” CAH2 7.2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989): 197-243. 
Older scholarship tended to assume a more beneficent and cohesive alliance system, see for instance J. S. Reid, 
“Problems of the Second Punic War: III. Rome and her Italian Allies” JRS 5 (1915): 87-124.   
102 On fides, see esp. E. S. Gruen, “Greek Πίστις and Roman Fides” Athenaeum 60 (1982): 50-68.  Fides as a 
justification for war, Harris (1979), 34-5; Harris is correct to insist that fides rarely kept the Romans from war.  Note 
also Badian, (1958), 47-54, for fides in the context of diplomacy and clientela. 
103 On low information: Eckstein (2006), 58-60 and Eckstein (2008), 13-4.  On honor or fides as a motivation for 
war: A. Eckstein, Moral Vision in The Histories of Polybius (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995), 56-70. 
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develop and maintain a reputation for willingness to fight for their allies, leading to the strong 
emphasis on Roman fides.  Fides, after all, was the currency that the socii counted on for their 
security. 
 Rome was indeed quite willing to go to war in order to demonstrate Roman fides.  As 
Fronda notes, Rome was willing on numerous occasions to go to war over the security of one 
allied community or another.104  This was not just simple altruism.  Rather, the Romans often 
exploited local rivalries to justify intervention and expand their influence.105  However, the 
Roman concern for demonstrating fides is pronounced in the sources.  Diodorus has Hiero 
describe the Roman envoys at the start of the First Punic War as “harping on the word fides 
[πίστεως],” but Hiero declares the sentiment empty because of the bad conduct of the 
Mamertines who the Romans had come to protect.106  To an Italian audience, however, such an 
interaction might have played rather better, showcasing a Roman willingness to defend their 
friends, no matter the context or the cost.  In another episode, related by both Polybius and 
Dionysius, a garrison of Campanian socii requested by the allied city of Rhegium during the 
Pyrrhic War victimized the city.  The Romans responded by recapturing the city, executing the 
Campanians and restoring Rhegium’s territory to its citizens because, as Polybius notes, they 
“wished, by this punishment, in as much as possible to repair the trust (πίστιν = fides) with the 
allies.”107  This same sense of fides also figures highly into Livy’s telling of the Second 
                                                 
104 Fronda, (2010), 20, n. 47, 301, n. 44. 
105 Fronda, (2010), 21. 
106 θρυλλοῦντες τὸ τῆς πίστεως ὄνομα.  Diodorus 23.1.2. 
107 βουλόμενοι διὰ τῆς εἰς ἐκείνους τιμωρίας, καθ᾽ ὅσον οἷοί τ᾽ ἦσαν, διορθοῦσθαι παρὰ τοῖς συμμάχοις τὴν αὑτῶν 
πίστιν.  Plb. 1.7; the same incident is noted by Dionysius, 20.4.1-2. 
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Macedonian War and the Roman decision to withdraw from Greece afterwards.108  While the 
need for the Roman Republic to regularly demonstrate the strength of Roman fides often led the 
Romans and their socii into war, it will also have reassured the socii, especially weaker 
communities, that when their security was on the line, Roman fides would be good. 
It is worth noting in this context the relative unwillingness of the Romans throughout this 
period to trade space for time against enemies in Italy.  The Romans were almost never willing to 
let an enemy force plunder or despoil the socii, even when there was a strong strategic advantage 
to be gained by doing so.  The initial Roman force to confront Pyrrhus attempted to block him at 
the river Siris, deep in hostile Lucanian territory and well in advance of Rome’s allies.109  Rome 
made multiple attempts to confront Hannibal before he could enter peninsular Italy, first at the 
Rhone,110 before engaging him well north of the Po at Ticinus and again at Trebia both in 218.111  
Despite defeats there, the Romans promptly re-engaged Hannibal the following year. Livy’s 
explanation for C. Flamininus’ fatal rush to face Hannibal is notable, that “once he saw before 
his own eyes the property of the allies being carried off and plundered, he considered it his own 
personal disgrace that the Phoenician should now be roaming through Italy…”112  Polybius 
presents this as a rational calculation by Hannibal, who judged that Flamininus would “be unable 
to watch passively the devastating of the country, partly for fear of the jeering of his soldiers, 
                                                 
108 Eckstein (2008), 251-2, 299-300. 
109 Plut. Pyrrhus 16.3.  Plb. 1.7.6-13.  Note that it is in this context that Rhegium, which was quite vulnerably 
positioned, requested and received the garrison force which later created such problems, see above at n. 106. 
110 Liv 21.32.  Plb. 3.45-47, 49.   
111 Battle at the Ticinus: Liv 21.39-47.  Plb. 3.64-65.  Trebia: Liv. 21.54-57, Plb. 3.70-75. 
112 Livy 22.3.7.  postquam res sociorum ante oculos prope suos ferri agique vidit, suum id dedecus ratus, per mediam 
iam Italiam vagari Poenum. 
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partly from his own pain [at the sight].”113  Likewise, Livy presents Q. Fabius’ troops the 
following year chafing at the sight of the Hannibal’s plundering of the socii, leading to Livy’s 
report of Minicius’ rebuke, “Did we come here to watch, in order to enjoy with our eyes the 
slaughter and burning of the allies?”114  It is remarkable that the sight which spurns the Romans 
repeatedly into action is not the desolation of the ager Romanus, but instead the pillaging of 
allied communities.   
It would be easy to dismiss such outrage as artefacts of Livy and Polybius’ pro-Roman 
stance except that Roman armies did subsequently engage Hannibal, precipitously and 
repeatedly.  Nor was this behavior limited to the Second Punic War.  At the end of the second 
century, the Romans would send no less than three consular armies against the Cimbri in an 
effort to keep them out of Italy, despite repeated military disaster, before meeting with any 
success.115  Somewhat ironically, military catastrophe after military catastrophe may have 
reinforced trust in the Roman Republic, because it proved that the Romans were willing to suffer 
tremendous losses rather than permit an enemy army to attack the allied territory in Italy.  The 
Romans might not always win, but the socii could hardly doubt that any foreign enemy seeking 
to pillage their land would have to overcome at least one Roman army to do so. 
                                                 
113 Plb. 3.80.4.  συνελογίζετο διότι παραλλάξαντος αὐτοῦ τὴν ἐκείνων στρατοπεδείαν καὶ καθέντος εἰς τοὺς 
ἔμπροσθεν τόπους τὰ μὲν ἀγωνιῶν τὸν ἐπιτωθασμὸν τῶν ὄχλων οὐ δυνήσεται περιορᾶν δῃουμένην τὴν χώραν, τὰ δὲ 
κατηλγηκὼς παρέσται προχείρως εἰς πάντα τόπον ἑπόμενος, σπουδάζων δι᾽ αὑτοῦ ποιήσασθαι τὸ προτέρημα καὶ μὴ 
προσδέξασθαι τὴν παρουσίαν τοῦ τὴν ἴσην ἀρχὴν ἔχοντος. 
114 Livy 22.14.3  “spectatum huc” inquit Minucius, “ut ad rem fruendam oculis, sociorum caedes et incendia, 
venimus? 
115 Consuls defeated in the Cimbric war: Gn. Papirius Carbo in Illyricum (Liv. Per 63.113.6), Marcus Junius Silanus 
(Liv. Per 65.108.2-3.), Marcus Aurelius Scaurus and Gnaeus Mallius (Liv. Per 67.105.2-3); the last of these, at 
Arausio, involved the loss of both a consular and pro-consular army (note also Tac. Ger. 37.5).  One might contrast 
Athens’ and Sparta’s willingness to leave allied communities to their own defenses, e.g. Plataea, Thuc. 2.3-5, 2.71-
78, 3.20-24, 3.52-68, or Mytilene, Thuc. 3.28-28. 
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 In addition to the security guarantee, an alliance with Rome provided other opportunities 
which reinforced the reciprocal nature of the arrangement and encouraged willing compliance.116  
The socii also had a chance to share in the spoils, what Tim Cornell describes as “a criminal 
operation which compensates its victims by enrolling them in the gang and inviting them to share 
to proceeds of future robberies.”117  The socii were entitled to a portion of the spoils of war, 
although they seem sometimes to have gotten less than their share; they seem also to have been 
entitled at least some of the time to settlement in colonies founded on seized land.118  Moreover, 
loyalty and good service could be rewarded with better status within the system, which came 
with its own set of legal and financial benefits.119 
Moreover, the Romans seem to have recognized the virtus of allied soldiers and permitted 
them a share of the glory of victory.  Livy presents a decidedly favorable impression of the valor 
of the socii, although his late date makes it difficult to extrapolate the reception of allied valor in 
the second century.120  The broader evidence tends to reinforce the impression, however, that at 
least some of Livy’s favorable impression of the socii is representative of Roman diplomacy in 
                                                 
116 Cornell notes that “by drawing up this kind of balance sheet it becomes possible to understand the loyalty of the 
allies to Rome.”  T. J. Cornell, The Beginnings of Rome: Italy and Rome from the Bronze Age to the Punic Wars (c. 
1000 – 264 BC) (London: Routledge, 1995), 367.  Cornell in this seems to echo Reid, (1915): 87-124.  Contra Reid, 
note Fronda, (2010), 50-51, n. 134.  Salmon presents a more cynical picture than Cornell, but still concludes, 
“Above all, Rome put an end to fighting between Italian states with incalculable benefit to all,” Salmon, (1982), 72.  
The situation is often viewed more negatively, especially in the late second century, cf. for instance Gabba (1989), 
243. 
117 Cornell, (1995), 367. 
118 E. Badian, (1958), 149-153.  Cornell, (1995), 367.  Salmon (1970). In defense (contra Hopkins (1978)) of 
Salmon’s argument for land assigned to socii in Roman colonial foundations, note E. Badian, “Figuring out Roman 
Slavery” JRS (1982): 164-169, esp. 165. 
119 For a discussion of the scholarship on this point, see: H. Mouritsen, Italian Unification: A Study in Ancient and 
Modern Historiography (London: Institute of Classical Studies, 1998), 87-108.  Note also Salmon (1982), 57-72, 
161-4. 
120 Valor of the socii in Livy: Liv. 25.14.2-12, 27.10.7-9, 44.40.  On the potential influence of the post-social war 
annalistic tradition on Livy, see Erdkamp (2007), 47-74. 
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the period. Some support for the notion that the contribution of the socii was favorably 
acknowledged comes from Taylor’s interpretation of the Pydna Monument, with several figures 
he identifies as socii prominently featured on the relief.121  Livy reports that the socii normally 
received equal donatives from the sale of loot and also seem to have been included in Roman 
triumphs.122  Likewise Appian reports that prior to the Social War there had been a saying, “No 
triumph over the Marsi or without the Marsi:” both the Marsi’s unconquered history and their 
contributions to Roman victories were points of pride.123  The socii also appear to have been 
fully eligible for military awards.124  Extending recognition for martial excellence to the socii fits 
with a general Roman tendency to maintain the pleasing fiction of the socii as partners, if not 
equal ones, in Roman military success.  It also facilitated Roman harnessing of allied martial 
virtue.  Just as clients dutifully performing officia for their patrons could serve as a source of 
honor, so too could the socii gain distinction by the exemplary performance of their military 
service. 
  As with the Roman practice of clientela, the language used by the Romans to talk about 
the system of the socii tended to obscure the subordinate status of Rome’s junior partners, not 
out of any actual egalitarian impulse, but out of a need to avoid injuring the honor of the 
                                                 
121 Taylor (2016), 569-570. 
122 E.g. Livy 40.43.6-7, Livy 45.43.1-8.  Taylor, 570, n. 45.  Note also Plb. 10.16.2-4.  This norm is broken in 177, 
and the socii protest by marching in silence during the triumph, Liv. 41.13.6-8.  Livy makes it quite clear that this is 
exceptional. On this episode, see R. Pfeilschifter, “The allies in the Republican army and the Romanization of Italy” 
in Roman by Integration: dimensions of Group Identity in Material Culture and Text eds. R. Roth and J. Keller 
(Portsmouth: Journal of Roman Archaeology, 2007), 27. 
123 οὔτε κατὰ Μάρσων οὔτε ἄνευ Μάρσων γενέσθαι θρίαμβον.  App. Bel Civ 1.46. 
124 Plb. 6.39.1-11; note esp. 6.39.6, on punishments note also 6.37.8.  On rewards, see also, Pfeilschifter, (2007), 36-
7, n. 39.  On the common aspects of soldier life for Romans and the socii, note N. Rosenstein, “Integration and the 
Armies in the Middle Republic” in Processes of Integration and Identity Formation in the Roman Republic ed. S. T. 
Roselaar (Leiden: Brill, 2012), 85-103. 
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subordinated party.125  Much as a patron might rather call his client an amicus than a cliens, the 
Romans engaged in a degree of polite euphemism when referring to their subject communities.  
The word itself, socius, used by the Romans both formally and informally of their allies, when 
used outside of a diplomatic context, as in business, implies an equal partnership.  The text of the 
foedus Cassianum, the only agreement between Rome and an Italian ally for which we have a 
text, is instructive.  As given by Dionysius, the text simply notes “There shall be peace between 
the Romans and the cities of the Latins,” before setting out a series of equal and symmetrical 
obligations.126  The text also explicitly notes that any changes must be mutually agreed upon by 
all parties.  In practice, the relationship was far from equal, as made clear by all of the cities of 
the Latins having equal standing with just the one Rome; but this fact is left implied, rather than 
spelled out.  Our evidence for the actual text of many Roman treaties is limited, but the closest 
they seem to have come to the “language of kratos” common in Athenian imperial diplomacy is 
a clause to maintain the majesty of the Roman people in good faith (maiestatem populi Romani 
conservato sine dolo malo), which first appears with the Roman treaty with the Aetolians, but 
which Rich supposes may have been a feature of at least some treaties in Italy before.127  Yet 
even this formulation does not rise to the level of implying servitude, at least as a legal matter; 
the jurist Proculus declares those who “are obligated to courteously maintain our maiestas are to 
be considered free.”128 
                                                 
125 One may contrast the Athenian ‘language of kratos.’  P. Low, “Looking for the Language of Athenian 
Imperialism” JHS 125 (2005): 93-111, argues that such language was a regular part of narratives of conquest and 
political power; but it is notable that the Romans deploy no equivalent to the Greek ‘language of kratos’ when 
interacting with the socii. 
126 Ῥωμαίοις καὶ ταῖς Λατίνων πόλεσιν ἁπάσαις εἰρήνη πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἔστω.  Dionysius RA 6.95.2. 
127 Plb. 21.32.2-3; Livy 38.11.2.  Rich (2008), 58-69. 
128 Digest 49.15.7.1.  qui maiestatem nostram comiter conservare debent, liberos esse intellegendum est. 
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 All of this effort would be for naught unless clientela, as the underlying social construct 
informing these relations, was known to the socii, but the evidence suggests that the basic pattern 
of social organization was fairly widespread.  Roman and Italian elites were already 
interconnected by ties of clientela, amicitia, hospitium, and even familial and clan ties.129  
Italians and Italian communities, increasingly historically visible in the late Republic, were 
already adroit at utilizing the ties of clientele.  Not only did local elites utilize these ties to 
consolidate their local status, but elites and communities alike also sought to gain influence and 
contacts at Rome through clientela.130  Thus not only did Roman networks of clientela sprawl 
out into the communities of the socii, but the elite socii themselves seem to have had their own 
patronage networks along the same lines.  The apparently seamless merging of these systems - 
for we hear of no great disruption along these lines following the extension of citizenship in Italy 
in the wake of the Social War - speaks to the degree to which these parallel social institutions 
had effectively merged.  In short, the language of relation was not only one which the Romans 
spoke, but one that the Italian socii could understand and accept, at least until the changing 
nature of Roman power in the late second century fundamentally altered this relationship.131 
 By constructing the framework of the alliance system in this way, the Romans were able 
to recruit from the socii using the same entitlement principle, the only difference being that the 
valor of the socii underwrote their status in their own communities, rather than at Rome.  
                                                 
129 F. Münzer, Römische Adelsparteien und Adelsfamilien (Stuttgart: Carl Ernst Poeschel Verlag, 1920), 42-97.  
Note also Fronda, 30-33; Badian, (1958), 154-191. 
130 J. Nicols, Civic patronage in the Roman Empire (Leiden: Brill, 2014), 33-82.  Of note, the earliest attested 
example of municipal patronage attested epigraphically Nicols gives is for the patronage of Aeclanum by a local 
elite immediately following the Social War. 
131 This shared understanding of course stood in stark contrast to the experience of the Greeks, most famously in the 
case of the Aetolians, who lacked the same cultural competence of the Italians when it came to Roman customs, cf. 
Plb. 20.9.  Contra Polybius however, note Gruen, (1982): 50-68. 
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Although we are generally less well informed about them, the communities of the socii appear to 
have been no less militarized than the Romans.  The socii were probably drawn up in cohorts and 
turmae of linguistically connected groups to enable communication and encourage unit cohesion.  
The officers of these units were the praefecti cohortis, who were drawn from the elites of these 
same communities, so that the socii, like the Romans, probably served under their own 
magistrates, or at least men of their own magisterial class.132  The socii thus fought, shoulder to 
shoulder with their neighbors, under the eyes of their own leading citizens, exactly as the 
Romans did.   
In combat, the socii were tough fighters, as the Romans were.  Erdkamp notes that Livy 
and Polybius present the socii as integral to the legion, functionally interchangeable with Roman 
troops in quality, except where Livy’s reliance on the late annalistic tradition leads him to single 
out units of the socii for praise.133  In his description of Pydna, Plutarch memorably mirrors the 
martial virtue of the Romans and the allies: at one point in the line a Paelignus praefectus flings 
his unit’s standard into the enemy to force his men to attack vigorously to retrieve it, while 
elsewhere on the same battle line, a young Marcus Cato, having lost his sword, has to rally his 
friends to push the line forward far enough to retrieve it.134  That Italian and Roman military 
values should mirror each other so closely should come as no surprise, even as Italy remained 
culturally fragmented.  This shared military culture was likely the product of a long process of 
increasing militarization and convergence in martial culture, as is to be expected from an 
                                                 
132 E.g. Plb. 6.21.5, Livy 22.24.11, 23.19.17, 25.14.4-6.  Plut. Aem. 20.1-4.  On the organization of the socii note: 
Pfeilschifter (2007) and Rosenstein, (2012), 85-103. 
133 Erdkamp (2007), 47-74. 
134 Plut. Aem.  20.1.-3 and 21.1-5. 
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interstate system of militarized anarchy.135  The socii were just as tough as the Romans because 
they had to be in order to survive in the same environment.  As a result, the Romans were able to 
expand their recruiting base without compromising quality, and to draw on the same martial 
values to motivate the allies as drove the Romans themselves. 
 
Decentralization and Resource Mobilization 
 Because this alliance system allowed Rome to foster such loyalty, it could be efficiently 
decentralized.  Even so, it had not necessarily been thought out in advance or carefully designed.  
Rather, the skillful management of the growing roster of allies permitted the Romans to scale up 
piecemeal what was in fact a legacy mobilization system that had emerged out of the shifting 
alliances of earlier centuries.  Indeed, the Roman alliance system appears to have emerged out of 
an Italian tradition in which broader alliances and federations were common.136  In the middle of 
the fourth century, there is evidence for federations or broad military alliances among the 
Campanians, the Samnites, possibly the Veneti, and occasionally the Etruscans.  Roman 
dominance of the peninsula was confirmed in what was essentially a war of coalitions between 
Rome and its allies on one side, and a looser coalition of Samnites, Etruscans, Umbrians and 
Gauls on the other.137  Much like the institution of clientela that provided a model for Rome’s 
relationship with the socii, the very idea of a large alliance system was already deeply rooted in 
the norms of Italian warfare and intercommunal relations. 
                                                 
135 On Italian military culture, see, Kent, (2012b), 17-83.  On homogenization in equipment, note Burns (2003): 60-
85.  On convergence with anarchic state systems, note Eckstein (2008), 16-17.  Waltz (1988), 620.   
136 P. Kent, (2012a), 83.  See also, Kent (2012b), 51-151. 
137 On evidence for early federations among non-Latin or Romans in Italy, see Salmon, (1982), 10-34.  For 
coalitions and fears of them in the Third Samnite War note esp.: Liv. 10.16, 21. 
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The number of officials and the amount of administrative overhead in this system of 
recruitment was extremely low, despite the very large mobilizations it could produce.  For 
instance, Rome did not need to maintain a complete census of the socii or to assign 
administrators to organize recruitment in allied communities, as this work was handled by local 
magistrates.138  Nor did the  Roman state need to create a system for equipping allied or even 
Roman soldiers, because this was done by the individual, or in the case of some of the socii, 
perhaps by the community.139  Likewise, the pay for the socii seems to be handled by their local 
communities, not by Rome.140  The one component of the system which was centralized was 
food supply, with the allies being given their rations as a free gift from Rome, presumably to 
avoid the logistical nightmare of maintaining separate supplies on campaign.141  All of this 
decentralization will have served to keep the costs of mobilizing Roman armies low.  The 
efficiency that resulted was necessary for Rome to compete in the broader Mediterranean, for, as 
Taylor has noted, Roman state finance was far weaker than that of the other great Mediterranean 
powers.  Rome could not afford the sort of administrative apparatus more common in the East.142 
 The private purchase of arms and equipment would have broader economic effects and 
serve to explain in part why Rome was able to recover so rapidly from defeat.  Unfortunately, we 
are poorly informed about the manufacture of arms in Italy, except that it seems to have been 
                                                 
138 The census of 225, reported by Polybius, seems to have been the only complete accounting by Rome of the 
resources of all of the allies.  Plb. 2.24.15. 
139 Self-supply of arms is clearly indicated by Plb. 6.26.1, where the soldiers are dismissed to acquire the weapons 
for their assigned battlefield role.  Polybius further notes that the cost of replacement arms is deducted from the pay 
of Roman soldiers, Plb. 6.39.14. 
140 Plb. 6.21.5.  Liv. 27.9.2.  Note also Pfeilschifter, (2007), 31. 
141 Plb. 6.39.12-14. 
142 Taylor, (2017), 143-180. 
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decentralized, with centers of production in most regions.143  Caere, Perugia and Vulci seem to 
have been centers of production in Etruria, to which Paddock adds Capua, Aquileia, Puglia and 
Reggio Calabria.144  Representational evidence suggests that individual workshops might have 
been quite small.145  Military production thus may have been quite decentralized.  Arms 
production certainly does seem to have been privatized, with arms available for individual 
purchase, even during the Late Republic.  Cicero claims that Cethegus attempted to excuse his 
large cache of weapons on the grounds that he was a private collector.146  In the Seventh 
Philippic, Cicero likewise declares that the senators can see the workshops of arms (armorum 
officinas) in the city as a sign that the citizenry was preparing itself for war against Antony, 
despite the Senate’s reluctance.147   
During the Middle Republic, these arms-makers would have worked under near 
continuous demand, as Rome was almost always engaged in active military deployment.  
Moreover, it seems likely that, rather than waiting for conscription, most Roman assidui 
households, and likely those of the allies as well, would have kept equipment ready.  In the event 
of a tumultus, the army was raised immediately and all state business was suspended, a step 
which would have little value unless many of the citizens already possessed the arms needed to 
                                                 
143 Paddock, (1993), 44-45. 
144 Paddock, (1993), 44-45.  H. H. Scullard, The Etruscan Cities and Rome (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1967), 
100, 126, 163-164.  Perugia at least seems to have been in production down until at least the first century B.C..   
145 Paddock, 48-55.  See also Sim and Ridge, (2002) and Sim and Kaminski, (2012), 5-78..  Sim and Ridge seem to 
suggest rather more centralization and larger workshops, but they also focus chronologically later, in the imperial 
period and in the context of permanently deployed standing armies. 
146 Cic. In Cat. 3.10. 
147 Cic. Philippic 7.13. 
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fight.148  Simple economic demand, then, propelled by the need of both Romans and allies to 
acquire personal arms, will have the manufacture of military equipment throughout Italy, with 
apparently minimal state involvement. 
Returning to the problem presented in the first chapter - that of encouraging 
specialization against a backdrop of low agricultural productivity - the aggregate demand for 
weapons by the entire Italian freeholding class would have motivated the production of arms on 
a far broader basis than state action.  In this case, we may easily imagine that the demands of an 
assiduus to equip himself (or his son) for the dilectus provided the spur towards the more 
intensive utilization of his agricultural labor.  Private purchase may also have encouraged a 
preference for heavier armor and equipment, as an individual is far less likely to economize 
concerning his own survival on the battlefield than a distant king or board of magistrates.  Given 
that nearly all families of the freeholding class would maintain arms against the possibility of 
selection in a dilectus or a tumultus, the result is the accumulation of a deep reserve of 
equipment, far beyond the Republic’s need for equipping any given army.  Moreover, starting in 
the third century, the deposition of arms in burial seems to decline markedly as a practice, which 
would in turn keep more arms and armor in active circulation.  This reserve would be intensified 
by the Roman practice of displaying captured spoils in positions of honor within the 
household.149  As a result, the Romans could expect to be able to raise a very large proportion of 
Roman and allied manpower without having to limit recruitment due to equipment shortages or 
to suffering from a diminished battlefield capacity. 
                                                 
148 On the immediate suspension of state business and raising of an army, note esp. Cic. Philippic 5.31.  Likewise, 
Liv 40.26.6, the consuls are empowered to raise suitable troops as they marched, which again, supposes that arms 
and equipment were already in readiness. 
149 E. Rawson, “The Antiquarian Tradition: Spoils and Representations of Foreign Armour” in Roman Culture and 
Society: Collected Papers (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991), 582-598. 
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 Alongside this deep well of reserve equipment, the Roman system of broad conscription 
combined with continual warfare also created an extensive reserve of military experience and 
expertise that was broadly distributed throughout the communities of Italy.  Exactly how 
widespread military service will have been among the entire freeholding class, both Romans and 
socii, is not entirely clear, although some modern scholars have offered estimates.150  Rosenstein 
estimates that, in the first 32 years of the second century, some 627,800 soldiers participated in 
battles significant enough to merit mention in Livy’s history.151  If we accept Brunt’s corrections 
for Polybius’ figure of the total number of Roman and allied iuniores liable for conscription in 
225 at 634,000, and assume that this total broadly represents the available iuniores at any given 
time, we might expect that Rosenstein’s minimum figure of 627,800 soldiers would represent 
perhaps 46% of the total number of eligible men in a 32 year period.152  The adoption of Brunt’s 
figures for military deployments from 218 to 168 results in a similar figure.  Including allies, 
Brunt’s figures suppose some 6,128,900 man-years of deployments for the 51 years from 218 to 
168, an average of 120,175 men under arms per year, not counting naval activity.153   
Even without accounting for battlefield casualties and disease, the figures suggest 5.5 
years of military service for each eligible male in Italy during the period.154  This estimate fits 
                                                 
150 On military service among Roman citizens, our information is rather better than for the socii.  See esp. 
Rosenstein (2004). 
151 Rosenstein, (2004), 109. 
152 Plb. 2.24.15.  On these numbers, and potential corrections to the figures, note Brunt, (1971), 44-60.  Assuming 
generational cohorts are of a roughly constant size, 32 years would allow time for slightly more than 2 full 
generational cohorts to move through recruitment age. 
153 Brunt, (1971), 416-426.  The figures for 218-200 have been roughly doubled to account for allied contingents. 
154 I calculated by breaking down Polybius’ figure for iuniores into equal-sized year-cohorts, which suggests that 
roughly 22,000 eligible Romans and socii came of age each year.  In practice, mortality (both normal and excess 
military mortality) would tend to raise this figure by lowering the average age among the iuniores, probably by a 
very significant margin, see Rosenstein, (2004), 107-140.  Moreover, Romans would have served disproportionately 
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with the impression given by Livy when he notes that of all of the iuniores in the census of 214, 
only 2,000 were found who had not yet performed some military service.155  Nearly all eligible 
male Italians, Romans and socii, would have seen at least some service in the military, with 
probably around half having experienced a major battle.  The resulting shared experience of 
military service meant a wide diffusion of military knowledge in the broader culture.156  The cost 
of achieving it, however, was a tremendous investment in man-hours required by nearly constant 
warfare and continuous conscription.  Indeed, the manpower demands of Roman levels of 
conscription were severe enough that family structure and agriculture in Roman Italy were 
forced to accommodate the rhythms of military service.157  The result was that the veterans of 
previous wars, with their equipment, were always available in the event of a future military 
disaster. 
 
Comparative Advantage 
 Thus, the combination of the private purchase of equipment with decentralized 
recruitment and large, regular annual call-ups served to produce a thoroughly militarized 
population of freeholding farmers, while simultaneously directing the necessary agricultural 
surplus towards sufficient production of equipment.  Compared to the rather narrow ethnic 
                                                 
more years, as the proportion of Romans in a Roman army was greater than the proportion of the total population.  
On the length of service in the Roman army, see Rosenstein, (2004), 189-190. 
155 Livy 24.18.8-9. 
156 Note, for instance, the broad use of military knowledge in the plays of Plautus: A joke at the expense of the triarii 
in Plaut. Frivolaria, fg. 5, agite nunc, supsidite omnes, quasi solent triarii. Plautus plays a joke off of the name of 
Hannibal’s elephant in the Pseudolus, Plaut. Pseudolus 1218-21.  On the background of this joke, see N. J. DeWitt, 
“Pseudolus and Hannibal’s Elephant” CP 36.2 (1941): 189-190.  Pseudolus also takes the time to play the 
triumphing general, Plaut. Pseudolus 562-73.  On this passage, note J. Wright, “The Transformations of Pseudolus” 
TAPA 105 (1975): 403-416.  Catapult jokes occur in multiple plays, e.g. Plaut. Persae 30-1, Curculio, 394. 
157 Rosenstein, (2004), 63-106. 
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military elite of the Hellenistic states, this system allowed Rome to mobilize not only a vast 
population but also a vast base of economic resources, with minimal overhead cost.  The creation 
of such a thoroughly militarized class comprising such a large portion of the adult male 
population of Italy is an astounding achievement.  It enabled Rome not merely to call up large 
numbers of men, but rather vast numbers of well-equipped soldiers, many of whom would 
already be combat hardened; and, in the event of defeat, Rome could call up more.  This strategic 
depth was not the result of a single massive dilectus, but the product of decades of both annual 
musters and the steady accumulation of military equipment.  The resulting depth was not only in 
manpower, but also in human capital, produced by generations of military service and economic 
capital, both in the form of vast stores of weapons and armor disbursed throughout the 
population, but also in the form of a vast, likely decentralized network of metal-working and 
equipment manufacturing. 
In contrast the efforts of the Ptolemaic and Seleucid kingdoms to remake part of their 
militaries along Roman lines did little to revive their ailing fortunes.158  Although the evidence is 
admittedly limited, it does not seem that ‘Roman style’ units were able to completely replace the 
older, less resource intensive Hellenistic core.159  Because the strength of the Roman system was 
not only in the equipment itself, but also in the embedded social structures of Italy on which the 
                                                 
158 Sekunda (1994/5); Sekunda (2001); but not also Fischer-Bovet (2014), 144-8 on the weaknesses of this 
argument. 
159 At Daphne, the Seleucid soldiers equipped in Roman style number only 5,000, compared to 20,000 armed in the 
Macedonian style  Plb. 30.25.3.  Bar-Kochva (1976), 55, 60-1.  Hannibal, likewise, only reequiped the African 
heavy infantry of his army, perhaps 10,000 strong by Cannae, in Roman fashion: Plb. 3.114.1; Liv 22.46.4.  Fischer-
Bovet (2014), 148, notes that the evidence for Roman-style reform in the Ptolemaic army is mixed and unclear, but 
she does point out that Roman style equipment, particularly mail, seems to have been limited. 
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alliance was built, it would in effect be impossible to imitate abroad.160  The problem was also 
economic: in the absence of a similarly effective system for extracting resources, the revenues of 
the Seleucid and Ptolemaic kingdoms was only just sufficient for the less matériel intensive 
Macedonian style of warfare.  Without the Roman system of resource extraction, it was nearly 
impossible to sustain the Roman style of matériel intensive warfare. 
 
 The set of norms and institutions that made this Roman triumph possible does not appear 
to have survived the second century.  Territory outside of Italy was not incorporated into the 
Italian alliance system, but rather was taxed to generate revenue for Rome.  This shift in turn 
allowed for the phasing out of the burdens placed directly on Rome’s smallholding farmer class, 
one by one.  In 167, after the Third Macedonian War, tributum in Italy was suspended.161  In 
122, Gaius Gracchus passed a law which provided for at least some state issue of equipment.  
Plutarch merely notes that the law provided for clothing (ἐσθής) be issued at state expense, 
without deduction from pay, but this is often reasonably assumed to mark the beginning of state 
funded equipment more generally.162  The requirement to serve came last, with sporadic use of 
volunteers in the legions in the late second century giving way to the professional armies of the 
first.163  Thus, by the end of the second century, the system of mobilization which had given 
                                                 
160 The honor-preserving nature of patronage, for instance, did not translate into the Greek cultural sphere, see P. 
Millett, “Patronage and its avoidance in classical Athens” in Patronage in Ancient Society ed. A. Wallace-Hadrill 
(London: Routledge, 1989), 15-47. 
161 Plut. Aem. 38.1. 
162 Plut. Gaius 5.1.  Taken to mean state issue, Keppie (1984), 58.  No help in clarifying the law’s scope comes from 
other sources; neither Appian’s account (App. Bel. Civ. 21-23) nor the Periochae (Liv. Per 60) include any details 
on this law.  Diodorus 34/35.25 implies changes to military discipline but does not specify what they were.  
Previously, the cost of clothing and any missing equipment was deducted from pay, Plb. 6.39.15. 
163 App. Iber. 84.  Sallust, Jugurtha 86.1-4.  Keppie (1984), 57-63. 
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Rome mastery over the Mediterranean had, by and large, been disassembled.  It was no longer 
needed.  In the Mediterranean of the first century there were no longer any peer competitors to 
match Rome. 
 
Conclusions 
 This work set out to account for Rome’s exceptional military success during the third and 
second centuries.  That investigation began with the steady elimination of possibilities.  Rome’s 
success cannot be attributed to exceptional aggression or bellicosity; rather Rome was merely 
one of many aggressive and bellicose states violently competing in a condition of interstate 
anarchy.  Nor can Rome’s success be attributed to an exceptional population or resource base; 
Rome was neither exceptionally populous, nor possessed of exceptional resources.  Finally, 
Roman soldiers were not exceptionally cheap or expendable.  Roman soldiers were, in fact, some 
of the most expensive and highest quality, yet the Roman Republic was able to field them in 
greater quantity than any other Mediterranean state or people.  The proximate cause of 
exceptional Roman success is thus found.  Rome comprehensively out-mobilized its competitors; 
only Carthage truly came close to matching Roman expenditure.  Such an advantage in 
mobilized men and matériel allowed Rome to wage wars on multiple fronts, endure losses and 
capitalize on success.  It also enabled Roman armies to take full advantage of expensive weapons 
and armor, most notably mail armor.  Although the fortunes of war are not predetermined, in 
Rome’s case the advantage proved decisive. 
 In turn, however, this conclusion begs an investigation into root causes: what allowed 
Rome to mobilize such a greater proportion of its resources?  The answer lies in the Roman 
alliance system’s ability to scale up an entitlement-based mobilization system.  This ability in 
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turn was socially embedded insofar as it was reliant on a set of cultural preconditions in Italy.  
The most important of these was a shared social script rooted in systems of patronage whereby 
individuals and communities could enter into unequal, but reciprocal, relationships without the 
loss of honor or face.  These ties were reinforced by Italy’s long history of military 
confederations and shared military culture.  Through this system, Rome was able to harness the 
civic militarism of subject ‘allied’ communities, making it possible to demand and receive a 
greater share of the resources of Italy in both men and matériel.  This greater degree of 
mobilization in turn provided for the vast quantities of men, supplies and equipment on which 
Rome’s military dominance depended.  Here, then, is to be found the basis of Rome’s success 
and the foundation of a broader imperium which would change both Rome, Italy, and the 
Mediterranean world. 
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ARTIFACT CATALOG 
 
Roman/Italian 
Swords 
R1: Gladius, Roman 
Date: c. 69 
Find Location: Delos 
Material: Iron 
Dimensions: Length (total): 76cm; (blade): 63.1cm; (tang): 12.9cm; Width (blade): 5.7cm. 
Notes: The frame of the scabbard is still attached to the sword, with the suspension clearly 
preserved.  The blade is relatively wide and does not show signs of being waisted.  The date, put 
forward by Siebert, is in connection to a pirate sack of the sanctuary. 
 
Bibliography: Siebert (1987); Bishop and Coulston (2006), 55-6; Feugere (1994b). 
 
 
R2: Gladius, Roman 
Date: Second half of the first century B.C. 
Find Location: Soknopaiou, Nesos (El-Fayyum, Egypt) 
Material: Iron 
Dimensions: Length (total): 94.5cm; (blade): 77.3cm; (tang): 17.2cm; Thickness (blade, 
shoulders): 5.8cm, (blade, waist): 4.19cm, (blade, point-transition), 5.68cm; (tang) 1.7mm. 
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Mass: 1.3kg (including pommel and grip) 
Notes: Davoli and Miks contend the blade should be understood as a “spatha of the Nauportus 
type.”  However the blade is strongly waisted, as compared to the parallel-edged spatha and 
should probably be understood as an unusually large example of the hispaniensis. 
 
Bibliography: Davoli and Miks (2015). 
 
 
R3: Gladius, Roman 
Date: c. 100 
Find Location: Mouriès Bouches-du-Rhône, France 
Material: Iron 
Dimensions: Length (total): 76.5cm;  (blade): 63.7cm; (tang): 12.8cm. 
Notes: Blade is bent and badly fragmented, but the total length is preserved.  Weak waisting.  
Original blade shape is reconstructed by Connolly. 
 
Bibliography: Feugere (1994b); Connolly (1997). 
 
 
R4: Gladius, Roman 
Date: c. 20 
Find Location: Berry-Bouy à Fontillet, France 
Material: Iron 
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Dimensions: Length (total): 75.7cm; (blade): 66.7cm; (tang): 9cm. 
Notes: The tang is incomplete.  The sword itself is slightly waisted and preserved with parts of 
the scabbard frame. 
 
Bibliography: Feugere (1994b); Connolly (1997). 
 
 
R5: Gladius, Roman 
Date: Unknown (Republican?) 
Find Location: Boyer, France 
Material: Iron 
Dimensions: Length (total): 71.5cm; (blade): 67.5cm; (tang): 4cm. 
Notes: Sword is slightly waisted, but damage distorts the blade-shape.  Tang is incomplete at 
4cm; if the tang was a more normal length (c. 13cm), the total length ought to be c. 80.5cm. 
 
Bibliography: Feugere (1994b); Connolly (1997). 
 
 
R6: Gladius, Roman 
Date: Augustan (Connolly: Late Republic) 
Find Location: Grave 119, Guibiasco, Switzerland 
Material: Iron 
Dimensions: Length (total): 81cm; (blade): 68cm; (tang): 13cm. 
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Notes: Primas suggests an Augustan date, but Connolly notes that the Gallic artifacts the blade 
was found with suggest a Late Republican date. 
 
Bibliography: Primas (1992); Connolly (1997); Feugere (1994b); Bishop and Coulston (2006), 
55-6. 
 
 
R7: Gladius, Roman 
Date: Augustan/Late Republic? 
Find Location: Grave 471, Guibiasco, Switzerland 
Material: Iron 
Dimensions: Length (total): 69cm. 
Notes: Tang incomplete, blade is split into two fragments, but overall length preserved.  
Moderately waisted, in a similar shape (but not length) to the Soknopaiou sword. 
 
Bibliography: Connolly (1997). 
 
 
R8: Gladius, Roman 
Date: Caesarian 
Find Location: Osuna, Spain 
Material: Iron 
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Dimensions: Width (blade, at hilt): 6cm; (waist): 5cm.  Connolly reconstructs a length of 64-
65cm. 
 
Bibliography: Connolly (1997). 
 
 
R9: Gladius, Roman 
Date: 118 
Find Location: Tomb of Micipsa, Es Soumâ, Algeria  
Material: Iron 
Dimensions: 
Top Fragment: Length: 29.5; Width (before sheath): 5cm 
Tang: 2.1cm x 1.1cm 
Lower Fragment: Length: 37.6cm; Width (max): 5.1cm; Blade Width (approx..): 4.4cm 
Center Fragment: Length: 6.6cm 
Notes: Find location believed to be the tomb of Micipsa, d. 118, providing date.  Blade is badly 
damaged and corroded, broken into three fragments, but appears to be of the recognizable 
hispaniensis type. 
 
Bibliography: Ulbert (1979); Connolly (1997). 
 
 
R10: Gladius, Roman 
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Date: Second Century (c. 181-c. 100) 
Find Location: Grad, near Šmihel, Slovenia. 
Material: Iron 
Dimensions: Length (blade): 66cm; Width (blade, max): 4.2cm. 
Mass: digitally reconstructed, 680g 
Notes: Šmihel-1. Part of a horde of weapons and military equipment.  Elements of this find are 
now split between the National Museum of Slovenia and the Natural History Museum in Vienna, 
others separated/lost.  Blade is well preserved (but bent in original find-context), shows slight 
waisting. 
 
Bibliography: Horvat (1997); Horvat (2002); Kmetič, D., J. Horvat and F. Vodopivec (2004); 
Bishop and Coulston (2006), 55-6; Connolly (1997). 
 
 
R11: Gladius, Roman 
Date: Second Century (c. 181-c. 100) 
Find Location: Grad, near Šmihel, Slovenia. 
Material: Iron 
Dimensions: Length (blade) 62.2cm; Width (blade, max): 4.5cm. 
Mass: digitally reconstructed, 528g. 
Notes: Šmihel-2.  See R10 for find context.  Blade is shorter and slightly less waisted than R10.  
Tang slightly broken off, but otherwise complete. 
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Bibliography: Horvat (1997); Horvat (2002); Kmetič, D., J. Horvat and F. Vodopivec (2004); 
Bishop and Coulston (2006), 55-6; Connolly (1997). 
 
 
Pila 
R12: Pila (Horvat type 1), Roman 
Date: c.181-100 
Find Location: Grad, near Šmihel, Slovenia 
Material: Iron 
Dimensions: 12 examples, ranging from 22 to 30cm in length. 
Notes: Type is typified by larger points, shorter shanks and flat hafts.  The pilum shank has a 
square or rectangular cross-section, from 0.7 to 1.1cm wide.  Horvat (1997) classifies as type 1; 
Connolly (2000b) does not reconstruct the type.  See R10 for find context. 
 
Bibliography: Horvat (1997). 
 
 
R13: Pila (Horvat type 2), Roman 
Date: c. 181-100 
Find Location: Grad, near Šmihel, Slovenia 
Material: Iron 
Dimensions: 7 examples, ranging from 33 to 40cm in length 
Mass: Reconstructed: 340g (iron), with 1.04kg wooden haft. 
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Notes: Type 2 is narrower, with less emphasized barbs.  Type is reconstructed by Connolly 
(2000b).  See R10 for find context. 
 
Bibliography: Horvat (1997); Connolly (2000b). 
 
 
R14: Pila (Horvat, type 3), Roman 
Date: c. 181-100 
Find Location: Grad, near Šmihel, Slovenia 
Material: Iron 
Dimensions: 10 examples, ranging from 44 to 57cm in length 
Mass: Reconstructed: 250g (iron) with 0.96kg wooden haft 
Notes: Type 3 is a longer, square-hafted type, but with thinner construction and overall lower 
weight.  Type is reconstructed by Connolly (2000b).  See R10 for find context. 
 
Bibliography: Horvat (1997); Connolly (2000b). 
 
 
R15: Pila, socketed, Roman 
Date: c. 181-100 
Find Location: Grad, near Šmihel, Slovenia 
Material: Iron 
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Dimensions: 47 examples, most between 30 to 38cm in length, some shorter (between 20 to 
30cm in length).  Sockets c. 1.3cm diameter. 
Notes: Lighter, socketed type, not reconstructed by Connolly.  The shank is joined to the pilum 
by a socket secured by one or two rivets, rather than a flat haft. 
 
Bibliography: Horvat (1997). 
 
 
R16: Pila (Flat-tanged), Roman 
Date: Second century 
Find Location: Talamonaccio, Italy 
Material: Iron 
Dimensions: 16 examples.  Length (total): 25-32cm; (tang): 6-9cm; (shank and point): 14-20cm; 
(rivet nail, best preserved): 4.7cm. 
Mass: Reconstructed: 265g (iron) with 1.015kg wooden haft. 
Notes: M. Luik classifies these as ‘variente 1.’  They correspond to Horvat type 1 (R12) in form 
and size.  Reconstructed (as a single type with R17) by Connolly (2000b). 
 
Bibliography: Luik (2000); Connolly (2000b). 
 
 
R17: Pila (Flat-tanged), Roman 
Date: Second century 
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Find Location: Talamonaccio, Italy 
Material: Iron 
Dimensions: 3 examples.  Length (total): 29.3, 32.0, 35.3cm; (tang): 8-9cm; (shank and point): 
18-21.5cm; (rivet, best preserved): 5cm.  Width (tang): 4-5.5cm. 
Mass: Reconstructed: 265g (iron) with 1.015kg wooden haft. 
Notes: M. Luik classifies these as ‘variente 2.’  They correspond roughly to Horvat type 1 (R12) 
or type 2 (R13) in form and size.  Reconstructed (as a single type with R16), by Connolly 
(2000b). 
 
Bibliography: Luik (2000); Connolly (2000b). 
 
 
R18: Pila (Flat-tanged), Roman 
Date: Late second, early first century 
Find Location: Caminreal, Spain 
Material: Iron 
Dimensions: 4 examples: 
Pilum 1: Length (max): 95.1cm; (point): 9.2cm; (shank): 65.1cm; (tang): 20.8cm.  Width 
(tang): 4.5cm. 
Pilum 2: Length (max): 100.2cm; (point preserved): 5.5cm; (point estimate): 8.9cm; 
(shank): 79.3cm; (tang): 17.2cm.  Width (tang): 4cm. 
Pilum 3: Incomplete.  Length (preserved, total): 29.7cm.  Width (tang): 4cm. 
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Pilum 4: Incomplete.  Length (preserved, total): 64.3cm; (point preserved): 4.8cm; (point 
estimated): 8cm. 
Notes: Very long examples, with flat tangs secured by two large rivets.  Pilum 1 and 2 are well 
preserved, 3 and 4 are incomplete.  Connolly (2000b) considers this type connected to the 
Renieblas types discovered by Schulten (1929). 
 
Bibliography: Vicente et al. (1997); Connolly (2000b). 
 
 
R19: Pila (Socketed), Roman 
Date: Late second, early first century 
Find Location: Caminreal, Spain 
Material: Iron 
Dimensions: 4 examples: 
Pilum 1: Length (max): 32.4cm; (point) 2.6cm; (shank): 22cm; (socket): 7.7cm; (socket 
interior): 5.9cm.  Diameter (socket, interior): 1.4cm; (exterior): 2.4cm 
Pilum 2: Length (max): 50.5cm; (point) 3.9cm; (socket): 11.4cm; (socket interior): 
10.5cm; Diameter (socket, interior): 2.2cm; (exterior): 2.6cm 
Pilum 3: Length (max): 41.4cm; (socket): 11cm; (socket, interior): 9.6cm.  Diameter 
(socket, interior): 2.2cm; (exterior): 2.6cm. 
Pilum 4: Incomplete. Length (max): 32.9cm. 
Notes: Socketed ‘light’ pila.  Of the same form as R15, but substantially longer.  Pilum n. 3 
preserves the hole for fixing the rivet. 
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Bibliography: Vicente et al. (1997). 
 
 
Spears 
R20: Spearhead, Roman 
Date: Late second, early first century 
Find Location: Caminreal, Spain 
Material: Iron 
Dimensions: Length (total, preserved): 21.6; (blade): 11.5cm; (socket, external): 10cm; (socket, 
internal): 8.4cm.  Width (blade): 3.6cm.  Diameter (socket, external): 2.4cm; (internal): 1.4cm. 
Mass: Reconstructed digitally, c. 225g. 
Notes: Relatively small spearhead, ‘tear-drop’ shaped, with no mid-ridge.  Attached by a circular 
socket (rivet holes not preserved). 
Figure: 4.15 
 
Bibliography: Vicente et al. (1997), n˚IG10.133 
 
 
R21: Spearhead, Roman 
Date: Late second, early first century 
Find Location: Caminreal, Spain 
Material: Iron 
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Dimensions: Length (total, preserved): 31.6cm; (total, est.): 32.4cm; (blade, preserved): 20.4cm; 
(blade, est.): 21.2cm; (socket): 11cm; (socket, internal): 8.1cm.  Width (blade): 4cm.  Diameter 
(socket, external): 2.6cm; (internal): 1.6cm. 
Mass: Reconstructed digitally, c. 337g. 
Notes: Relatively long and narrow spearhead, with a lenticular section and elongated ‘tear-drop’ 
shape.  No mid-ridge.  Attached by a circular socket with a single rivet hole. 
Figure: 4.15 
 
Bibliography: Vicente et al. (1997), n˚IG15.781 
 
 
R22: Spearhead, Roman 
Date: Late second, early first century 
Find Location: Caminreal, Spain 
Material: Iron 
Dimensions: Length (total, preserved): 27.4cm; (total, est): 28.5; (blade, preserved): 18.3; (blade, 
est): 19.5cm;  (socket): 9.4cm.  Width (blade): 4.1cm.  Diameter (socket external): 2.6; (internal) 
1.6cm. 
Mass: Reconstructed digitally, c. 292g 
Notes: Mid-sized spearhead, with a lenticular section and ‘tear-drop’ shape.  No mid-ridge.  
Attached by a circular socket secured with a single rivet hole. 
Figure: 4.15 
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Bibliography: Vicente et al. (1997), n˚IG15.782 
 
 
R23: Spearhead, Roman 
Date: Late second, early first century 
Find Location: Caminreal, Spain 
Material: Iron 
Dimensions: Length (total): 19.5cm; (blade): 11.6cm; (socket): 7.8cm.  Width (blade): 3.5cm.  
Diameter (socket, external): 2.3; (internal): 1.8cm. 
Mass: Reconstructed digitally, c. 237.5g 
Notes: Smaller, ‘tear-drop’ shaped spearhead.  Flat, apparently lenticular section (somewhat 
obscured by corrosion).  No apparent mid-ridge.  Attached by a circular socket with a single rivet 
hole. 
Figure: 4.15 
 
Bibliography: Vicente et al. (1997), n˚IG15.786 
 
 
R24: Spearhead, Roman 
Date: Late second, early first century 
Find Location: Caminreal, Spain 
Material: Iron 
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Dimensions: Length (total): 44cm; (blade): 34.5cm; (socket): 9.5cm.  Width (blade): 2.6cm.  
Diameter (socket, external): 2.6cm; (internal): 1.4cm 
Mass: Reconstructed digitally, 318.5g 
Notes: Very large ‘stiletto’ or bodkin point spearhead.  The blade is somewhat corroded but 
seems to have had a rectangular or square section.  Attached by a circular socket.  Unusually 
large for this type. 
Figure: 4.15 
 
Bibliography: Vicente et al. (1997), n˚IG16.388 
 
 
R25: Spearhead, Roman 
Date: Late second, early first century 
Find Location: Caminreal, Spain 
Material: Iron 
Dimensions: 2 Fragments: 
Fragment 1: Length (total, preserved): 14.6cm; (blade): 5.4cm; (socket): 9.1cm; (socket, 
internal): 4.4cm.  Width (blade, preserved): 5.7cm; (blade, est.): 6.2cm.  Diameter (socket 
external): 2.5cm; (internal0: 1.8cm. 
Fragment 2: Length (total): 6.9cm.  Width (max): 2.3cm 
Notes: Spearhead is in two fragments: the bulk of the spearhead is fragment 1; the tip, broken 
off, is fragment 2. 
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Bibliography: Vincente et al. (1997), n˚IG16.357 and IG16.545. 
 
 
R26: Spearhead, Roman 
Date: Mid-second century 
Find Location: Numantia 
Material: Iron 
Dimensions: Length (total): 28.4cm.  Diameter (socket): c. 1.4cm.  Diameter measured from 
scale diagram. 
Notes: Socketed spearhead of the bodkin type.  Significantly smaller than R24. 
 
Bibliography: Schulten (1929), 209, taf 25.2. 
 
R27: Spearhead, Roman 
Date: Mid-second century 
Find Location: Numantia 
Material: Iron 
Dimensions: Length (total): 15.3cm.  Width (max): c. 3.6cm.  Diameter (socket): c. 3.3cm.  All 
but length measured from scale diagram. 
Notes: Socketed spearhead with a ‘tear-drop’ shaped tip.  Flat section, no mid-ridge. 
 
Bibliography: Schulten (1929), 209, taf. 26.2. 
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R28: Spearhead, Roman 
Date: Mid-second century 
Find Location: Numantia 
Material: Iron 
Dimension: Length (total): 19.8.  Width (max): c. 3.9cm.  Width measured from scale diagram. 
Notes: Spearhead with ‘tear-drop’ shape.  Cross-section is rhombic and concave, with a well-
pronounced mid-ridge.  The socket has been broken off. 
 
Bibliography: Schulten (1929), 209, taf. 26.3. 
 
 
R29: Spearhead, Roman 
Date: Mid-Second century 
Find Location: Numantia 
Material: Iron 
Dimensions: Length (total, preserved): 13.5cm; (total, est.): 16.5cm.  Width (max): c. 3cm.  
Diameter (socket): c. 2.5cm.  All but length measured from scale diagram. 
Notes: Spearhead with a ‘tear-drop’ shape and a pronounced mid-ridge.  Section is rhombic, but 
only mildly concave.  Socket appears to be only partially preserved; tip is missing (but rough 
size is reconstructed by Schulten). 
 
Bibliography: Schulten (1929), 209, taf. 26.5. 
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R30: Spearhead, Roman 
Date: Mid-Second century 
Find Location: Numantia 
Material: Iron 
Dimensions: Length (total): 16cm.  Width (max): c. 3.8cm.  Width measured from scale diagram. 
Notes: Spearhead, socket entirely lost.  ‘Tear-drop’ shaped blade with a midridge, concave cross-
section.  Edges of the blade of the spearhead are damaged.  Mid-ridge runs the length of the 
blade. 
 
Bibliography: Schulten (1929), 223, taf. 45.1. 
 
 
R31: Spearhead, Roman 
Date: Mid-Second century 
Find Location: Numantia 
Material: Iron 
Dimensions: Length (total): c. 21.8cm.  Width (max): c. 4.6cm.  Measured from scale diagram. 
Notes: No cross-section shown; appears flat or convex, with no mid-ridge.  Part of the socket is 
broken off, blade is worn on the edges. 
 
Bibliography: Schulten (1929), 223, taf. 45.3. 
 595 
 
 
R32: Spearhead, Roman 
Date: Mid-Second century 
Find Location: Numantia 
Material: Iron 
Dimensions: Length (total): c. 19.4cm.  Width (max): c.1.4cm.  Measured from scale diagram. 
Notes: No cross-section shown; appears rectangular in section.  ‘Stiletto’ or bodkin type spear-
head, with a long, apparently rectangular-section blade, attached by a circular socket. 
 
Bibliography: Schulten (1929), 223, taf. 45.4. 
 
 
R33: Spearhead, Roman 
Date: Mid-Second century 
Find Location: Numantia 
Material: Iron 
Dimensions: Length (total): c. 15.8cm; Width (max, reconstructed): c. 4cm.  Measured from 
scale diagram. 
Notes: Spearhead with ‘tear-drop’ shaped blade, with a strong central mid-ridge.  Circular socket 
is mostly lost.  Substantial damage to the edges of the blade.  Mid-ridge runs nearly the entire 
length of the blade. 
Figure: 4.13 
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Bibliography: Schulten (1929), 223, taf 45.5. 
 
 
R34: Spearhead, Roman 
Date: Mid-Second century 
Find Location: Numantia 
Material: Iron 
Dimensions: Length (total, preserved), c. 19.5cm; Width (max): c. 3.6cm.  Measured from scale 
diagram. 
Notes: Badly damaged spearhead with a flat blade.  No mid-ridge.  Point is missing and the 
edges of the badly damaged. 
 
Bibliography: Schulten (1929), 209, taf. 26.3. 
 
 
R35: Spearhead, Roman 
Date: Mid-second century 
Find Location: Numantia 
Material: Iron 
Dimensions: Length (total): c. 22cm.  Width (max): c. 1.2cm.  Measured from scale diagram. 
Notes: Mid-sized ‘stiletto’ or bodkin point with a rectangular cross-section, attached by a circular 
socket. 
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Bibliography: Schulten (1929), taf 32.5a. 
 
 
R36: Spearhead, Roman 
Date: Mid-second century 
Find Location: Numantia 
Material: Iron 
Dimensions: Length (total): c. 25.6cm.  Width (max); c. 1.2cm.  Measured from scale diagram. 
Notes: mid-sized ‘stiletto’ or bodkin point with a rectangular cross-section, attached by a circular 
socket. 
 
Bibliography: Schulten (1929), taf. 32.6 
 
 
R37: Spearhead, Roman 
Date: c. 80 
Find Location: Caceres, Spain 
Material: Iron 
Dimensions: Length (total): 21.1cm.  Width (max): 3cm.  Diameter (socket): 2.8cm. 
Notes: ‘Tear-drop’ shaped spearhead with a fairly flat blade, attached by a circular socket.  No 
mid-ridge. 
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Bibliography: Ulbert (1984), 105, 224, taf 24; cat. n˚181. 
 
 
R38: Spearhead, Roman 
Date: c. 80 
Find Location: Caceres, Spain 
Material: Iron 
Dimensions: Length (total, preserved): 14cm.  Width (max): 3.3cm. Diameter (socket, internal): 
1.3cm. 
Notes: ‘Tear-drop’ shaped spearhead with a fairly flat blade and no mid-ridge.  Left side of the 
blade is damaged and the point is partially lost.  Socket is missing. 
 
Bibliography: Ulbert (1984), 105, 224, taf 24; cat n˚182. 
 
 
R39: Spearhead, Roman 
Date: c. 80 
Find Location: Caceres, Spain 
Material: Iron 
Dimensions: Length (total, preserved): 15.5cm.  Width (max): 4.8cm.  Diameter (socket): 4.8cm. 
Notes: Spearhead, ‘tear-drop’ shape with a flat cross-section.  The blade is broken off perhaps 
1/2 to 1/3 of the way down, with most of the blade missing. 
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Bibliography: Ulbert (1984), 105,225, taf 24; cat. n˚183. 
 
 
R40: Spearhead, Roman 
Date: c. 80 
Find Location: Caceres, Spain 
Material: Iron 
Dimensions: Length (total) 24.5cm.  Diameter (socket): 1.8cm. 
Notes: Spearhead, ‘tear-drop’ shaped with a strong mid-ridge running that runs the entire blade 
all the way to the point.  This example has a very long blade, with a very short socket.  The edges 
of the blade are badly damaged, original width uncertain. 
Figure: 4.13 
 
Bibliography: Ulbert (1984), 105, 225, taf 24; cat. n˚184. 
 
 
 
R41: Spearhead, Roman/Numidian 
Date: 118 
Find Location: Tomb of Micipsa, Es Soumâ, Algeria 
Material: Iron 
Dimensions: Length (total): 29.7cm.  Width (blade): 3.8cm.  Diameter (socket): 1.6cm. 
Mass: 77g 
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Notes: See R9 for dating.  Spearhead is ‘tear-drop’ shaped with a weak mid-ridge and a rhombic 
cross-section, attached by a round socket.  The blade is mostly intact.  Ulbert classifies it as a 
wurflanzenspitzen; this is supported by the very light construction of the tip, but argued against 
by the shape of it, which is very wide for a throwing weapon.  Could also be the tip of a hasta; 
lightness may be due to multi-purpose use (throwing, thrusting), in a Numidian context. 
 
Bibligraophy: Ulbert (1979), 333-8, taf. 125.2. 
 
 
R42: Spearhead, Roman/Numidian 
Date: 118 
Find Location: Tomb of Micipsa, Es Soumâ, Algeria 
Material: Iron 
Dimensions: Length (total): 30cm.  Width (blade): 3.8cm.  Diameter (socket): 1.5cm. 
Mass: 73g. 
Notes: See R9 for dating.  Spearhead is ‘tear-drop’ shaped with a weak mid-ridge and a rhombic 
cross-section, attached by a round socket.  The blade is mostly intact.  Ulbert classifies it as a 
wurflanzenspitzen; this is supported by the very light construction of the tip, but argued against 
by the shape of it, which is very wide for a throwing weapon.  Could also be the tip of a hasta; 
lightness may be due to multi-purpose use (throwing, thrusting), in a Numidian context. 
 
Bibliography: Ulbert (1979), 333-8, taf. 125.3. 
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R43: Spearhead, Roman/Numidian 
Date: 118 
Find Location: Tomb of Micipsa, Es Soumâ, Algeria 
Material: Iron 
Dimensions: Length (total, preserved); 18.5cm; (total, est.); 21cm.  Width (blade): 2.8cm.  
Diameter (socket): 1.3cm. 
Mass: 68g. 
Notes: See R9 for dating.  Spearhead is ‘tear-drop’ shaped with a weak mid-ridge and a rhombic 
cross-section, attached by a round socket.  The blade is mostly intact.  Ulbert classifies it as a 
wurflanzenspitzen; this is supported by the very light construction of the tip, but argued against 
by the shape of it, which is very wide and rather long for a throwing weapon.  Could also be the 
tip of a hasta; lightness may be due to multi-purpose use (throwing, thrusting), in a Numidian 
context. 
 
Bibliography: Ulbert (1979), 333-8, taf 126.1. 
 
 
R44: Spearhead, Roman/Numidian 
Date: 118 
Find Location: Tomb of Micipsa, Es Soumâ, Algeria 
Material: Iron 
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Dimensions: Length (total, preserved): 17.4; (total, est.): 22cm.  Width (blade); 2.8cm.  Diameter 
(socket): 1.3cm. 
Mass: 66g. 
Notes: See R9 for dating.  Spearhead is ‘tear-drop’ shaped with a weak mid-ridge and a rhombic 
cross-section, attached by a round socket.  The blade is mostly intact.  Ulbert classifies it as a 
wurflanzenspitzen; this is supported by the very light construction of the tip, but argued against 
by the shape of it, which is a bit wide and rather long for a throwing weapon.  Could also be the 
tip of a hasta; lightness may be due to multi-purpose use (throwing, thrusting), in a Numidian 
context. 
 
Bibliography: Ulbert (1979), 333-8, taf 126.2. 
 
 
R45: Spearhead, Roman/Numidian 
Date: 118 
Find Location: Tomb of Micipsa, Es Soumâ, Algeria 
Material: Iron 
Dimensions: Length (total): 18.2cm; (blade): 10.7cm.  Width (square head at base): 1.1cm.  
Diameter (socket): 1.2cm. 
Mass: 66g 
Notes: See R9 for dating.  Spearhead is a ‘stiletto’ or bodkin point with a square cross-section.  
Spearhead is almost entirely intact with only light damage to the socket.  Ulbert identifies this 
weapon as a wurfgeschosspitze, but this seems unlikely due to the narrow, bodkin-type point. 
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Figure: 4.16 
 
Bibliography: Ulbert (1979), 333-8, taf 126.5. 
 
 
R46: Spearhead, Roman/Numidian 
Date: 118 
Find Location: Tomb of Micipsa, Es Soumâ, Algeria 
Material: Iron 
Dimensions: Length (total): 17.8cm.  Width (square head at base): 1cm.  Diameter (socket); 
1.2cm. 
Mass: 67g 
Notes: See R9 for dating.  Spearhead is a ‘stiletto’ or bodkin point with a square cross-section.  
Spearhead is almost entirely intact with only light damage to the socket.  Ulbert identifies this 
weapon as a wurfgeschosspitze, but this seems unlikely due to the narrow, bodkin-type point. 
Figure: 4.16 
 
Bibliography: Ulbert, (1979), 333-8, taf. 126.6. 
 
 
R47: Spear Butt, Roman 
Date: Late second, early first century 
Find Location: Caminreal, Spain 
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Material: Iron 
Dimensions: Length (total): 13.6, (socket, internal): 5.5cm.  Diameter (max): 2.4cm. 
Mass: Reconstructed digitally, c. 81.4g 
Notes: Iron spear butt, in a simple conical shape. 
 
Bibliography: Vincente et al. (1997), n˚IG16.476. 
 
 
R48: Spear Butt, Roman 
Date: Late second, early first century 
Find Location: Caminreal, Spain 
Material: Iron 
Dimensions: Length (total): 8.4cm; (socket, internal): 7.5cm.  Diameter (max): 2.3cm. 
Mass: Reconstructed digitally, c. 69.5g 
Notes: Iron spear butt, in a simple conical shape.  A relatively small and light example. 
 
Bibliography: Vincente et al. (1997), n˚IG16.397. 
 
 
R49: Spear Butt, Roman/Numidian 
Date: 118 
Find Location: Tomb of Micipsa, Es Soumâ, Algeria 
Material: Iron 
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Dimensions: Length (total, preserved) 14.7cm; (total, est.): 18cm.  Diameter (socket, max): 
1.2cm 
Mass: 47g. 
Notes: See R9 for dating.  Iron spear, butt, in a simple conical shape.  A quite small and light 
example (probably matching the much lighter spearheads found in the same deposit). 
 
Bibliography: Ulbert (1979), 333-8, taf. 126.3. 
 
 
R50: Spear Butt, Roman/Numidian 
Date: 118 
Find Location: Tomb of Micipsa, Es Soumâ, Algeria 
Material: Iron 
Dimensions: Length (total, preserved): 16.4cm; (total, est.): 17.5cm.  Diameter (socket, max): 
1.4cm. 
Mass: 58g. 
Notes: See R9 for dating.  Iron spear, butt, in a simple conical shape.  A quite small and light 
example (probably matching the much lighter spearheads found in the same deposit). 
 
Bibliography: Ulbert (1979), 333-8, taf 126.4. 
 
 
Shields 
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R51: Round Umbo?  Roman 
Date: Mid-second century 
Find Location: Numantia 
Material: Bronze 
Dimensions: Diameter (total): 14.5cm.  Width (outer flat section): 1.5cm.  Height (raised portion, 
max): 1.2cm.  Measurements from scale diagram. 
Mass: Estimated 140g if made in bronze. 
Notes: Bronze circular plate with a raised center.  Three rivets for attachment to some sort of 
backing, potentially shield, like the parma.  The center of the plate is raised in a dome, with a flat 
outer edge. 
 
Bibliography: Schulten (1929), 210, taf. 26.22. 
 
 
R52: Umbo, Roman. 
Date: Late second, early first century 
Find Location: Caminreal, Spain 
Dimensions: Width (max): c. 23.5cm; (wing): c. 6cm.  Height (center): c. 10cm; (max, wing): 
20cm.  Measurements from scale diagram. 
Mass: Reconstructed digitally, 281.8g. 
Notes: Iron butterfly boss from Caminreal, published without measurements, but with scale 
drawing.  There is a rectangular puncture in the center of the hull of the boss; the right wing has 
a small part of the top tip missing, the left wing has lost a larger part of the top tip. 
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Figure: 4.20 
 
Bibliography: Vicente et al. (1997), fig 40, IG 15.760; Bishop and Coulston (2006), 62. 
 
 
R53: Umbo, Roman. 
Date: Late second, early first century 
Find Location: Caminreal, Spain 
Dimensions: Width (max): c. 24cm; (wing): c. 6.25-6.5cm.  Height (center): c. 11cm; (max, 
wing): 16cm.  Measurements from scale diagram. 
Mass: Reconstructed digitally, 264.3g 
Notes: Iron butterfly boss from Caminreal, published without measurements, but with scale 
drawing.  The boss is almost entirely intact, with only a bit of the top tip of one wing missing.  
The hulls of three of the four securing rivets are still visible. 
Figure: 4.20 
 
Bibliography: Vicente et al. (1997), fig 40, IG 11.630; Bishop and Coulston (2006), 62. 
 
 
R54: Shield Binding, Roman (Imperial) 
Date: Imperial (unstratified) 
Find Location: Carnafon, Wales 
Material: Copper-alloy 
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Dimensions: Length (total): 83mm (broken).  Width: 1.9cm.  Thickness: 0.5mm. 
Notes: Metal shield binding for preventing the edge of a shield from delaminating.  In its original 
state, it would have run the length of an edge of the scutum. 
 
Bibliography: Chapman (2005), 106. 
 
 
R55: Shield Binding, Roman (Imperial) 
Date: Imperial (unstratified) 
Find Location: Carnafon, Wales. 
Material: Copper-alloy 
Dimensions: Length (total): 110mm (broken).  Width 1.9cm.  Thickness: 0.5mm. 
Notes: Metal shield binding for preventing the edge of a shield from delaminating.  In its original 
state, it would have run the length of an edge of the scutum. 
 
Bibliography: Chapman (2005), 106. 
 
 
R56: Shield Maniple, Roman (Imperial) 
Date: c. 200-300 C.E. 
Find Location: Caerleon, Wales 
Material: Iron 
Dimensions: Length (total): 12.0cm.  Width: 1.6cm.  Thickness: c.6mm. 
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Notes: Part of the a shield grip for an imperial-era scutum.  Perforations for nails to attach to the 
shield preserved at the ends of the strip; one preserves a nail.  Incomplete. 
 
Bibliography: Chapman (2005), 105. 
 
 
R57: Shield Maniple, Roman (Imperial) 
Date: c. 200-300 C.E. 
Find Location: Caerleon, Wales 
Material: Iron 
Dimensions: Length (total): 22.0cm.  Width: 1.5cm.  Thickness: c.8mm. 
Notes: Bar of rectangular section, with expanded disc at one end to provide space for it to be 
riveted or nailed to the shield.  There is a second swelling two-fifths of the way across the 
surface which may have been the beginning of a second disc for the same purpose. 
 
Bibliography: Chapman (2005), 105. 
 
 
R58: Shield Maniple? Roman 
Date: Mid-second century 
Find Location: Numantia 
Material: Iron 
Dimensions: Length: 35.4cm.  Width c. 2.4cm.  Width measured from scale diagram. 
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Notes: Metal bar with three rivets driven through (still extent when diagrammed by Schulten).  
Schulten terms it an “iron fitting the use of which cannot be determined” but it is the right size 
and length for a reinforcing strip for a shield maniple. 
 
Bibliography: Schulten (1929), 221, taf. 41.1. 
 
 
R59: Shield Maniple?  Roman 
Date: Mid-second century 
Find Location: Numantia 
Material: Iron 
Dimensions: Length 28.8cm.  Width 3.6cm.  Width measured from scale diagram. 
Notes: Rectangular metal bar with two rivers.  Schulten terms it an “iron fitting the use of which 
cannot be determined” but it is the right size and length for a reinforcing strip for a shield 
maniple. 
 
Bibliography: Schulten (1929), 221, taf 41.2. 
 
 
R60: Shield Maniple?  Roman 
Date: Mid-second century 
Find Location: Numantia 
Material: Iron 
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Dimensions: Length 14.7cm.  Width: 3.3cm.  Width measured from scale drawing. 
Notes: Thin iron plate, bent outwards in the middle, with rivet holes on both end.  Schulten terms 
it an “iron fitting the use of which cannot be determined” but it is the right size and length for a 
reinforcing strip for a shield maniple. 
 
Bibliography: Schulten (1929), 221, taf 41.3. 
 
 
 
Body Armor – Mail 
R61: Armor Rings, Roman 
Date: c. 150 
Find Location: Numantia (Lager III) 
Material: Bronze 
Dimensions: Diameter (rings): 0.9-1.1cm.  Thickness (wire of rings): 1mm.  Measured from 
scale diagram. 
Mass: Estimated, c. 0.18g per ring. 
Notes: Set of ten armor rings, joined in the standard four-in-one pattern. 
 
Bibligraphy: Schulten (1929), 210 and taf. 26.20. 
 
 
R62: Armor Rings, Roman, Imperial 
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Date: Unknown (Imperial) 
Find Location: Ouddorp, Leiden, Netherlands 
Material: Gilded Bronze 
Dimensions: 6 Rings.  Diameter (outer): 3.062mm to 3.197mm; (inner): 2.123mm to 2.268.  
Thickness: 0.51 to 0.63mm. 
Notes: Individual ring measurements in Sim (1997).  Quite small rings, manufactured to fairly 
high size standard tolerances.  Alternating rivets and solid rings, in a four-in-one pattern.  Likely 
produced by punching from a solid sheet, rather than wire-drawing. 
 
Bibliography: Sim (1997). 
 
 
R63: Armor Rings, Roman, Imperial 
Date: Second century C.E. 
Find Location: Caerleon, Wales 
Material: Iron 
Dimensions: 10 Rings.  Diameter (outer): 6.6mm to 7.8mm; (inner): 4.4mm to 5.4mm.  
Thickness: 0.8mm to 1.4mm. 
Notes: Individual ring measurements in Sim (1997).  Fairly large rings, manufactured to 
moderately high tolerances. 
 
Bibliography: Sim (1997) 
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R64: Armor Rings, Roman, Imperial 
Date: 150-250 CE 
Find Location: Thorsberg, Germany 
Material: Iron 
Dimensions: Two rings measured (more in find) from scale image.  Diameter (Outer): 3.8mm, 
4.2mm; (inner): c. 3.5mm.  Thickness: 0.3-0.5mm. 
Notes: Rings pictured in Sim and Kaminski (2012), and discussed in Sim (1997), but without a 
full list of measurements. 
 
Bibliography: Sim and Kaminski (2012), 114, 125, fig 88; Sim (1997). 
 
 
R65: Armor Ring Concretion, Roman, Imperial 
Find Location: Arbeia, England 
Material: Iron 
Dimensions: Concretion (number of rings unclear).  Diameter (outer): c. 7.5mm.  Thickness (ring 
wire): c. 1.3mm. 
Notes: Concretion of rings rusted together.  Measurements listed alongside image in Sim and 
Kaminski (2012). 
 
Bibliography: Sim and Kaminski (2012), pl. 4b. 
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R66: Armor Rings, Roman, Imperial 
Date: Mid-first century C.E. (listed as ‘Pre-Flavian’)  
Find Location: Usk, Wales 
Material: Iron 
Dimensions: Ring Diameter (average): 4.3+-0.3mm.  Thickness: c. 1mm. 
 
Bibliography: Chapman (2005), cat. Ma03. 
Current Location: National Museum of Wales, acc. N˚82.11H 
 
R67: Armor Rings, Roman, Imperial 
Date: Mid-first century C.E. (listed as ‘Pre-Flavian’) 
Find Location: Usk, Wales 
Material: Iron 
Dimensions: Ring Diameter (average): 5.4±0.8mm.  Thickness 1.1mm. 
 
Bibliography: Chapman (2005), cat. Ma04. 
Current Location: National Museum of Wales, acc. N˚82.11H 
 
 
R68: Armor Rings, Roman, Imperial 
Date: Mid-first century C.E. (listed as ‘Pre-Flavian’) 
Find Location: Usk, Wales 
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Material: Iron 
Dimensions: Six Fragments (Ring diameter; thickness) 
 i: 2.8±0.2mm; 0.7mm thick 
ii. 2.7±0.3mm; 0.6mm thick 
iii: 2.6±0.3mm; 0.6mm thick 
iv 2.6±0.2mm; 0.7mm thick 
v. 2.5 ±0.1mm; 0.8mm thick 
vi 2.4±0.3mm; 0.7mm thick 
Notes: Six fragments of mail.  All six pieces probably came from the same armor of very fine 
mail. 
 
Bibliography: Chapman (2005), cat. Ma04. 
Current Location: National Museum of Wales, acc. N˚82.11H 
 
 
R69: Armor Rings, Roman, Imperial 
Date: Mid-first century C.E. (listed as ‘Pre-Flavian’) 
Find Location: Usk, Wales 
Material: Iron 
Dimensions: Ring Diameter (average): 8.0±0.4mm.  Thickness: 1.6mm. 
 
Bibliography: Chapman (2005), cat. Ma06. 
Current Location: National Museum of Wales, acc. N˚82.11H 
 616 
 
 
R70: Armor Rings, Roman, Imperial 
Date: Mid-first century C.E. (listed as ‘Pre-Flavian’) 
Find Location: Usk, Wales 
Material: Iron 
Dimensions: Three Fragments; Ring Diameter (all fragments, average): 2.6±0.2mm.  Thickness 
(all fragments, average): 0.5mm. 
Notes: R70 and R71 were initially included by Chapman (2005) under a single heading (Ma07).  
However, Chapman reckons these rings were part of two armors, one relatively finer (R70) and 
one of lower quality (R71), so I have split them into two entries accordingly. 
 
Bibliography: Chapman (2005), cat. Ma07. 
Current Location: National Museum of Wales, acc. N˚82.11H 
 
 
R71: Armor Rings, Roman, Imperial 
Date: Mid-first century C.E. (listed as ‘Pre-Flavian’) 
Find Location: Usk, Wales 
Material: Iron 
Dimensions: Three Fragments (ring diameter; thickness): 
i. c.5.5mm; c.1.2mm thick 
ii. 5.0±0.4mm; c. 1.0mm thick 
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iii. 6.1±0.8mm; c. 1.0mm thick 
Notes: R70 and R71 were initially included by Chapman (2005) under a single heading (Ma07).  
However, Chapman reckons these rings were part of two armors, one relatively finer (R70) and 
one of lower quality (R71), so I have split them into two entries accordingly. 
 
Bibliography: Chapman (2005), cat. Ma07. 
Current Location: National Museum of Wales, acc. N˚82.11H 
 
 
Body Armor – Pectoral 
R72: Rectangular Anatomical Cuirass, Southern Italian 
Date: 365-325 
Find Location: Unknown (Southern Italy) 
Material: Bronze 
Dimensions: Height: 27.94cm.  Width: 30.48cm.  Thickness: c.2mm. 
Mass: Front Plate: 877g; Back Plate 707g. 
Notes: Front and back plate from a rectangular anatomical cuirass.  The front plate is decorated 
with stylized muscles.  Attachment points on the shoulders and at the sides are visible.  Connolly 
(1986) suggests that there would have been side and shoulder plates in addition to the front and 
back plates. 
Figure: 4.33 
 
Bibliography: Connolly (1986). 
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Current Location: British Museum 1902,0428.2 
 
 
R73: Rectangular Anatomical Cuirass?  Italian/Western Greek? 
Date: Undated 
Find Location: Unknown 
Material: Bronze 
Dimensions: Height: 35cm 
Notes: Heavily damaged front plate.  Connolly (1986) identifies this as an Italian type, but it 
could also be the remains of a Greek-style muscle cuirass.  The matching back-plate is R74. 
Figure: 5.22 
 
Bibliography: Connolly (1986) 
Current Location: British Museum 1772,0303.140a 
 
 
R74: Rectangular Anatomical Cuirass?  Italian/Western Greek? 
Date: Undated 
Find Location: Unknown 
Material: Bronze 
Dimensions: Height: 32.5cm 
Notes: Damaged back-plate.  Connolly (1986) identifies this as an Italian type, but it could also 
be the remains of a Greek-style muscle cuirass.  The matching front-plate is R73. 
 619 
 
Bibliography: Connelly (1986) 
Current Location: British Museum 1772,0303.140b 
 
 
R75: Rectangular Anatomical Cuirass, Italian/Western Greek 
Date: Undated 
Find Location: Ruvo di Puglia, Italy. 
Material: Bronze 
Dimensions: Height 31.75.  Width 33.02cm. 
Notes: Damaged front plate.  Connolly (1986) identifies this as an Italian type.  The plate appears 
too flat to have been the front of a muscle-cuirass. 
 
Bibliography: Connolly (1986). 
Current Location: British Museum 1867,0508.196. 
 
 
R76: Rectangular Anatomical Cuirass, Italian/Western Greek 
Date: Fourth century 
Find Location: Tomb 2, Paestum, Italy. 
Material: Bronze 
Dimensions: Height (front plate): 30cm; (back plate): 32cm; (side plate): 10.4cm.  Width (front 
plate): 28cm; (back plate): 28cm; (side plate): 7.9cm. 
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Notes: Similar in form to R72, but with the side plates preserved. 
 
Current Location: Paestum Museo Archeologico Nazionale, Inv. 4815. 
 
 
R77: Rectangular Anatomical Cuirass, Italian/Western Greek 
Date: 340-330 
Find Location: Santa Croce Necropolis, Eboli, Italy 
Material: Bronze 
Dimensions: Height (front plate): 37cm; (back plate): 29.5cm; (connecting plates): 8.6cm and 
8.9cm.  Width (front plate): 27.6cm; (back plate): 29.5cm; (connecting plates): 11.6 and 12.6cm. 
Notes: Rectangular cuirass with stylized anatomical surface decoration.  Very similar in style to 
R72.  The plates all have small perforations for attachment to a textile or leather packing.  Only 
the side-plates have survived, but Carratelli (1996) notes there would have been shoulder plates. 
 
Bibliography: Carratelli (1996), 649. 
Current Location: Paestum Mueso Archeologico Nazionale, inv. 133158. 
 
 
R78: Triple Disc Pectoral, Italian 
Date: 400-300 
Find Location: Ruvo, Italy 
Material: Bronze 
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Dimensions: Height: 26.67cm.  Thickness: c. 1mm. 
Mass: 352g 
Notes: Triple disc pectoral front-plate, but with significant damage.  Substantial chip on the 
lowermost disc.  Upper right disc has a significant hole in it. Crack on the lower right edge of the 
left disc. 
Figure: 4.35 
 
Current Location: British Museum, 1856,1226.665. 
 
 
R79: Triple Disc Pectoral, Samnite 
Date: Late fourth century 
Find Location: Alfedena, Abruzzo, Italy 
Material: Bronze 
Dimensions: Height (front plate): 28cm; (back plate); 27.5cm; (shoulder plates, each): 10cm; 
(side plates, each): 19cm.  Width (front plate): 26.5cm; (back plate): 27cm. 
 
Bibliography: Cianfarani (1969). 
Current Location: Mueso Archaeologico A. De Nino Alfedena 
 
 
 
Helmets 
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R80: Helmet, Montefortino, Roman 
Date: Mid-fourth to mid-third century 
Find Location: Unknown (Italy?) 
Material: Bronze, with iron reinforcements 
Dimensions: Length: 21.5cm; Width: 16.0cm; Height: 18.0cm.  Thickness: 2-3mm. 
Mass: 2,010g 
Notes: Rather heavy example of a Montefortino helmet; cheek-guards are intact.  Find location is 
unknown, but Junkelmann (2000), 93 notes, “probably Italy.”  Junkelmann identifies this helmet 
as being cast bronze, but there are tool marks visible on the inside of the helmet in one image, 
suggesting it was raised by hammering instead.  From the Axel Guttmann Collection. 
 
Bibliography: Junkelmann (2000), 93-4, cat. AG441. 
 
 
R81: Helmet, Montefortino, Roman 
Date: Mid-fourth to mid-third century 
Find Location: Unknown (Italy?) 
Material: Bronze, with iron fragments 
Dimensions: Length: 20.5cm; Width: 17.0cm; Height: 20.0cm.  Thickness: 2-3mm. 
Mass: 1,895g 
Notes: Montefortino-type helmet; cheek-guards are intact.  From the Axel Guttmann Collection. 
 
Bibliography: Junkelmann (2000), 95-6, cat. AG323. 
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R82: Helmet, Montefortino, Roman 
Date: Mid-fourth to mid-third century 
Find Location: Unknown (Italy?) 
Material: Bronze, with iron fragments 
Dimensions: Length: 21.0cm; Width: 16.5cm; Height: 18.3cm.  Thickness: 2-3mm. 
Mass: 2,204g. 
Notes: Montefortino-type helmet; cheek-guards are intact.  From the Axel Guttmann Collection. 
 
Bibliography: Junkelmann (2000), 96, cat. AG425. 
 
 
R83: Helmet, Montefortino, Roman 
Date: Mid-fourth to mid-third century 
Find Location: Unknown (Italy?) 
Material: Bronze, with iron rivets 
Dimensions: Length: 20.0cm; Width: 17.0cm; Height: 18.5cm.  Thickness: 1-3mm. 
Mass: 1,180g 
Notes: Motefortino-type helmet.  The cheek-guards are lost, but the attachment points and the 
rivets for attachment are clearly visible.  From the Axel Guttmann Collection. 
 
Bibliography: Junkelmann (2000), 96, cat. AG542. 
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R84: Helmet, Montefortino, Roman 
Date: Late-fourth to mid-third century 
Find Location: Unknown (Italy?) 
Material: Bronze 
Dimensions: Length 20.5cm; Width: 16.4cm.  Thickness: 1-1.5mm; 3.5mm on the rim.  No 
height given. 
Mass: 868g. 
Notes: Montefortino-type helmet.  The cheek-guards are lost, but the attachment points are 
clearly visible.  From the Axel Guttmann Collection. 
 
Bibliography: Junkelmann (2000), 106, cat. AG181. 
 
 
R85: Helmet, Montefortino, Roman 
Date: Third century 
Find Location: Unknown (Italy?) 
Material: Bronze 
Dimensions: Length 22.0cm; Width: 18.5cm; Height: 22.0cm.  Thickness: 2.5mm; 5mm at the 
rim. 
Mass: 1,315g 
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Notes: Montefortino-type helmet.  The cheek-guards are lost, but the attachment points are 
visible.  From the Axel Guttmann Collection. 
 
Bibliography: Juneklmann, (2000), 107, cat. AG130. 
 
 
R86: Helmet, Montefortino, Roman 
Date: Mid to late-third century 
Find Location: Unknown (Italy?) 
Material: Bronze, with tin soldering 
Dimensions: Length 22.7cm; Width: 17.0cm; Height: 25.5cm.  Thickness: 1-2mm; 4.5mm at the 
rim. 
Mass: 1,180g 
Notes: Montefortino-type helmet.  The cheek-guards are lost.  The helmet is unusually high and 
thin.  Multiple instances of repair on the helmet. 
 
Bibliography: Junkelmann (2000), 109-10, cat. AG290. 
 
 
R87: Helmet, Montefortino, Roman 
Date: Second-half of second century to first half of first century 
Find Location: Unknown 
Material: Bronze 
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Dimensions: Length: 21.2cm; Width: 19.4cm; Height: 22.7cm.  Thickness: 1-2mm. 
Mass: 984g. 
Notes: Montefortino-type helmet.  Compared to earlier examples (R80, R81, R82, etc), the trend 
towards lighter construction is clear.  Cheek-guards are missing. 
 
Bibliography: Junkelmann (2000), 111, cat. AG597. 
 
 
R88: Helmet, Montefortino, Roman 
Date: Late second to early first century 
Find Location: Unknown 
Material: Bronze 
Dimensions: Length: 21.6cm; Width: 21.0cm; Height: 16.8cm.  Thickness 1-1.5mm. 
Mass: 680g. 
Notes: Montefortino-type helmet.  Relatively low helmet bowl.  Trend towards lighter 
construction in the late second/early first century.  There is a maker’s mark on the back of the 
helmet reading PX.  Cheek-guards lost. 
 
Bibliography: Junkelmann (2000), 113, cat. AG266. 
 
 
R89: Helmet, Montefortino, Roman 
Date: Late second to first half of first century. 
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R89: Helmet, Montefortino, Roman 
Date: Late second to first half of first century 
Find Location: Unknown 
Material: Bronze 
Dimensions: Length: 21.0cm; Width: 18.3cm; Height: 19.3cm.  Thickness: 1.5-3mm. 
Mass: 960g 
Notes: Montefortino-type helmet.  Cheek-guards lost, otherwise intact. 
 
Bibliography: Junkelmann (2000), 115, cat. AG310. 
 
 
R90: Helmet, Montefortino, Roman 
Date: 300-100 
Find Location: Montefortino, Italy 
Material: Bronze 
Dimensions: Length: 22.86cm; Height 20.32cm. 
Mass: 1,180g 
Notes: Montefortino-type helmet.  Cheek-guards lost, otherwise intact.  Paddock (1993) assigns 
to type IV (third to second century). 
 
Bibliography: Paddock (1993), cat. 192. 
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Current Location: British Museum 1867,0508.202. 
 
 
R91: Helmet, Montefortino, Roman 
Date: 250-150 
Find Location: Vulci, Italy 
Material: Bronze 
Dimensions: Height 20.32cm.  Thickness (body): c.3mm; (rim): 6mm. 
Mass: 1,270g. 
Notes: Montefortino-type helmet.  Some surface corrosion and slightly deformed, but largely 
intact.  Cheek-guards lost, but attachment points visible. 
 
Current Location: British Museum 1847,0806.159. 
 
 
R92: Helmet, Montefortino, Roman 
Date: 220-170 
Find Location: Unknown. 
Material: Bronze 
Dimensions: Diameter (base): 21.7cm.  Height: 19.2cm.  Thickness (body): c.2mm; (rim): 
3.5mm. 
Notes: Montefortino-type helmet.  Well preserved, but cheek-guards missing.  Attachment points 
for the cheek-guards clearly visible. 
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Current Location: British Museum 1975,0603.1. 
 
 
R93: Helmet, Montefortino, Roman 
Date: Third to second century 
Find Location: Unknown 
Material: Bronze 
Dimensions: Height (helmet): 35cm; (cheek-guard): 14.4cm.  Width (helmet, max): 23.3cm; 
(cheek-guard, max): 9.8cm.  Thickness: 4mm. 
Notes: Montefortino-type helmet.  Appears very well preserved, with both cheek-guards 
apparently intact. 
 
Current Location: MAN Madrid 1999/99/9. 
 
 
R94: Pair of Cheek-Guards from a Montefortino Helmet, Roman 
Date: Mid-third to early second century 
Find Location: Unknown 
Material: Bronze 
Dimensions: Width (top): 13.5cm; Height: 14.4cm.  Thickness: 2mm to 2.5mm. 
Mass: 350g (each) 
Notes: A pair of matching cheek-guards, separated from their helmet. 
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Figure: 4.37 
 
Bibliography: Junkelmann (2000), 163, cat. AG548 and AG549. 
 
 
R95: Cheek-Guard from a Montefortino helmet, Roman 
Date: Late first century B.C.E. to first half of first century C.E. 
Find Location: Unknown 
Material: Brass 
Dimensions: Height: 15.2cm; Width (max): 11.7cm.  Thickness: 0.8mm to 1.4mm. 
Mass: 92g (single). 
Notes: Single cheek-guard from the Late Republic or Early Imperial periods, produced in brass.  
It is quite thin, corresponding to the declining weight and manufacture standards of helmets in 
the first century B.C.E. 
 
Bibliography: Junkelmann (2000), 164, AG331. 
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Greek/Macedonian 
H1: Xiphos, Macedonian 
Date: Late Classical/Early Hellenistic 
Find Location: Royal Tombs at Vergina 
Material: Iron 
Dimensions: Length (total): 55cm, Width (guard): 10.9cm. 
Mass: 300g; with reconstructed tang c. 400g 
Notes: Sword is strongly waisted with the thickest portion quite close to the tip.  Tang was likely 
originally a flat tang along the lines of H2. 
Figure: 5.13 
 
Bibliography: Markle (1982), 101.  Adam-Veleni (2004), 53. 
Current Location: Museum of the Royal Tombs of Aigai, BM1713. 
 
 
H2: Xiphos, Macedonian 
Date: Late Classical 
Find Location: Veroia, Greece 
Material: Iron 
Dimensions: Length (total): 55cm; (blade): 46.4cm.  Width (blade, max): 4.5cm; (blade, min): 
3.0cm; (guard): 10.3cm 
Mass: digitally reconstructed, c. 490g 
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Notes: ‘Sword of Beroia.’  Sword is extremely well-preserved, with elements of organic (ivory) 
grip and pommel surviving. 
 
Bibliography: Tourgatsoglou (1986). 
Current Location: Archaeological Museum of Veroia, Permanent Collection. 
 
 
H3: Xiphos, Greek 
Date: Classical? 
Find Location: Ialysus, Rhodes 
Material: Iron 
Dimensions: Length (total): 55cm; Width (blade, max): 4.5cm; (guard):12.5cm. 
Notes: Sword is badly rusted, but the general shape is intact.  Blade is strongly waisted, with a 
shape much like H1 and H2.  The tang was flat, although now obsured by rust.  The British 
Museum lists a date of 1-400 AD; I confirmed with the Ass.t Collections Manager Ben Harridge 
that this is a misdating of the sword.  The sword was excavated by Sir Alfred Biliotti from 
Rhodes with material that is either Archaic or Classical; a Classical or late Classical date seems 
likely. 
Figure: 5.14 
 
Current Location: British Museum 1868,1025.98. 
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H4: Kopis, Greek 
Date: 350-325 
Find Location: Thesprotia, Greece 
Material: Iron 
Dimensions: Length (total): 77cm; (blade): 64cm. 
Notes: Found with the ‘prodromi’ cuirass at Thesprotia.  Grave good strongly suggest the burial 
of a cavalryman, possibly on the site of a battle.  Example of the longer form of kopis. 
 
Bibliography: Choremis (1980). 
 
 
H5: Kopis, Greek 
Date: 5th-4th century 
Find Location: Unknown 
Material: Iron 
Dimensions: Length (total): 54.6cm 
Mass: 1.5lbs (c. 700g) as measured by museum. 
Notes: Weapon is remarkably well preserved, with some rust.  Double fuller down the length of 
the spine of the blade.  Hilt is only partially enclosed, as opposed to the full-enclosure style seen 
in the Spanish falcata, or on H6. 
Figure: 5.10 
 
Current Location: Metropolitan Museum of Art, 2001.543. 
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H6: Kopis, Greek 
Date: 5th-4th century 
Find Location: Unknown 
Material: Iron 
Dimensions: Length (total): 56.5cm 
Mass: 1.5lbs (c. 700g) as measured by museum. 
Note: Weapon is remarkably well preserved, with some rust and some marks on the blade.  
Double fuller down the length of the spine of the blade.  Longer than H5, with a similar blade-
shape.  Hilt is fully enclosed; the pommel may have shown a horse motif. 
Figure: 5.10 
 
Current Location: Metropolitan Museum of Art, 2001.346. 
 
 
Spears and Sarisae 
H7: Spearhead, Sarisa, Macedonian 
Date: Late fourth century 
Find Location: Royal Tombs at Vergina 
Material: Iron 
Dimensions: Length (total): 27.3cm; (socket): 8cm.  Width (max): 3cm.  Diameter (socket): 
1.9cm.  Socket wall thickness: 1-1.5mm. 
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Mass: 97g 
Notes: Head of a sarisa in use by the infantry, following Connolly (2000a).  Small oval-shaped 
spearhead with a pronounced mid-ridge.  The mid-ridge is a continuation of the socket and 
remains hollow for much of the length of the blade of the spear, reducing weight. 
Figure: 5.7 
 
Bibliography: Andronikos (1970); Manti (1992), (1994); Markle (1977), (1978), (1982); 
Connolly (2000a); Sekunda (2001b); Matthew (2016) 
 
 
H8: Spear Butt, Sarisa, Macedonian 
Date: Late fourth century 
Find Location: Royal Tombs at Vergina 
Material: Iron 
Dimensions: Length (total): 45cm; (socket): 18cm.  Width (max): 4cm.  Diameter (socket): 
3.4cm.  Socket wall thickness: 2-2.5mm. 
Mass: 1,070g 
Notes: Butt of the infantry sarisa, following Connolly (2000a).  A large, flanged and heavy butt, 
presumably for counteracting the significant weight of the long sarisa haft.  Probably a pair with 
H7. 
Figure: 5.7 
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Bibliography: Andronikos (1970); Manti (1992), (1994); Markle (1977), (1978), (1982); 
Connolly (2000a); Sekunda (2001b); Matthew (2016) 
 
 
H9: Spear Butt, Sarisa, Macedonian? 
Date: Unknown, Hellenistic 
Find Location: Unknown.  No secure provenance. 
Material: Iron 
Dimensions: Length (total): 38.0cm.  Width (max): 3.8cm.  Diamter (socket, interior): 2.9cm. 
Mass: 876g. 
Notes: Heavy spear-butt, possibly for a Macedonian sarisa.  The butt has the letters MAK 
painted on it.  Lack of secure find location, dating or provenance make interpretation difficult, 
but the significant weight suggests use in a sarisa; lacks the flanged construction of H8. 
 
Bibliography: Matthew (2016), 49-51; Sekunda (1992). 
Current Location: Shafton Collection in the Great North Museum in Newcastle Upon Tyne, 
#111. 
 
 
H10: Spearhead, Xyston, Macedonian 
Date: Late fourth century 
Find Location: Royal Tombs at Vergina 
Material: Iron 
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Dimensions: Length (total): 47cm.  Diameter (socket): 2.5cm. 
Mass: 235g 
Notes: ‘Tear-drop’ shaped spearhead of typical size, with pronounced mid-ridge; the socket 
remains hollow over the length of the blade.  There is some damage to the tip and to the socket.  
Connolly (2000b), preferred this to H11 for use as a cavalry spearhead.  Weight and form could 
be consistent with either a xyston or a dory.  Listed by Markle (1982) as “Sarissa-head LXIX-
LXXI K38.”  This piece was not included in Andronikos (1970). 
Figure: 5.7 
 
Bibliography: Markle (1982).  Connolly (2000b). 
 
 
H11: Spearhead, Xyston, Macedonian 
Date: Late fourth century 
Find Location: Royal Tombs at Vergina 
Material: Iron 
Dimensions: Length (total): 50cm.  Diameter (socket): 2cm. 
Mass: 297g 
Notes: ‘Tear-drop’ shaped spearhead of typical size; rather longer blade and shorter socket 
compared to H10; moderate mid-ridge.  There is some damage to edges of the blade.  Weight 
and form could be consistent with either a xyston or a dory.  Listed by Markle (1982) as “Sarissa-
head LXIX-LXXI I32.”  This piece was not included in Andronikos (1970). 
Figure: 5.7 
 638 
 
Bibliography: Markle (1982).  Connolly (2000b). 
 
 
H12: Spearbutt, Xyston, Macedonian 
Date: Late fourth century 
Find Location: Royal Tombs at Vergina 
Material: Iron 
Dimensions: Length (total): 51cm; (socket): 23.5cm.  Width (max): 6.7cm.  Diameter (socket): 
3.6cm. 
Mass: 1,235g 
Notes: Large, oval-shaped blade on a very thick socket.  Overall shape like a spearhead, but it is 
very large, wide and with no point. 
Figure: 5.7 
 
Bibliography: Andronikos (1970); Manti (1992), (1983), (1994); Markle (1977), (1978); 
Connolly (2000a). 
 
 
H13: Spearhead, Dory, Greek 
Date: Eight or seventh century 
Find Location: Chauchitza, Grave A, Macedonia 
Material: Iron 
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Dimensions: Length (total): 29cm. 
Notes: Long ‘tear-drop’ shaped spearhead with pronounced mid-ridge, attached by a circular-
sectioned socket. 
 
Current Location: British Museum 1919,1119.43 
 
 
H14: Spearhead, Dory, Greek 
Date: Eighth or seventh century 
Find Location: Chauchitza, Macedonia 
Material: Iron 
Dimensions: Length (total): 23cm. 
Notes: Long ‘tear-drop’ shaped spearhead.  Heavily corroded and significant damage to the 
blades of the spear.  Only the mid-ridge is substantially intact.  Socket appears to be broken off 
but was circular in section. 
 
Current Location: British Museum 1919,1119.44 
 
 
H15: Spearhead, Dory, Greek 
Date: Fifth century BC 
Find Location: Olympia, Greece 
Material: Bronze 
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Dimensions: Length (total): 17.78cm 
Notes: Short ‘tear-drop’ shaped spearhead.  In very fine condition, without significant damage.  
Mid-ridge is very pronounced.  Attached by a circular socket with two holes for rivets. 
 
Current Location: British Museum 1865,0720.55. 
 
 
Shields 
H16: Shield Facing, Greek 
Date: Late fifth, early fourth century 
Find Location: Olympia, Greece 
Material: Bronze 
Dimensions: Diameter: c. 33.8cm 
Notes: Bronze shield facing for a relatively smaller shield, possible a pelte.  Mostly intact.  No 
thickness listed. 
 
Bibliography: Liampi (1998), 51-52, taf. 1.1, cat. S1. 
Current Location: Olympia Museum, Inv. M356. 
 
 
H17: Shield Facing, Hellenistic 
Date: Third century 
Find Location: Dodona, Epirus, Greece. 
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Material: Bronze 
Dimensions: Diameter: 66cm. 
Notes: Fragments of a bronze-shield facing.  Liampi reconstructs to obtain the above full 
diameter.  No thickness listed. 
 
Bibliography: Liampi (1998), 52-53, taf. 1.2, cat. S2. 
Current Location: Ionnina Museum, Inv. 1951. 
 
 
H18: Shield Facing, Hellenistic 
Date: Late fourth, early third century 
Find Location: Vegora, Florina, Greece 
Material: Bronze 
Dimensions: Diameter (reconstructed): c. 73.6cm.  Thickness: 0.3mm 
Mass: Reconstructed, c. 900g 
Notes: Badly damaged fragments of a shield-facing.  Diameter reconstructed by Liampi. 
 
Bibliography: Liampi (1998), 53, taf. 1.3, cat. S3. 
Current Location: Florina Museum 
 
 
H19: Shield Facing, Macedonian 
Date: 185-160 
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Material: Bronze 
Inscription: ΒΑΣΙΛΕΩΣ ΦΑΡΝΑΚΟΥ 
Dimensions: Width: 79.7cm x 81.4cm.  Height (dome): 11.8cm.  Thickness (measured at the four 
attachment tabs): 1.0mm; 1.27mm; 2.05mm; 2.97mm. 
Notes: ‘Shield of Pharnakes.’  Date is connected to Pharnakes I of Pontus, following the 
inscription. The rectangular tabs and serrations along the edges have never been bent back, 
suggesting that this shield facing may never been attached to a wooden core.  The shield has 
clearly been reconstructed, cf. current form with image in Peltz (2001). 
 
Bibliography: Peltz (2001). 
Current Location: J. Paul Getty Museum, Obj. N˚ 80.AC.60. 
 
 
H20: Shield Facing, Hellenistic 
Date: 159-133 
Find Location: Arsenal III, Pergamum 
Material: Bronze 
Dimensions: Width: 65cm x 67cm.  Depth: 11cm.  Thickness (average): 0.4mm; (range): 0.35-
0.5mm. 
Mass: 1,080g (with some damage). 
Notes: Significant corrosion to the shield facing, with large sections missing.  The serrated edges 
of the shield are still visible on the reverse side of the shield, bent back as they would have been 
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over a wood core.  The museum’s dating, listed above, is determined from the find-context, 
Arsenal III at Pergamum. 
Figure: 5.9 
 
Bibliography: Peltz (2001). 
Current Location: Antikensammlung, Berlin, Indent. Nr. Y1767. 
 
 
H21: Shield Facing, Greek (Archaic) 
Date: Second half of the sixth century 
Find Location: Unknown 
Material: Bronze 
Dimensions: Diameter: 81.5cm.  Depth: 11.5cm.  Thickness (average): 0.5mm. 
Notes: Remarkably well-preserved shield-cover for an Archaic Date aspis.  The rim is decorated 
by an intricate pattern of punch-dots. 
 
Current Location: Boston Museum of Fine Arts, 1971.285. 
 
 
H22: Shield Facing, Macedonian 
Date: Early third century 
Find Location: Sanctuary of Zeus, Dion 
Material: Bronze 
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Inscription: ΒΑΣΙΛ[ΕΩΣ ΔΗΜΕΤΡ]ΙΟΥ 
Dimensions: Diameter: 74cm. 
Notes: Fragment of a shield-facing.  What remains is a rectangle of bronze, presumably part of 
the center of such a shield-facing.  Part of an inscription is visible above a 12-pointed ‘Vergina’ 
star.  The shield may have been deposited when Demetrius Poliorcetes visited Dion in 294 BC. 
 
Bibliography: Adam-Veleni (2004), 55. 
Current Location: Archaeological Museum of Dion, MΔ 7479 
 
 
Armor 
Breastplates 
H23: Muscle Cuirass, Hellenistic 
Date: Third quarter of the fourth century 
Find Location: Thesprotia, Greece 
Material: Iron 
Dimensions: Height: 45cm; Width (max); 38cm; (min): 33cm. 
Notes: Iron muscle-cuirass, found in the same context as the kopis, H4.  Horse-fittings suggest 
that the burial was one of a cavalryman.  The cuirass has shoulder decorations mimicking the 
shoulder-straps of a type-IV cuirass, even including (structurally superfluous) attachment points 
for the shoulder-straps to be tied down.  This is the only known find of an iron Hellenistic 
muscle cuirass of this type. 
Figure: 5.21 
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Bibliography: Choremis (1980). 
 
 
H24: Muscle Cuirass, Western Greek 
Date: 350-300 
Find Location: Ruvo di Puglia, Italy 
Material: Bronze 
Dimensions: Height: 38.5cm; Width (max): 36.5cm.  Depth (both halves, on display): 27.5cm; 
(front plate): 12cm; (back plate):10cm. 
Mass: Total: 2,502g.  Front Plate: 1,186g.  Back Plate: 1,316g. 
Notes: Hellenistic muscle cuirass, in remarkably good condition.  Rings for securing the front 
plate to the back plate are visible on both the right and left side, as well as the shoulders.  The 
high waist may be indicative of a piece for a cavalryman, as in H23. 
 
Current Location: British Museum 1873,0820.223 
 
 
H25: Muscle Cuirass, Western Greek 
Date: Fourth century 
Find Location: Ruvo di Puglia, Italy 
Material: Bronze 
Dimensions: Height: 50.8cm. 
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Mass: 7.25lbs (3,280g) 
Notes: Muscle cuirass including both front and back plate.  Relatively low waist, possibly for use 
by an infantryman.  There is heavy wear to the armor, with a significant gap in the material in the 
left abdomen and several smaller holes.  Attachment points on the sides and shoulders still 
preserved. 
Figure: 5.23 
 
Current Location: British Museum 1856,1226.614 
 
 
H26: Muscle Cuirass, Western Greek 
Date: c. 330 
Find Location: Apulia, Italy 
Material: Bronze 
Dimensions: Height (front plate): 41.8cm; (back plate): 52.7cm.  Width (front plate, max): 
34.5cm.  Thickness (front plate): 1mm to 1.5mm; (back plate): 1mm to 2mm. 
Mass: 3,850g (front and back together) 
 
Bibliography: Cahn (1989), 66-7, W. 25. 
 
 
H27: Muscle Cuirass, Western Greek 
Date: c. 330 
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Find Location: Apulia, Italy 
Material: Bronze 
Dimensions: Height (front plate): 41.5cm; (back plate); 55cm.  Width (front plate, max): 23.8cm; 
(back plate): 34.7cm to 35.2cm.  Thickness (front plate): 1mm to 1.5mm; (back plate); 1.5mm. 
Mass: Front Plate: 1,170g; Back Plate: 2,193; Total: 3,363g. 
Notes: Well preserved muscle cuirass from Apulia.  Rings for attaching the front to the back 
plates are preserved on the shoulders and the sides; the front and back plates overlap on the sides. 
 
Bibliography: Cahn (1989), 58-60, W24C. 
 
 
H29: Fragment, Muscle Cuirass, Western Greek 
Date: c. 450 
Find Location: Metapontum(?), Italy 
Material: Bronze 
Dimensions: Height: 46cm.  Width: 30.2cm.  Thickness: 1.1mm-1.7mm. 
Notes: Piece is a fragment of the front plate of a muscle cuirass, but with substantial damage.  
One ring from the attachment system, on the left shoulder, survives.  Cahn notes the find location 
is angeblich (‘allegedly’) Metaponto. 
 
Bibliography: Cahn (1989), W9. 
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H29: Muscle Cuirass, Western Greek 
Date: 325-300 
Find Location: Southern Italy 
Material: Bronze 
Dimensions: Height (total): 44cm; (chest): 38cm.  Diameter (neck): 14.6cm.  Thickness 0.5cm. 
Notes: Muscle cuirass, some damage to the lower part of the front plate, cracks down the lower 
part of the back plate.  Short waist, much like H23, may suggest use by a cavalryman.  
Thickness, measured at 0.5cm (=5mm) may be measurements of the edges of the breastplate, 
which are thickened, rather than the rest of the armor, which appears thinner. 
 
Bibliography: Carratelli (1996), 653. 
Current Location: Florence, Collezione Ceccanti Inv. CC485,486. 
 
 
H30: Vergina Cuirass, Macedonian 
Date: Late fourth century 
Find Location: The Royal Tombs at Vergina 
Material: Iron with gold leaf. 
Dimensions: Thickness: 5mm. 
Note: Unique iron cuirass in the shape of a type-IV textile armor.  The iron is significantly 
corroded; there are traces of an original white-linen cover material.  Cuirass is in a single piece 
with hinged side-plates to allow it to be put on, rather than the normal two-piece construction of 
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a muscle cuirass.  The cuirass is heavily decorated with gold leaf.  The full measurements have 
not been published. 
 
Bibliography: Andronikos (1977), (1980), (1984), 140-4..  Connolly (1981), 58-9;  Everson 
(2004), 192-3; Aldrete et al. (2013), 69-70. 
Current Location: Museum of the Royal Tombs at Aigai/Vergina 
 
 
H31: Bell Cuirass, Greek (Archaic) 
Date: Eighth century 
Find Location: Argos, Greece 
Material: Bronze 
Dimensions: Thickness: 1mm-2mm. 
Mass: 3,360g 
Note: Intact bell cuirass, including both front and back-plate.  Quite well preserved. 
Figure: 5.24 
 
Bibliography: Courbin (1957), 340-50. 
 
Helmets 
H32: Pilos Helmet, Greek 
Date: Fifth century 
Find Location: Upper Egypt 
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Material: Bronze 
Dimensions: Height 21cm; Diameter (base); 41cm.  Thickness: 2.4mm to 2.9mm. 
Mass: 725g 
Notes: There has been some restoration work to the helmet.  It is an older pilos-type.  There are 
no attachments for cheek-guards, which were probably never present. 
Figure: 5.31 
 
Current Location: Antikensammlung, Berlin.  Misc. 11910, L41. 
 
H33: Pilos/Konos Helmet, Greek 
Date: 327-275 
Find Location: Ruvo di Puglia, Italy 
Material: Bronze 
Dimensions: Height: 41.91cm.  Thickness (body): 2.9mm. 
Mass: 920g. 
Notes: Pilos/Konos style helmet, with a large, decorative bronze crest consisting of a pair of 
detachable horns.  There are several punctures in the body of the helmet.  Almost certainly an 
elite product, given the elaborate crest decorations. 
Figure: 5.30 
 
Current Location: 1873,0820.222. 
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H34: Pilos/Konos Helmet, Greek 
Date: Unknown; type suggests c. third century 
Find Location: Unknown, Southern Italy? 
Material: Bronze 
Dimensions: Height: 19.1cm; Diameter (base): 17.3cm to 19cm.  Thickness: 1.4mm to 2.5mm. 
Mass: 720g. 
Notes: Simple pilos/konos type helmet, without cheek-pieces.  Intact and unrestored.  According 
to Waurick, typical of the Southern Italian style of pilos. 
 
Bibliography: Waurick (1988), 438, cat. no. 49. 
Current Location: Antikensammlung, Berlin, Fr.1014. 
 
 
H35: Pilos/Konos Helmet, Hellenistic 
Date: First half of the second century 
Material: Bronze 
Notes: Dintsis provides no measurements, but a pencil drawing.  Cheek-guards for this helmet 
are missing, but the attachments are clearly visible. 
 
Bibliography: Dintsis (1986), 241-2, taf. 31.2, cat. 117. 
 
 
H36: Konos Helmet, Hellenistic 
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Date: First half of the second century 
Material: Bronze 
Notes: Dintsis provides no measurements, but a picture.  The helmet appears badly damaged, and 
there are no cheek-guards; unclear if there were attachment points for them. 
 
Bibliography: Dintsis (1986), 246, taf. 32.8, cat. 131. 
 
H37: Konos Helmet, Hellenistic 
Date: Third quarter of the second century 
Material: Bronze 
Dimensions: Height: 21.5cm.  Thickness: 1mm to 2mm. 
Mass: 826g. 
Notes: Dintsis provides no measurements; measured by museum.  Cheek-guards are missing but 
would originally have been present.  There are some holes in the cap and the rim is slightly 
battered; but overall it is intact.  An inscription on the helmet reads, “ΜΗΝΟΦΙΛΟΥ.” Catling 
(in Vickers, et al (1974/5), classified this helmet as a Thracian type and dated it to the c. 5th or 4th 
century; I follow Dintsis identification as a third century Konos-type. 
Figure: 5.32 
 
Bibliography: Vickers, et al (1974/5), 34, fig 13.  Dintsis (1986), 248-9, cat. 137, taf. 33.8. 
Current Location: Ashmolean Museum, 1971.904. 
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H38: Phrygian Helmet, Hellenistic 
Date: Second half of the fourth century 
Material: Bronze 
Dimensions: Height: 27cm; Length: 23cm; Width: 12cm. 
Notes: Ornate, decorated Phrygian helmet.  High crest adorned with a spiked ridge, with 
sphynxes depicted on the cheek-guards.  Similar decorative theme to H40. 
 
Bibliography: Dintsis (1986), 218, cat. 53. 
Current Location: Louvre, Inv. Nr. C7240. 
 
 
H39: Phrygian Helmet, Hellenistic 
Date: c. 350 
Find Location: Unknown 
Material: Bronze 
Dimensions: Height: 22.86cm.  Thickness (body): c. 1.5mm. 
Mass: 529g 
Notes: Some damage, but the bulk of the helmet is intact.  Small exceptions to the base of the 
helmet to cover the top of the ear.  No raised edge of cabling on the base.  Weight is very light 
and the construction is overall quite thin.  This helmet was misclassified as an Attic-type; it is 
actually a Phrygian type, with the knob only partially separated from the body of the helmet (see 
Dintsis (1986) cat.99 and cat. 100 for similar examples.) 
Figure: 5.33 
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Current Location: British Museum: 1867,0508.206. 
 
 
H40: Phrygian Helmet, Western Greek 
Date: second half of the fourth century 
Find Location: Unknown, Southern Italy 
Material: Bronze 
Dimensions: Height (total): 34cm; Length (neck-guard to brow): 24cm.  Thickness: 3mm to 
6mm. 
Notes: Highly decorated and ornate Phrygian helmet, very well preserved.  It has a high crest 
with a spiked metal adornment and attached cheek-guards.  The back of the helmet extends 
somewhat to form a short neck-guard.  Cheek-guards with griffin decoration.  Floral motifs on 
the brow of the helmet. 
Figure: 5.34 
 
Bibliography: Carratelli (1996), 652. 
Current Location: Florence, Collezione Ceccanti, inv. CC451. 
 
 
H41: Phrygian Helmet, Hellenistic 
Date: Late third or second century 
Find Location: Unknown, both Rome and Lake Nemi, Italy, reported. 
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Material: Bronze 
Dimensions: Height: 53.9cm; Length (base); 48.5cm; Width (base): 23.0cm.  Thickness: 2.3mm 
to 6.9mm. 
Notes: Damaged Phrygian helmet with a very high crest.  The top knob is decorated with a bird 
motif and ridged decorations.  The helmet construction is very thick, but badly damaged. 
 
Bibliography: Waurick (1988), 170. 
 
 
H42: Attic/Phrygian Helmet, Greek 
Date: 450-400 
Find Location: Lake Copias, Boeotia, Greece 
Material: Bronze 
Dimensions: Height: 27cm.  Length: 26.5cm.  Thickness (body): 1.2mm. 
Notes: Classified as a Thracian (Phrygian) type helmet, but the crest is quite low for the type and 
the shape of the helmet bowl is more in line with Attic type helmets.  The helmet has an 
extension to cover the back of the neck and attachment points for cheek-guards (now lost.  There 
are perforations in the edge of the helmet for the attachment of a liner. 
Figure: 5.35 
 
Current Location: British Museum 1927,1011.1. 
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H43: Attic Helmet, Hellenistic 
Date: Early third century 
Find Location: Ochrida, Albania 
Material: Bronze 
Dimensions: Height: 29.5cm; Length: 26.6cm.  Thickness: 0.8mm to 2mm thick. 
Mass: 1,010g. 
Note: Attic type helmet with a crest decoration reminiscent of a smaller, flat version of the 
typical forward-sloping knob of the Phrygian type.  The back of the helmet extends down to 
cover the lower neck.  One cheek-guard is preserved.    Inscription on the helmet reads: 
ΒΑΣΙΛΕΩΣ ΜΟΝΟΥΝΙΟΥ. 
Figure: 5.37 
 
Bibliography: Waurick (1988), 441, cat. 51. 
Current Location: Antikensammlung, Berlin, Misc. 11905. 
 
 
H44: Attic Helmet, Hellenistic 
Date: Hellenistic Period (unspecified) 
Find Location: Melos, Greece 
Material: Bronze 
Dimensions: Height: 18.4cm; Width: 18.5cm.  Thickness (at brim): 0.7mm. 
Mass: 470g. 
Notes: Some elements of the helmet restored.  Helmet features a decorated crest and a brim-
guard.  Despite the relatively low weight, the decoration, including a relief of a shoulder-up 
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figure wearing what appears to be crown at the join of the brow-guard and the crest, suggest a 
high-end product. 
Figure: 5.38 
 
Bibliography: Waurick (1988), 170. 
Current Location: Antikensammlung, Berling, Fr.1010. 
 
 
H45: Attic Helmet, Hellenistic 
Date: Hellenistic Period (unspecified) 
Find Location: Pergamon 
Material: Bronze 
Dimensions: Height: 18cm.  Thickness: 0.6mm to 1.5mm. 
Mass: 995g 
Notes: Unrestored.  Attachments for a pair of cheek-guards, now missing, are visible on the 
helmet.  It has an additional brow-ridge, similar in style to the one on H37. 
 
Current Location: Antikensammlung, Berlin.  Misc.10481. 
 
 
H46: Boeotian Helmet, Macedonian 
Date: Late Classical/Early Hellenistic (Associated with Alexander’s campaign in Mesopotamia) 
Find Location: Tigris River 
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Material: Copper-Alloy 
Dimensions: Height: 24cm; Length: 34cm.  Thickness 1mm to 2mm. 
Mass: 1,005g. 
Notes: Boeotian helmet found in the Tigris river.  The helmet has a wide brim, typical of the 
Boeotian type.  There is damage to the crown and two modern holes in the side. 
 
Bibliography: Waurick (1988), 159-61. 
Current Location: Ashmolean AN1927.256. 
 
 
Greaves 
H47: Greaves (pair), Western Greek 
Date: Late Sixth or Fifth century 
Find Location: Unknown, Apulia, Italy 
Material: Bronze 
Dimensions: Height (right): 41.5cm; (left); 43.8cm.  Thickness: 0.7mm to 1.4mm. 
Mass: 609g and 677.7g. 
Notes: Pair of bronze greaves, well preserved.  These match Jarva (1995)’s ‘anatomical’ 
grouping, which might suggest a later date than the one above (provided by Cahn (1989)). 
 
Bibliography: Cahn (1989), 33, W18b. 
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H48: Greaves (pair, umatched), Western Greek 
Date: Sixth or fifth century 
Find Location: Tarquinia, Italy 
Material: Bronze 
Dimensions: Height (left): 46.9cm; (right): 46.2cm.  Thickness (left): 1.9mm; (right, edge): 
4mm, (right, body): 2.5mm. 
Mass: (left): 1.2kg; (right): 1.1kg; Measured with mount, can no longer be removed. 
Notes:  These greaves appear to not originally have been a pair.  Unfortunately, they can no 
longer be removed from their museum mounts for independent weighing.  The style of greaves 
both follow Jarva (1995)’s ‘spiral’ grouping. 
 
Current Location: British Museum 1838,0608.82. 
 
 
H49: Greaves (pair), Western Greek 
Date: 550-500 
Find Location: Ruvo di Puglia, Italy. 
Material: Bronze 
Dimensions: Height (left): 43cm; (right): 42cm.  Width (left): 10cm; (right): 9.5cm.  Depth (left): 
14cm; (right): 13cm.  Thickness (left): 2.5mm to 1.6mm; (right): 3mm to 2.1mm. 
Mass: (left): 580g; (right): 623g. 
Notes: Decorated greaves of the ‘anatomical’ style.  The greaves extend to cover the kneecaps.  
Moderate damage to the lower and upper edge of the greaves, but both are almost entirely intact. 
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Current Location: British Museum 1856,122.615. 
 
 
H51: Greave (single), Western Greek 
Date: 500-450 
Find Location: Unknown, Produced in Italy 
Material: Bronze 
Dimensions: Length: 45.72cm.  Thickness (body): 2.2mm. 
Mass: 759g. 
Notes: Left greave to H51’s right greave.  Fairly simple greaves of the ‘spiral’ grouping.  
Complete. 
 
Current Location: British Museum 1881,0725.4. 
 
 
H51: Greave (single), Western Greek 
Date: 500-450 
Find Location: Unknown, Produced in Italy 
Material: Bronze 
Dimensions: Length: 45.72cm.  Thickness: 2.4mm to 4mm. 
Mass: 773g. 
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Notes: Right greave to H50’s left greave.  Fairly simple greaves of the ‘spiral’ grouping.  
Complete. 
 
Current Location: British Museum 1881,0725.3. 
 
 
H52: Greaves (pair), Western Greek 
Date: c. 330 
Find Location: Unknown, Apulia, Italy 
Material: Bronze 
Dimensions: Height (right): 41.5cm; (left): 41.2cm. 
Mass: (right): 909g; (left); 738g. 
Notes: Greaves formed part of a complete panoply. 
 
Bibliography: Cahn (1989), 45, W23C. 
 
 
H53: Greaves (pair), Western Greek 
Date: c. 330 
Find Location: Unknown, near Canosa, Apulia, Italy 
Material: Bronze 
Dimensions: (right): 39cm; (left): 40cm.  Thickness (both): 0.8-1.3mm. 
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Notes: Cahn (1989) does not lift a mass for these greaves, but the thickness suggests a mass 
lower than H52.  Greaves are of the anatomical type.  Formed part of a complete panoply with 
H27. 
 
Bibliography: Cahn (1989), 62, W24F. 
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La Tène/Gallic 
Swords 
G1: Gladius, Roman or La Tène Sword, Gallic 
Date: c. 153 
Find Location: Lager III, Numantia 
Material: Iron 
Dimensions: Length (total): 74cm; Length (blade): 63.5cm; Length (hilt): 10.5cm; Width 
(blade): 5.4-4.5cm 
Notes: Schulten identifies this weapon as a reiterschwert and as an example of the gladius 
hispaniensis.  The weapon is probably better understood as a Middle La Tène sword; the blades 
are nearly parallel and the tip somewhat rounded. 
 
Bibliography: Schulten (1929), 209. 
 
 
G2: Sword, La Tène 
Date: Middle La Tène 
Find Location: La Tène, Switzerland. 
Material: Iron 
Dimensions: Length (total): 79.7cm; (blade): 63.6cm; (hilt): 16.1cm.  Width (blade): 4.1cm. 
Mass: 490g 
Notes: The point is missing; de Navarro notes that it would have likely been blunt. 
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Bibliography: de Navarro (1972), 363, n˚9 
Current Location: BMH Bern, 13527 
 
 
G3: Sword with sheath, La Tène 
Date: Middle La Tène 
Find Location: La Tène, Switzerland. 
Material: Iron 
Dimensions: Length (total preserved, with sheath): 88.2cm; (total, sword): 78.2cm; (blade): 63.8, 
(tang): 14.4cm.  Width (blade): 4.1cm.  Thickness (blade): 5mm. 
Mass: 695g. 
Notes: Sword rusted into sheath, no longer able to be removed.  The sword is double-edged, but 
with a losangée, or rhombic section, rather than the more common lenticular section. 
 
Bibliography: Lejars (2013), 152.  de Navarro (1972), 364-5, n˚10. 
Current Location: NMB Bienne, N˚2754. 
 
 
G4: Sword, La Tène 
Date: Middle La Tène 
Find Location: La Tène, Switzerland. 
Material: Iron 
Dimensions: Length (total): 81.6cm; (blade): 66.5cm; (hilt): 15.1cm.  Width (blade): 4.57cm. 
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Mass: 593.55g 
 
Bibliography: de Navarro (1972), 371, n˚20. 
Current Location: MCA Neuchatel, N MAR-LT-541 
 
 
G5: Sword, La Tène 
Date: Middle La Tène 
Find Location: La Tène, Switzerland. 
Material: Iron 
Dimensions: Length (total): 79.9cm; (blade): 65.1cm; (hilt): 14.8cm.  Width (blade): 3.95cm. 
Mass: 472.36. 
Notes: de Navarro notes that the point, which is not quite intact, is blunt. 
 
Bibliography: de Navarro (1972), 373, n˚26a. 
Current Location: MCA Neuchatel, N MAR-LT-109. 
 
 
G6: Sword, La Tène 
Date: Middle La Tène 
Find Location: La Tène, Switzerland. 
Material: Iron 
Dimensions: Length (total): 86.4cm; (blade): 71.3cm; (hilt): 15.1cm.  Width (blade): 4.05cm. 
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Mass: 576.93g 
Notes: Tang would have disc-button, now lost.  De Navarro notes good condition. 
 
Bibliography: de Navarro (1972), 375-6, n˚32. 
Current Location: MCA Neuchatel, N. MAR-LT-118. 
 
 
G7: Sword, La Tène 
Date: Middle La Tène 
Find Location: La Tène, Switzerland. 
Material: Iron 
Dimensions: Length (total): 85.8cm; (blade): 68.9cm; (hilt): 16.9cm.  Width (blade): 4.11cm. 
Mass: 500g 
Notes: Broader, tapering blade with a lenticular section.  De Navarro comments on the fine 
quality of the weapon; blade has a ‘streaky snake pattern’ to the metal, suggesting pattern-
welding.  Point is somewhat sharp and not fully rounded off. 
 
Bibliography: de Navarro (1972), 381-2, n˚45a. 
Current Location: BHM Bern, 13575. 
 
 
G8: Sword with sheath, La Tène 
Date: Middle La Tène 
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Find Location: La Tène, Switzerland. 
Material: Iron 
Dimensions: Length (total): 93.6cm; (sword): 85.8cm; (tang): 16.4cm; (blade): 69.3cm.  Height 
(guard): 2.8cm).  Width (blade): 3.7cm.  Thickness (blade): 4mm. 
Mass: 813g (sword + sheath) 
Notes: lenticular blade section, largely obscured by sheath, which can no longer be removed.  
Tapering tang of the usual rectangular section, would have been mounted with a disc-button. 
 
Bibliography: Lejars (2013), 153; de Navarro (1972), 383-4, n˚47a. 
Current Location: NMB Bienne N˚2756. 
 
 
G9: Sword with sheath, La Tène 
Date: Middle La Tène 
Find Location: La Tène, Switzerland. 
Material: Iron 
Dimensions: Length (total): 83.0cm; (sword): 81.0cm; (blade): 64.3cm; (tang): 16.7cm.  Height 
(guard): 2.8cm.  Width (blade): 3.7cm.  Thickness (blade): 4mm. 
Mass: 840g (sword + sheath) 
Notes: Lenticular blade section, in sheath which can no longer be removed.  Blade comes to a 
relatively sharp point (detected by Lejars with radiography).  Tang is rectangular in section with 
intact disc-button. 
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Bibliography: Lejars (2013), 154; de Navarro (1972), 384, n˚48a. 
Current Location: NMB Bienne, N˚2758 
 
 
G10: Sword with sheath, La Tène 
Date: Middle La Tène 
Find Location: La Tène, Switzerland. 
Material: Iron 
Dimensions: Length (total): 88.3cm; (restored): 87.0cm; (sword): 86.5cm; (blade): 69.8cm; 
(tang): 16.7cm.  Height (guard): 2.3cm.  Width (blade): 4.3cm.  Thickness (blade): 6mm. 
Mass: 1003g (sword+sheath, with an 8.6g guard) 
Notes: Sword extracted from sheath, but both massed together by Lejars.  De Navarro notes this 
is “a very fine” sword.  Lenticular in section, with a streaky pattern on the blade that suggests 
pattern-welding; Lejars confirms this, noting the fibrous structure visible on the metal.  The point 
is somewhat rounded off.  The tang would have had a disc-button, now missing. 
 
Bibliography: Lejars (2013), 154; de Navarro (1972), 384-5, n˚49a. 
Current Location: NMB Bienne, N˚2759. 
 
 
G11: Sword, La Tène 
Date: Middle La Tène 
Find Location: La Tène, Switzerland. 
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Material: Iron 
Dimensions: Length (total): 87.8cm; (blade): 72.2cm; (tang): 15.6cm.  Height (guard): 2.1cm.  
Width (blade): 3.9cm.  Thickness (blade): 5mm. 
Mass: 578.6g 
Notes: Lenticular section blade with a somewhat broad tang and a sharp point.  Lejars detects a 
fibrous structure on parts of the sword, suggesting pattern-welding.  Decorative stamp above the 
guard. 
 
Bibliography: Lejars (2013), 151; de Navarro (1972), 386-7, n˚51a. 
Current Location: NMB Bienne, N˚2744. 
 
 
G12: Sword, La Tène 
Date: Middle La Tène 
Find Location: La Tène, Switzerland. 
Material: Iron 
Dimensions: Length (total, preserved): 79.2cm; (total, restored): 82.6cm; (blade): 64.0cm; (tang, 
preserved): 15.2cm; (tang, restored): 18.6cm.  Width (blade): 4.7cm.  Thickness (blade): 5mm. 
Mass: 642g. 
Notes: Lenticular section blade with a pronounced point, remarkably well preserved above the 
pommel, where the tang is broken off.  The tang is rectangular in section and came to a disc 
button (now lost). 
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Bibliography:  Lejars (2013), 150; de Navarro (1972), 378-8, n˚52a. 
Current Location: NMB Bienne N˚2743. 
 
 
G13: Sword, La Tène 
Date: Middle La Tène 
Find Location: La Tène, Switzerland. 
Material: Iron 
Dimensions: Length (total): 83.2; (blade): 66.8cm; (tang): 16.4cm.  Height (guard): 2.5cm.  
Width (blade): 4.6cm.  Thickness (blade): 5mm. 
Mass: 635.7g (with 8.2g for the guard) 
Notes: Top of the tang burred for a disc-button which is not preserved.  Blade is of a somewhat 
flat, lenticular section.  Slightly wider than most blades of the type.  Point is not intact, but seems 
to have been originally sharp. 
 
Bibliography: Lejars (2013), 151; de Navarro (1972), 388-9, n˚53a. 
Current Location: NMB Bienne, N˚2746. 
 
 
G14: Sword, La Tène 
Date: Middle La Tène 
Find Location: La Tène, Switzerland. 
Material: Iron 
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Dimensions: Length (total): 85.0cm; (blade): 67.9cm; (tang): 17.1cm.  Height (guard): 2.9mm.  
Width (blade): 4.9cm.  Thickness (blade): 5mm. 
Mass: 661g 
Notes: Lenticular blade section with broad, but not blunt tip.  Tang complete and includes disc-
button.  Lejars notes fibrous pattern visible on the blade, suggesting pattern-welding; apparently 
a high quality piece, with signs of repair from damage.  Bird-shaped stamp above guard. 
 
Bibliography: Lejars (2013), 151; de Navarro (1972), 390-1, n˚55a. 
Current Location: NMB Bienne N˚2748. 
 
 
G15: Sword, La Tène 
Date: Middle La Tène 
Find Location: La Tène, Switzerland. 
Material: Iron 
Dimensions: Length (total): 81.9cm; (blade): 65.6cm; (tang): 14.4cm.  Width (blade): 5.02cm. 
Mass: 607.5g 
Notes: Blade is lenticular in section, with a blunt tip.  Three decorative raised lines down the 
center of the blade. 
 
Bibliography: Lejars (2013), 149; de Navarro (1972), 391-2, n˚56a. 
Current Location: NMB Bienne N˚2737. 
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G16: Sword, La Tène 
Date: La Tène II (Middle La Tène) 
Find Location: Thiele River, Switzerland 
Material: Iron 
Dimensions: Length (total): 77.7cm.  Width (blade): 3.65cm.  Thickness (blade, max) 5.7mm. 
Mass: 410g 
 
Current Location: British Museum, 1915,0503.1 
 
 
G17: Sword, La Tène 
Date: c. 320-120 (La Tène II) 
Find Location: River Thames, London 
Material: Iron, Copper-Alloy (remains of scabbard) 
Dimensions: Length (total): 73.9cm; (blade): 59.2cm.  Width (blade): 4.45cm.  Thickness 
(blade): 4.5mm. 
Mass: 448g. 
Notes: Sword is in good condition; elements of the copper-alloy sheath frame remain attached.  
Sword is marked where it was once sharply bent and then straightened.  Rectangular tang. 
 
Bibliography: Stead (2006), 77. 
Current Location: British Museum 1891,0418.8 
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G18: Sword with sheath, La Tène 
Date: c. 300-200 (La Tène II) 
Find Location: Somme-Suippe(?), France  
Material: Iron 
Dimensions: Length (total):67.7cm; (blade): 61.2cm; (tang): 14.2.  Width (blade): 6.1cm. 
Mass: 1225g (with sheath and suspension loop) 
Notes: Museum uncertain about reliability of find location.  Sword is rusted; bent nearly double 
at the halfway mark.  Minimal taper suggests Middle, rather than Early La Tène, but both 
possible. 
 
Current Location: British Museum ML.2952. 
 
 
G19: Sword, La Tène 
Date: Middle La Tène 
Find Location: La Tène, Switzerland. 
Material: Iron 
Dimensions: Length (total): 79.5cm; (blade): 72.6; (tang): 13.9.  Height (guard): 2.4cm.  Width 
(blade): 3.7cm.  Thickness (blade): 5mm. 
Mass: 480g. 
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Notes: Lenticular blade section with a slight taper to a pronounced, sharp point.  Tang is 
rectangular in section with a disc-button. 
 
Bibliography: Lejars (2013), 149. 
Current Location: NMB Bienne, N˚2733 
 
 
G20: Sword, La Tène 
Date: Middle La Tène 
Find Location: La Tène, Switzerland. 
Material: Iron 
Dimensions: Length (total, preserved): 89.0cm; (blade, preserved): 72.9cm; (tang): 16.1cm.  
Width (blade): 3.8cm.  Thickness (blade): 5mm. 
Mass: 530g. 
Notes: Blade is corroded and incomplete; missing the tip (perhaps 1cm?).  Rectangular section 
tang with disc-button. 
 
Bibliography: Lejars (2013), 149. 
Current Location: NMB Bienne N˚2734 
 
 
G21: Sword, La Tène 
Date: Middle La Tène 
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Find Location: La Tène, Switzerland. 
Material: Iron 
Dimensions: Length (total): 79.5cm; (blade): 64.2; (tang): 15.3cm.  Width (blade): 4.1cm.  
Thickness (blade): 5mm. 
Mass: 437.6g 
Notes: Complete but broken into two fragments.  The blade-shape is losangée or rhombic, but 
becomes more lenticular down the length of the blade.  Lejars notes fibrous structure, suggesting 
pattern welding.  Blade comes to a sharp point.  Tang is rectangular, with a disc button.  Two 
notches, possibly battle-damage, are visible on the blade. 
 
Bibliography: Lejars (2013), 149. 
Current Location: NMB Bienne N˚2735. 
 
 
G22: Sword, La Tène 
Date: Middle La Tène 
Find Location: La Tène, Switzerland. 
Material: Iron 
Dimensions: Length (total): 80.5cm; (blade): 64.9cm; (tang): 15.6cm.  Width (blade): 4.0cm.  
Thickness (blade): 5mm. 
Mass: 497g (including 6g for the guard). 
Notes: Blade is lenticular in section.  Tang is rectangular in section, disc button not preserved. 
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Bibliography: Lejars (2013), 150. 
Current Location: NMB Bienne N˚2738. 
 
G23: Sword, La Tène 
Date: Middle La Tène 
Find Location: La Tène, Switzerland. 
Material: Iron 
Dimensions: Length (total): 79.5; (blade): 65.5; (tang): 14.0cm.  Width (blade): 5.1cm.  
Thickness (blade): 6mm. 
Mass: 574g 
Notes: Blade is lenticular in section.  Rectangular tang with disc-button still preserved. 
 
Bibliography: Lejars (2013), 150. 
Current Location: NMB Bienne N˚2739. 
 
 
G24: Sword, La Tène 
Date: Middle La Tène 
Find Location: La Tène, Switzerland. 
Material: Iron 
Dimensions: Length (total): 81.6cm; (blade): 64.9cm; (tang): 16.7cm.  Width (blade): 4.7cm.  
Thickness (blade): 4mm. 
Mass: 575g. 
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Notes: Blade is lenticular in section, slightly tapered with a pronounced point.  Rectangular tang 
with the disc-button still preserved.  Decorative stamp above the guard, Lejars suggests shaped 
like a piece of rawhide or leather. 
 
Bibliography: Lejars (2013), 150. 
Current Location: NMB Bienne N˚2740. 
 
 
G25: Sword, La Tène 
Date: Middle La Tène 
Find Location: La Tène, Switzerland. 
Material: Iron 
Dimensions: Length (total): 90.7cm; (blade): 75.1cm; (tang): 15.6cm.  Width (blade): 4.0cm.  
Thickness (blade): 5mm. 
Mass: 531g 
Notes: Blade is lenticular in section and tapers to a pronounced point. Tang is rectangular in 
section, with a simple tapering pommel; no disc button. 
Figure: 6.13 
 
Bibliography: Lejars (2013), 150. 
Current Location: NMB Bienne N˚2741. 
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G26: Sword, La Tène 
Date: Middle La Tène 
Find Location: La Tène, Switzerland. 
Material: Iron 
Dimensions: Length (total): 88.2cm; (blade): 72.8cm; (tang): 15.4.  Width (blade): 4.2cm.  
Thickness (blade): 5mm. 
Mass 578.3g 
Notes: Blade is lenticular in section and tapers to a sharply pointed tip.  Fibrous structure visible 
along the middle of the blade, suggesting pattern-welding.  Tang is rectangular in section; the 
pommel is damaged.  Decorative stamp above the guard. 
Figure: 6.13 
 
Bibliography: Lejars (2013), 150. 
Current Location: NMB Bienne N˚2742. 
 
 
G27: Sword, La Tène 
Date: Middle La Tène 
Find Location: La Tène, Switzerland. 
Material: Iron 
Dimensions: Length (total): 84.3cm; (blade): 66.4cm; (tang): 17.9cm.  Width (blade): 4.4cm.  
Thickness (blade): 5mm. 
Mass: 662.3g 
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Notes: Blade is lenticular in section and tapers to a sharp point.  Tang is rectangular and ends 
with a disc button, which is preserved. Decorative stamp just above the guard. 
 
Bibliography: Lejars (2013), 151. 
Current Location: NMB Bienne N˚2745. 
 
 
G28: Sword, La Tène 
Date: Middle La Tène 
Find Location: La Tène, Switzerland. 
Material: Iron 
Dimensions: Length (total): 82.5cm; (blade): 65.2cm; (tang): 17.3cm.  Width (blade): 4.8cm.  
Thickness (blade): 5mm. 
Mass: 643.1g 
Notes: Blade is lenticular in section, tapering to a sharp point. Notches from impacts, probably 
with another sword, along the blade. 
 
Bibliography: Lejars (2013), 151. 
Current Location: NMB Bienne N˚2749 
 
 
G29: Sword, La Tène 
Date: Middle La Tène 
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Find Location: La Tène, Switzerland. 
Material: Iron 
Dimensions: Length (total): 83.4cm; (blade): 67.7cm; (tang): 15.7cm.  Width (blade): 3.9cm.  
Thickness (blade): 4mm. 
Mass 549g. 
Notes: Blade is lenticular in section, coming to a rounded, somewhat blunt, point.  Rectangular 
section tang with a disc button. Double-crescent decorative stamp above the guard. 
 
Bibliography: Lejars (2013), 152. 
Current Location: NMB Bienne N˚2750. 
 
 
Javelins 
G30:  Javelin Tip, La Tène 
Date: Middle La Tène 
Find Location: La Tène, Switzerland. 
Material: Iron 
Dimensions: Length (total): 16.8cm; (blade): 9.5cm; (socket): 7.3cm.  Width (blade): 3.2cm.  
Diameter (socket, external): 2.4cm. 
Mass: 121g 
Notes: Javelin tip, socketed and fixed with a rivet.  Tip is ‘leaf-shaped,’ convex with a rhombic 
section.  There is no central mid-ridge. 
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Bibliography: Lejars (2013), 162. 
Current Location: NMB Bienne N˚2801 
 
 
G31: Javelin Tip, La Tène 
Date: Middle La Tène 
Find Location: La Tène, Switzerland. 
Material: Iron 
Dimensions: Length (total): 14.0cm; (blade): 8.0cm; (socket): 6.0cm.  Width (blade): 2.7cm.  
Diameter (socket, external): 1.9 x 2.2cm. 
Mass: 94g 
Notes: Javelin tip, socketed and fixed by two rivets.  The socket is square, rather than round. The 
tip has no central rib and is rounded (possibly a result of corrosion).  Socket secured by rivet 
(now lost) through two holes at the base. 
 
Bibliography: Lejars (2013), 162. 
Current Location: NMB Bienne N˚2803 
 
 
G32: Javelin Tip, La Tène 
Date: Middle La Tène 
Find Location: La Tène, Switzerland. 
Material: Iron 
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Dimensions: Length (total): 12.0cm; (blade): 7.0cm; (socket): 5.0cm.  Width (blade): 2.3cm.  
Diameter (socket, external): 2.0cm. 
Mass: 68g. 
Notes: Javelin tip with a lenticular, convex section.  Secured through round socket with a rivet 
(now lost) with two rivet holes.  Point is intact, very weak mid-ridge. 
 
Bibliography: Lejars (2013), 162. 
Current Location: NMB Bienne N˚2804 
 
 
G33: Javelin Tip, La Tène 
Date: Middle La Tène 
Find Location: La Tène, Switzerland. 
Material: Iron 
Dimensions: Length (total): 12.5cm; (blade) 7.5mm; (socket): 5.0cm.  Width (blade, preserved): 
1.2cm; (blade, restored): 2.2cm.  Diameter (external, socket): 1.7cm. 
Mass: 44g. 
Notes: Javelin tip with a convex section; the tip is damaged and bent over on the edges.  Lejars 
notes further signs of repair, presumably for the final damage.  The tip is socketed, fixed by a 
single rivet (partially preserved) through a round socket.  Socket runs through the blade, creating 
a strong mid-ridge. 
 
Bibliography: Lejars (2013), 162. 
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Current Location: NMB Bienne N˚2805 
 
 
G34: Javelin Tip, La Tène 
Date: Middle La Tène 
Find Location: La Tène, Switzerland. 
Material: Iron 
Dimensions: Length (total): 16.4; (blade): 8.0cm; (socket); 8.4cm.  Width (blade): 2.2cm.  
Diameter (socket, external): 2.1cm. 
Mass: 110g 
Notes: Javelin tip with a convex, lenticular section; no strong mid-ridge but the central hull is 
relatively thick.  Attachment to haft via circular socket, affixed by rivets (lost), through two 
rivet-holes. 
 
Bibliography: Lejars (2013), 163. 
Current Location: NMB Bienne N˚2807 
 
 
G35: Javelin Tip, La Tène 
Date: Middle La Tène 
Find Location: La Tène, Switzerland. 
Material: Iron 
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Dimensions: Length (total): 17.4cm; (blade): 8.0cm; (socket): 9.6cm.  Width (blade): 2.5cm.  
Diameter (socket, external): 2.0cm. 
Mass 98g. 
Notes: Javelin tip with convex blade and lenticular section.  Moderate mid-ridge.  Tip is rounded, 
possibly worn or corroded.  Attached by a circular socket with 2 rivets (present), through a pair 
of holes to the base of the side of the socket. 
 
Bibliography: Lejars (2013), 163. 
Current Location: NMB Bienne N˚2808 
 
 
G36: Javelin Tip, La Tène 
Date: Middle La Tène 
Find Location: La Tène, Switzerland. 
Material: Iron 
Dimensions: Length (total): 23.7cm; (blade): 10.0cm; (socket): 13.7cm.  Width (blade): 2.5cm.  
Diameter (socket, external): 1.8cm. 
Mass: 158g. 
Notes: Javelin tip with a convex and rhombic section, with a sharp point and a relatively weak 
mid-ridge.  Unusually heavy, due to being very long.  Attached by a circular socket with a pair of 
nails (present), through a pair of holes to the base of the side of the socket. 
 
Bibliography: Lejars (2013), 163. 
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Current Location: NMB Bienne N˚2811 
 
 
G37: Javelin Tip, La Tène 
Date: Middle La Tène 
Find Location: La Tène, Switzerland. 
Material: Iron 
Dimensions: Length (total): 25.5cm; (blade): 17.5cm; (socket): 8.0cm.  Width (blade): 3.0cm.  
Diameter (socket, external): 1.9cm. 
Mass: 128g 
Notes: Javelin tip with a convex blade and rhombic section, with a visible but only slightly raised 
mid-ridge.  Attached by a circular socket with by nails or rivets (missing) through a pair of holes 
at the base. 
 
Bibliography: Lejars (2013), 164. 
Current Location: NMB Bienne N˚2818 
 
 
G38: Javelin Tip, La Tène 
Date: Middle La Tène 
Find Location: La Tène, Switzerland. 
Material: Iron 
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Dimensions: Length (total): 24.0cm; (blade): 16.0cm; (socket): 8.0cm.  Width (blade): 3.0cm.  
Diameter (socket, external): 1.8cm 
Mass: 105g 
Notes: Javelin tip with a narrow, convex blade with a rhombic section.  Attached by a circular 
socket, with two holes for a pair of nails (one lost, other broken off) at the base.  Relatively weak 
mid-ridge. 
 
Bibliography: Lejars (2013), 165. 
Current Location: NMB Bienne N˚2837. 
 
 
G39: Javelin Tip, La Tène 
Date: Middle La Tène 
Find Location: La Tène, Switzerland. 
Material: Iron 
Dimensions: Length (total): 17.3cm; (blade): 6.5cm; (socket): 10.8cm.  Width (blade): 2.3cm.  
Diameter (socket, external); 2.0cm. 
Mass: 119g 
Notes: Javelin tip with a convex blade, rhombic section.  The blade has a relatively high mid-
ridge.  The socket is, unusually, octagonal in shape. 
 
Bibliography: Lejars (2013), 206. 
Current Location: NMB Bienne, N˚6924 
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G40: Javelin (or spear) Tip, La Tène 
Date: Middle La Tène 
Find Location: La Tène, Switzerland. 
Material: Iron 
Dimensions: Length (total): 31.5cm; (blade): 11.5cm; (socket): 20.0cm.  Width (blade): 3.2cm.  
Diameter (socket, external): 2.0cm. 
Mass: 203g 
Notes: Like G41 and G42, listed by Lejars as a ‘fer de lance’ but the type classification (VIb) is 
one for ‘les fers de javelot a douille longque,’ suggesting use as a javelin.  The javelin head is, as 
per the classification, long and narrow, with a pronounced mid-ridge.  The section of the socket 
is circular, but the tip and the base of the blade have rectangular sections. 
 
Bibliography: Lejars (2013), 206 
Current Location: NMB Bienne N˚2809. 
 
 
G41: Javelin (or spear) Tip, La Tène 
Date: Middle La Tène 
Find Location: La Tène, Switzerland. 
Material: Iron 
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Dimensions:  Length (total): 34.8cm; (blade): 12.0cm; (socket); 22.8cm.  Width (blade): 2.2cm.  
Diameter (socket, external): 1.8cm. 
Mass: 174g. 
Notes: Like G40 and G42, listed by Lejars as a ‘fer de lance’ but the type classification (VIb) is 
one for ‘les fers de javelot a douille longque,’ suggesting use as a javelin.  As per the 
designation, the socket is very long.  The blade is also quite long, with a convex section. 
 
Bibliography: Lejars (2013), 206. 
Current Location: NMB Bienne N˚2810 
 
 
G42: Javelin (or spear) Tip, La Tène 
Date: Middle La Tène 
Find Location: La Tène, Switzerland. 
Material: Iron 
Dimensions: Length (total): 41.1cm; (blade): 21.0cm; (socket): 20.1cm.  Width (blade): 4.5cm.  
Diameter (socket, external): 2.0cm. 
Mass: 269g 
Notes: Like G40 and G41, listed by Lejars as a ‘fer de lance’ but the type classification (VIb) is 
one for ‘les fers de javelot a douille longque,’ suggesting use as a javelin.  The blade is biconvex, 
with a circular-section socket; the fixing nails are not preserved. 
 
Bibliography: Lejars (2013), 163. 
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Current Location: NMB Bienne N˚2815. 
 
Spears 
G43: Spearhead, La Teǹe 
Date: Late La Tène I 
Find Location: Ciumes̡ti, Romania 
Material: Iron 
Dimensions: Length (total): 22cm.  Width (blade): 2.5cm.  Diameter (socket): 1.7cm. 
Notes: Spearhead, with a triangular shape.  Weak mid-ridge; blade overall has a rhombic section.  
Socket is circular in section, significantly damaged. 
 
Bibliography: Rusu (1969). 
 
 
G44: Spearhead, La Teǹe 
Date: 250-150 (La Tène II) 
Find Location: Unknown (possibly Marson, France) 
Material: Iron 
Dimensions: Length (total); 32.6cm.  Width (blade) 5.67cm.  Diameter (socket): 2.01cm.  
Thickness (blade0: 5.7mm. 
Mass: 206g 
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Notes: Spearhead with a ‘tear-drop’ shape.  Strong mid-ridge which merges into the circular 
socket.  Blade is chipped, parts of the socket are lost.  Secured by two rivets in the socket, one of 
which is visible, the other is lost. 
 
Current Location: British Museum ML.1501 
 
 
G45: Spearhead, La Tène 
Date: Late second century (Middle La Tène) 
Find Location: La Tène, Switzerland 
Material: Iron 
Dimensions: Length (total, preserved): 54.6cm; (blade): 30.0cm; (socket): 24.6cm.  Width 
(blade): 4.2cm.  Diameter (socket, external): 1.8cm. 
Mass: 296g 
Notes: Dating follows type (IIC).  Spearhead has a convex blade, with a strong mid-ridge.  Some 
damage to the blade; Lejars suggests this damage may not have been ancient.  Socket is rhombic 
on the blade, but rounded towards the base. 
 
Bibliography: Lejars (2013), 163. 
Current Location: NMB Bienne N˚2812. 
 
 
G46: Spearhead, La Tène 
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Date: Late second century (Middle La Tène) 
Find Location: La Tène, Switzerland 
Material: Iron 
Dimensions: Length (total): 34.4cm; (blade): 20.5cm; (socket): 13.9cm.  Width (blade): 4.3cm.  
Diameter (socket, external): 2.0cm. 
Mass: 200g. 
Notes: Dating follows type (IIC).  Spearhead with a convex blade and a pronounced mid-ridge.  
Attached by a circular socket. 
 
Bibliography: Lejars (2013), 163. 
Current Location: NMB Bienne N˚2813. 
 
 
G47: Spearhead, La Tène 
Date: Late second century (Middle La Tène) 
Find Location: La Tène, Switzerland 
Material: Iron 
Dimensions: Length (total): 35.5cm; (blade): 25.0cm; (socket): 10.5cm.  Width (blade): 3.4cm.  
Diameter (socket, external), 1.9cm. 
Mass: 147g. 
Notes: Dating follows type (IIC).  Spearhead with a convex blade and a pronounced mid-ridge.  
Some damage to the side of the blade.  Circular socket secured by two nails, which are both  
preserved. 
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Bibliography: Lejars (2013), 163. 
Current Location: NMB Bienne N˚2814 
 
 
G48: Spearhead, La Tène 
Date: Late second century (Middle La Tène) 
Find Location: La Tène, Switzerland 
Material: Iron 
Dimensions: Length (total): 30.9cm; (blade): 19.5cm; (socket): 11.4cm.  Width (blade): 3.3cm.  
Diameter (socket, external): 1.8mm. 
Mass: 142g. 
Notes: Dating follows type (IIC).  Spearhead with a convex blade and a pronounced mid-ridge.  
The socket is oval shaped (possibly crushed?), fixed by nails (not preserved). 
 
Bibliography: Lejars (2013), 163. 
Current Location: NMB Bienne N˚2816. 
 
 
G49: Spearhead, La Tène 
Date: Late second century (Middle La Tène) 
Find Location: La Tène, Switzerland 
Material: Iron 
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Dimensions: Length (total): 28.6cm; (blade): 19.0cm; (socket): 9.6cm.  Width (blade): 3.4cm.  
Diameter (socket, external): 1.75cm. 
Mass: 128g. 
Notes: Dating follows type (IIC).  Spearhead with a convex blade and a pronounced mid-ridge.  
Lejars notes that the point is unusually thick.  The opening of the socket at the base is oval 
(possibly originally circular), but shifts to a rhombic, diamond shape as it rises up the blade.  The 
two fixing nails are preserved.  Overall a remarkably well-preserved specimen, despite the low 
weight. 
 
Bibliography: Lejars (2013), 163. 
Current Location: NMB Bienne N˚2817 
 
 
G50: Spearhead, La Tène 
Date: Late second century (Middle La Tène) 
Find Location: La Tène, Switzerland 
Material: Iron 
Dimensions: Length (total): 30.5cm; (blade): 17.5cm; (socket): 13.0cm.  Width (blade): 2.8cm.  
Diameter (socket, external): 2.0cm. 
Mass: 160g. 
Notes: Dating follows type (IIC).  Spearhead with a convex blade and a pronounced mid-ridge.  
Lejars notes a thick point.  Circular socket with space for two nails (not preserved). 
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Bibliography: Lejars (2013), 164. 
Current Location: NMB Bienne N˚2820 
 
 
G51: Spearhead, La Tène 
Date: Late second century (Middle La Tène) 
Find Location: La Tène, Switzerland 
Material: Iron 
Dimensions: Length (total): 40.8cm; (blade): 36.1cm; (socket): 4.7cm.  Width (blade): 6.5cm.  
Diameter (socket, external): 2.2cm. 
Mass: 284g. 
Notes: Dating follows type (Va).  Spearhead with an elongated biconvex blade-shape, with a 
strong mid-ridge.  The socket is oval in section.  There are two decorative ribs running over the 
pair of holes for the nails or rivets (not preserved).  Relatively long blade for a fairly short 
socket. 
 
Bibliography: Lejars (2013), 164. 
Current Location: NMB Bienne N˚2821. 
 
 
G52: Spearhead, La Tène 
Date: Late third to early second century (Middle La Tène) 
Find Location: La Tène, Switzerland 
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Material: Iron 
Dimensions: Length (total): 24.3cm; (blade): 39.1cm; (socket): 4.5cm.  Width (blade): 7.5cm.  
Diameter (socket, external): 1.5cm. 
Mass: 115g. 
Notes: Dating follows type (IIIC).  Spearhead with a somewhat elongated biconvex blade-shape, 
with a pronounced, but relatively low mid-ridge.  Circular socket at the base with space for 2 
nails (not preserved), which becomes rhombic in section as it rises over the blade. 
 
Bibliography: Lejars (2013), 164. 
Current Location: NMB Bienne N˚2822. 
 
 
G53: Spearhead, La Tène 
Date: Late second century (Middle La Tène) 
Find Location: La Tène, Switzerland 
Material: Iron 
Dimensions: Length (total): 45.0cm; (blade): 39.1cm; (socket): 5.9cm.  Width (blade): 8.9cm.  
Diameter (socket, external): 2.1cm. 
Mass: 295g 
Notes: Dating follows type (VC).  Spearhead with a somewhat elongated biconvex blade-shape, 
with a moderate but still visible mid-ridge.  The socket is circular at the base, with holes for two 
nails, only one of which is preserved.  The socket becomes rhombic in section as it rises over the 
blade. 
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Bibliography: Lejars (2013), 164. 
Current Location: NMB Bienne N˚2823. 
 
 
G54: Spearhead, La Tène 
Date: Mid-third century (Middle La Tène) 
Find Location: La Tène, Switzerland 
Material: Iron 
Dimensions: Length (total): 22.5cm; (blade): 17.5cm; (socket): 5.0cm.  Width (blade): 7.9cm.  
Diameter (socket, external): 2.0cm. 
Mass: 151g. 
Notes: Dating follows type (IIB).  Spearhead with a convex blade-shape, with a pronounced mid-
ridge.  Socket is circular at the base with holes for two rivets (one partially preserved), but 
becomes rhombic in section as it rises over the blade. 
 
Bibliography: Lejars (2013), 164. 
Current Location: NMB Bienne N˚2824 
 
 
G55: Spearhead, La Tène 
Date: Late fourth to late second century (Early/Middle La Tène) 
Find Location: La Tène, Switzerland 
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Material: Iron 
Dimensions: Length (total): 21.2mm; (blade): 16.2cm; (socket): 5.0cm.  Width (blade): 3.6cm.  
Diameter (socket, external): 2.0cm. 
Mass: 132g. 
Notes: Dating follows type (IA).  Spearhead with a convex blade-shape with a moderately 
pronounced mid-ridge.  Lejars notes the point is thick.  Socket is circular in section over the 
entire length.  Mid-ridge is somewhat wide for a fairly narrow blade. 
Figure: 4.14 
 
Bibliography: Lejars (2013), 164. 
Current Location: NMB Bienne N˚2826. 
 
 
G56: Spearhead, La Tène 
Date: Late fourth to late second century (Early/Middle La Tène) 
Find Location: La Tène, Switzerland 
Material: Iron 
Dimensions: Length (total): 24.7cm; (blade): 20.2cm; (socket): 4.5cm.  Width (blade): 3.1cm.  
Diameter (socket, external): 2.2cm. 
Mass: 122g. 
Notes: Dating follows type (IA).  Spearhead with a convex and quite thin blade-shape, with a 
moderately pronounced mid-ridge.  Lejars notes a thick point.  The socket is circular in section at 
the base, but rhombic over the blade.  There are two holes for nails (not preserved). 
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Figure: 4.14 
 
Bibliography: Lejars (2013), 164. 
Current Location: NMB Bienne N˚2827 
 
 
G57: Spearhead, La Tène 
Date: Late second century (Middle La Tène) 
Find Location: La Tène, Switzerland 
Material: Iron 
Dimensions: Length (total): 38.8cm; (blade): 32.8cm; (socket): 6.0cm.  Width (blade): 32.8cm.  
Diameter (socket, external); 1.8cm. 
Mass: 224g. 
Notes: Dating follows type (ID).  Spearhead, with a quite wide, convex blade-shape with a 
relatively low mid-ridge.  Some damage on the edges of the blade.  Socket is circular in section 
at the base, but rhombic over the blade.  Space for two nails, neither preserved. 
 
Bibliography: Lejars (2013), 164. 
Current Location: NMB Bienne N˚2828 
 
 
G58: Spearhead, La Tène 
Date: Late second century (Middle La Tène) 
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Find Location: La Tène, Switzerland 
Material: Iron 
Dimensions: Length (total): 46.3cm; (blade): 40.8cm; (socket): 5.5cm.  Width (blade): 7.5cm.  
Diameter (socket, external): 2.0cm. 
Mass: 259g 
Notes: Dating follows type (ID).  Spearhead with a quite wide, convex blade-shape with a 
relatively low mid-ridge.  Socket is circular in section at the base, but rhombic over the blade.  
Two nails (preserved. 
 
Bibliography: Lejars (2013), 165. 
Current Location: NMB Bienne N˚2829. 
 
 
G59: Spearhead, La Tène 
Date: Mid-third century (Middle La Tène) 
Find Location: La Tène, Switzerland 
Material: Iron 
Dimensions: Length (total): 28.6cm; (blade): 23.2cm; (socket): 5.4cm.  Width (blade): 7.4cm.  
Diameter (socket, external); 2.0cm. 
Mass: 174g. 
Notes: Dating follows type (IIB).  Spearhead with a convex blade-shape and a relatively high 
mid-ridge.  Spearhead is more rounded in shape.  Socket is rhombic in section along the entire 
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length, with space for two nails (one preserved).  Blade is damaged, with a notch and puncture 
on one side; damage not severe. 
 
Bibliography: Lejars (2013), 165. 
Current Location: NMB Bienne N˚2830. 
 
 
G60: Spearhead, La Tène 
Date: Late second century (Middle La Tène) 
Find Location: La Tène, Switzerland 
Material: Iron 
Dimensions: Length (total): 34.2cm; (blade): 29.5cm; (socket): 4.7cm.  Width (blade): 7.2cm. 
Diameter (socket, external): 1.9cm. 
Mass: 211g. 
Notes: Dating follows type (ID).  Spearhead with a convex blade-shape and relatively low mid-
ridge.  The socket is circular at the base, but rhombic in section over the blade.  Holes for two 
nails, both partially preserved.  Lejars notes the point is thick. 
 
Bibliography: Lejars (2013), 165. 
Current Location: NMB Bienne N˚2832. 
 
 
G61: Spearhead, La Tène 
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Date: Late second century (Middle La Tène) 
Find Location: La Tène, Switzerland 
Material: Iron 
Dimensions: Length (total): 34.3cm; (blade); 28,8cm; (socket): 5.5cm.  Width (blade): 6.2cm.  
Diameter (socket, external): 1.8cm. 
Mass: 188g. 
Notes: Dating follows type (ID).  Spearhead with a convex blade-shape with a moderate mid-
ridge.  Lejars notes a thick point.  Socket is circular at the base, but rhombic in section over the 
blade.  Holes for two nails, both preserved.  Small notches in the blade edge, otherwise complete. 
 
Bibliography: Lejars (2013), 165. 
Current Location: NMB Bienne N˚2833. 
 
 
G62: Spearhead, La Tène 
Date: Late second century (Middle La Tène) 
Find Location: La Tène, Switzerland 
Material: Iron 
Dimensions: Length (total): 31.6cm; (blade): 26.0cm; (socket): 5.6cm.  Width (blade): 6.2cm.  
Diameter (socket, external): 1.8cm. 
Mass: 162g. 
Notes: Dating follows type (ID).  Spearhead with a convex blade-shape with a moderate mid-
ridge, emphasized by a pair of decorative grooves along the edges of it.  Socket is circular at the 
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base but rhombic along the blade, with space for two nails, one preserved.  Blade is damaged 
with several notches on the upper portion; small parts of the lower blade are missing, but the 
piece of substantially complete. 
 
Bibliography: Lejars (2013), 165. 
Current Location: NMB Bienne N˚2834. 
 
 
G63: Spearhead, La Tène 
Date: Late fourth to late second century (Early/Middle La Tène) 
Find Location: La Tène, Switzerland 
Material: Iron 
Dimensions: Length (total): 25.4cm; (blade): 19.0cm; (socket): 6.4cm.  Width (blade): 5.3cm.  
Diameter (socket, external): 1.7cm. 
Mass: 125g. 
Notes: Dating follows type (IA).  Spearhead with a convex blade-shape and a moderate mid-
ridge.  Socket is circular at the base but rhombic along the blade, with space for two nails, both 
preserved.  Small notch on one side of the blade about a quarter of the length from the bottom. 
 
Bibliography: Lejars (2013), 165. 
Current Location: NMB Bienne N˚2835. 
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G64: Spearhead, La Tène 
Date: Late fourth to late second century (Early/Middle La Tène) 
Find Location: La Tène, Switzerland 
Material: Iron 
Dimensions: Length (total): 24.6cm; (blade): 19.8cm; (socket): 4.8cm.  Width (blade): 4.5cm.  
Diameter (socket, external): 1.8cm. 
Mass: 103g. 
Notes: Dating follows type (IA).  Spearhead with a convex blade-shape and a moderate mid-
ridge.  Socket is somewhat rounded at its base, but rhombic over the blade, with space for two 
rivets (not preserved). 
 
Bibliography: Lejars (2013), 165. 
Current Location: NMB Bienne N˚2836. 
 
 
G65: Spearhead, La Tène 
Date: Late fourth to late second century (Early/Middle La Tène) 
Find Location: La Tène, Switzerland 
Material: Iron 
Dimensions: Length (total): 22.2cm; (blade): 15.2cm; (socket): 7.0cm.  Width (blade): 3.4cm.  
Diameter (socket, external): 1.6cm. 
Mass: 91g. 
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Notes: Dating follows type (IA).  One of the lighter examples from La Tène.  Spearhead with a 
convex blade-shape and a moderate mid-ridge.  Socket is circular at the base, but rhombic over 
the blade, with two rivet-holes joined by a single metal rivet (preserved). 
 
Bibliography: Lejars (2013), 165. 
Current Location: NMB Bienne N˚2839. 
 
 
G66: Spearhead, La Tène 
Date: Late fourth to late second century (Early/Middle La Tène) 
Find Location: La Tène, Switzerland 
Material: Iron 
Dimensions: Length (total): 26.3cm; (blade): 14.9cm; (socket): 11.4cm.  Width (blade): 3.8cm.  
Diameter (socket, external): 1.8cm. 
Mass: 151g. 
Notes: Dating follows type (IA).  Spearhead with a biconvex blade and a fairly moderate mid-
ridge.  Socket is round at the base but rhombic over the blade, with two holes joined by a single 
rivet. 
 
Bibliography: Lejars (2013), 165. 
Current Location: NMB Bienne N˚2840. 
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G67: Spearhead, La Tène 
Date: Late second century (Middle La Tène) 
Find Location: La Tène, Switzerland 
Material: Iron 
Dimensions: Length (total): 40.3cm; (blade): 35.0cm; (socket): 5.3cm.  Width (blade); 6.5cm.  
Diameter (socket, external): 2.0cm. 
Mass: 173g. 
Notes: Dating follows type (VC).  Spearhead with a biconvex blade-shape and a moderate mid-
ridge.  Blade is very long and strongly tapered, with an asymmetrical cutout on the base of the 
blade.  Socket section is circular at the base but rhombic over the blade, with space for two nails 
(one preserved). 
 
Bibliography: Lejars (2013), 165. 
Current Location: NMB Bienne N˚2842. 
 
 
G68: Spearhead, La Tène 
Date: Late second century (Middle La Tène) 
Find Location: La Tène, Switzerland 
Material: Iron 
Dimensions: Length (total): 39.3cm; (blade): 34.0cm; (socket): 5.3cm.  Width (blade): 7.7cm.  
Diameter (socket, external): 2.0cm. 
Mass: 198g. 
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Notes: Dating follows type (VC).  Spearhead with a biconvex blade-shape and a moderate mid-
ridge.  Asymmetrical cutout on one side of the blade.  Socket is circular at the base, but rhombic 
over the blade, with space for two nails (both preserved). 
 
Bibliography: Lejars (2013), 165. 
Current Location: NMB Bienne N˚2843. 
 
 
G69: Spearhead, La Tène 
Date: Late fourth to late second century (Early/Middle La Tène) 
Find Location: La Tène, Switzerland 
Material: Iron 
Dimensions: Length (total): 17.2cm; (blade): 9.9cm; (socket): 7.3cm.  Width (blade): 4.0cm.  
Diameter (socket, external): 2.4cm. 
Mass: 121g. 
Notes: Dating follows type (IA).  Spearhead with a convex blade-shape with a strong mid-ridge.  
Socket is circular at the base, but becomes rhombic over the blade.  Space for two nails (both 
preserved). 
 
Bibliography: Lejars (2013), 162. 
Current Location: NMB Bienne N˚2802. 
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G70: Spearhead, La Tène 
Date: Late fourth to late second century? (Early/Middle La Tène) 
Find Location: La Tène, Switzerland 
Material: Iron 
Dimensions: Length (total, preserved): 28.3cm; (blade, preserved); 22.4cm, (socket): 5.9cm. 
Mass: 112.7g preserved. 
Notes: Type identification (IA) and resulting date-range tentative due to heavy damage to the 
blade, making it unclear what the original blade-shape was. 
 
Bibliography: Lejars (2013), 206. 
Current Location: NMB Bienne N˚6922. 
 
 
G71: Spearhead, La Tène 
Date: Late second century (Middle La Tène) 
Find Location: La Tène, Switzerland 
Material: Iron 
Dimensions: Length (total): 39.2cm; (blade): 25.0cm; (socket): 14.2cm.  Width (blade): 4.8cm.  
Diameter (socket, external): 2.0cm. 
Mass: 162g. 
Notes: Date follows type (IIC).  Spearhead with a convex blade-shape and a pronounced mid-
ridge.  Some damage on the edge of the blade, but overall complete.  Socket is oval shape, with 
space for two nails, both preserved. 
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Bibliography: Lejars (2013), 164. 
Current Location: NMB Bienne N˚2819. 
 
 
 
G72: Spearhead, La Tène 
Date: Late second century (Middle La Tène) 
Find Location: La Tène, Switzerland 
Material: Iron 
Dimensions: Length (total): 40.1cm; (blade): 24.5cm; (socket): 15.6cm.  Width (blade): 3.7cm.  
Diameter (socket, external): 1.8cm. 
Mass: 201g. 
Notes: Date follows type (IIC).  Spearhead is damaged but has a convex blade-shape with a 
pronounced mid-ridge. 
 
Bibliography: Lejars (2013), 206. 
Current Location: NMB Bienne N˚6921. 
 
 
G73: Spearhead, La Tène 
Date: Early second century (Middle La Tène) 
Find Location: La Tène, Switzerland 
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Material: Iron 
Dimensions: Length (total): 27.7cm; (blade): 21.3cm; (socket): 6.4cm.  Width (blade): 3.3cm.  
Diameter (socket, external), 1.7cm. 
Mass: 115g. 
Notes: Date follows type (IV).  Spearhead with a convex blade-shape and a relatively low mid-
ridge; the mid-ridge extends somewhat beyond the edge of the blade into a ‘bayonet’ point.  
Some damage to the edges of the blade, but on the whole intact. 
 
Bibliography: Lejars (2013), 206. 
Current Location: NMB Bienne N˚6923 
 
 
G74: Spearhead, La Tène 
Date: Early second century (Middle La Tène) 
Find Location: La Tène, Switzerland 
Material: Iron 
Dimensions: Length (total): 19.0cm; (blade); 10.2cm; (socket): 8.8cm.  Width (blade): 3.0cm.  
Diameter (socket, external); 1.8cm. 
Mass: 75g. 
Notes: Date follows type (IV).  Very small spearhead with a ‘bayonet’ point, convex blade-shape 
and a relatively high mid-ridge.  One of the lightest of the La Tène examples.  Socket is circular 
with space for two nails (once is which is preserved). 
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Bibliography: Lejars (2013), 162. 
Current Location: NMB Bienne N˚2806. 
 
G75: Spearhead, La Tène 
Date: 300-150 (Middle La Tène) 
Find Location: Unknown, France? 
Material: Iron 
Dimensions: Length (total): 38.75cm.  Width (max): 3.2cm.  Diameter (socket, external), 
1.78cm. 
Mass: 138g. 
Notes: Date range by museum above is consistent with type (IB).  Spearhead has an elongated 
convex blade-shape, with a moderate mid-ridge.  Socket is circular at the base, becoming more 
rhombic along the blade. 
Figure: 4.14 
 
Current Location: British Museum ML.2403. 
 
 
G76: Spearhead, La Tène 
Date: 200-50 (Middle/Late La Tène) 
Find Location: River Thames, London (exact location unknown). 
Material: Iron, with copper-alloy decorative plates. 
 711 
Dimensions: Length (total): 30.2cm.  Width (max): 7.13cm.  Diameter (socket, external): 
1.93cm. 
Mass: 146g. 
Notes: Date range somewhat late for the type (IB), but the find-location is in Britain.  Spearhead 
has a weakly convex blade-shape with a very strong mid-ridge.  Socket is circular in shape.  
Copper-alloy decorative plates adorn the blades of the spearhead on either side of the mid-ridge 
on the lower half.  There is significant damage on one blade, and a smaller hole corroded in the 
other. 
 
Current Location: British Museum 1938,0504.1. 
 
 
G77: Spear Butt, La Tène 
Date: Middle La Tène? 
Find Location: La Tène, Switzerland 
Material: Iron 
Dimensions: Length (total): 7.8cm; (point): 4.3cm; (socket): 3.5cm.  Width (point): 7x7mm.  
Diameter (socket, external): 1.0cm. 
Mass: 17.9g. 
Notes: Spear Butt.  Round socket with a rectangular-section butt-spike extending down. 
 
Bibliography: Lejars (2013), 174. 
Current Location: NMB Bienne N˚2945. 
 712 
 
 
G78: Spear Butt, La Tène 
Date: Middle La Tène? 
Find Location: La Tène, Switzerland 
Material: Iron 
Dimensions: Length (total, preserved): 5.5cm.  Diameter (socket, external): 1.8cm. 
Mass: 21g 
Notes: Spear Butt, incomplete.  Circular section socket-type.  One fixing nail is preserved; the 
base of the point is broken off.   
 
Bibliography: Lejars (2013), 174. 
Current Location: NMB Bienne N˚2942. 
 
 
G79: Spear Butt, La Tène 
Date: Middle La Tène? 
Find Location: La Tène, Switzerland 
Material: Iron 
Dimensions: Length (total, preserved): 6.7cm; (total, est): 5.8cm.  Diameter (socket, external): 
2.0cm. 
Mass: 22g. 
Notes: Spear Butt, mostly complete, but badly corroded.  Circular section socket-type. 
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Bibliography: Lejars (2013), 207. 
Current Location: NMB Bienne N˚6929. 
 
 
 
G80: Spear Butt, La Tène 
Date: Middle La Tène? 
Find Location: La Tène, Switzerland 
Material: Iron 
Dimensions: Length (total): 4.9cm.  Diameter (socket, external): 1.8cm; (base, external): 1.4cm 
Mass: 40g. 
Notes: Spear Butt, flat-bottomed with no spike.  Circular-section with two hole for the 
attachment nails (lost). 
 
Bibliography: Lejars (2013), 174. 
Current Location: NMB Bienne N˚2943. 
 
 
G81: Spear Butt, La Tène 
Date: Middle La Tène? 
Find Location: La Tène, Switzerland 
Material: Iron 
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Dimensions: Length (total): 7.6cm.  Diameter (base, external): 2.0cm 
Mass: 45g. 
Notes: Spear Butt, driven in by a single nail projecting out of the base.  Cicular in section on the 
top, but hexagonal at the base. 
 
Bibliography: Lejars (2013), 172. 
Current Location: NMB Bienne N˚2916. 
 
 
G82: Spear Butt, La Tène 
Date: Middle La Tène? 
Find Location: La Tène, Switzerland 
Material: Iron 
Dimensions: Length (total): 7.2cm; (base): 3.3cm.  Diameter (base, external): 2.1cm 
Mass: 46g. 
Notes: Spear butt with a conical base, driven in by a single up-ward facing nail; no ferrule. 
 
Bibliography: Lejars (2013), 172. 
Current Location: NMB Bienne N˚2917. 
 
 
G83: Spear Butt, La Tène 
Date: Middle La Tène? 
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Find Location: La Tène, Switzerland 
Material: Iron 
Dimensions: Length (total): 6.9cm; (base): 2.9cm.  Diameter (base, external): 2.1cm. 
Mass: 47g. 
Notes: Spear butt with a conical base, driven in by a single up-ward facing nail; no ferrule. 
 
Bibliography: Lejars (2013), 171. 
Current Location: NMB Bienne N˚2913. 
 
 
G84: Spear Butt, La Tène 
Date: Middle La Tène? 
Find Location: La Tène, Switzerland 
Material: Iron 
Dimensions: Length (total): 7.8cm; (base) 2.1cm.  Diameter (base, external): 2.2cm. 
Mass: 47g. 
Notes: Spear butt with a conical base, driven in by a single up-ward facing nail; no ferrule. 
 
Bibliography: Lejars (2013), 171. 
Current Location: NMB Bienne N˚2914. 
 
 
G85: Spear Butt, La Tène 
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Date: Middle La Tène? 
Find Location: La Tène, Switzerland 
Material: Iron 
Dimensions: Length (total): 9.1cm; (base) 3.5cm.  Diameter (base, external): 2.1cm. 
Mass: 55g. 
Notes: Spear butt with a conical base, driven in by a single up-ward facing nail; no ferrule. 
 
Bibliography: Lejars (2013), 171. 
Current Location: NMB Bienne N˚2915. 
 
 
G86: Spear Butt, La Tène 
Date: Middle La Tène? 
Find Location: La Tène, Switzerland 
Material: Iron 
Dimensions: Length (total): 7.6cm; Diameter (external): 2.4cm. 
Mass: 72g. 
Notes: Spear butt, hollow conical socket attached by a nail through a hole; hole present, nail not 
preserved. 
 
Bibliography: Lejars (2013), 173. 
Current Location: NMB Bienne N˚2941. 
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G87: Spear Butt, La Tène 
Date: Middle La Tène? 
Find Location: La Tène, Switzerland 
Material: Iron 
Dimensions: Length (total):10.2cm; (base): 3.0cm; (ferrule): 1.1cm.  Width (base): 2.3cm.  
Diameter (ferrule): 2.5cm. 
Mass: 82g (including 7g ferrule). 
Notes: Spear butt with a conical base driven in by a single upward facing nail, with a circular 
section ferrule. 
 
Bibliography: Lejars (2013), 172. 
Current Location: NMB Bienne N˚2922. 
 
 
 
G88: Spear Butt, La Tène 
Date: Middle La Tène? 
Find Location: La Tène, Switzerland 
Material: Iron 
Dimensions: Length (total):10.1cm; (base): 5.1cm; (ferrule): 1.1cm.  Width (base): 2.1cm.  
Diameter (ferrule): 2.4cm. 
Mass: 91g (including 7g ferrule). 
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Notes: Spear butt with an octagonal base driven in by a single upward facing nail, with a ferrule. 
 
Bibliography: Lejars (2013), 172. 
Current Location: NMB Bienne N˚2923. 
 
 
G89: Spear Butt, La Tène 
Date: Middle La Tène? 
Find Location: La Tène, Switzerland 
Material: Iron 
Dimensions: Length (total): 17.2cm; (base): 10.0cm; (socket): 7.2cm.  Width (base): 1.5cm.  
Diameter (socket, external): 1.9cm. 
Mass: 102g. 
Notes: Spear butt, socketed.  Socket only runs for the first 7.2cm of the length; the rest of non-
hollow, with grooves like fullers giving it a pyramidal shape.  It is secured through a single-rivet 
through two holes (partially preserved). 
 
Bibliography: Lejars (2013), 174. 
Current Location: NMB Bienne N˚2944. 
 
 
G90: Spear Butt, La Tène 
Date: Middle La Tène? 
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Find Location: La Tène, Switzerland 
Material: Iron 
Dimensions: Length (total): 11.3cm; (base): 4.5cm; (ferrule): 1.0cm.  Width (base): 2.4cm.  
Diameter (ferrule): 2.8cm. 
Mass: 123g (including 6g ferrule). 
Notes: Spear butt with an octagonal base driven in by a single upward facing nail, with a ferrule. 
 
Bibliography: Lejars (2013), 172. 
Current Location: NMB Bienne N˚2919. 
 
 
G91: Spear Butt, La Tène 
Date: Middle La Tène? 
Find Location: La Tène, Switzerland 
Material: Iron 
Dimensions: Length (total): 15.0cm; (base): 5.9cm; (ferrule): 9mm.  Width (base): 2.5cm.  
Diameter (ferrule): 2.6cm. 
Mass: 135g (including 8g ferrule). 
Notes: Spear butt with an octagonal base driven in by a single upward facing nail, with a ferrule. 
 
Bibliography: Lejars (2013), 172. 
Current Location: NMB Bienne N˚2918. 
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G92: Spear Butt, La Tène 
Date: Middle La Tène? 
Find Location: La Tène, Switzerland 
Material: Iron 
Dimensions: Length (total): 17.1cm; (base): 6.5cm; (ferrule): 1.3cm.  Width (base): 2.4cm.  
Diameter (ferrule): 2.7cm. 
Mass: 153g (including 7g ferrule). 
Notes: Spear butt with an octagonal base driven in by a single upward facing nail, with a ferrule. 
 
Bibliography: Lejars (2013), 172. 
Current Location: NMB Bienne N˚2921. 
 
 
G93: Spear Butt, La Tène 
Date: Middle La Tène? 
Find Location: La Tène, Switzerland 
Material: Iron 
Dimensions: Length (total): 15.6cm; (base): 4.9cm; (ferrule): 1.9cm.  Width (base): 2.4cm.  
Diameter (ferrule): 2.8cm. 
Mass: 154g (including 15g ferrule). 
Notes: Spear butt with an octagonal base driven in by a single upward facing nail, with a ferrule.  
Ferrule is unusually large. 
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Bibliography: Lejars (2013), 172. 
Current Location: NMB Bienne N˚2920. 
 
 
Shields 
G94: Shield Boss, La Tène 
Date: c. 225-175 (based on type) 
Find Location: Gournay-sur-Aronde 
Material: Iron 
Dimensions: Height (hull, recorded): 5.6cm.  Measurements from scale diagram: Length (wing): 
3.52cm; (hull) 13.8cm.  Width (wing, min.): 2.35cm. 
Notes: Example of Brunaux and Rapin Group IIC boss type; only the height of the hull is 
reported in their catalog.  Boss is quite small, with small, concave wings.  Two holes for rivets sit 
very close to the hull (one partially preserved, one lost).  The boss is complete. 
 
Bibliography: Brunaux and Rapin (1988), 177, cat. n˚2584. 
 
 
G95: Shield Boss, La Tène 
Date: c. 275-200 (based on type) 
Find Location: Gournay-sur-Aronde 
Material: Iron 
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Dimensions: Height (hull, recorded): 4.2cm.  Measurements from scale diagram: Length (wing): 
c. 1.88cm; (hull): c. 14.1cm. 
Notes: Example of Brunaux and Rapin Type IIIA boss type; only the height of the hull is 
reported in their catalog.  Boss is quite small, with very small, rounded wings.  Two holes for 
rivets sit in the middle of the wings, one preserves the top of the rivet.  Boss is undamaged. 
 
Bibliography: Brunaux and Rapin (1988), 174, cat. n˚755. 
 
 
G96: Shield Boss, La Tène 
Date: 185-125 (based on type) 
Find Location: Gournay-sur-Aronde 
Material: Iron 
Dimensions: Height (hull, recorded): 13.8cm.  Measurements from scale diagram: Length (total): 
47.4cm; (wing): 18.5cm.  Height (wing): 13.8cm. 
Notes: Example of Brunaux and Rapin type VI; only the height of the hull is reported in their 
catalog.  Significant damage: one wing is broken off into a fragment and a significant amount of 
the central hull is missing.  The boss is very large, requiring four rivet holes (instead of the usual 
two); one rivet near the center of the wing, while another is on the very edge.  None of the rivets 
are preserved. 
 
Bibliography: Brunaux and Rapin (1988), 177, cat. n˚2706-7. 
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G97: Shield Boss, La Tène 
Date: c. 275 - 180 (based on type) 
Find Location: Gournay-sur-Aronde 
Material: Iron 
Dimensions: Height (hull, recorded): 8.2cm.  Measurements from scale diagram: Length (hull): 
15.25; (wing): 5.4cm. 
Notes: Example of Brunaux and Rapin type IIA; only the height of the hull is reported in their 
catalog.  The boss is moderate in size, with elongated oval wings.  Two holes for rivets sit in the 
middle of the wings, neither rivet is preserved.  Boss is slightly bent, but otherwise in good 
condition. 
 
Bibliography: Brunaux and Rapin (1988), 173, cat. n˚22. 
 
 
G98: Shield Boss, La Tène 
Date: c. 175-75 (based on type) 
Find Location: Gournay-sur-Aronde 
Material: Iron 
Dimensions: Height (hull, recorded): 15.5cm. 
Notes: Example of Brunaux and Rapin type VII; only the height of the hull is reported in their 
catalog.  The boss is ‘butterfly’ shaped, with a moderate hull, but very large outward-curving 
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wings.  The heads of two rivets, one in the center of each wing, are preserved.  Boss is slightly 
bent, but otherwise appears to be in excellent condition. 
 
Bibliography: Brunaux and Rapin (1988), 174, cat. n˚497. 
 
 
G99: Shield Boss, La Tène 
Date: 250-150 (Middle La Tène) 
Find Location: Grave 1, Connatre, Champagne-Ardenne, France 
Material: Iron 
Dimensions: Length: 20.3cm.  Width (wings): 11.3cm; (hull, max): 12.2cm.  Height (hull, 
approx..): 5.9cm.  Thickness c. 2mm at edge. 
Mass: 298g. 
Notes: Iron boss with rounded wings.  Almost complete but was in many fragments, now 
repaired with plaster.  Heavily corroded.  Type IIA in Brunaux and Rapin’s typology, but fairly 
large for that type. 
 
Current Location: British Museum ML1659. 
 
 
G100: Shield Boss, La Tène 
Date: 250-150 (Middle La Tène) 
Find Location: Campagne-Ardenne, France. 
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Material: Iron 
Dimensions: Length (total): 22.5cm; (hull): 8.8cm.  Width (right wing): 8.73cm; (left wing): 
9.37cm.  Height (hull): 6.39.  Nail head diameter: 26cm. 
Mass: 335g. 
Notes: One break, between the right wing and the hull, has been repaired with plaster.  There are 
decorative grooves at the edge of the hull.  Two rivets held the boss to the shield; the heads of 
these are preserved, along with part of the shank of one.  Type IB in Brunaux and Rapin’s 
typology. 
 
Current Location: British Museum ML.2873. 
 
 
G101: Shield Boss, La Tène 
Date: c. 225-100 (Middle La Tène) 
Find Location: La Tène 
Material: Iron 
Dimensions: Length (total, preserved): 27.4cm; (flange): 10.8cm.  Height (hull): 11.0cm. 
Mass: 174g, damaged. 
Notes: Dating follows type (V).  Original length perhaps c. 32cm.  Perhaps half of the boss in 
total is missing.  Only part of one flange and the hull remains.  One rivet survives, along with 
part of the maniple, allowing for the thickness of the original wooden core (now lost), to be 
assessed (c. 9mm thick). 
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Bibliography: Lejars (2013), 171. 
Current Location: NMB Bienne N˚2902. 
 
 
G102: Shield Boss, La Tène 
Date: c. 275-100 (Middle La Tène) 
Find Location: La Tène 
Material: Iron 
Dimensions: Length (total): 26.4cm; (wing): 9.0cm.  Height (hull): 10.8cm. 
Mass: 195.6g (including 4.2g for the rivets). 
Notes: Dating follows type (V).  Shield boss with trapezoidal wings.  Boss is complete, but the 
handle is missing.  Both rivets preserved. 
 
Bibliography: Lejars (2013), 171. 
Current Location: NMB Bienne N˚2903. 
 
 
G103: Shield Boss, La Tène 
Date: c. 225-100 (Middle La Tène) 
Find Location: La Tène 
Material: Iron 
Dimensions: Length (total): 29.0cm; (wing): 10.0cm.  Height (hull): 8.2cm. 
Mass: 197g. 
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Notes: Dating follows type (V).  Complete shield boss, with trapezoidal wings; one rivet 
completely preserved, the other slightly damaged.  The rivets allow the thickness of the original 
wooden shield (now lost) to be estimated (c. 9mm).  The rivets are decorated with a starburst 
pattern not seen on the other examples.  The maniple is missing. 
 
Bibliography: Lejars (2013), 171. 
Current Location: NMB Bienne N˚2904. 
 
 
G104: Shield Boss, La Tène 
Date: c. 225-100 (Middle La Tène) 
Find Location: La Tène 
Material: Iron 
Dimensions: Length (total, preserved): 20.8cm; (wing): 7.6cm.  Height (hull): 10.3cm. 
Mass: 180g. 
Notes: Dating follows type (V).  Shield boss with trapezoidal wings; one wing is nearly entirely 
lost, the other bent.  There is a large crack in the hull.  A rivet is preserved, allowing for the 
thickness of the original wooden shield (now lost) to be estimated (11mm).  The maniple is 
missing. 
 
Bibliography: Lejars (2013), 171. 
Current Location: NMB Bienne N˚2905. 
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G105: Shield Boss, La Tène 
Date: c. 275-100 (Middle La Tène) 
Find Location: La Tène 
Material: Iron 
Dimensions: Length (total): 35.1cm; (wing); 12.1cm.  Height (hull): 10.0cm. 
Mass: 217g 
Notes: Dating follows type (I).  Shield boss with rectangular wings; the right and left edges have 
a scalloped design.  There are two large primary rivets in the center of the wings, along with 
pairs of secondary nails in each of the far corners of the wings.  There is some minor damage to 
the right wing, and a crack in the leg, but the boss is by and large complete. 
 
Bibliography: Lejars (2013), 171. 
Current Location: NMB Bienne N˚2906. 
 
 
G106: Hull of a Shield Boss, La Tène 
Find Location: La Tène 
Material: Iron 
Dimensions: Length (total, preserved): 11.7cm; Height (hull): 10.2cm. 
Mass: 167g 
Notes: Type (and dating by type) impossible to determine.  Only the hull of the boss remains; the 
fragment shows traces of damage and repair, with a rivet fixed in the base of the hull. 
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Bibliography: Lejars (2013), 171. 
Current Location: NMB Bienne N˚2907. 
 
 
G107: Shield Maniple, La Tène 
Date: Middle(?) La Tène? 
Find Location: La Tène 
Material: Iron 
Dimensions: Length (total): 15.2; (stem): 10.4.  Width (stem): 8mm; (wings): 3.7 and 3.8cm.  
Thickness (stem): 2mm. 
Mass: 10.9g. 
Notes: Maniple, composed of a stem and a pair of small wings with complex curving designs at 
each end, which contain the rivet holes to connect with a boss.  There are two groups of three 
decorative grooves on the stem.  Overall, the maniple seems to be a high-quality piece.  
Complete. 
 
Bibliography: Lejars (2013), 170. 
Current Location: NMB Bienne N˚2895. 
 
 
G108: Shield Maniple, La Tène 
Date: Middle(?) La Tène? 
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Find Location: La Tène 
Material: Iron 
Dimensions: Length (total): 13.9cm; (stem): 10.5cm.  Width (stem): 5mm; (wings): 5.2 and 
5.7cm.  Thickness (stem): 2mm. 
Mass: 14.1g 
Notes: Maniple is curved (possibly bent), with semi-circular wings which contain the rivet holes 
to connect with a boss.  Two pairs of decorative grooves on the stem. 
 
Bibliography: Lejars (2013), 170. 
Current Location: NMB Bienne N˚2896. 
 
 
G109: Shield Maniple, La Tène 
Date: Middle(?) La Tène? 
Find Location: La Tène 
Material: Iron 
Dimensions: Length (total): 12.5cm; (stem): 9.1cm.  Width (stem): 6mm; (wings): 3.2 and 
3.3cm.  Thickness (stem): 1mm. 
Mass: 6.3g 
Notes: Maniple, composed of a stem with a pair of simple wings on the end which house the 
rivet holes to connect to the boss.  Some damage (small cracks) to the wings, otherwise 
complete. 
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Bibliography: Lejars (2013), 170. 
Current Location: NMB Bienne N˚2897. 
 
 
G110: Shield Maniple, La Tène 
Date: Middle(?) La Tène? 
Find Location: La Tène 
Material: Iron 
Dimensions: Length (total): 14.3cm; (stem): 10.2cm.  Width (stem): 5mm; (wings): 7.0 and 
7.5cm.  Thickness (stem): 3mm. 
Mass: 15.9g 
Notes: Maniple, composed of a stem with a pair of semi-circular wings on the end; the wings are 
quite large with rivet holes in the center. 
 
Bibliography: Lejars (2013), 170. 
Current Location: NMB Bienne N˚2898. 
 
 
G111: Shield Maniple, La Tène 
Date: Middle(?) La Tène? 
Find Location: La Tène 
Material: Iron 
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Dimensions: Length (total): 15.2cm; (stem): 10.4cm.  Width (stem): 8mm; (wings): 3.7 and 
3.8cm.  Thickness (stem): 2mm. 
Mass: 18.9g 
Notes: Maniple, composed of a stem with a pair of complex and fairly ornate wings which house 
the rivet holes to connect to the boss.  The grip is slightly thicker in the center. 
 
Bibliography: Lejars (2013), 170. 
Current Location: NMB Bienne N˚2899. 
 
 
G112: Shield Maniple, La Tène 
Date: Middle(?) La Tène? 
Find Location: La Tène 
Material: Iron 
Dimensions: Length (total, preserved): 12.8cm; (total, est.): 13.0cm; (stem): 9.6cm.  Width 
(stem): 9mm; (wing): 5.6cm.  Thickness (stem): 2mm. 
Mass: 8.16g 
Notes: Maniple.  Incomplete; a large part of the left-wing is missing and there is minor damage 
to the right wing.  The wings have a complex curving design. 
 
Bibliography: Lejars (2013), 170. 
Current Location: NMB Bienne N˚2900. 
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G113: Shield Maniple, La Tène 
Date: Middle(?) La Tène? 
Find Location: La Tène 
Material: Iron 
Dimensions: Length (total): 16.3cm; (stem); 11.5cm.  Width (stem): 9mm; (wings): 2.7 and 
3.0cm.  Thickness (stem): 3mm. 
Mass: 24.5g 
Notes: Maniple, composed of a stem (curved or bent), with rectangular wings which have 
flourishes on the edges and decorative grooves.  Complete. 
 
Bibliography: Lejars (2013), 170. 
Current Location: NMB Bienne N˚2901. 
 
 
G114: Complete Shield, La Tène 
Date: Middle(?) La Tène? 
Find Location: La Tène 
Material: Iron 
Dimensions: Length (total): 110cm.  Width (preserved): 50.7cm; (restored): c.52-54cm.  
Thickness (max): 8.2cm. 
Mass: Connolly reconstructs the shield at c. 6-7kg (4kg wood, 2kg leather, 250g iron). 
 734 
Notes: Shield, including wooden elements, dredged from the site of La Tène.  Heavily damaged.  
Gassmann (2007) shows that it was constructed out of a pair of planks hewn from the same tree, 
rather than the multilayered plywood construction of the Roman scutum. 
 
Bibliography: Gassman (2007).  Connolly (1981), 119.  Lejars (2013), 163.  
 
 
Armor 
Mail 
G115: Fragments of Mail Shirt, La Tène 
Date: Late La Tène I 
Find Location: Ciumes̡ti, Romania 
Material: Iron 
Dimensions: Diameter (rings): 8.5mm to 9.2mm; Thickness (wire): 0.8mm to 1.8mm.  Some 
rings were much finer, with diameters between 7.2mm and 7.5mm, wire thickness 1.2mm to 
1.4mm. 
Notes: Remains of a mail tunic included in a warrior burial with spearhead (G43) and decorated 
helmet (G118).  The mail tunic included elaborate decorative metal studs for affixing the 
shoulder-doubling of the armor.  Some of the rings are irregularly shaped and there is 
considerable variation in ring size.  Ring construction is four-in-one, but end-abutted, rather than 
riveted. 
 
Bibliography: Rusu (1969). 
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G116: Mail Shirt, Iron Age Britain 
Date: c. Late La Tène I 
Find Location: Kirkburn, England 
Material: Iron 
Dimensions: Tunic: 92cm to 85cm long; 48cm wide when folded in burial deposit.  Ring 
Diameter: 8.2mm to 9.2mm.  Thickness (wire): 1.5mm to 1.9mm. 
Notes: Nearly complete mail shirt deposited as part of a warrior burial.  The rings are in a four-
in-one pattern but are end-abutted rather than riveted.  The form of the shirt is different than 
Roman mail, featuring a tube-and-yoke style construction (like a type-IV cuirass), rather than 
shoulder-doubling. 
 
Bibliography: Stead (1991), 54-7. 
 
 
G117: Armor Rings, La Tène 
Date: Late La Tène II or Early La Tène III 
Find Location: Tiefenau near Bern, Switzerland. 
Material: Iron 
Dimensions: Diameter (rings): 1.3cm.  Thickness (wire): 1mm. 
Notes: Concretion of rings, now restored.  The rings are quite large.  The fragment has an 
unusual link-joining pattern of six-in-one (each ring joined to six adjacent rings. 
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Bibliography: Müller (1986). 
 
 
Helmets 
G118: Decorated Iron Helmet, La Tène 
Date: Late La Tène I 
Find Location: Ciumes̡ti, Romania 
Materials: Iron, bronze decoration 
Dimensions: Thickness (current, with rust): 2mm to 2.5mm; (original, est.): 1.5mm. 
Notes: Found in the same deposit as spearhead (G43) and mail (G115).  Decorated iron helmet 
with a metal bird affixed at the crest.  The bird is made from very thin copper-alloy plate (0.4-
0.8mm), and is hollow.  The bird’s wings are attached via hinges, and would have flapped while 
the rider was moving on horseback (cf. the rider with a bird-helmet on the Gundestrup 
Cauldron).  The helmet itself is of an iron La Tène ‘Montefortino’ type, badly damaged.  The 
impression from a (probably copper-alloy) panel, now lost, above the cheek-guard is preserved 
(much like G119); much of one cheek-guard is lost, the other is missing completely.  There are 
numerous holes and fractures in the bowl of the helmet.  As with most La Tène ‘Montefortino’ 
helmets, the crest of the helmet is topped by a knob which is a separate hollow piece affixed to 
the crest. 
Figure: 6.22 
 
Bibliography: Rusu (1969). 
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G119: ‘Montefortino’ Iron Helmet, La Tène 
Date: Fourth century 
Find Location: Umbria, Italy 
Material: Iron, with bronze decoration 
Dimensions: Height: 20.3cm; Width: 21cm; Thickness: 2.4mm to 2.9mm. 
Mass: 725g. 
Notes: Helmet has been significantly restored.  The crest-knob is, typical for La Tène 
‘Montefortino’ types, appears to be a separate element, affixed through a hole in the crest.  The 
helmet is decorated by copper-alloy plating applied above the cheek-guard and adorned with 
snaking line patterns, both on the cheek-guard, above it, and over the brow of the helmet.  The 
bowl of the helmet descends down slightly further in the back to provide protection for the neck. 
 
Bibliography: Schaaff (1988), 514-5, cat. K103.  Connolly (1981), 121. 
Current Location: Antikensammlung, Berling, Misc. 11910, L78. 
 
 
G120: ‘Coolus’ Coppy-Alloy Helmet, La Tène 
Date: (Museum Date): 120-50; (Paddock): Third to second century 
Find Location: Marne River, Coolus, France. 
Material: Copper Alloy 
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Dimensions: Length (total, external): 24.7cm; (internal): 21.3cm.  Width (external): 18.0cm; 
(internal): 21.3cm.  Height: 13.7cm.  Thickness: 0.5mm. 
Mass: 598g. 
Notes: Coolus-type helmet; Paddock (1993) classes this as a Type 1 Coolus helmet.  Helmet is in 
copper-alloy with a slight neck-guard in the back.  Just above the rim of the helmet, there are 
several lines of decorative punched dots.  Helmet lacks cheek-guards, may never have had any.  
Like all Coolus-types, lacks top-knob. 
 
Bibliography: Paddock (1993), 675. 
Current Location: British Museum ML 1734. 
 
 
G121: ‘Coolus’ Copper-Alloy Helmet, La Tène 
Date: Pre-200 
Find Location: River Po, near Cremona 
Material: Copper-Alloy 
Dimensions: Length (external): 24.0cm; (internal): 14.7cm.  Width (external): 19.0cm; (internal): 
18.2cm.  Thickness: (rim): 4mm; (bowl): 0.8-1mm.  Height: 15.5cm. 
Notes: Type III Coolus helmet, in Paddock (1993)’s typology.  Paddock associates this type with 
Gallic settlement in the Po River valley and bases his terminus ante quem of c. 200 on this. 
Cheek plates and the hinge-plates that would have secured them are both missing.  Significant 
damage, including two large holes in the helmet bowl.  Well made, but thin compared to 
contemporary Roman/Italian helmet types. 
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Bibliography: Paddock (1993), 680. 
Current Location: Museo Civico Cremona. 
 
 
G122: ‘Coolus’ Copper-Alloy Helmet, La Tène 
Date: 50-150 C.E. 
Find Location: Unknown, England? 
Material: Copper-Alloy 
Dimensions: Length (including neck-guard): 30.2cm.  Width: 17.0cm.  Height: 16.5cm. 
Mass: 514g 
Notes: Later form of the Copper-Alloy La Tène ‘Coolus’ helmet.  The helmet has a peaked cap 
with a long, flat neck-guard on the back.  Decorations on the neck-guard and above the ears are 
La Tène in style. 
 
Current Location: British Museum 1872,1213.2. 
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Iberian/Celtiberian 
I1: La Tène Sword, Celtiberian(?) 
Date: 300-100 
Find Location: Cerro de las Cabezas, Spain 
Material: Iron 
Dimensions: Length (total): 70.2; Width (max): 4.2cm; Thickness (max): 6mm. 
Mass 410g 
Notes: Imported Sword of the Late La Tène II or early La Tène III type, found in Southern 
Spain.  Sword is rusted, with some material loss on the blade, but intact and complete.  The disc-
button which would have ended the pommel is lost. 
 
Current Location: MAN Madrid 10482. 
 
 
I2: Antenna Sword, Celtiberian 
Date: Fourth or third century 
Find Location: Necrópolis de la Osera, Avila, Spain 
Material: Iron 
Dimensions: Length (total): 49.8cm; (blade): 40.5cm; (Hilt): 9.2cm.  Width (blade): 4cm; 
(guard): 5cm; (hilt): 2.4cm; (pommel): 4cm. 
Mass: 350g 
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Notes: Blade is waisted with an angular, rather than curved profile.  It has a metal hilt (rather 
than a tang), with a twin-antenna pommel.  Quesada Sanz (1997c), type VI. 
 
Current Location: MAN Madrid 1986/81/I/153/19A 
 
 
I3: Antenna Sword, Celtiberian 
Date: Third century 
Find Location: Necrópolis de Acrobriga, Monreal de Ariza, Spain. 
Material: Iron 
Dimensions: Length (total): 44cm.  Width (max): 6cm. 
Mass: 410g 
Notes: Celtiberian find-context.  Sword has some damage on the tip.  Slightly waisted, with an 
angular blade-shape.  It has a metal hilt (rather than a tang), with a twin-antenna pommel.  
Quesada Sanz (1997c), type VI. 
 
Current Location: MAN Madrid 1940/27/ARC/2455 
 
 
I4: Antenna Sword, Celtiberian 
Date: Fourth or third century 
Find Location: Necrópolis de la Osera, Avila, Spain 
Material: Iron 
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Dimensions: Length (total):41cm; (blade): 30.5cm; (hilt): 10.2cm.  Width (blade, max): 3.9cm; 
(hilt, max): 4.7cm. 
Mass: 430g 
Notes: Blade is only slightly waisted, in quite good condition.  It has a metal hilt, with 
decorations, and a twin-antenna pommel.  Quesada Sanz (1997c), type VI. 
Figure: 6.25 
 
Current Location: MAN Madrid 1986/81/VI/200/2 
 
 
I5: Falcata, Iberian 
Date: Museum note: ‘Possible 2nd-4th century’ presumably B.C.E. 
Material: ‘steel’ with wooden handle (restored?) 
Find Location: Unknown 
Dimensions: Length (total): 53.2cm; (blade): 43.2cm.  Width (blade): 6.7cm. 
Mass: 473.4g 
 
Current Location: Metropolitan Museum of Art, 32.75.260 
 
 
I6: Falcata, Iberian 
Date: Fourth or third century 
Find Location: Unknown 
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Material: Iron 
Dimensions: Length (total): 53.1cm; (blade): 41.6cm; (hilt): 11.5cm.  Width (blade): 5.8cm; 
(hilt): 6.2cm.  Thickness (blade): 8mm; (hilt): 1.8cm. 
Mass: 510g 
Notes: Falcata with a fully enclosed hilt.  The pommel is decorated with a feline motif.  Blade is 
single-edged and forward curving, with a double-fuller running along the back edge. 
Figure: 6.24 
 
Current Location: MAN Madrid 2003/114/51 
 
 
I7: Falcata, Iberian 
Date: Fourth or third century 
Find Location: Unknown 
Material: Iron 
Dimensions: Length (total): 58cm; (blade): 47cm; (hilt): 11cm; (guard): 6.5cm.  Width (blade): 
3.5-6.0cm; (Hilt): 2.5-6.5cm.  Thickness (blade): 0.2-0.6mm; (hilt): 1.8cm. 
Mass: 740g. 
Notes: Some corrosion to the tip of the weapon.  Blade is single-edged and forward curving.  
Fully enclosed hilt, with an animal motif on the pommel.  Fuller runs the length of the back edge. 
Figure: 6.24 
 
Current Location: MAN Madrid 10475 
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I8: Falcata, Iberian 
Date: Fourth or early third century 
Find Location: Cerro del Santuario, Basti, Spain 
Material: Iron 
Dimensions: Length (total): 60cm; (blade): 47cm: (hilt): 12.5cm.  Width (blade): 3.9-6.4cm. 
Mass: 530g 
Notes: Corrosion over the entire blade, but the weapon is almost entirely complete.  Blade is 
single-edged and forward-curving.  The hilt may have been fully enclosed, but the guard is now 
partially lost.  Horse-head shaped decorative motif on the pommel.  Fullers running the back 
edge of the sword. 
 
Current Location: MAN Madrid 1969/68/155/14 
 
 
I9: Falcata, Iberian 
Date: Fifth to third century 
Find Location: Unknown 
Material: Iron 
Dimensions: Length (total): 52.8cm (blade): 42.8cm; (hilt): 10cm.  Width (blade): 5.7cm; (hilt): 
4.7cm. 
Mass: 390g 
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Notes: Corrosion over the entire blade, but the weapon is almost entirely complete.  Blade is 
single-edged and forward curving.  The hilt may have been fully enclosed, but the guard is now 
partially lost.  Fullers running the back edge of the sword. 
Figure: 6.24 
 
Current Location: MAN Madrid 2003/114/52 
 
 
I10: Falcata, Iberian 
Date: Fifth to third century 
Find Location: Unknown 
Material: Iron 
Dimensions: Length (total): 52.5cm; (blade): 41.2cm; (hilt): 11.3cm.  Width (blade): 5.3cm; 
(hilt): 5.7cm.  Thickness (blade): 7mm; (hilt): 1.4cm. 
Mass: 530g 
Notes: Corrosion over the entire blade, but the weapon is almost entirely complete.  Blade is 
single-edged and forward curving.  The hilt may have been fully enclosed, but the guard is now 
partially lost.  Fullers running the back edge of the sword. 
 
Current Location: MAN Madrid 2003/114/55. 
 
 
Soliferrea 
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I11: Soliferreum, Iberian 
Date: Fourth or third century 
Find Location: Necrópolis de los Collados, Penibetica, Spain 
Material: Iron 
Dimensions: Length (listed, bent): 72.5cm; (point): 7.2cm. 
Mass: 220g 
Notes: Fragments of a soliferreum, tip preserved but some of the full length missing.  Some 
corrosion on the length of the weapon. 
 
Current Location: MAN Madrid 10645 
 
 
I12: Soliferreum, Iberian 
Date: Late third to early first century 
Find Location: Campamento de la Cerca, Aguilar de Anguita, Spain. 
Material: Iron 
Dimensions: None given. 
Mass: 90g 
Notes: Chronologically late example of a soliferreum, significantly damaged and incomplete.  
Perhaps 30-40cm of the iron haft of the weapon is preserved; the tip is also lost. 
 
Current Location: MAN Madrid 1940/27/AA/1786 
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I13: Soliferreum, Iberian 
Date: Fifth to early fourth century 
Find Location: Necrópolis de El Atillo, Aguilar de Anguita, Spain 
Material: Iron 
Dimensions: Length (listed, bent), 54cm; Thickness (max): 1.2cm 
Mass: 400g 
Notes: Soliferreum split into two fragments.  The length measurement provided in the museum 
information is simply a measurement from one end to the other of the longest fragment.  
Preserved elements appear to be c. 160cm long; tip is missing.  If the original weapon was c. 
195cm long and had a tip, it might have massed c. 550g or more. 
Figure: 6.33 
 
Current Location: MAN Madrid 1940/27/AA/19 
 
 
I14: Soliferreum, Iberian 
Date: Fifth or fourth century 
Find Location: Necrópolis de El Altillo, Aguilar de Anguita, Spain 
Material: Iron 
Dimensions: Length (listed, bent): 63cm; (tip): 7.3cm.  Thickness (haft): 1cm; (tip): 0.4 x 1.8cm. 
Mass: 600g 
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Notes: Original, unbent length c. 190cm.  Soliferreum, apparently complete, intentionally bent at 
three points. 
Figure: 6.32 
 
Current Location: MAN Madrid 1940/27/AA/3 
 
 
Shields 
I15: Boss, Caetra, Celtiberian 
Date: Fifth or early fourth century 
Find Location: Necrópolis de El Cuarto, Griegos, Spain 
Material: Bronze, Iron 
Dimensions: Diameter: 33.5cm x 37.0cm; Thickness: 2mm. 
Mass: Estimated (very approximately), c. 1224g. 
Notes: A large shield boss of Quesada Sanz (1997b), type IA.  It has been mounted on a wooden 
board for preservation and display, from which it cannot be removed.  The boss itself consists of 
a central dome, which would have covered the hand and the grip, over a flat circular metal sheet.  
And additional set of attachments are rivets through to allow for a strap for the shield to be hung 
when not in use.  The boss is decorated and would have been an elite product. 
Figure: 6.28 
 
Bibliography: Quesada Sanz (1997b), 508-11. 
Current Location: MAN Madrid, 1976/40/1. 
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I16: Boss, Caetra, Celtiberian 
Date: Late fourth to second century 
Find Location: Necrópolis de Viñas de Portuguí, Burgo de Osma-Ciudad de Osma, Spain 
Material: Iron 
Dimensions: Diameter (max): 16.2cm; (min): 11.7cm.  Depth (dome): 3.5cm.  Thickness: 2mm. 
Mass: 127.05g 
Notes: Iron shield boss of Quesada (1997b), type IIIA.  It is a circular iron shield boss, consisting 
of a hemispherical dome, which would have covered the hand and the grip, with a fairly small 
flat base, about 2cm wide, ringing the bottom of the dome.  The base has space for four rivets, 
the heads of three of which are preserved, equally spaced around the perimeter.  A single 
puncture hole is visible in the dome of the boss.  The metal is somewhat deformed, but the boss 
is overall intact. 
Figure: 6.30 
 
Current Location: MAN Madrid 24499. 
 
 
I17: Boss, Caetra, Celtiberian 
Date: Fourth to third century 
Find Location: Necrópolis de Quintanas de Gormaz, Gormaz, Spain 
Material: Iron 
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Dimensions: Diameter (max, outer flanges): 23cm; (min, inner hub): 5.7cm.  Height (hub, 
dome): 6cm.  Thickness: 1mm. 
Mass: 193.67g 
Notes: Iron shield boss of Quesada (1997b), type IIA.  Radial boss with a central dome and 12 
radial flanges, each of which terminates in a disk.  The dome is relatively low and has a puncture 
in the center, along with a ‘+’ decoration inscribed.  All of the radial flanges are bent, but only 
two are broken.  They terminate in disks with space for a rivet to attach them to the shield. 
Figure: 6.29 
 
Current Location: MAN Madrid: 1919/2/6. 
 
 
I18: Maniple, Caetra, Celtiberian 
Date: Mid-fourth century 
Find Location: Necrópolis de los Collados, Almedinilla (Cordoba), Spain. 
Material: Iron 
Dimensions: Length (wing): 6.4cm; (handle); 10cm.  Diameter (handle): 2.5cm. 
Mass: 31.29g (est. original: c. 55g) 
Notes: Part of an iron maniple for a caetra, Quesada (1997b), type IIA.  What remains is most of 
the handle and one of the wings, along with a ring for attaching a shoulder-strap for carrying the 
shield when not in use.  A single rivet in the remaining wing is preserved.  The maniple would 
have originally had a second wing. 
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Current Location: MAN Madrid 10505 
 
 
I19: Maniple, Caetra, Celtiberian 
Date: Early to mid-fourth century 
Find Location: Tomb 155, Cerro del Santuario, Basti, Spain 
Material: Iron 
Dimensions: Length (preserved): 20cm. 
Mass: 37.7g (est. original: c. 65g) 
Notes: Part of an iron maniple for a caetra, Quesada (1996b), type IIIA.  The maniple preserves 
most of the handle and all of one of the two wings; the other wing is completely missing.  
Roughly half of the preserved length is made up of one of the wings, which has a hole for a rivet, 
now lost.   
 
Current Location: MAN Madrid 1969/68/155/20 
 
 
I20: Maniple, Caetra, Celtiberian 
Date: Early to mid-fourth century 
Find Location: Tomb 155, Cerro del Santuario, Basti, Spain 
Material: Iron 
Dimensions: Length (preserved): 15cm. 
Mass: 57.87g 
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Notes: Part of an iron maniple for a caetra, type-classification not possible.  The only fully 
preserved element is the handle itself, both wings are nearly entirely missing.  The handle is 
quite thick and heavy, despite limited preservation. 
 
Current Location: MAN Madrid 1969/68/155/21 
 
 
I21: Maniple, Caetra, Celtiberian 
Date: Early to mid-fourth century 
Find Location: Tomb 155, Cerro del Santuario, Basti, Spain 
Material: Iron 
Dimensions: Length (preserved): 14.7cm 
Notes: Part of an iron maniple for a caetra, type-classification not possible.  Most of the handle 
and a small part of one wing are preserved. 
 
Current Location: MAN Madrid 1969/68/155/22 
 
 
I22: Maniple, Caetra, Celtiberian 
Date: Early to mid-fourth century 
Find Location: Tomb 155, Cerro del Santuario, Basti, Spain 
Material: Iron 
Dimensions: Length (preserved): 8cm. 
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Mass: 20.58g 
Notes: Part of an iron maniple for a caetra, type-classification not possible.  Most of a handle 
and part of one of the wings is preserved in two fragments.  The first fragment is the join 
between one of the wings and the handles; it is not clear how large the wing would have 
originally been.  The second fragment is part of the handle; original length also uncertain. 
 
Current Location: MAN Madrid 1969/68/155/23 
 
 
I23: Ring Assembly, Caetra, Celtiberian 
Date: Late sixth to early fourth century 
Find Location: Sepultura 12, Necrópolis del Val, Alpanseque, Spain 
Material: Iron 
Dimensions: Height: 3.8cm.  Length: 6.3cm.  Diameter (ring): 5.1cm. 
Mass: 27.79g 
Notes: Ring assembly for the ‘telamon’ shoulder strap of a caetra, Quesada Sanz (1997b) type 
VI.  Could have been paired with a smaller type V or I maniple, or with a handle made of organic 
material; larger maniples can include such ring assemblies as part of the wings.  One of what 
would have been at least two ring assemblies survives, consisting of a fastener attached to the 
shield to hold the ring, and the ring itself.  The fastener is missing the second connection to the 
shield board and is, perhaps, 3/4ths complete.  With two such assemblies in their original form, 
the total mass may have been c. 60-65g. 
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Current Location: MAN Madrid 1940/27/ALP/11. 
 
Armor 
I24: Pectoral, Iberian/Roman? 
Date: Mid-second century 
Find Location: Numantia 
Material: Bronze 
Dimensions Diameter: 17cm. 
Notes: Circular copper-alloy plate with 25 evenly spaced holes for attachment onto a textile or 
leather backing or harness.  There is a rectangular metal plate attached to the rim and supported 
by a reinforcing strip which does not seem to be part of the original item.  The plate is decorated 
by a central knob and a series of 17 grooves in concentric circles.  The exact suspension system 
of the plate is unclear.  While the plate has been associated with the Roman pectoral (Schulten 
(1927), Bishop and Coulston (2006), 63), it might also have been part of a Celtiberian disc-
harness.  The style of decoration (concentric ring designs with a central knob) is consistent (e.g. 
I28) with Celtiberian pieces, although these are chronologically much earlier. 
Figure: 4.32 
 
Bibliography: Schulten (1927), pl. 44.19, 50.  Bishop and Coulston (2006), 63-4. 
 
 
I25: Iron Disc Pectoral, Iberian 
Date: Fourth century 
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Find Location: Necrópolis de la Osera, Avila, Spain 
Material: Iron 
Dimensions: Diameter: 26cm.  Thickness 3mm. 
Mass: 470g 
Notes: Iron disc pectoral, paired with I26, probably as front and back plates in a harness.  It has a 
series of perforations around the edges to serve as the attachment points for some sort of backing 
(cf. I24).  Only minor damage to the plate, a small notch on the right side. 
 
Current Location: MAN Madrid 1986/81/VI/350/10 
 
 
I26: Iron Disc Pectoral, Iberian 
Date: Fourth century 
Find Location: Necrópolis de la Osera, Avila, Spain 
Material: Iron with bronze rivets. 
Dimensions: Diameter: 26cm.  Thickness 3mm. 
Mass: 470g 
Note: Iron disc pectoral, paired with I25, probably as front and back plates in a harness.  It has a 
series of perforations around the edges to serve as attachment points for some sort of backing.  
Some damage to the edges (three larger gouges).  Some of the bronze rivets in the perforations 
are preserved. 
 
Current Location: MAN Madrid 1986/81/VI/350/11. 
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I27: Bronze Disc, Iberian 
Date: Fourth century 
Find Location: Necrópolis de la Carretera, Aguilar de Anguita, Spain 
Material: Bronze 
Dimensions: Diameter: 15.8cm; Thickness 1.2mm. 
Mass: 140g 
Notes: Bronze disc, possibly an element in a disc-harness.  The disc is copper-alloy with silver 
leaf in a wheel design with a central knob.  There are seven perforations around the central knob 
where rivets would have joined it to an textile or leather backing.  Possibly a shoulder or thigh-
guard as part of a disc-harness, as with the smaller elements of I28. 
 
Current Location: MAN Madrid 1940/27/AA/76 
 
 
I28: Disc Harness, Iberian 
Date: Fifth or early fourth century 
Find Location: Necrópolis de El Altillo, Aguilar de Anguita, Spain 
Material: Bronze 
Dimensions: Total Height: 44cm.  Diameter (front plate): 18cm. 
Notes: Complete Disc harness, consisting of a front plate, a back plate, two smaller shoulder 
discs.  A pair of circular discs hang down from the front plate, and a pair of oval discs hang from 
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these.  Pairs of perforations in the rims of each disc provide for the elements to be connected.  
The decoration on the large discs consists of five knobs (one central, the others evenly spaced 
around it), surrounded by concentric circular depressions.  The smaller discs have only one 
central knob, surrounded by concentric circular grooves, very similar to I24. 
 
Current Location: MAN Madrid 1940/27/AA/314. 
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du monde méditerranéen, edited by J.-C. Couvenhes, S. Crouzet and S. Péré-Noguès, 
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L’École Française D’Extrême Orient 68 (1980): 5-116. 
 760 
 
Beresford, J.  The Ancient Sailing Season.  Leiden: Brill, 2013. 
 
Billows, R.  Kings and Colonists: Aspects of Macedonian Imperialism.  Leiden: Brill, 1995. 
 
Bishop, M. C. “The Evolution of Certain Features.”  In Roman Military Equipment: The 
Accoutrements of War, Proceedings of the Third Roman Military Equipment Research 
Seminar, edited by M. Dawson, 109-39.  Oxford: BAR International Series, 1987. 
 
Bishop, M. C. and J. C. N. Coulston.  Roman Military Equipment: From the Punic Wars to the 
Fall of Rome.  2nd ed.  Oxford: Oxbow, 2006. 
 
Blackman, D.  “The Athenian Navy and Allied Naval Contributions in the Pentecontaetia.”  
GRBS 10 (1969): 179-216. 
 
Blair, C.  European Armour, circa 1066 to circa 1700.  London: B.T. Batsford, 1958. 
 
Blundell, S.  Women in Ancient Greece.  Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995. 
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Déchelette, J.  Second âge du fer ou époque de La Tène.  Vol. 4 of Manuel d’archéologie 
préhistorique celtique et gallo-romaine.  Paris: Picard, 1927. 
 
Derow, P, A. Erskine and J. Quinn.  Rome, Polybius and the East.  Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2015. 
 
DeWitt, N.J.  “Pseudolus and Hannibal’s Elephant.”  CP 36, no. 2 (1941): 189-190. 
 
Deyber, A.  Les Gaulois en Guerre: Stratégies, tactiques et techniques Essai d’histoire militaire 
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Gällnö, S. “(In)visible Spinners in the Documentary Papyri from Roman Egypt.”  In Making 
Textiles in Pre-Roman and Roman Times: People, Places, Identities, edited by M. Gleba 
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